JUDGEMENT Sheema Ali Khan, J. 1. This application has been filed for quashing the order, dated 24.12.2005 whereby charges have been framed under Sections 498A of the Penal Code and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 2. Briefly stated the allegations in the F.I.R. are that after the marriage of Pankaj Kumar Sahni, petitioner no. 2 with Varsha Rani, opposite party no. 3, a dispute arose between them and the allegation made against the husband and the inlaws is that they were demanding a piece of land in Patna as dowry. On refusal to meet the demand, opposite party no. 3 was tortured by her husband and family members and finally she was left at her parents home. No attempt was made to take her back and in fact petitioner no. 2 had told her that she would not be welcome if she comes back to his place of posting at Jammu at the relevant time. 3. In this case charges have been framed and the trial has commenced. All the witnesses except the Investigating Officer have been examined. 4. The case of the petitioners is that the allegations as levelled in the F.I.R. are not true and in fact the daughter of the informant does not want to live with petitioner ho. 2, as she suffers from frequent epileptic attack and requires constant care and treatment. It has been submitted and stated that Varsha Rani had filed a complaint before the Commandant under whom petitioner no. 2 was serving, who enquired into the entire allegations and came to the conclusion that the dispute lay in the fact that the parties were suffering from ego problem. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that petitioner no. 2 should be allowed to refer to the enquiry report of his immediate superior in order that this court can conclude that the allegations are false and fabricated. 5. The main argument advanced before this court is that petitioner no. 2 is in the service of the Indian Army and as such his case would be covered by Section 475 of the Cr.P.C. and under Sections 125 and 126 of the Army Act. 6. 5. The main argument advanced before this court is that petitioner no. 2 is in the service of the Indian Army and as such his case would be covered by Section 475 of the Cr.P.C. and under Sections 125 and 126 of the Army Act. 6. Before going any further, I may state here that as far as the cases of petitioners 1, 3, 4 and 5 are concerned, this court is not inclined to interfere, since the trial has began and is about to conclude. 7. The case of petitioner no. 2 is being considered separately as he is an army personnel. 8. Section 475 of the Cr.P.C. deals with the manner in which persons belonging to the Army, Navy and Air Force charged with a criminal case are to be treated. Section 475 of the Cr.P.C. provides as follows: "Delivery to commanding officers of persons liable to be tried by Court-martial. (1) The Central Government may make rules consistent with this Code and the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957), and the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950) and any other law relating to the Armed Forces of the Union, for the time being in force, as to cases in which persons subject to Military, Naval or Air Force Law, or such other law, shall be tried by a Court to which this Code applies or by a Court-martial; and when any person is brought before a Magistrate and charged with an offence for which he is liable to be tried either by a court to which this Code applies or by a Court-martial, such Magistrate shall have regard to such rules, and shall in proper cases deliver him, together with a statement of the offences of which he is accused, to the commanding officer of the unit to which he belongs, or to the commanding officer of the nearest Military, Naval or Air Force Station, as the case may be, for the purpose of being tried by a Court-martial. "Explanation.In this section (a) "unit" includes a regiment, corps, ship, detachment, group, battalion or company. (b) "court-martial" includes any tribunal with the powers similar to. those of a Court-martial constituted under the relevant law applicable to the Armed Forces of the Union. "Explanation.In this section (a) "unit" includes a regiment, corps, ship, detachment, group, battalion or company. (b) "court-martial" includes any tribunal with the powers similar to. those of a Court-martial constituted under the relevant law applicable to the Armed Forces of the Union. (2) Every Magistrate shall, on receiving a written application for that purpose by the commanding officer of any unit or body of soldiers, sailors or airmen stationed or employed at any such place, use his utmost endeavors to apprehend and secure any person accused of such offence. "(3) A High Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that a prisoner detained in any jail situated within the State be brought before a Court-martial for trial or to be examined touching any matter pending before the Court-martial." 9. The section envisages that the Central Government may make rules consistent with the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be referred as the Code) and the Army Act (the Act hereinafter) relating to armed forces which are triable by both the Code and by Court- martial. In accordance with the rules the Magistrate has to deliver the Commanding Officer to the unit to which he belongs, in cases which the court thinks fit. 10. There has been controversy regarding the jurisdiction to try persons who are military personnel and some of the High Courts of the country have held that the provisions of Section 126(1) of the Act read with Rule 4 are mandatory and if the provisions are not complied with, the trial and conviction would become null and void. Some of the decisions which subscribe to the aforesaid view are in the case of N.F. Chand V/s. State of U.P., 1987 Cr.L.J. 637, State of Bihar V/s. D.N. Mundgil, 1971 PLJR 406. The matter has now been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Jogendra Singh V/s. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 500 and in the case of Balbir Singh V/s. State of Punjab, (1995)1 SCC 90 . The matter has now been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Jogendra Singh V/s. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 500 and in the case of Balbir Singh V/s. State of Punjab, (1995)1 SCC 90 . Before referring to the case law I may quote the provisions of Section 125 of the Army Act which is as follows: "When a criminal court and a court- martial have each jurisdiction in respect of an offence, it shall be in the discretion of the officer commanding the Army, army corps, division or independent brigade in which the accused person is serving or such other officer as may be prescribed to decide before which court the proceedings shall be instituted, and if that officer decides that they should be instituted before a court martial, to direct that the accused person shall be detained in military custody." 11. This section lays down that if there is an offence which is triable by a criminal court and also triable by a Court- martial, then in order to resolve the conflict of jurisdiction, the necessary machinery has been provided. Section 125 of the Act laid downs that when a criminal court having jurisdictions of the opinion that the proceedings shall be instituted before itself in respect of-any alleged offence, it may, by a written notice refer the matter to the officer as defined under Section 125 who will have the option either to deliver over the offender to the nearest Magistrate or to proceed against him in accordance with law or to postpone the proceeding pending a reference to the Central Government. 12. While dealing with these issues I shall also refer to the rules which are material to the issues in question. Rule 2 defines the expression "Commanding Officer", "competent Military Authority", "Competent Naval Authority" and "Competent Air Force Authority", whereas Rules 3, 4, 5 and 8 are being quoted below: "Rule 3. 12. While dealing with these issues I shall also refer to the rules which are material to the issues in question. Rule 2 defines the expression "Commanding Officer", "competent Military Authority", "Competent Naval Authority" and "Competent Air Force Authority", whereas Rules 3, 4, 5 and 8 are being quoted below: "Rule 3. Where a person subject to Military, Naval or Air Force Law is brought before a Magistrate and charged with an offence for which he is liable to be tried by a Court-martial, such Magistrate shall not proceed to try such person......or to inquire with a view to his commitment for trial by the Court of Session or the High Court for any offence triable by such Court, unless (a) he is of opinion for reasons to be recorded, that he should so proceed without being moved thereto by competent Military, Naval or Air Force Authority, or (b) he is moved thereto by such authority. "Rule 4. Before proceeding under clause (a) of Rule 3, the Magistrate shall give a written notice to the Commanding Officer of the accused and until the expiry of a period of (i) three weeks, in the case of a notice given to a Commanding Officer in command of a unit or detachment located in any of the following areas of the hill districts of the State of Assam, i.e. to say (1) Mizo (2) Naga Hills (3) Garo Hills (4) Khasi and Jaintia Hills; and (5) North Cachar Hills. (ii) seven days, in the case of a notice given to any other Commanding Officer in command of a unit of detachment located elsewhere in India from the date of the service of such notice, he shall not (a) convict or acquit the accused under Sections 243, 245, 247 or 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), or hear him in his defence under Section 244 of the said Code, or (b) frame in writing a charge against the accused under Section 254 of the said Code, or (c) make an order committing accused for trial by the High Court or the Court of Session under Section 213 of the said Code, or (d) transfer the case for enquiry or trial under Section 192 of the said Code. Rule 5. Rule 5. Where within the period of seven days mentioned in Rule 4, or at any time thereafter before the Magistrate has done any act or made any order referred to in that Rule, the Commanding Officer of the accused or competent Military, Naval or Air Force Authority, as the case may be, gives notice to the Magistrate that in the opinion of such authority, the accused should be tried by a court-martial, the Magistrate shall stay proceedings and if the accused is in his power or under his control shall deliver him, with the statement prescribed in subsection (1) of Section 549 of the said Code to the authority specified in the said section. Rule 8. Notwithstanding anything in the forging Rules, where it comes to the notice of a Magistrate that a person subject to Military, Naval or Air Force Law has committed an offence, proceedings in respect of which ought to be instituted before him and that the presence of such person cannot be procured except through Military, Naval or Air Force Authorities, the Magistrate may by a written notice require/the Commanding Officer of such person either to deliver such person to a Magistrate to be named in the said notice for being proceeded against according to law, or to say the proceedings against such person before the court-martial, if such instituted, and to make reference to the Centra! Government for determination as to the Court before which proceedings should be instituted." 13. In the present case the facts reveal that opposite party no. 3 had filed a complaint before the Commandant who had conducted an enquiry which is contained in Annexure-7. The statements made in the enquiry report are based on the personal assessment of the Commanding Officer (Colonel Mehta) in view of the comments by petitioner no. 2. The enquiry report indicates that the Commanding Officer did not make attempts to bring about a settlement between the parties. In fact it appears that an ex parte enquiry inasmuch as the opposite party no. 3 was not examined. It was only on her written statement that the enquiry was concluded. 14. Opposite Party No. 2 filed an F.I.R. in which cognizance was taken. Petitioner No. 2 was granted anticipatory bail on the ground that there was a compromise between the husband and wife. 3 was not examined. It was only on her written statement that the enquiry was concluded. 14. Opposite Party No. 2 filed an F.I.R. in which cognizance was taken. Petitioner No. 2 was granted anticipatory bail on the ground that there was a compromise between the husband and wife. After the filing of the complaint case, a case was filed by opposite party no. 2 in which opposite parties {sic) 2 and 3 have been granted bail. Apart from the two criminal cases Matrimonial Suit No. 10F/2006 was filed by Pawan Kumar Mandal who claimed that he had married opposite party no. 2 (sic-3 ?) on 4.11.2005. Notice was sent to opposite party no. 3 to appear in this case. It has been submitted that the need to file this false matrimonial case arose as opposite party no. 3 had filed an application to the Commandant to deduct part of the salary of petitioner no. 2 for the purpose of paying maintenance to her. Petitioner No. 2 is said to have presented the plaint of Suit No. 10F/2006 in order to avoid such payment. Subsequently opposite party no. 2 {sic3 ?) filed Matrimonial Case No. 41/2006 in which he has claimed that petitioner is mentally unwell and, therefore, suffers from athyphisia. In these circumstances one can safely presume that the Commandant had full knowledge that there was dispute pending between the two parties with respect to their matrimonial life. 15. The submission on behalf of petitioner no. 2 is that the entire trial is null and void on the basis Section 125 of the Act and Rules 3 and 4 which envisages that the Magistrate has to give reasons for not referring the matter to the competent military authority, has not been complied with. In fact no notice has been given by the Magistrate. 16. While interpreting the requirement of giving a notice as envisaged by the Act and the Rules to the authority under the Act, the Supreme Court has held that the object of giving notice is to make the authority fully aware of the pendency of the criminal case against a member of the force and to afford them an opportunity to exercise their discretion of having the member of the force tried either by Court-martial or allow the ordinary court to proceed with the trial. The Act envisages that the first option would be given to the authority under the Army Act. However, no particular form of notice has been prescribed under the Act, Rules or the Code. The law only envisages that the authorities should be aware of the facts and the nature of the offences, status of the victim, the circumstances in which the offence was committed. 17. It is to be presumed in the present case that the petitioner must have attended the court on several occasions and taken leave. The matrimonial suits were brought to the notice of the authority, the application for payment of part of the salary as maintenance (which perhaps has been allowed) and the complaint filed by opposite party no. 3 alleging torture etc. against her husband has also been brought to the notice of the authorities concerned. At that stage the authorities did not think.it proper to take any step in the matter. In effect the authority had already give up its jurisdiction to try the case by Court-martial. Even if the provisions have not been followed in the strictest term in the sense that this court cannot definitely say that the authorities had knowledge of the criminal case but certainly they had knowledge regarding the complaint and the dispute between the parties and chose not to intervene in the matter. 18. In a case of this nature and in the circumstances of the case this court finds that there is substantial compliance inasmuch as the authorities under the Army Act have knowledge regarding the disputes and the allegations levelled against petitioner no. 2. 19. In view of the discussions made above, I do not find any merit in this case. This application is dismissed. The trial should be expedited.