JUDGMENT 1. This second appeal has been filed at the instance of plaintiff against the judgment of reversal. The trial Court decreed the suit but in appeal the same has been reversed. 2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this second appeal lie in a narrow compass. Suffice it to say that a suit for declaration of bhumiswami right and injunction has been filed by the plantiff in respect of certain agricultural lands, the description whereof is mentioned in the plaint and which is the subject-matter of the suit. According to the plaintiff, the suit property was owned by one Chunnilal and having bequeathed the same by will dated 19.3.1961 in favour of plaintiff, after his death he became bhumiswami of the suit property and eventualy he submitted an application for his mutation in the revenue record which was ordered to be mutated. According to the plaintiff he is possessing the suit property as bhumiswami and further because defendants 1 and 2 are trying to interfere in his possession hence, a suit for declaration and injunction was filed by him on 21.6.1983. 3. The defendants 1 and 2 denied the plaint averments by filing a joint written statement and also filed counter claim praying to declare them as bhumiswami of the suit property on account of adverse possesssion and further the order of mutation dated 9.7.1982 be set-aside. 4. The learned trial Court framed necessary issues and after recording the evidence of the parties decreed the suit. 5. The First Appeal which was filed by defendants has been allowed by the impugned judgment and decree. In this manner this second appeal has been filed by plaintiff. 6. This Court on 10.8.1998 admitted the second appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. “Whether the finding of the first appellate Court below regarding Will is perverse being contrary to the evidence on record? and 2. “Whether the appellate Court below erred in law in decreeing counter claim of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of adverse possession when as per their own showing they were in possession of the suit property in pursuance of an agreement of sale? 7. and 2. “Whether the appellate Court below erred in law in decreeing counter claim of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of adverse possession when as per their own showing they were in possession of the suit property in pursuance of an agreement of sale? 7. The contention of Shri O.P. Solanki learned counsel for the appellant is that having admitted the photocopy of the will in evidence by learned trial Court, the learned First Appellate Court erred in substantial error of law in holding that Will is not proved. According to learned counsel the copy of the Will Ex. P/1 is dated 19.3.1961 and is a 30 year old document, and, therefore, under section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act it shall be presumed that not only it was executed but the same was also duly attested, therefore, it was not incumbent upon the plaintiff to get the attesting witnesses examined to prove the execution and the attestation of the Will. 8. By addressing substantial question of law No. 2 it has been contended by learned counsel for appellant that defendants have not perfected their bhumiswami right by adverse possession for two reasons, firstly there is no proper pleadings of defendants in that regard in their counter claim and secondly the plea has not been proved by placing cogent evidence on record. On these premised submissions it has been put forth by learned counsel for the appellant that this appeal be allowed and by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned First Appellate Court judgment and decree passed by learned Trial Court be restored. 9. Combating the aforesaid submissions put forth by learned Counsel for the appellant Shri Shastri, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that cogent reasons have been assigned by learned First Appellate Court holding that the Will is not proved and further defendants have perfected their title on the suit property by adverse possession. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed. Regarding substantial question of law No. 1. 11. The contention of learned Counsel for the appellant is that because a copy of the document of Will Ex. P/1 dated 19.3.1961 was tendered in evidence of plaintiff on 4.1.1995, therefore, 30 years were completed and hence from the date when the copy of the document Ex. Regarding substantial question of law No. 1. 11. The contention of learned Counsel for the appellant is that because a copy of the document of Will Ex. P/1 dated 19.3.1961 was tendered in evidence of plaintiff on 4.1.1995, therefore, 30 years were completed and hence from the date when the copy of the document Ex. P/1 was tendered in evidence the period of limitation of 30 years should be computed. The arguments so advanced by learned counsel for the appellant at the first blush appears to be quite attractive, however, on being scrutinized at length the same is found to be devoid of any substance. Indeed, the presumption envisaged under section 90 of the Evidence Act would be applicable to the document itself and not for its copy. Since the document itself was not tendered in the evidence, there cannot be any presumption for a copy of the document. 12. According to me the photocopy is neither a primary nor secondary evidence and in this regard decision of this Court Ramesh Verma and others etc. v. Smt. Lajesh Saxena and others etc. AIR 1998 MP 46 may be seen. Apart from this even if it is stretched to the extent to bring the photocopy of Will Ex. P/1 within the sphere of secondary evidence, the plaintiff was required to satisfy the ingredients to section 65 of the Evidence Act which speaks about the secondary evidence. The plaintiff was further required to examine the person who took out the photocopy of the original. This is very much essential because, it is a matter of common knowledge that by putting another writing written on a separate paper if that paper is kept upon the original document and photocopy is taken out, the said photo copy cannot be said to be a true photocopy of the original document. Further it cannot be said that Ex. P/1 is the photocopy of the original Will because it is very easy to take out a photocopy from a document which itself was a photocopy. Therefore, if the person who took out the photocopy Ex. P/1 would have been examined, it could have been ascertained whether he took out the photocopy Ex. P/1 from the original document, or Ex. P/1 is the photocopy of the document which itself was a photocopy and further whether the document of which the photocopy Ex. Therefore, if the person who took out the photocopy Ex. P/1 would have been examined, it could have been ascertained whether he took out the photocopy Ex. P/1 from the original document, or Ex. P/1 is the photocopy of the document which itself was a photocopy and further whether the document of which the photocopy Ex. P/1 was taken out was not at all tampered. Hence, I am of the view that in absence of tendering in the evidence a document of Will itself, a photocopy Ex. P/1 cannot take place of the original document and, therefore, section 90 is not applicable and the finding of learned First Appellate Court in that regard is, thereby, affirmed. 13. The substantial question of law No. 1 is thus, answered that Will on the basis which the plaintiff is claiming bhumiswami right is not at all proved and the finding of learned First Appellate Court in regard to the Will is not perverse. Regarding substantial question of law No. 2. 14. On going through the written statement of the defendants this Court finds that they have also claimed the counter claim in respect to the suit property pleading therein that they have acquired bhumiswami right by way of adverse possession on the suit property because they are possessing the suit property for last 35 years from the time of their predecessors as owner and in the knowledge of plaintiff, and hence they have perfected their bhumiswami right by adverse possession. In this regard para 5 of the pleading of the counter claim which is on page No. 4 of the written statement may be seen. The written statement in which counter claim has been claimed was filed on 23.8.1984 and if the period of 35 years is computed it comes to year 1949. True the defendants have not filed revenue record from the year 1949 but certainly they have filed revenue record w.e.f. 1969-70 to 1983-84. In the revenue record Ex. D/1, D/2 and D/9 the possession of defendant’s predecessor Mangilal is mentioned and thereafter defendant’s possession has been mentioned. The evidence of defendants is also that they are possessing the suit property for more than 12 years. I do not find any merit in the contention of learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant that defendant’s witness Yukub Khan says that he is possessing the suit property since 1968-69. The evidence of defendants is also that they are possessing the suit property for more than 12 years. I do not find any merit in the contention of learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant that defendant’s witness Yukub Khan says that he is possessing the suit property since 1968-69. On bare perusal of his statement this Court finds that he is the ‘bataidar’ of the defendants and, therefore, his possession would be for the defendants. 15. I have gone through the reasoning arrived at by learned First Appellate Court holding that defendants 1 and 2 have perfected their bhumiswami right by adverse possession on the suit property. The findings are based on correct appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record and are pure finding of fact which cannot be interfered in this appeal. 16. The substantial question of law No. 2 is thus answered that learned First Appellate Court did not err in law in decreeing counter claim of respondents 1 and 2 on the basis of adverse possession although they have shown that they were in possession of the suit property in pursuance to the agreement of sale. 17. Resultantly, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with cost. Counsel fee according to the schedule if pre-certified.