Judgment : PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J This appeal is directed against a judgment and/or order dated 27th July, 2010 passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge refusing the writ petition which was filed by the writ petitioner challenging the order dated 19th September, 2006 passed by the Collector of Excise (North), Calcutta declining their prayer for grant of licence to run a foreign liquor off shop at 244/A, Vivekananda Road, Kolkata – 700 006. It is not in dispute that the said writ petition was placed before the Court on 3rd February, 2009 after lapse of 2 ½ years. The writ petitioner in the application tried to give an explanation making averments in the paragraphs 22 to 25 of the said writ petition. It appears that the averments which was made in the said writ petition to overcome the delay in filing such writ petition where it has been stated that the steps could not be taken by the writ petitioners since the mother was admitted in a nursing home and was under the intensive care unit for several days and furthermore the mother was also required to have the constant check up and as such no step was taken by the writ petitioners in challenging the said order dated 19th September, 2006. It further appears that the averments have been made in the petition that the petitioner contacted the learned Advocate-on-Record and the impugned order would only show that the writ petitioners tried to overcome the delay of making an averment in the writ petition which is nothing but to devoid all particulars. Therefore, it appears that the Hon’ble Single Judge did not accept the submissions made in the said paragraphs and held that there is no explanation was given by the appellant/writ petitioner which can give them a right to condone the delay in filing the said writ petition. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Single Judge did not give any credence to the submissions made in the said petition. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Single Judge did not give any credence to the submissions made in the said petition. His Lordship further held that since the appeal is maintainable from the said order passed by the Collector before the Commissioner of Excise within a particular period mentioned in the statute and no steps for preferring such appeal was taken by the appellant/writ petitioners and the said order has become final and furthermore in respect of the vacancy it has been created a third party rights having acquired, cannot be ruled out on the ground that application for grant of licence is also an old one for two decades. Hence, His Lordship dismissed the writ petition. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 27th July, 2010 this appeal has been filed by the appellant. The leaned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/writ petitioner tried to impress on us that the State Government in exercise of its power under Rule 13(1) of the 1993 Rules (The West Bengal Excise Selection of New Sites and grant of licence for retail sale of spirit and certain other intoxicants) Rules 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1993 Rules’). It is the case of the appellant/writ petitioner that on 12th May, 2000 the Deputy Secretary, respondent No. 3 in the writ petition intimated the respondent No. 2 that the State Government has approached the said premises offered by the appellant for grant of a new licence for setting up of a foreign liquor off shop. Such intimation is a product of an advertisement published by the State Government by a notification dated 4th February, 2000 by holding lottery in terms of Rule 13(1) of the 1993 Rules. It appears that the four writ petitions were moved before this Court challenging the notification issued by the State Government by resorting the said offer by the appellant, premises NO. at 244/A, Vivekananda Road, Kolkata – 700 006, its vicinity have forms or societies firm of unemployed youth. The said notification was challenged by the writ petitioners and had applied for licence and those writ petitions were disposed of by a common judgment by the High Court dated 9th October, 2001. at 244/A, Vivekananda Road, Kolkata – 700 006, its vicinity have forms or societies firm of unemployed youth. The said notification was challenged by the writ petitioners and had applied for licence and those writ petitions were disposed of by a common judgment by the High Court dated 9th October, 2001. The question which was decided by the Court that whether the reservation of the sites for unemployed youth have been made or not and the Court was pleased to passed the following order : “For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned notice published in the Newspaper dated July 28, 2000 is so far as the respective sites of the petitioners and their vicinity have been reserved for unemployed youth, the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. In the result, the two writ applications are allowed in part quashing and setting aside that portion of the impugned notice published on July 28, 2000 whereby the premises No. 16, Prem Chand Boaral Street (W.P. No. 748 of 2001) and 244A, Vivekananda Road (W.P. No. 749 of 2001) have been reserved for unemployed youth.” His Lordship further directed the respondents authority to start the selection process afresh by inviting applications in accordance with law in respect of the sites and vicinity thereof. An appeal was preferred from the said order and/or judgment dated 9th October, 2001. The said appeal was disposed of on 11th June, 2004 by the Hon’ble Division Bench where the Court held as follows : “Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are also of the view that regulation 9(14) of the 1993 regulations will apply in respect of applications made prior to the cut off date which had been forwarded by the Excise Commissioner to the State Government. Whether the same had been done or not is a matter of fact which can only be clarified by the State Government and its authorities to inform the appellants writ petitioners of the fate of their earlier application filed in 1986 within one month from the date of communication of this order. If any reasoned order has been passed, the same is to be duly communicated to the appellants petitioners. If any reasoned order has been passed, the same is to be duly communicated to the appellants petitioners. Since the petitioners have not succeeded in the lottery, we make no further observations regarding the selection that may have been made in respect of the site for which such lottery had been held as far as the writ petitioners appellants are concerned.” By an order dated 18th September, 2006 the respondents authority rejected the application made by the appellant for grant of licence for running a foreign off shop of premises No. 244/A, Vivekananda Road, Kolkata – 700 006. No step was taken nor any appeal was preferred before the Excise Commissioner by the appellant/writ petitioner excepting on 3rd January, 2009 the appellant challenged the order of filing a writ petition being W.P. No. 98 of 2009 which was dismissed by the Hon’ble Single Judge on 27th July, 2010. Our attention has been drawn to the following decisions to overcome the delay in approaching this Court by the appellant : 1. The Moon Mills Ltd. Vs. M.R. Meher, President Industrial Court Bombay & Ors. reported in AIR 1967 SC 1450 ; 2. G.P. Doval & Ors. Vs. Chief Secretary Govt. of U.P. & Ors. Reported in (1984) 4 SCC 329 ; 3. State of M.P. & Ors. Vs. Nandalal Jaiswal & Ors. reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566 ; 4. Shiv Das Vs. UOI reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 . On such point we have noticed that the Court has power to condone the delay but the matter is still within the discretion of the Court and such discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. The Supreme Court in Shiv Das (Supra) where the Court held as follows : “6. Normally, in the case of belated approach writ petition has to be dismissed. Delay or laches is one of the factors to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission o the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission o the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the mater is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, PC at pl. 239 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and Maharashtra SRTC v. Baalwant Regular Motor Service. Sir barnes had stated : “Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.” In the given facts it appears to us that the appellant/writ petitioner has not been able to explain the delay satisfactorily. In our considered opinion when the Writ jurisdiction is invoked the facts as has been stated on behalf of the State that the creation of third party rights in the mean time is an important factor and, therefore, on such ground we do not find that a case has been made out by the writ petitioner to overcome the delay as stated in the petition. The point which has also been stated by the respondent before us that there is an alternative remedy and the writ petitioner has not exhausted the said remedy. Therefore, Court should not entertain in the matter which has been specifically pointed out before us that time to file appeal from the said impugned order has also expired and the appellant/writ petitioner has also applied before the Court to have an order which the appellant could not have got directly. Mr. Debdutta Sen, leaned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant on the question of alternative remedy cited the following decisions : 1. A.V. Venkateswaran, Colelctor of Customs, Bombay Vs. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani & Ors. reported in AIR 1961 SC 1506 ; 2. Whirlpool Corpration Vs. Registrat of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors. reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 ; 3. Ram & Shyam Company Vs. State of Hariyana & Ors. reported in (1985) 3 SCC 267 ; 4. State of Tripurar Vs. Monoranjan Chakraborty & Ors. reported in (2001) 10 SCC 740 . We do not join issue with the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in those decisions. We must admit that we are conscious that the rule is that a party who applies for issue of a high prerogative writ should, before he approaches the Court, have exhausted other remedies open to him under the law is not one which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petition under Article 226 or to deal with it, but is rather a rule which Courts have laid down for the exercise of their discretion. In A.V. Venkateswaran Case (Supra) of Five-Judges Bench the Court held that if a petitioner has disabled himself from availing himself of the statutory remedy by his own fault in not doing so within the prescribed time, he cannot certainly be permitted to urge that as a ground for the Court dealing with his petition under Article 226 to exercise its discretion in his favour. It appears to us that in the instant case the appellant/writ petitioner has failed to avail the statutory remedy for their own fault and, therefore, he cannot be permitted to urge that before the Court to exercise its discretion in his favour to entertain the writ petition. In the given facts and the reasons as we have stated hereinabove, we do not find that a case has been made out by the appellant to entertain this appeal. We do not find any merit in this appeal. Hence, this appeal is dismissed.