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2011 DIGILAW 1150 (RAJ)

Om Prakash Veshnav v. Vidhya Veshnav

2011-05-26

R.S.CHAUHAN

body2011
Hon'ble CHAUHAN, J.—Aggrieved by the order dated 03.05.2008, passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Udaipur, whereby the learned Judge has directed the petitioner-husband to pay a maintenance of Rs.800/- per month to the respondent-wife, Smt. Vidhya Veshnav, the petitioner-husband has approached this Court. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner-husband and the respondent-wife were married on 20.9.1999 according to the Hindu customs and rites. According to the respondent-wife, for the first three years, the petitioner-husband and his family members kept her well. However, subsequently they started demanding that she should bring Rs.5,000/- from her parents. Moreover, they started subjecting her to physical and mental cruelty. Eventually, she was thrown out of the house. Because of their cruelty, she had filed a criminal case for offences under Sections 498A, 323, 406 and 120B IPC, which is pending before the courts of Kanod. The respondent-wife also claims that the petitioner-husband has married the daughter of one Kalu Das through the Nata ceremony and the said lady is living with him. Unable to maintain herself, the respondent-wife had filed an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. After going through the oral and documentary evidence, vide order dated 3.5.2008, the learned Judge directed the petitioner to pay a maintenance of Rs. 800/- per month to the respondent-wife. Hence, this petition before this Court. 3. Mr. B.M. Kalla, the learned counsel for the petitioner-husband, has vehemently contended that the respondent-wife is staying away from the petitioner-husband without any rhyme or reason. Therefore, she has deserted him. Hence, the benefit of Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. should be given to him. Thus, the respondent-wife is disentitled from claiming any maintenance from the petitioner-husband. 4. On the other hand, Mr. R.S. Mankad, the learned counsel for the respondent-wife, has strenuously contended that both in her affidavit as well as in her cross-examination, the respondent-wife had clearly stated that she was subjected to mental and physical cruelty. Moreover, due to the cruelty meted out to her, she had lodged a criminal case against the petitioner-husband. Furthermore, the petitioner-husband has also contracted a second marriage through the Nata practice and is living with the other lady. Thus, the respondent-wife has ample reasons for staying away from the petitioner-husband. Thus, it cannot be held that she has deserted the petitioner-husband. Therefore, the benefit of Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. cannot be granted to the petitioner-husband. Furthermore, the petitioner-husband has also contracted a second marriage through the Nata practice and is living with the other lady. Thus, the respondent-wife has ample reasons for staying away from the petitioner-husband. Thus, it cannot be held that she has deserted the petitioner-husband. Therefore, the benefit of Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. cannot be granted to the petitioner-husband. Hence, he has supported the impugned order. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and examined the record submitted before this Court. 6. A bare perusal of the testimony of the respondent-wife clearly shows that in her affidavit, she had clearly mentioned the above noted facts. Thus, she has given sufficient cause for staying away from the petitioner-husband. 7. It is, indeed, trite to state that desertion requires two elements : firstly, the physical separation, and secondly, the intention to desert. In the present case, while the first element is clearly present as the couple has separated, the second element is conspicuously missing. The respondent-wife has given cogent reasons for staying away from the petitioner-husband. For, a woman who has has subjected to physical and mental cruelty, a woman who has to face the prospect of living with another woman in the house, such a woman cannot be expected to co–habit with the husband. Hence, no ground is made out which proves the factom that it is the respondent-wife who has deserted the petitioner-husband. Therefore, the benefit of Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. certainly cannot be given to the petitioner-husband. 8. Hence, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order. This petition, being devoid of any merit is, hereby, dismissed.