JUDGMENT : Manjula Chellur, J. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Sr. Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. It is not in dispute that the appellant herein is engaged in the execution of works like construction and other civil works. For the work of the appellant, certain articles like Excavators covered under Chapter 84 of the Customs Tariff Act were Imported by the appellant. Initially these goods were to be re-exported after use. However, the petitioner/appellant cleared the goods by filing the Bill of Entry for home consumption and paid duty at the rate applicable, in accordance with the Notification No. 27/2002 hat was in existence at the relevant point of time. It is not in dispute that the goods were not re-exported within the time limit stipulated in the Notification 27/2002. Therefore, proceedings came to be initiated for recovery of duty and interest. At that stage, the appellant herein approached the respondents authorities seeking for extension of the benefit of the Notifications No.27/2008, which came to be issued on 01/03/2008. It is also not in dispute that the claim of the appellant was considered only for one Bill of Entry, which came within the time limit prescribed under the substituted Notification 27/2008 and rejected the claim in respect of the other Bills of Entry. Apparently, no appeal provided under the statute came to be filed by the appellant. Subsequently, he filed WP(C) 38168 of 2010, challenging the order at Ext. P6. 3. According to the learned Single-Judge, the order at Ext. P6 ought to have been challenged before the statutory appellate authority; having failed to do so, the appellant cannot approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking writ jurisdiction. In other words, once remedy open to them was not availed, he is not allowed to approach this Court to get the relief in respect of a time barred cause of action. 4. The appellant is before us challenging judgment of the learned Single Judge. According to him, the writ petition is maintainable even with regard to a claim which is time barred, as long as he would be able to establish that the order is arbitrary in nature for want of consideration of the controversy raised by him. 4. The appellant is before us challenging judgment of the learned Single Judge. According to him, the writ petition is maintainable even with regard to a claim which is time barred, as long as he would be able to establish that the order is arbitrary in nature for want of consideration of the controversy raised by him. According to him, right from the beginning, he insisted upon the authorities to extend the benefit of the notification 27/2008, as the same is a continuation of the notification 27/2002; therefore, the authorities concerned ought to have specifically answered the said question raised by the appellant. In the absence of the same, he has a right to challenge the said order on the ground that the crucial aspect of the matter was never considered by the authorities; therefore, arbitrariness has resulted in. 5. So far as the second argument is concerned, according to him, the interpretation of the statute indicates how the word "substitute" has to be considered. In the present case, notification 27/2002 was substituted by notification No. 27/2008. Therefore, it has to have a retrospective application and the case of the appellant ought to have been considered by the respondent authorities while considering his claim at Ext. P6. He relies upon two decisions. So far as maintainability of the writ petition, he refers to the decision in Panopharam v. Union of India, 2010 KHC 6221 : 2010 (3) KLT 149 : ILR 2010 (2) Ker. 909 and so far as interpretation of the Statute, he relies upon the decision in Government of India v. Indian Tobacco Association, 2005 KHC 1400 : 2005 (187) ELT 162 : 2005 (7) SCC 396 : AIR 2005 SC 3685 . 6. It is well settled that when a party has a remedy by way of an appeal under a Statute and if he has not chosen to approach the statutory appellate-authority, the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Panopharam’s case, the challenge was with regard to difference in service tax that came to be imposed. In Panopharam’s case, the challenge was with regard to difference in service tax that came to be imposed. Their Lordships, while considering the question raised as to whether a party-whose remedy by way of appeal underline Statute is barred by period prescribed thereunder, can invoke jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, opined that a cause barred by limitation itself cannot be a reason to oust jurisdiction under Article 226. They further held that in spite of cause of action before statutory authority being barred by limitation, one can invoke jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution provided on the issues raised in the writ petition ordinarily the statutory authority could not have given any relief. 7. The case of the appellant is not that if he had approached the statutory appellate authority, he could not ordinarily get the relief at the hands of the statutory authority because the authority had no power or jurisdiction to grant such relief. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion this decision is of no assistance to the appellant. 8. Then coming to the second argument that what the substituted Notification would import. The case referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellant (Indian Tobacco Association's case) was a case where certain benefit was extended to the persons who were in the business of manufacture of Tobacco goods. One place in Andhra Pradesh - viz., Guntur was not included in the list of Ports of Registration. Therefore, the controversy was whether the subsequent inclusion of the place Guntur in the list of Ports would have retrospective or prospective effect. When such a situation came up for consideration, after referring to sub-clause (iv) of clause (2) of the notification concerned, especially the proviso to said notification, where the Commissioner of Customs had power by special order and subject to such conditions permitting imports and exports from any other seaports, airports, inland container depots or through a land Customs Station other than the one included in the list of Ports, Their Lordships proceeded to opine that without inclusion of any place in the notification as Commissioner could exercise such power, the intention of issuing the notification including the place Guntur has to be considered as having retrospective effect, in other words, by the very notification, the Commissioner of Customs could include any place in the list of Ports. Therefore, their Lordships proceeded to opine that the intention of the subsequent notification including Guntur would only lead to conclusion even otherwise it has retrospective effect. In the present case, the benefit of the notification 27/2008 is sought by the appellant herein contending that as on the date of proceedings initiated against him, the notification 27/2008 was already in existence and therefore he must be given the benefit thereunder. 9. The notification 27/2008 (Ext.P4) has three Columns. Column No. 1 pertains to description of goods, Column No. 2 is - about Limitation and Conditions to secure the benefit extended under the Notification and Column No. 3 is about Extent of exemption available to the parties. So far as first and second columns, there is no modification or change. In Column No.3 with regard to period of re-exporting of the imported goods, the time limit came to be substituted by virtue of the notification 27/2008 thereby the time limit prescribed under the notification 27/2002 came to be extended. Therefore, according to the appellant, the extended period of exemption as provided under Column 3 of the notification 27/2008 ought to have been extended to him as Column. 3 is nothing but substitution of Column 3 of the notification 27 of 2002. By referring to Indian Tobacco Association's case, we cannot import the principle held by their Lordships in the said case. The situation is entirely different in the present case. 10. In the present case, obviously, there is no indication that such leniency is vested with the authorities concerned to extend the time seeking exemption under Column No.3. In other words, what was envisaged under the notification 27/2002 had to be exercised within the time limit permitted under the notification and beyond that no authority could have extended the time limit. Only by virtue of notification 27/2008 for re-export of the goods, depending upon the period within which they wanted to re-export after importing the goods, certain exemptions were given and this would be applicable depending upon the time at which the import was done and also the fact within what time the re-export was sought by the party concerned. Apparently, except one Bill of Entry, he could not have asked for the relief as per the substituted notification 27/2008, as the time limit which was applicable to the appellant herein was as per the notification 27/2002. Apparently, except one Bill of Entry, he could not have asked for the relief as per the substituted notification 27/2008, as the time limit which was applicable to the appellant herein was as per the notification 27/2002. The words used in this notification does not, lead to any conclusion that the intention of issuing this Notification was with retrospective effect. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion, reading the notification from any angle, one cannot opine that this notification has any retrospective effect. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that none of the contentions raised by the appellant could be considered in this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.