JUDGMENT 1. THOUGH the life of law is said to be experience and not logic, law is not altogether illogical. One of the questions that falls for consideration in this matter is the meaning of the mundane expression "unless the context otherwise requires" that appears in almost every statute. 2. THE facts need to be noticed in brief. THE appellant purchased a Zen motor vehicle and got the same insured at the initial stage. After obtaining a permit for operating the vehicle as a tourist cab, a further policy was secured. THE relevant clause in the subsequent insurance policy provided, inter alia, that as regards the driver, he had to hold an effective driving licence at the time of any accident and should not have been disqualified from holding or obtaining such a licence. The writ petitioner-appellant's vehicle met with an accident where the driver was, unfortunately, killed. Upon the claim being made, a terse reply emanated from the insurance company, the material part whereof reads as follows:- "This Contravenes the Driver's Clause of the Policy." 3. THE appellant approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a two-fold grievance. THE first line of attack against the impugned decision of the insurance company was that it contained no reasons. THE second part related to the arbitrary action in rejecting the claim. 4. THE appellant has referred to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and, in particular, to Sections 2(21), 2(33), 2(35) and 2(47) thereof to demonstrate the meaning of a light motor vehicle, the definition whereof includes a transport vehicle; and to bring about the distinction between a private service and a public service vehicle. THE appellant has also referred to Sections 10 and 14 of the Act. Section 10 lays down the form and contents of a driving licence. Section 14 stipulates certain conditions as to the currency of driving licences in certain cases. The simple argument that the appellant makes is that in view of the definition of light motor vehicle in Section 2(21) of the Act, and such definition including a transport vehicle within its fold, wherever the expression "light motor vehicle" is used in the Act, a transport vehicle ought to be read to be included therein. 5. The simple argument that the appellant makes is that in view of the definition of light motor vehicle in Section 2(21) of the Act, and such definition including a transport vehicle within its fold, wherever the expression "light motor vehicle" is used in the Act, a transport vehicle ought to be read to be included therein. 5. THE order impugned finds that in view of the expression "unless the context otherwise requires" that is found in the opening line of the definition section, the definition of a particular expression cannot be mechanically imported into every part of the statute where the expression defined figures. There was every reason for such an approach to be adopted. Section 10 of the 1988 Act incorporates an amendment made in the year 1994 whereby clause (e) was substituted in sub-section (2) thereof. Clause (d) refers to a light motor vehicle and clause (e) refers to a transport vehicle. It is evident, therefore, that the distinction between a light motor vehicle and a transport vehicle was incorporated by way of the 1994 Amendment to the statute. If thence one travels to Section 14 of the Act, there is a distinction in sub-section (2) thereof between a licence required for driving a transport vehicle and a licence for driving any other vehicle; in the one case, the licence is granted for a period of three years; in the other case, the licence is granted for a period of 20 years. 6. WHEN a word or expression is defined in a statute, its meaning has to be understood to be that ascribed to it in the definition. That is the general rule. But such ordinary rule cannot be carried to an inflexible absurdity. It is for such reason that the expression "unless the context otherwise requires" is used in the opening limb of definition sections contained in statutes. The implication of the expression is that ordinarily the defined word or expression will bear the same meaning as assigned to it in the definition; but a particular context may necessitate the exact definition to not be substituted for the word or expression used later in the statute. The implication of the expression is that ordinarily the defined word or expression will bear the same meaning as assigned to it in the definition; but a particular context may necessitate the exact definition to not be substituted for the word or expression used later in the statute. After the preliminary chapter in the 1988 Act that covers the first two sections, the second chapter is entitled "Licensing of Drivers of Motor Vehicles." In the classification of the licences made under Section 10(2) of the Act, the licences for light motor vehicles and those for transport vehicles figure separately. That is the first pointer toward a distinction as to licences made in the chapter in respect of light motor vehicles and transport vehicles. 7. SECTION 14 of the Act, which is part of Chapter II thereof, spells out the duration of licences issued to drive motor vehicles. Sub-section (2) thereof creates two broad classes-the first governs licences to drive transport vehicles and the residuary clause governs other lincences. It is evident that clause (a) of sub-section (2) carves out the conditions as to the currency of a driving licence issued or renewed under the Act in respect of transport vehicles. SECTION 14 of the Act, which governs this case, in its material part, does not refer to a light motor vehicle. Even more fundamental than understanding the expression "unless the context otherwise requires," is that in the matter of driving licences for transport vehicles, a completely separate niche has been made out in SECTION 14 of the Act. Since it is evident in this case that the licence granted in favour of the driver was for a period of 2G years, which is covered by the residuary clause (b) of SECTION 14(2) of the Act, such licence was obviously not issued in respect of a transport vehicle. 8. A light motor vehicle may or may not be a transport vehicle. A transport vehicle, similarly, may or may not be a light motor vehicle. A truck is surely a transport vehicle but scarcely a light motor vehicle. The definition of light motor vehicle in the Act refers to the category of the machine; the definition of a transport vehicle relates to the use of the vehicle. A transport vehicle, similarly, may or may not be a light motor vehicle. A truck is surely a transport vehicle but scarcely a light motor vehicle. The definition of light motor vehicle in the Act refers to the category of the machine; the definition of a transport vehicle relates to the use of the vehicle. The distinction in Section 14(2) of the Act is on the basis of the use of the vehicle, not on the basis of the capacity of the machine. The other ground that the writ petitioner carried to Court was that there was virtually no reason given for rejecting the claim. That, strictly speaking, is incorrect since the letter of rejection specified that the reason for refusal was in the driver not possessing an effective driving licence. It is true that the insurance company's letter did not refer to the statute, but it is not as if the ground furnished for rejection is unintelligible. Reasons should disclose the application of the mind to the matter and the basis for the decision in such a case. The cryptic allusion to the driver not possessing an effective driving licence and the reference to the consequential contravention of the policy are adequate and cover the entirety of the ground on which the rejection is founded. The length of an order does not necessarily tell upon its quality, the purport of the contents does. A ten-page letter may contain no reasons for the decision reflected therein, but a solitary sentence in another case may suffice. Prolixity is no virtue and there is often more merit in parsimony. 9. THERE is no reason to interfere with the order under appeal but there remain a couple of other points that have been taken by the appellant. 10. THE appellant says that notwithstanding it being strenuously argued before the learned Trial Court that the letters 'PDL' appearing in the reverse of the driver's licence implying that the driver possessed a valid professional driving licence, such aspect of the matter was not considered in the judgment impugned. THE learned Judge noted that in the context of the discussion which preceded that recording, it was not necessary to enter upon the argument made in furtherance of the expansion of the letters 'PDL'. THE learned Judge noted that in the context of the discussion which preceded that recording, it was not necessary to enter upon the argument made in furtherance of the expansion of the letters 'PDL'. Let us assume that 'PDL', indeed, stood for "professional driving licence." It is possible that a career chauffeur obtains a licence for the purpose of plying vehicles. The driver may offer his service for a private vehicle or for the purpose of driving a transport vehicle. In either case, the driver would be a professional driver and it would not tell upon the quality of the rejection by the Insurance Company as to whether the driver in the particular case was a professional driver or not. 11. THE second aspect which has been canvassed" by the appellant is that at the time when the car met with the accident, there was only the driver in the car and, as such, even if the other rigours as to a transport vehicle were attached to the vehicle, at the relevant time it ought to have been regarded merely as a light motor vehicle. Such argument cannot be accepted. THE status is once decided and does not depend on varying circumstances. If a motor vehicle is registered as of a particular class, that such motor vehicle did not have a paying passenger at the time of the accident would not alter the category assigned to it. It may then be said that a taxi is not a taxi when it answers the call to pick up a customer and becomes a taxi only when the customer clambers aboard. That would be stretching logic to absurdity. 12. THE order under appeal calls for no interference. THE respondents have not been called upon. M.A.T. No. 062 of 2010 stands dismissed without any order as to costs. It is made clear that the only matter that has been considered is as to the alleged arbitrary rejection of the claim by the insurance company.