JUDGMENT : K. Kannan, J. The appeal is against the dismissal of petition u/s 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. On a day, six months after the institution of petition, when the matter was called before the Court for eliciting the consent of both parties for a divorce by mutual consent, the wife gave a statement as follows: I do not want to make the statement today u/s 13-B of HMA. 2. On this statement, the Court found that there had been no consent of spouse and proceeded to dismiss the petition. 3. Learned Counsel for the appellant-husband states that the Trial Court could not have dismissed the petition without eliciting the definite case of withdrawal of consent by the wife. A mere statement that she was not prepared to make a statement on that day, could not have been taken as meaning that she was unwilling for divorce by mutual consent and, therefore, the order passed by the Trial Court was erroneous. 4. If the case had stopped when the statement was made by wife suggesting that there was a case of pre-verification by the wife or there was definitely nothing possible for a Court to infer that she was not willing to stand by the averments in the petition for divorce by mutual consent, the appeal could have been perfectly maintained but the appellant himself has filed a subsequent event viz., of an application filed by the wife u/s 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking for restitution of conjugal rights. Even the application makes a reference to the fact that the application u/s 13-B was filed by both the parties but later, the petition was dismissed and therefore, she was moving an application for restitution of conjugal rights. 5. Although the appeal would normally be examining only the validity or correctness of order passed, here a subsequent event which has taken place itself proved the fact that the wife was not willing to stand by the terms of compromise entered between them for securing a divorce by mutual consent. All subsequent events are not relevant and there are several decisions coming in various jurisdictions as to when subsequent event could still be taken note of by the Appellate Court (please see Parents Association of Students v. MA. Khan, 2009 (1) SLT 152 relevance of subsequent events in contempt proceedings; Dulari Exports Ltd. and Others Vs. All subsequent events are not relevant and there are several decisions coming in various jurisdictions as to when subsequent event could still be taken note of by the Appellate Court (please see Parents Association of Students v. MA. Khan, 2009 (1) SLT 152 relevance of subsequent events in contempt proceedings; Dulari Exports Ltd. and Others Vs. H.S.I.D.C. Ltd. and Others, (2009) 14 JT 45 relevance of subsequent event for equitable reliefs; A. Mohammed Basheer Vs. State of Kerala and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 159 in contractual matters; Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. Machado Brothers & Others, AIR 2004 SC 2093 subsequent event that renders suit in fructuous; Ramesh Kumar Vs. Kesho Ram, AIR 1992 SC 700 in rent control proceedings; State of West Bengal and Others Vs. Kaberi Khastagir and Others, AIR 2009 SC 1437 in family and personal law). These judgments are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. In this case although the dismissal of the petition was not appropriate by the Court, for, it was passing an order without definite evidence that she was withdrawing from consent, the subsequent fact that the wife had filed an application for restitution of conjugal rights itself would show that she was not willing to stand by agreement for divorce by mutual consent. If she has withdrawn the consent, it cannot be a ground for husband to contend that there had been a compromise between the parties and amounts have been paid for securing a divorce. It is possible under law that a person after agreeing to a divorce by compromise to resile from the same within 6 months and so long as there is no decree already passed, an action taken by the wife for restitution will be taken as an event that shows that she was unwilling to stand by the compromise and unwilling to suffer a decree of divorce by mutual consent. 6. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed although on different grounds than what was referred to in the impugned judgment. 7. The observation made by this Court relating to the inconclusive nature of effect of compromise is confined to the proceedings for divorce by mutual consent only and the appellant husband is entitled to rely on any of the terms of the alleged compromise in defence in the application for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the wife against him, if the law so permits.