Judgment : V. RAMKUMAR, J. 1. In this appeal filed under S.37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act” for short), the appellant who was the petitioner in O.P. (Arbitration) No.1 of 2011 on the file of the District Court, Lakshadweep, challenges the order dated 13.10.2011 passed by the said Court dismissing the interlocutory application (I.A.No.157 of 2011) filed by the appellant n the said O.P. THE BACKGROUND FACTS 2. The first respondent is the Union Territory of Lakshadweep represented by its Administrator at Kavaratti. The 2nd respondent is the Director of Tourism, Union Territory of Lakshadweep, Kavaratti. The 3rd respondent is the Society for Promotion of Recreational Tourism and Sports (SPORTS), Kavaratti, represented by its Managing Director. The facts leading to this appeal are as follows:- 1996:R3 invited global tenders for the running of a twenty bed tourism resort at Agatti Island called Agatti Island Beach Resort (AIBR). The appellant (Muthukoya Thoopiyakal) who belongs to the Scheduled Tribe and who is an islander hailing from the Amini Island of the Union Territory of Lakshadweep, was the successful bidder. 1.11.1996:Ext.A1 registered lease deed was executed between the appellant and R3 (SPORTS) as per which the 20 bed resort AIBR was let out to the appellant for a period of 5 years on a rent of `5 lakhs for the first year, `6 lakhs for the second year, `7 lakhs for the 3rd year, `8 lakhs for the 4th year and `9 lakhs for the 5th year. Clause 9 of the lease deed provides that in case the lessee opts to continue the lease agreement after the expiry of the lease period he may apply for renewal of the lease suggesting his terms and conditions at least six months before the expiry of the lease to be extendable for further periods of 5 years or more. Clause 20 of the lease deed provides that any dispute arising between the lessor and the lessee during the currency of the lease or after its expiry or earlier termination shall be settled by arbitration of two arbitrators one to be appointed by each party and that the arbitrators will select an umpire before commencing the arbitration hearing the venue of which shall be Kavaratti. 2001:Six months before the expiry of the lease the appellant exercised his option for renewal of the lease for a further period of 5 years. 2001:Six months before the expiry of the lease the appellant exercised his option for renewal of the lease for a further period of 5 years. 19.10.2001:In a special general body meeting in which the appellant also attended, R3 reviewed its earlier decision not to renew the lease and resolved that in view of the fact that the resort was run by an islander who was given only five year’s term initially and he had, despite difficulties, cleared all the dues, the request of the appellant deserves favourable consideration. Accordingly, it was decided to renew the lease for another 5 years on the terms recommended by the meeting dated 4.6.2001 of the Board of Management namely, a minimum guarantee of `8 lakhs or 22% of the gross turnover whichever is higher. The appellant was agreeable to those terms. 22.4.2002:R2 sent a letter to the appellant inviting his attention to the meeting of R3 held on 19.10.2001 and the undertaking by the appellant to pay `8 lakhs or 22% of the gross turnover whichever was higher per year as rent and called upon the appellant to pay the rent immediately to R1 under receipt head 3452 Tourism 800 other receipts. It appears that since the minimum rent of `8 lakhs fixed for renewal was less than the rent of `9 lakhs fixed under Ext.A1 lease deed for the period from 1.11.2000 to 31.10.2001, R1 intervened and insisted that the renewal shall only be for a period of two years. A notice to that effect was served on the appellant on 10.7.2003. As the appellant was not agreeable for the same he instituted a suit O.S. 6 of 2003 before the District Court, Lakshadweep, seeking specific performance of the agreement to renew the lease as decided on 19.10.2001 and consequential injunction calling upon R1 and R2 (who were defendants 2 and 3) to execute the renewal of the lease deed. The first defendant in the suit was the Union of India. Pending suit R3 was impleaded as defendant No.4. While so, R1 to R3 constituted a committee to look into the matter and suggest remedial measures. 12.7.2005:The above committee met. The first defendant in the suit was the Union of India. Pending suit R3 was impleaded as defendant No.4. While so, R1 to R3 constituted a committee to look into the matter and suggest remedial measures. 12.7.2005:The above committee met. 17.7.2006: The committee recommended renewal of the lease from 1.11.2001 to 31.10.2006 subject to two conditions namely; i) The appellant shall submit to R2 duly audited balance sheets certified by registered chartered accountants/auditors and filed before the concerned authorities for the financial years 2001-02,2002-03,2003-04,2004-05 and 2005-06. ii) The appellant shall abide by the Coastal Zone Regulation in force and shall dismantle immediately any unauthorised structures. 14.9.2006: R2 informed the appellant the above decision and called upon the appellant to submit the duly audited balance sheets within one month of receipt of the letter and added that the terms and conditions of the lease agreement for renewal of the lease would be formulated on receipt of those documents. 11.12.2006:The District Court took note of the recommendations of the committee and placed on record the acceptance by the appellant to abide by the first condition. Regarding the second condition the Court found that the structures referred to in the second condition was outside the tenanted premises and, therefore, the same cannot be a pre-condition for renewal of the lease already agreed upon. The suit was accordingly decreed on consent directing the defendants (Union of India and R1 to R3) to renew and execute the lease deed in favour of the plaintiff for the further period of 5 years from 1.11.2006 to 31.10.2011 on terms mutually agreed upon. Ext.A2 is the Judgment and Ext.A3 is the decree in that suit. According to the appellant in spite of his repeated requests R1 to R3 did not renew and execute the lease deed. The appellant would have it that the rent for the first and second year 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 was paid by him and received by R2 and since the renewed lease deed was not executed by R1 to R3, he paid rent only at the rate of Rs.8 lakhs per year thereafter. 8.3.2010:The appellant was served with a notice demanding `36,76,000/- by way of arrears of rent. 8.3.2010:The appellant was served with a notice demanding `36,76,000/- by way of arrears of rent. The appellant filed W.P.(C) 31573/2010 before this Court challenging the notice dated 8.3.2010 and alleging that even the payment of `8 lakhs per year was not accounted for and stating that actually `17 lakhs alone was due. The appellant paid `17 lakhs as directed by this Court in the above Writ Petition. 4.4.2011:The appellant issued Ext.A4 notice seeking renewal of the lease beyond 31.10.2011 and also submitted balance sheets for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 showing a larger turnover during those periods. The appellant also stated that as per the turnover shown a further amount of `9.14 lakhs would be due from him and he was willing to pay the same. According to the appellant his request for renewal was not heeded to and he, therefore, paid `9.14 lakhs. 28.7.2011: Appellant sent Ext.A5 letter again seeking renewal of the lease. 12.8.2011: Appellant sent Ext.A6 lawyer notice under S.80 C.P.C. again seeking renewal of the lease. 2.9.2011: R2 issued Ext.A7 notice stating inter alia that Ext.A1 lese agreement was continued but alleged that the appellant had been making defaults and expressed their unwillingness to renew the lease. The appellant was called upon to hand over vacant possession of AIBR on or before 31.10.2011. 22.9.2011:Appellant sent Ext.A8 notice nominating his arbitrator and calling upon R1 to R3 to nominate their arbitrator. 30.9.2011:Ext.A9 reply was sent informing the appellant that the respondents had no obligation to nominate their arbitrator since the period of lease was over on 31.10.2011. 10.10.2011:Appellant filed O.P. (Arbitration) 1 of 2011 before the District Court, Lakshadweep at Kavaratti, for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the respondents from evicting the appellant from the resort in question or in any manner preventing the entry of tourists to the said resort or from interfering with the right of the appellant to operate the resort till the disputes are finally adjudicated and a final award is passed by the proposed arbitral tribunal and for a permanent prohibitory injunctions restraining the respondents from enforcing Ext.A7 notice 2.9.2011 till the final award is passed. The appellant also filed I.A. 157 of 2011 in O.P. (Arbitration) No.1 of 2011 seeking an interim injunction restraining the respondents from enforcing Ext.A7 notice and from evicting the appellant from the resort in question or preventing the entry of tourists to the resort and in any manner interfering with the rights of the appellant to operate the resort, accommodate and entertain guests/tourists therein pending disposal of the O.P. 10.10.2011The appellant also filed an Arbitration Request as A.R.47 of 2011 before the Chief Justice, High Court of Kerala under S.11 (6) of the Act for the appointment of an arbitrator. The said request is now pending before Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sri Jagan, the designated Judge. 13.10.2011:The District Judge as per the impugned order dismissed I.A. 157 of 2011 on merits and without a counter. O.P. (Arbitration) No.1 of 2011 now stands posted before the District Court on 28.11.2011. 17.10.2011: The appellant filed this appeal before this Court under S.37(1)(i) of the Act read with S.104 and Order 43 R.1(r) C.P.C. challenging the order dated 13.10.2011 passed on I.A. No.157/2011. Objection Regarding the Maintainability of this Appeal 3. Advocate Sri. S. Radhakrishnan, the learned Standing Counsel for R1, also representing R2 and R3 raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of this appeal. IS AN INTERIM ORDER GRANTING OR REFUSING AN INTERIM MEASURE PENDING AN APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 9, APPELLABLE? The objection of the respondents is as follows:- The main relief prayed for in Arbitration O.P.1/2011 is one in terms of Section 9(ii)(d) of the Act. Eventhough the prayer in the said O.P. is for a perpetual injunction, the purpose of S.9 of the Act itself is for enabling a party to seek any of the interim measures as enumerated therein and such measures are to be claimed before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the arbitral award but before its enforcement. I.A.157/2011 filed along with the above O.P. was one for an interim injunction in terms of the main relief of injunction prayed for in the O.P. When the main relief which can be claimed in and O.P. filed under S.9 of the Act itself is an interim measure, it was not open to the appellant to seek an interim relief in the main O.P. by filing an interlocutory application. The Court below also could not have entertained I.A.157/2011 which was ab initio not maintainable. The Court below also could not have entertained I.A.157/2011 which was ab initio not maintainable. The order impugned in this appeal is the order passed on L.A.157/2011. The main O.P. is still pending before the District Court and stands posted to 28.11.2011. The counter-affidavit of R1 to R3 in the main O.P. has only been filed now after the impugned order. What is appealable under S.37(1)(a) of the Act is an order granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under S.9. An order on the Original Petition filed under S.9 of the Act is yet to be passed. Hence, the present appeal against an order passed on an interlocutory application filed in the original petition is not maintainable. An identical question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in M/s. Nikitha Build-Tech (P) Ltd. Bangalore v. M/s. Natural Textiles Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore (AIR 2010 Karnt.170) and it has been held that an interlocutory application was not maintainable in a petition under S.9 of the Act and the appeal preferred against the order on the interlocutory petition was not maintainable. JUDICIAL EVALUATION OF THE OBJECTION 4. We are afraid that we are unable to accept the above submission, which at first blush, seems to be attractive. It is true that what section 9 of the Act provides for is only an interim measure of protection by the Court either before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the passing of an arbitral award but before its enforcement. The appellant has already moved the Hon’ble the Chief Justice under S.11(6) of the Act on 10.10.2011 and the said proceedings are pending before the designated Judge of this Court as Arbitration Request No.47 of 2011. Hence, it cannot be said that when the appellant filed the O.P. under Section 9 of the Act, he did not have any intention to take the matter to arbitration. But an applicant under Section 9 of the Act has to further show that there exists an “arbitration agreement” within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act and that he himself is a party to such arbitration agreement as indicated by the definition of the expression “party” contained in Section 2(h) of the Act and that the proposed arbitral proceedings also will be between the parties to such arbitration agreement. Here the appellant and R1 to R3 are at issue regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement for the period beyond 31.10.2011 and also on the question whether R1 and R2 could be treated as parties to the arbitration agreement notwithstanding Ext.A2 judgment and Ext.A3 decree. Well, we do not purpose to go into these contested issues in this appeal for reasons to be indicated later. Our immediate concern is regarding the objection as to the maintainability of this appeal. Section 37 of the Act providing for appeals reads as follows:- “37. Appealable order:-(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:- (a) granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9; (b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34. (2) An appeal shall also lie to a Court from an order granting of the arbitral tribunal.— (a) accepting the plea referred in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17. 3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court”. 5. Thus, what is appealable under Section 37(1)(a) is an “order” granting or refusing to grant any “measure” under S.9. The section does not say “interim order” or “final Order”. It only says “order”. It is pertinent to note that I.A.No.157/2011 was also filed, inter alia, invoking Section 9 of the Act. the “measure” under Section 9 is an “interim measure of protection” in respect of any of the enumerated situations contemplated by clauses (a) to (d) of Section 9(ii) or “such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient” and covered by the residuary clause (e) to Section 9(ii). Section 9 of the Act reads as follows:- “9. Interim measures, etc. Section 9 of the Act reads as follows:- “9. Interim measures, etc. by Court.—A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a Court:-- (i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:- (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) Securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence; (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient, and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it”. The latter part of S.9 which reads “and the court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of an in relation to any proceedings before it” is of great significance since it is to the civil court that the application under Section 9 is made and such civil court has ancillary, incidental, auxiliary or inherent powers to do justice to the parties before it. The relevance of the above provision in S.9 of the Act has been specially noticed by the Apex Court in Adhunik Steels Limited v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd. ((2007) 7 SCC 125) where it has been observed as follows:- “11. The relevance of the above provision in S.9 of the Act has been specially noticed by the Apex Court in Adhunik Steels Limited v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd. ((2007) 7 SCC 125) where it has been observed as follows:- “11. It is true that Section 9 of the Act speaks of the court by way of an interim measure passing an order for protection, for the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods, which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement and such interim measure of protection as may appear to the court to be just and convenient. The grant of an interim prohibitory injunction or an interim mandatory injunction are governed by well-known rules and it is difficult to imagine that the legislature while enacting Section 9 of the Act intended to make a provision which was de hors the accepted principles that governed the grant of an interim injunction. Same is the position regarding the appointment of a receiver since the section itself brings in the concept of “just and convenient” while speaking of passing any interim measure of protection. The concluding words of the section,: :and the court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose and in relation to any proceedings before it” also suggest that the normal rules that govern the court in the grant of interim orders is not sought to be jettisoned by the provision. Moreover. When a party is given a right to approach an ordinary court of the country without providing a special procedure or a special set of rules in that behalf, the ordinary rules followed by that court would govern the exercise of power conferred by the Act. On that basis also, it is not possible to keep out the concept of balance of convenience, prima facie case, irreparable injury and the concept of just and convenient while passing interim measures under Section 9 of the Act”. (emphasis supplied) A party approaching the civil court with a request for an interim measure of protection under Section 9 of the Act, will naturally be apprehending some danger or adverse consequences at the hands of the respondents. It is to forestall such danger or adverse consequences that he is approaching the civil court under S.9 of the Act. (emphasis supplied) A party approaching the civil court with a request for an interim measure of protection under Section 9 of the Act, will naturally be apprehending some danger or adverse consequences at the hands of the respondents. It is to forestall such danger or adverse consequences that he is approaching the civil court under S.9 of the Act. The Kerala Arbitration and Conciliation (Court) Rules, 1997 (“the Rules” for short) prescribe the form of application to be filed before the civil court and the procedure to be followed by the civil court. R.3 of the Rules makes the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 “(C.P.C.” for short) and the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice, 1971 applicable for verification of pleadings in the case of every application presented before the Court. R.6enjoins that when an application is made under the Act the Court shall order notice thereof to all the respondents and to such other person as may appear to the Court to be likely to be affected by the proceedings and calling upon them to show cause within the time specified in the notice, as to why the reliefs sought in the application should not be granted. R.11 of the Rules reads as the follows:- “11. In matters not provided for in these Rules, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice, 1971 and the circular orders issued by the High Court of Kerala from time to time shall mutatis mutandis apply to all proceedings under the Act including appeals”. If an order on a petition under S.9 of the Act can be passed only after complying with the above procedure and after calling upon the respondent to show cause against granting the relief prayed for, in very many cases the application itself may become infructuous on the happening of the apprehended danger or adverse consequences. Hence, a power to grant an ad interim measure of protection to the applicant in deserving cases cannot be denied to the civil court which has all the ancillary powers to do so. If the applicant is asked to wait until the respondents file their objections or until the matter is finally heard, it would amount to negation of justice to such applicant. If the applicant is asked to wait until the respondents file their objections or until the matter is finally heard, it would amount to negation of justice to such applicant. Hence, depending upon the expediency of and the dire need for the interim order passed by the court on the apprehended danger or adverse consequences pending final disposal of an application under S.9, it can be said that an appeal from such interim order would be maintainable if such interim order partakes the character of a final order. It is true that in an appropriate case an ad interim order can be passed on the application filed under Section 9 itself. But since the application, as insisted by the Rules, is to be filed as an Original Petition, the interim orders as well as final orders passed thereon will have to be styled as “orders” and this may cause confusion since there could be more orders than one on the same Original Petition. Hence, the appellant cannot be faulted, if instead of, pressing for an interim order on the O.P. he filed I.A.157 of 2011 seeking an ad interim order. Since the said I.A. was also filed invoking S.9 of the Act, the impugned order passed on the said I.A. can be treated as an ad interim or intermediary order passed in the pending O.P. In this case, the learned District Judge was finally disposing of the said I.A. on merits on the 3rd day of its filing even without having had the advantage of a counter or objection by respondents 1 to 3 who were evidently, but unjustifiably, pressing for a disposal of the I.A. Since such an order partakes the character of a final order passed on merits, we are of the view that an appeal from such an order would be maintainable provided the order renders the apprehended danger or the adverse consequences imminent. With due respect, we record our dissent to the view taken by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in H.M.P. Cements Ltd. (supra) which has overlooked the latter part of Section 9 of the Act and the other vital aspects discussed above. WHAT ORDER TO BE PASSED IN THIS APPEAL 6. But in this case there is some difference. WHAT ORDER TO BE PASSED IN THIS APPEAL 6. But in this case there is some difference. The appellant had rushed to the court below in view of the stand taken by the respondents in Ext.A7, calling upon the appellant to surrender vacant possession of the resort on or before 31.10.2011. He was obviously apprehending that he would be thrown out on or after 31.10.2011. But the court below has allayed his apprehension in that regard by adding the following rider at the end of the impugned order:- “However, it is made clear that this order does not permit the respondents to evict the petitioner otherwise than through due process of law”. Since the respondents have not taken any steps to evict the appellant through due process of law, the impugned order is not of such a moment as to dissuade the appellant from waiting till the final order is passed or at least till steps were taken to evict him before approaching this Court. Hence, we are of the view that in this case the appellant was not justified in rushing to this Court without waiting for the final order in the O.P. or at least till some steps were taken to evict him. We are told that the respondents have now filed their counter to the Original Petition pending before the court below. The Original Petition stands posted to today. We see no reason why the said Original Petition should not be directed to be disposed of finally on merits after giving both sides sufficient opportunity to adduce documentary and/or oral evidence. 7. During the pendency of this appeal we had directed the respondents by a written order to explore the possibilities of an amicable settlement of the dispute with a view to give the appellant some reasonable time to finally vacate the tenanted resort and handover peaceful possession of the same to the respondents unconditionally. The following is the order passed by us: “We have heard both sides at some length. We notice that the issue as to whether the original lease in favour of Agatti Island Beach Resort (AIBR) in favour of the appellant (Muthukoya Thoopiyakal) executed way back in the year 1996 is to be renewed or not and, if so, on what terms etc., had been engaging the attention of various authorities and courts. We notice that the issue as to whether the original lease in favour of Agatti Island Beach Resort (AIBR) in favour of the appellant (Muthukoya Thoopiyakal) executed way back in the year 1996 is to be renewed or not and, if so, on what terms etc., had been engaging the attention of various authorities and courts. In the forensic battles which had been fought and the legal imbroglios to which both sides had placed themselves, a decade has passed by without any tangible solution. There is much to be said on either side. But if the matter is interminably fought between the parties, there will be no sign of this litigation coming to a quietus in the near future. This litigation need not necessarily end with the High Court. Such a long drawn out litigative persistence by either side is certainly not going to benefit both sides. Under these circumstances, we direct both sides to genuinely explore the possibility of an amicable settlement by which the appellant Muthukoya Thoopiyakal could be given some reasonable time of three years or such other lesser period as is mutually agreed upon and on such terms as could be stipulated so that the appellant may vacate from the premises once and for all. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has expressed the appellant’s willingness to pay rent at the rate of 33% of the gross turnover or `12 lakhs per annum whichever is higher during the said period after which the appellant will vacate the premises without any demur and he will also agree to withdraw all the petitions filed by him and now pending before the various authorities in relation to this dispute. 3. Advocate Sri. Radhakrishnan, the learned Standing Counsel for the Lakshadweep Administration submits that he may have to put it to respondents 1 to 3 for their approval. We therefore, direct both sides to consider the pros and cons of the matter and come to an amicable settlement as aforesaid so that there is a finale to this litigation. While the appellant can, thereafter, think of some other profitable venture elsewhere, the Administration also can think of resorting to global tender of the AIBR if they are desirous of augmenting their resources. Post the case on Tuesday, 22nd of this month”. 8. While the appellant can, thereafter, think of some other profitable venture elsewhere, the Administration also can think of resorting to global tender of the AIBR if they are desirous of augmenting their resources. Post the case on Tuesday, 22nd of this month”. 8. On 22.11.2011 when the matter again came up before us the learned counsel for R1 to R3 submitted that the response from the respondents was an emphatic “no”. We do not appreciate the stand taken by R1 to R3. It was through a global tender that the appellant came to the scene and was granted a lease for running the resort (AIBR). Unlike the resort at Bangaram Island (the operation of which has also come to a grinding hault) which was run by the Casino Hotel group from the mainland, the appellant who has been running this resort is an islander and he also belongs to the scheduled tribe. It was on the strength of permits issued by the respondents to the tourists that they could occupy the rooms in the resort in question. With effect from 31.10.2011 the respondents have stopped issuing permits to the intending tourists for occupying this resort. Apart from disabling the appellant from running the resort and thereby pushing the 50 employees of the appellant to starvation, the respondents have also deprived the Lakshadweep Administration a sizeable revenue of `12 lakhs per annum or 33% of the gross turnover whichever is more as offered by the appellant. According to the appellant, on account of the default committed by R2 and R3 in effecting maintenance to the resort to make it suitable for the international tourists to occupy the same, the appellant had undertaken the maintenance work and had incurred expenses to the tune of `35 lakhs which is also claimed to have been included in the arbitration request. We hade put it to the learned counsel appearing for R1 to R3 that since the O.P. filed under S.9 of the Act has not been disposed of on merits by the court below we would direct a disposal of the said O.P. within a time frame and the respondents should permit the appellant to operate the resort during the said period. The learned counsel, however, expressed the unwillingness of the respondents to permit the appellant to operate the resort even for a day. The learned counsel, however, expressed the unwillingness of the respondents to permit the appellant to operate the resort even for a day. We are told that the tourist season has already started and will last only for a couple of months. We do not understand as to why the respondents are taking such an obstinate stand as to deny the appellant to run the resort even for a day. We have accordingly decided to make it an order of Court. OUR CONCLUSION 9. For the forgoing reasons we hold that if an interim order of interim measure of protection passed by the civil court pending disposal of a petition under S.9 of the Act is of such a nature that it partakes the character of a final order rendering the apprehended danger or the adverse consequences imminent, such interim order would be appealable under S.37(1)(a) of the Act. But, in the light of the rider added by the court below towards the end of the impugned interim order, we do not think that there is any necessity for this Court to go into the merits of the rival contentions in this appeal. It is suffice to direct the court below to dispose of O.P. (Arbitration) No.1 of 2011 finally. Accordingly, this appeal is disposed of directing the court below to pass final orders in O.P. (Arbitration) No.1 of 2011 untrammeled by the observations in the order impugned herein and after giving both sides an opportunity to adduce such oral or documentary evidence as they deem fit and after fully hearing them. We are told that some of the documents produced before the Court below are not their originals. In case the parties take steps for summoning the originals, the Court below shall not guillotine such steps as long as they are taken for the proper disposal of the case. We direct the court below to finally dispose of the above O.P. expeditiously and at any rate within a period of four months of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Eventhough the learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed the request of the appellant to permit him to operate the resort until and subject to the final result of the O.P., we are inclined to accede to the said request. Eventhough the learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed the request of the appellant to permit him to operate the resort until and subject to the final result of the O.P., we are inclined to accede to the said request. The respondents cannot adopt a “dog in the manager” policy and thereby deprive the Lakshadweep Administration whatever revenue is due to it. The appellant also cannot be left in the lurch during the said period. It is also a question of livelihood for the 50 employees engaged by him. There will be an interim injunction on the terms of I.A.157 of 2011 until final disposal of the Original Petition. We direct the respondents to issue necessary permits and perform such other acts as are necessary to enable the appellant to operate the resort (AIBR) until and subject to the final disposal of O.P. (Arbitration) No.1 of 2011. It goes without saying that during the period of operation of the resort the appellant shall be liable to pay the respondents damages for use and occupation of the resort at the rate of `12 lakhs per annum or 33% of the gross annual turnover whichever is higher. This permission to operate the resort shall not confer any special right or equities in favour of the appellant if ultimately he does not succeed in his litigative endeavours. The court below shall be moved for any violation of these directions as if the said directions were issued by the lower court. Dated this 28th day of November, 2011.