Judgment 1. Writ petitions by persons, who claim interest in agricultural land to an extent of 2 acres 37 guntas of land in Sy.No.66/2 of G. Shankaranahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Arasikere Taluk, Hassan District, as past and present owners, as the 1st petitioner who had claimed interest in the land initially by way of purchasing an extent of 4 acres in the said survey number under a sale deed dated 28.6.1970 having not enforced his right under the sale deed, but later claiming interest a tenant under the 5th respondent Sri Hunya Naika S/o. Ganga Naik had obtained occupancy rights in the land to an extent of 2 acres 37 guntas of land under the provisions of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the KLR Act’) by making an application in Form No.7 and having been granted occupancy rights as per order dated 16.07.1979 passed by the 4th respondent – the Tahsildar, Land Tribunal, Arasikere, (copy produced as Annexure-A to the petition) and having in turn sold this land in favour of petitioners 2 and 3 under sale deed 17.12.2008 purporting to be after the expiry of 15 years from the date of order of the Land Tribunal and the 2nd and 3rd petitioners now claim ownership and to be in possession of the subject land, are all aggrieved by the adverse order that they have suffered before the 2nd respondent – the Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District, Hassan, while functioning as an appellate authority under Section 5(A) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the PTCL Act’) has while set aside the order passed by the Asst. Commissioner rejecting the request of the 5th respondent – the original grantee to annul the sale transaction and resume the land and restore it to the original grantee, has allowed the appeal set aside the order of the Asst. Commissioner, declaring the transactions to be null and void and has directed resumption of the land and restitution to the 5th respondent and it is aggrieved by this order, the present writ petitions to quash the same. 2. Appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submission of Sri. Commissioner, declaring the transactions to be null and void and has directed resumption of the land and restitution to the 5th respondent and it is aggrieved by this order, the present writ petitions to quash the same. 2. Appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submission of Sri. N.R. Naik, learned counsel, is that the 1st petitioner having claimed interest as a tenant under the 5th respondent and the 4th respondent – Land Tribunal found it to be factually so and having passed the order under the provisions of the KLR Act in terms of the order at Annexure-A, the provisions of the PTCL Act could not have been invoked by the statutory authority functioning under the PTCL, Act for either disturbing the order passed by the Land Tribunal under the provisions of the KLR ACT nor for directing resumption of the land in favour of the State and for restitution of the subject land in favour of the 5th respondent. 3. Mr.N.R.Naik would submit placing strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in MOHAMMED JAFFAR AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS reported in 2003(1) KCCR 110 (FB) that when once the Land Tribunal had granted occupancy rights in favour of the 1st petitioner in terms of the law as determined or interpreted by the Full Bench decision of this Court cited supra the provisions of PTCL Act do not apply and therefore, the order of the Deputy Commissioner being contrary to this legal position cannot be sustained and has to be quashed. Mr. Naik would also supplement this submission by pointing out even the 1st petitioner is also a person who belongs to scheduled caste community and therefore, the provisions of the PTCL Act should not make much difference to the 1st petitioner, if so found in possession and as the 1st petitioner has transferred the rights that he had acquired under the order of the Land Tribunal after the expiry of the prohibitory period viz., 15 years from the date of the order passed by the Land Tribunal as the 2nd and 3rd petitioners acquire valid and good title to the subject property and therefore, also the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner should be quashed. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. R. Om Kumar, learned AGA, who had been furnished with an advance copy of the writ petition papers voluntarily taking notice of the matter and wants to not only clarify the correct legal position as it prevails in terms of provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the PTCL Act, but also points out that the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of case cited supra to submit that the ratio of the MOHAMMED JAFFAR case is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 5. What is submitted by learned AGA with reference to Section 3(1)(e) of the PTCL Act providing the definition for the word “Transfer” reading as under:- “3(1)(e) ‘transfer’ means a sale, gift, exchange, mortgage (with or without possession), lease or any other transaction not being a partition among members of a family or a testamentary disposition and includes the creation of a charge or an agreement to sell, exchange, mortgage or lease or enter into any other transaction.” Is that for the purpose of the PTCL Act the work “Transfer” also includes the work ‘Lease’ and in the instant case, the question being one arising initially by way of sale and then trying to convert that into a lease etc., and all such transactions being within the definition of the word transfer and if the transfer was found to be in violation of the terms of the grant to the original grantee i.e., 5th respondent being a transaction which had taken place and the order passed by the Land Tribunal being dated 16.7.1979 i.e. after the provisions of PTCL Act had come into force and with the PTCL Act having the effect of prevailing over the other statutory provisions, the Land Tribunal could not have passed the order and the order passed by the Land Tribunal being derogatory to the provisions of the PTCL Act, it does not sustain in law and neither the 1st petitioner nor 2nd and 3rd petitioners can claim any right, title and interest under such an order which is unsustainable in law. Mr. Om Kumar would also submit that for the provisions of the KLR Act to be attracted, it is essential that the land should be in private ownership and a person claiming interest should be a tenant in terms of lease transaction. Mr. Om Kumar would also submit that for the provisions of the KLR Act to be attracted, it is essential that the land should be in private ownership and a person claiming interest should be a tenant in terms of lease transaction. But in the instant case, in the first instance, the land was never in the ownership of the original grantee i.e., 5th respondent that the ratio of MOHAMMED JAFFAR case is based on factual situation, that the subject land in that case was not a granted land whereas in the present case it is undisputedly a land which had been granted by the State Government in favour of the 5th respondent as per the grant order of the year 1963 and as a person belonging to the scheduled caste community and with various conditions expressly and statutorily imposed, it could not have been sold or transferred within the meaning of Section 3(1)(e) of the PTCL Act and the first transaction having taken place within the prohibitory period, it is one which clearly attracts the provisions of the PTCL Act and the ratio in MOHAMMED JAFFAR’s case is not applicable for the reasons mentioned therein. 6. Submission of Mr. Om Kumar is very apt and proper and is appreciated. 7. The legal position insofar as the granted land as defined in Section 3(1)(b) of the PTCL Act has considerable significance for the reason that the provisions of the PTCL Act are attracted in a situation where the subject land is initially a granted land and not leased lands which are held in private holdings. In the present case, the subject land being a granted land and not a land in which there were pre-existing private rights as had been noticed in MOHAMMED JAFFAR’s case the subject land in that case being not a granted land, but only a land in private holding the ratio of MOHAMMED JAFFAR’s case is not attracted to the present situation. While such is the legal position the factual position which is not much in dispute is that the 5th respondent had been granted 4 acres of land in terms of grant order of the year 1963 and he had sold the entire extent of 4 acres of land, as per sale deed dated 1970 and whatever might have transpired thereafter the 1st petitioner claiming to be in possession and cultivation of an extent of 2 acres 37 guntas of land out of 4 acres of such land, the application before the Land Tribunal by the 1st petitioner though was ordered, with the 5th respondent himself having conceded and having agreed to the conferment of occupancy rights on the 1st petitioner before the Tribunal, the Tribunal found it very convenient to grant occupancy rights in favour of the 1st petitioner and it is such a land which is sold etc. 8. Be that as it may, it clearly exposes the game played by the 1st petitioner to project a picture of the 1st petitioner, who had purchased the land also becoming a tenant under a person, who was not a landlord even as per the 1st petitioner’s version. 9. If according to the 1st petitioner the sale transaction of the year 1970 had conveyed right, title and interest in the subject land in favour of the 1st petitioner, the 5th respondent seizes to be landlord and therefore, the is no relationship of landlord and tenant nor a lease created in favour of the 1st petitioner. 9. If according to the 1st petitioner the sale transaction of the year 1970 had conveyed right, title and interest in the subject land in favour of the 1st petitioner, the 5th respondent seizes to be landlord and therefore, the is no relationship of landlord and tenant nor a lease created in favour of the 1st petitioner. Though Mr.Naik would urge that as the petitioner had continued to remain in possession and cultivation of this extent of 2 acres 37 guntas of land out of total extent of 4 acres of land as the 1st petitioner realizing that the 5th respondent being a grantee of the land and as a person belonging to scheduled caste community should be provided some sustenance had voluntarily yielded 1 acre 13 guntas of land in favour of the 5th respondent also being in possession and cultivation of this extent and if the Land Tribunal on recognizing the practical arrangement worked out voluntarily by the parties has naturally given effect to the order that order of the Land Tribunal should not be disturbed at this point of time, it is not private arrangements that matters when the interest of the parties rights claimed by private transactions gets distinguished, the operation of the statute prevail over all transactions and rights. The fact remains that the land was originally a granted land in favour of a person belonging to the scheduled caste community and it had been sold in violation of the terms of the grant condition. It is this transaction which gets voided after the PTCL Act came into force and subsequent transactions are all of no consequence in law. 10. This apart there are no bona fides on the part of the 1st petitioner in claiming tenancy when in reality there was no tenancy and the Land Tribunal assuming that it is not open to disturb in any other manner, having passed the order, it is nothing short of a void order yet again and does not create rights in favour of the 1st petitioner, as in the first instance, there was no recognizable tenancy in law as understood within the meaning of the provisions of the KLR Act nor a lease in terms of sub-section (34) of Section 2 of he Act. The definition of “Tenant” reads as follows:- “[(34) Tenant” means an agriculturist (who cultivates personally the land he holds on lease] from a landlord and includes,- (i) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under section 4; (ii) a person who was protected from eviction from any land by the (Karnataka) Tenants 9temporary Protection from Eviction) Act 1961: [(iia) a person who cultivates personally any land on lease under a lease created contrary to the provisions of Section 5 and before the date of commencement of the Amendment Act.] (iii) a person who is a permanent tenant; and (iv) a person who is a protected tenant.11. The lease for creating tenancy envisages the landlord or a person who has ownership of the agricultural lands which is being cultivated on some terms by another person who becomes a tenant. All these requirements were never there and assuming that the 1st petitioner also belongs to the scheduled caste community and there was good working arrangement between the 1st petitioner and the 5th respondent, that can never prevail over operation of the law and it is for this reason, this Court does not recommended to go by the order passed by the Land Tribunal. While such is the legal position, on the basis of the factual position as it emerges and even the 1st petitioner does not get any right, the arguments that the sale transaction had taken place after the prohibitory period has expired is only rejected, as in the first instance the 1st petitioner never acquires any right either through the order passed by the Land Tribunal under the provisions of the KLR Act or such rights gets extinguished when once the provisions of the PTCL Act operates. Apart from this legal position, the factual position also clearly shows that there is no bona fides on the part of the 1st petitioner in pursuing such relief, particularly, before the Land Tribunal and writ jurisdiction is one to provide relief only to such persons who approach this Court for ventilating the bona fide grievance and not to those who come with stimulating grievance. 12. I do not find any merit at all in this petition to disturb the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner who has only passed an order to sub-serve and achieve the object of the PTCL Act. 12. I do not find any merit at all in this petition to disturb the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner who has only passed an order to sub-serve and achieve the object of the PTCL Act. Even assuming that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner falter either in recognizing the proper legal position or the factual position ultimately the result cannot be any different. What the Deputy Commissioner has ordered i.e., to set aside the order passed by the Asst. Commissioner, annul the sale transaction resume the land to the State and restitute it to the original grantee, that precisely being what is required to be achieved under the provisions of the Act and a proper action warranted in law and it is therefore, no scope for interference with the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and accordingly the writ petitions are dismissed.