JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. This petition is directed against the order dated 13.5.2010 passed by the Labour Court, Bhavnagar in Recovery Application No.17 of 2005. 1.1 By the impugned order, the Labour Court has directed the petitioner – Bhavnagar Municipality {hereinafter referred to as “the Municipality”} to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs.52,800/- being the amount short-paid towards pension i.e. the difference between the amount payable and the amount actually paid towards pension for a period of 44 months (difference @ Rs.1,200/- p.m. from October 2001 to February 2005) with interest at 9% to be calculated from 7.3.2005. 2. So far as the factual aspects are concerned, it emerges from the record that the respondent herein was a permanent employee of the petitioner - Municipality. 2.1 Since the respondent reached the age of superannuation fixed under the Rules, he was declared superannuated, w.e.f. 30.9.2001. 2.2 As per applicable Rules, upon his retirement, the respondent was entitled for pension. Before the payment of pension could actually commence upon completion of the formalities required to be finalised for payment of pension, an industrial dispute, which was raised by the respondent while he was in employment and was registered as Reference (IT) No.48 of 1996, came to be decided by the Industrial Tribunal by award dated 8.11.2001. 3. It emerges from the record that the award was neither implemented nor challenged by the petitioner for almost 4 years. 4. Thus, on the premise that the employer i.e. the petitioner - Municipality had not complied the award dated 8.11.2001 rendered in Reference (IT) No.48 of 1996, the respondent preferred a Recovery Application before the Labour Court, Bhavnagar under Section 33(C)(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). The said Recovery Application was registered as Recovery Application No.17 of 2005. 5. The claim in the said recovery application was based on the findings recorded in and the directions given vide said award dated 8.11.2001 passed by the Tribunal in Reference (IT) No.48 of 1996 and it was claimed that though the applicant i.e. present respondent was entitled for payment as per the directions in the award, the payment was not made by the municipality and his pension amount was not fixed and computed as per the learned Tribunal's directions vide award dated 08.11.2001. On such premise, necessary and appropriate directions to make the payment, with interest at the rate of 18% p.a., were prayed for. 6. The said Recovery Application No.17 of 2005 was contested by the petitioner - Municipality. It was claimed by the petitioner before the Trial Court that the Industrial Tribunal had directed, by virtue of the award dated 8.11.2001 passed in Reference (IT) No.48 of 1996, to make the payment to the respondent as per the pay scale applicable to the post of Slum Superintendent and that though the pay scale applicable to the post of Slum Superintendent was Rs.5,500 - 9,000/- and the municipality had accordingly made the payments to the petitioner and also fixed/computed his pension accordingly, however, the respondent was claiming the alleged dues on the basis of altogether different pay scale i.e. the scale of Rs.8,000 - 13,500 which was unjustified. 7. In view of the fact that in entertaining and deciding the recovery application filed under Section 33(C)(1) of the Act, the Labour Court (in the State of Gujarat, the appropriate/State Government has by notification bearing No.KH/SH/1060/IDA-1166-Juh. dated 25.10.1967 [and other similar subsequent notifications in respect of other learned Labour Court for different areas] directed that the learned Labour Court shall exercise the powers under subsection (1) of Section 33) has limited jurisdiction, the Court considered and examined the respondent's claim in light of the findings recorded in and directions passed vide the award dated 8.11.2001. The learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that the learned Industrial Tribunal had held that the pay scale applicable (at the relevant time) to the post of Slum Superintendent was Rs.8,000-13,500/- and that the respondent was short paid Rs.1,200/- p.m. (for 44 months) towards pension. The Labour Court, therefore, directed present petitioner – Municipality to pay the difference towards the pension amount for 44 months at the rate of Rs.1,200/- p.m. and also directed to pay the difference with interest @ 9.% p.a. (instead of 18% as prayed for). Hence, present petition. 8. Heard Mr.Munshaw, learned advocate for the petitioner – Municipality and Mr.Vasavada, learned advocate for the respondent workman. At the request of and with the consent of the learned advocates for the parties, the petition is taken out for final decision. Hence, present petition. 8. Heard Mr.Munshaw, learned advocate for the petitioner – Municipality and Mr.Vasavada, learned advocate for the respondent workman. At the request of and with the consent of the learned advocates for the parties, the petition is taken out for final decision. 8.1 Mr.Munshaw, learned advocate for the municipality submitted that at this stage, the municipality does not dispute that the respondent was working as a Slum Superintendent, but, at the relevant time, actually, the respondent was in employment as Head Clerk and was discharging additional duties of Slum Superintendent for which he was being paid additional allowances. The petitioner's counsel submitted that upon considering the evidence on record, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that the claimant before the learned Tribunal was working as Slum Superintendent and the said finding has not been challenged until now by the municipality. He submitted that the municipality has by now accepted the said finding and it has even acted accordingly. He also stipulated that the municipality accepts the conclusion regarding respondent's post and designation and does not dispute the finding and the decision of the Industrial Tribunal as regards the respondent's designation. He, as a clarification also submitted that the municipality has preferred the petition by admitting and accepting the respondent's status and designation as of “Slum Superintendent”. Mr. Munshaw, learned advocate, however, hastened to add that the dispute, however, is with regard to the applicable pay scale and with regard to the total amount payable towards pension. Mr. Munshaw, learned advocate, submitted that the conclusion, recorded by the learned Tribunal in its award dated 08.11.2001 regarding the applicable pay scale in respect of post of Slum Superintendent was, and is, erroneous and that the learned Labour Court, while deciding the recovery application, should not have relied upon the findings and conclusions recorded by the learned Tribunal in the award and/or the learned Labour Court should not have proceeded on the basis of the directions passed by the learned Tribunal vide its award dated 08.11.2001. 8.2 According to the petitioner's counsel, the Labour Court has erred in calculating, the payable amount on the basis of the learned Industrial Tribunal's finding that the pay scale of Rs.8,000 – 13,500 was applicable to the post of Slum Superintendent whereas it should have been calculated on the basis of Rs.5,500 – 9,000. 8.2 According to the petitioner's counsel, the Labour Court has erred in calculating, the payable amount on the basis of the learned Industrial Tribunal's finding that the pay scale of Rs.8,000 – 13,500 was applicable to the post of Slum Superintendent whereas it should have been calculated on the basis of Rs.5,500 – 9,000. He submitted that the record placed before the Court as well as before the Controlling Authority in separate proceedings pertaining to respondent's claim for gratuity clearly demonstrates that even on the date on which the respondent got superannuated, he was being paid wages in the pay scale of Rs.5,500 – 9,000 and that therefore, the premise on which the Labour Court has proceeded is unjustified, unsustainable and contrary to the record. 8.3. Per contra, Mr.Vasavada, learned advocate for the respondent workman, has submitted that the Labour Court has taken into account the findings recorded and the directions issued by the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (IT) No.48 of 1996 and the calculations have been made on that basis and that therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned order in the Recovery Application suffers from any error. Mr.Vasavada, learned advocate, further submitted that while considering a Recovery Application filed under Section 33(C) of the Act, the learned Labour Court cannot take into account anything other than adjudicated order or duly finalised settlement and in present case also, the learned Labour Court could not have taken into account any other material. He also submitted that the order in question is plainly based on the direction given by the Tribunal in he award and not and that any other detail or other material have not been considered at all and that there is no error or illegality in the order. 9. I have considered the record and the rival submissions. 10. At the outset, some undisputed facts may be noted. 10.1 It is not in dispute that the respondent had raised an industrial dispute, which was referred for adjudication by way of Reference (IT) No.48 of 1996. 10.2 It is also not in dispute, rather it is a matter of record, that during the proceedings of the Reference No.48 of 1996 before the learned Tribunal on behalf of he petitioner municipality one Mr. Rameshbhai Karmanbhai Jagrani was examined as its witness i.e. the municipality had offered oral evidence of said Mr.Jagrani as its witness. 10.2 It is also not in dispute, rather it is a matter of record, that during the proceedings of the Reference No.48 of 1996 before the learned Tribunal on behalf of he petitioner municipality one Mr. Rameshbhai Karmanbhai Jagrani was examined as its witness i.e. the municipality had offered oral evidence of said Mr.Jagrani as its witness. 10.3 It is also a matter of record, recorded by the learned Tribunal in para-3 of its award, that said Mr.Jagrani i.e. the witness of the petitioner municipality had stated that “it is true that the concerned workman was possessing the qualification for the post”. The said witness had also admitted, in his oral evidence/deposition, that the workman concerned in the reference had taken over the charge of the said post of Slum Superintendent. The said witness Mr.Jagrani also admitted, as recorded by the learned Tribunal in para-13 of the award, that the pay scale applicable for the post of Head Clerk and the pay scale applicable to the post of Slum Superintendent were different. The pay scale to the post of Head Clerk was Rs.5,500-9,000/- and the pay scale applicable to the post of Slum Superintendent was Rs.8,000-13,500/-. 10.4 It is also not in dispute that the said reference proceedings pertaining to Reference (IT() No.48 of 1996 came to be decided and culminated in the award dated 8.11.2001 passed by the Industrial Tribunal. 10.5 It is also not in dispute that in the said award the Industrial Tribunal conclusively decided that (a) the respondent was working as a Slum Superintendent and (b) he was entitled for the pay scale and all benefits applicable to the post of Slum Superintendent. 10.6 It is also undisputed that having reached such conclusion, the Industrial Tribunal directed the petitioner Municipality to calculate and pay salary and other benefits and all consequential benefits to the respondent w.e.f. 1.7.1996 and also directed that all such benefits should be calculated and paid considering the respondent on the post of Slum Superintendent. Differently put, the benefits and amount payable to the respondent was to be calculated paid by taking into account the pay scale and benefits payable to a “Slum Superintendent”. 10.7 It is also not in dispute that the Tribunal held (in view of admission by the petitioner's witness) in the award, that the pay scale applicable to the post of “Slum Superintendent” was Rs.8,500-13,000/-. 10.7 It is also not in dispute that the Tribunal held (in view of admission by the petitioner's witness) in the award, that the pay scale applicable to the post of “Slum Superintendent” was Rs.8,500-13,000/-. 10.8 It is also not in dispute that since November 2001, i.e. for almost 10 years by now, the said findings, the award and the direction have not been challenged by the petitioner – Municipality and they have thus, attained finality. 10.9 It is also not in dispute that the Labour Court took into consideration the aforesaid findings and directions of the Tribunal regarding the applicable pay scale and passed the award on that basis. 10.10 It is also not in dispute that the premise and base of the learned Labour Court's order in the Recovery Application is the findings of fact recorded by and the consequential directions issued by the learned Tribunal in the award and any other material has not been taken into account by the learned Labour Court. 11. In this background, it is required to be noted that when the Labour Court entertains (the State/appropriate Government having directed, by the earlier referred notification dated 25.10.1967 and other subsequent notifications that the Labour Court shall exercise the powers under sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the Act), a Recovery Application preferred under Section 33(C)(1) of the Act, the Court can exercise the jurisdiction in the nature of execution proceedings and the Labour Court is to act as an Executing Court and does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute. 11.1 So as to appreciate the aforesaid aspects and rival contentions raised by the contesting parties, it is, at this stage, appropriate to take into account the provision under Section 33 (C) (1) of the Act, which reads thus :- “33(C) (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of [Chapter VA or Chapter VB] the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue : Provided that ....... Provided further that ........” 11.2 It can be seen from the aforesaid provision that when the learned Labour Court entertains an application filed under Section 33(C)(1) of the Act and exercises the power conferred by virtue of the said provision, it has to examine the claim in light of the terms of the settlement and/or directions contained in the award on which, the application is based and it has to proceed on the premise of adjudicated, crystallized and ascertained right and has to merely to compute the benefit in terms of money. Differently put, the learned Labour Court does not act, or does not exercise powers, as the Court of original jurisdiction or the Court of first instance who would adjudicate the claim and decide the propriety and justification and/or maintainability of the dispute. The said authority and jurisdiction rests with the learned Labour Court to whom, the reference under Section 10 of the Act is made by the appropriate Government. The application under Section 33(C)(1) of the Act must be for enforcement of existing right. In the proceedings of the Recovery Application, the learned Labour Court cannot go behind and/or travel beyond the settlement or the award. 11.3 Consequently, neither legality nor justification of the directions contained in the award or the terms of the settlement can be examined by the learned Labour Court while entertaining an application under the said provision. In the proceedings of the Recovery Application, the learned Labour Court cannot go behind and/or travel beyond the settlement or the award. 11.3 Consequently, neither legality nor justification of the directions contained in the award or the terms of the settlement can be examined by the learned Labour Court while entertaining an application under the said provision. 11.4 If, upon examination of the material on record, the learned Labour Court finds that the payment required to be made by award-debtor in favour of the award-creditor is not made and/or is not properly computed then the Court would compute the benefit in terms of money and would pass appropriate order directing the party in default to make the payment and though the learned Labour Court may interpret, for the purpose of ascertaining its correct meaning and scope, the directions contained in the award or the terms of the settlement, it cannot modify or substitute the relevant directions in the award or the terms in the settlement and/or it cannot hold that the base for passing the directions ought to have been different. 12. Accordingly, in the present case, the Labour Court, while entertaining and deciding the recovery application No.17 of 2005 filed by the present respondent, was required to decide the maintainability and justifiability of respondent's claim in light of the award dated 8.11.2001 in Reference (IT) No.48 of 1996. 12.1 It was, thus, neither permissible nor justified for the Tribunal to go behind and/or to travel beyond the said award or to take into account any material other than the said award, more so when the findings and directions contained in the award were not, and have not been, challenged by the petitioner until now, and they had attained finality when the impugned order in the Recovery Application came to be passed. 12.2 And that is precisely what the learned Labour Court has done in present case. 12.3 The petitioner is aggrieved by such decision of the learned Labour Court. It is the case of the respondent that if the order in present case i.e. Recovery Application No.17 of 2005 is examined, then it emerges that the learned Labour Court has taken into account, the base on which the final directions were passed. 12.3 The petitioner is aggrieved by such decision of the learned Labour Court. It is the case of the respondent that if the order in present case i.e. Recovery Application No.17 of 2005 is examined, then it emerges that the learned Labour Court has taken into account, the base on which the final directions were passed. 12.4 So as to examine the said aspect it would be appropriate to revert to the award dated 08.11.2001 by the learned Tribunal in the Reference No.48 of 1996. The free transaction of the operative portion of the said award 08.11.2001 in Reference No.48 of 1996 reads thus :- “The reference is partly allowed. The Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation is hereby ordered to grant the pay scale of the post of Slum Superintendent to the concerned labourer Shri Sushilchandra Sanghvi with effect from 01.07.1996 and to pay the salary and other consequent benefits in that regard within 30 days from the publication of this award and further ordered that the amount paid to him as charge allowance of the post of Slum Superintendent during this period, shall be deducted and the first party corporation shall pay Rs.500/- to the second party labourer towards cost.” 12.5 For making the said award and passing the aforesaid final direction by virtue of the said award, the learned Tribunal had examined the material on record which included the (earlier referred) deposition/oral evidence of Mr.Jagrnai (i.e. the witness of the petitioner municipality), who had stated, inter-alia, in his deposition that the pay scale applicable to the post of Head Clerk and Slum Superintendent were different and that the concerned workman (i.e. present respondent) possessed the qualification for the post of Slum Superintendent. The free translation of the relevant part of the deposition/oral evidence of said Mr.Jagrani which came to be considered by the learned Tribunal in para-13 of its award reads thus : “Shri Rameshbhai Karmanbhai Jagrani, the Labour Officer, for the corporation has given deposition on oath vide Exh:60. He also admits in it that the concerned labourer is the employee of the institution and at present, discharging duty as a Head Clerk. The promotion channel is from lower category to higher category in higher pay scale. He also admits in it that the concerned labourer is the employee of the institution and at present, discharging duty as a Head Clerk. The promotion channel is from lower category to higher category in higher pay scale. The promotion is given from the cadre of Junior Clerk to Senior Clerk, from the cadre of Senior Clerk of Sub Inspector, from the cadre of Sub Inspector to Inspector, from the cadre of Inspector of Head Clerk, from the cadre of Head Clerk to Assistant Superintendent and thereafter, on the post of the Superintendent. As stated by Shri Jagrani, the pay scale of every post is different. The promotion is given on the basis of seniority and merit. The pay scale of Head Clerk is Rs.5,500-9,000/-. The pay scale of Superintendent is Rs.8,000-13,500/-. It is true that the concerned labourer of this case was holding all the qualifications for the said post.” 12.6 If one looks at the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in the reference (IT) No.48 of 1996, it emerges that after analysing the entire documentary and oral evidence on record, the Industrial Tribunal had come to the conclusion and had recorded the findings that (a) the respondent was possessing qualification for being promoted as Slum Superintendent; and (b) that the pay scale applicable to the post of Head Clerk and Slum Superintendent were different; and that (c) the pay scale applicable to the post of Head Clerk was Rs.5,500 – 9,000 while the pay scale applicable to the post of Slum Superintendent was Rs.8,000 – 13,500. 13. It was on the premise of and strength of the said finding in the award that the respondent filed the Recovery Application No.17 of 2005 and claimed, contending that despite such clear finding in the award his pension amount was calculated by taking into account the pay scale of Rs.5,500 – 9,000/- instead of taking into account the pay scale of Rs.8,000 – 13,500/- as per the direction in the award and accordingly, that there was short-payment. 14. 14. In background of such facts and circumstances, when the learned Labour Court took up the Recovery Application No.17 of 2005 for adjudication, it was required to adjudicate the applicant's claim in light of the findings recorded by the learned Industrial Tribunal in the award dated 08.11.2001 in Reference No.48 of 1996 and the final direction given by the learned Tribunal in the said award. The learned Labour Court could not have gone beyond the findings recorded and direction given by the learned Tribunal. The learned Labour Court also could not have arrived at different conclusion regarding applicable pay scale for the post of Slum Superintendent and could not have arrived at independent different conclusion, which can be, ordinarily, arrived at after adjudication of claim and rights in light of evidence. Therefore, the contention of the municipality that the learned Labour Court should independently consider the issue and should decide the issue about the applicable pay scale to the post of Slum Superintendent, afresh, could not have been accepted and allowed by the learned Labour Court. It would, otherwise, amount to adjudication of the rights and obligations. 15. It is pertinent to note that the said recovery application was filed 4 years after the award i.e. some where in 2005. Meaning thereby, almost 4 years had rolled by when the respondent preferred the recovery application. During the said 4 years, the Municipality had not taken any action as regards the Tribunal's conclusion about applicable pay scale. Thereafter, the proceedings continued for 5 years. During the said 5 years' period also, i.e. for almost 9 years, the Municipality did not take any action with regard to Tribunal's conclusion pertaining to the applicable pay scale. Now, almost after 9 years, the petitioner seeks to contend that the Tribunal's conclusion about the applicable pay scale recorded in the award was erroneous and that therefore, in the Recovery Application, the Labour Court ought not have relied on the said conclusion but should have independently considered the issue and should have decided afresh the pay scale applicable to the post of “Slum Superintendent”. 15.1 When the award has attained finality such contention is not available to the petitioner and the petitioner – Municipality now cannot be heard to say that the pay scale of Rs.8,000 – 13,500 is not applicable to the post of Slum Superintendent. 16. Mr. 15.1 When the award has attained finality such contention is not available to the petitioner and the petitioner – Municipality now cannot be heard to say that the pay scale of Rs.8,000 – 13,500 is not applicable to the post of Slum Superintendent. 16. Mr. Munshaw, learned advocate for the petitioner, has attempted to contend that the pay scale to the post of Slum Superintendent is of Rs.5,500 – 9,000. However, in the award dated 8.11.2001, on the basis of the evidence obtaining on its record, particularly the evidence of Mr.Jagrani, the learned Tribunal has expressly recorded and concluded that the said pay scale of Rs.5,500 – 9,000 was applicable to the post of Head Clerk whereas the pay scale applicable to the post of Slum Superintendent, even according to the petitioner's aforesaid witness, was Rs.8,000 – 13,500. It is not in dispute that for calculating the payable amount, the Labour Court has taken into account the said findings of the learned Tribunal regarding the applicable pay scale i.e. the pay scale of Rs.8,000 – 13,500. The said conclusion was not challenged by the municipality in any proceeding, during and for last 9 years. 17. It is not the case of the petitioner that the computation of the amount which the learned Labour Court has directed the petitioner to pay is erroneous and such amount would not be payable even if the pay scale of Rs.8,000-13,500/- is held to be the pay scale applicable to the post of Slum Superintendent. Differently put, considering the pay scale of Rs.8,000-13,500/- as the applicable pay scale there is no error in computation of the amount with the learned Labour Court has directed the petitioner to pay the respondent. The contention about the error in computation of the amount payable to the respondent may hold good only if the petitioner's contention regarding applicable pay scale (i.e. pay scale of Rs.5,500-8,000/- and not Rs.8,000-13,500/- is applicable) is upheld, and not otherwise. However, as aforesaid, when the municipality has not challenged the award until now, the said finding of the Tribunal; which has attained finality, cannot be held to be incorrect. 18. However, as aforesaid, when the municipality has not challenged the award until now, the said finding of the Tribunal; which has attained finality, cannot be held to be incorrect. 18. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the Labour Court has committed any error in calculating the amount payable to the respondent workman towards difference of pension inasmuch as undisputedly the respondent has been paid the pension by calculating the amount by taking into account the pay scale of Rs.5,500 – 9,000 instead of applying the pay scale of Rs.8,000 – 13,500. In view of the said undisputed position, the Labour Court is justified in directing the petitioner – Municipality to pay difference of amount payable towards pension. 19. So far as the direction to pay the amount with interest at the rate of 9% is concerned, I am not inclined to interfere with the said direction inasmuch as despite the requests by the respondent workman in the intervening period and despite the pendency of the recovery application for almost 5 years, the petitioner – Municipality did not consider it appropriate to act as per the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal and to make necessary payments accordingly, in spite of the fact the award was not challenged and it had attained finality. The petitioner – Municipality did not make the payment despite pendency of recovery application for almost 5 years. During the hearing, it has been informed that even as of now, i.e. even after rendition of the order dated 13.5.2010, the respondent workman is being paid the pension on the basis of pay scale of Rs.5,500 – 9,000 and even after almost 6 months since the order in the recovery application came to be passed, the petitioner – Municipality has not taken any corrective measures. Under the circumstances, I am not inclined to disturb the direction regarding payment of interest on the different amount. 20. Before parting, it is necessary and appropriate to mention, (more particularly since the petitioner has raised objections against the directions granting interest) that after retirement in 2001, the respondent had to undergo the litigation for getting proper fixation of pension amount. 20. Before parting, it is necessary and appropriate to mention, (more particularly since the petitioner has raised objections against the directions granting interest) that after retirement in 2001, the respondent had to undergo the litigation for getting proper fixation of pension amount. Despite the fact that the learned Tribunal passed the award in November-2001, the petitioner municipality did not act as per the award, for almost four years and made the respondent again pass through the process of litigation in form of Recovery Application. It is well settled that pension is not booty and yet the respondent had to pass through three rounds of litigation (including present petition). The respondent, undoubtedly, cannot be expected to pay even a rupee more than what would be legally payable towards pension. However, once, the Court of competent jurisdiction determined the payable amount then, it was wholly unjustified for the petitioner to not to take steps and appropriately fix the pension amount as per the learned Tribunal's award, more particularly, when it had not taken any steps to challenge the award. The inaction on the part of the petitioner required the respondent to pass through two rounds of litigation's. To say the least, the approach of the local authority exhibits in sensitivity towards the plight of retired employees and it saddens the Court beyond expression. 21. As an upshot of the above discussion, the petition fails and it deserves to be rejected. Accordingly, the petition is rejected. Notice is discharged. Petition rejected.