Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has challenged the concurrent findings of conviction and the modified sentence for the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter called as ‘the Act’ for short). 2. The petitioner herein is the accused, whereas, the respondent is the complainant, who submitted his complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and it is averred that the complainant lent loan to the accused and on 2.4.2001 the accused issued a cheque for Rs.2 lakhs for the discharge of the debt due by him to the complainant and when the said cheque was presented for encashment, it returned with an endorsement of insufficient funds. The complainant issued the notice. It is said to have been refused. In the circumstances, a complaint came to be filed to initiate action against the petitioner for the aforesaid offences. 3. The complainant examined PW.1 and got marked the documents Exs.P.1 to P.9. The statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The accused is examined as DW.1. The Trial Court after hearing the counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the material on record convicted the petitioner for the aforesaid offences and ordered to pay fine of Rs.4,00,000/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days, in addition to the substantial imprisonment for three months. Aggrieved by the conviction and the sentence, the petitioner approached the Sessions Court in Crl.A.No.102/2007. The said appeal came to be allowed in part and the sentence was modified directing the petitioner to pay fine of Rs.2,50,000/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Against these orders, the present revision petition has been filed. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no documents have been produced to substantiate the contention that an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- was due and therefore, in the absence of any material on record to prove amount due, the Courts below committed an error in awarding the conviction. 5. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no documents have been produced to substantiate the contention that an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- was due and therefore, in the absence of any material on record to prove amount due, the Courts below committed an error in awarding the conviction. So also, he submits that there are no averments in the complaint as regards the date, month and year of the transaction and it is not even stated as to the nature of the loan transaction and further, he submits that the complainant has not examined the postal official to prove the refusal of the notice and that Exs.P.7 and 8 the account extracts cannot be relied upon as they have not been proved by examining the author of the documents. It is his further submission that even as could be seen from Ex.P.7, the amount due is less than the cheque amount and therefore, there was no necessity for the accused to issue cheque for Rs.2,00,000/-. Furthermore, he contends that Ex.P.1 was given as a security at the time of the loan transaction and that the same has been misused by the complainant for making a false claim. On these grounds, he has sought for setting aside the conviction and the sentence. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and also the signature and there is a presumption under Section 139 of the Act about the existence of the debt and the liability to pay the amount mentioned in the cheque towards the dues. He also submits that though DW.1 admits in the evidence that he has got the documents to prove the transaction and it is not produced and therefore, the presumption is not rebutted. On these grounds, he has sought for the dismissal of the petition. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision reported in ILR 2008 KAR 3635 (K. Narayana Nayak vs. Sri. M. Shivarama Shetty) wherein the cheque was issued as a security and this Court held that the issuance of the cheque is not for the discharge of the existing debt. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision reported in ILR 2008 KAR 3635 (K. Narayana Nayak vs. Sri. M. Shivarama Shetty) wherein the cheque was issued as a security and this Court held that the issuance of the cheque is not for the discharge of the existing debt. On this aspect of the matter, it is relevant to note that DW.1 in his evidence at the first instance states that the cheque was given to Shahji and later, makes a submission that it was given to Harish. So this admission goes to establish that the said cheque was not given to the complainant at the time when the loan transaction was entered into between the parties. As could be seen from Ex.P.7 the loan transaction is dated 20-4-1997 is was repayable in 42 monthly installments. The total amount of loan was Rs.2,37,700/-, H.P. amount was Rs.1,35,000/-, Finance Charges Rs.82,700/- and Rs.20,000/-towards insurance premium of the vehicle purchased under hypothecation. Though the petitioner has not made a specific averment in the complaint regarding the date of the loan transaction, Exs.P.7 and P.8 reveal these all requirements and though these two documents are the notarized certified copies, a perusal of the evidence of PW.1 (the complainant) reveals that documents admitted in evidence were marked with the consent of the respondent (the accused). Therefore, the Courts below have looked into Exs.P.7 and 8 and come to the conclusion that the accused was due for some amount from the loan advanced. 8. These are the proceedings wherein summary procedure is adopted and the documents have been marked with the consent. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1971 SC 1865 (Sait Tarajee Khimchand and others vs. Yelamarti Satyam and others), the Apex Court held that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with its proof. The Apex Court was taking into consideration the proceedings in a suit, but as the proceedings on hand being a summary trial, the principle cannot be accepted and when the respondent himself admitted the document in evidence and it was marked with consent. I do not think that there is any error on the part of the Courts below in accepting Exs.P.7 and 8 as the account extracts of the loan transaction between the parties. 9. I do not think that there is any error on the part of the Courts below in accepting Exs.P.7 and 8 as the account extracts of the loan transaction between the parties. 9. The learned counsel also relied upon AIR 1961 SC 1277 (Devidas and other vs. Shrishailappa and others) wherein the Apex Court considering the non production of an important document held that in case if it is not produced when it was not in his possession or power, no adverse inference could be drawn. To mean, in case, if a document is in possession of a party and if the same is not produced, adverse inference could be drawn against a person who was to produce the document. This decision was referred because the complainant did not produce the loan documents and therefore, the learned counsel sought for drawing adverse inference. But when the loan transaction is admitted, so far as the particulars of the loan transaction is concerned, the complainant has produced Exs.P.7 and P.8 which reveal the date of transaction, the number of installments etc., in addition to the amount which has been paid by the respondent towards the dues. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the principle cannot be extended to the facts on hand. 10. The counsel also relied upon the decision reported in I (2006) BC 273 of Kerala High Court wherein the Court considering the provisions of Section 138 explanation held that the debt or the liability to be recovered must be legally enforceable. Furthermore, he relied upon ILR 2006 KAR 3579 (M/s. Sathavahana Ispat Ltd. Vs. Umesh Sharma and another) wherein the cheque was issued in respect of uncertain future liability and it was held that the provisions of Section 138 of the Act are not attracted. He further relied upon 2004 Cri.L.J. 2812 (Abdul Raheem vs. U.P.K. Mohammed Haneefa) wherein the High Court of Madras considering the reference ‘Legally Enforceable Debt’ held that the story of hand loan put forth by complainant was improbable in view of strained relations between parties and pendency of litigations between the parties and that the Court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal. He also relied upon the decision reported in ILR 2007 KAR 2709 (M. Senguttuvan vs. Mahadevaswamy) wherein it is held by this Court that the presumption can be rebutted even on the basis of the facts elicited in the cross examination of the complainant as has been done in the present case and the judgment of acquittal was affirmed. 11. The petitioner in his evidence is not certain as to whom he had issued the cheque and though he admits in the evidence that he has the documents to prove the satisfaction of the loan, he does not produce any documents and when he is in possession of the said documents, it was his duty to produce the same before the Court and therefore, the non production of the material documents leads to an adverse inference. If really, an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- was not due and he has fully paid the amount of loan that was advanced, there was no impediment for him to produce the documents and convince the Court that he has no liability under law. So, merely because in the complaint the date of the transaction has not been furnished with the particulars, the documents produced at Exs.P.7 and P.8 clearly lead to an inference that the accused has not discharged the liability as a whole and as on 4.3.1999, he was due for an amount of Rs.1,39,839/-. It may be that because of the non payment of the installments, the interest accrued on the loan as on the date of the cheque i.e. 2.4.2001 the amount to an extent of Rs.2,00,000/- was due to the complainant. In such circumstances, when the cheque has been issued for Rs.2,00,000/-, I am of the opinion that there is no error on the part of the Courts below in holding that the complainant was entitled to legally enforceable debt of Rs.2,00,000/- as on 2.4.2001. 12. So far as the notice which has been issued by the complainant under Ex.P.3 and an envelope which was returned to the complainant was produced at Ex.P.5. There is a postal endorsement to the effect that the notice was refused. Apart from this endorsement, there are no other endorsements on Ex.P.5 and Ex.P.6 envelope is accompanied by the acknowledgement and it has been returned to the complainant. Having sent the notice by registered post, the complainant has produced Ex.P.4 the postal receipt. There is a postal endorsement to the effect that the notice was refused. Apart from this endorsement, there are no other endorsements on Ex.P.5 and Ex.P.6 envelope is accompanied by the acknowledgement and it has been returned to the complainant. Having sent the notice by registered post, the complainant has produced Ex.P.4 the postal receipt. Under the provisions of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, when a notice is sent to the correct address, the presumption is that it is gone to the person to who it is addressed and when there is a postal endorsement that it has been refused, a presumption has to be raised in the business transactions of the postal office. If in fact, the respondent had not refused the notice, which was sent by the complainant, it was for the respondent to examine the postal officials to rebut the presumption. Though the learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court reported in 2000 (4) Kar.L.J. 145 (Ramanna Vs. T. Jayaprakash), the principle does not apply to the facts on hand, as there was no such refusal of notice in such case. 13. This is a revision against concurrent findings of conviction and the scope is limited unless an error apparent on the face of the record is brought to the notice of this Court or that there is inherent defect in the appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties. So, in the context of this principle and the facts stated above, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has not made out any such grounds to warrant interference in the conviction and sentence ordered by the Court below. In that view of the matter, I proceed to pass the following; Order The revision petition is dismissed. No costs.