Judgment With consent of learned counsel for the parties, the petition is heard finally. 2. Petition is directed against the order dated 16.1.2007 passed by the Industrial Court; whereby, an appeal under section 65 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 filed by petitioner has been dismissed upholding the order passed by the Labour Court on 20.6.2005. 3. Facts briefly are that the members of respondent No. 1 -Union engaged initially for 89 days with the petitioner establishment were regularized in October, 1995. However, by order No. @ Hindi @ the order of regularization was cancelled on the ground that mistakenly the workmen were regularized against the post reserved for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and that without following the procedure laid down in the Madhya Pradesh Lok Seva (Anusuchit Jatiyon, Anusuchit Jan Jatiyon Aur Anya Pichhade Vargon Ke Liye Arakshan) Adhiniyam, 1994 (for short 'the Adhiniyam of 1994'). 4. Aggrieved, the respondent-Union raise the dispute by filing an application under section 31 (3) read with section 61 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960, challenging the order of deregularisation on the ground that no opportunity of hearing was afforded before canceling the order of regularization. 5. The Labour Court vide order dated 20.6.2005 allowed the application and while setting aside the order of cancellation of regularization on the ground that the same was passed without affording an opportunity of hearing, also directed for permanent classification of the workmen as they had completed six months satisfactory services on vacant post. 6. Aggrieved, the petitioner-employer filed an appeal on the grounds that in absence of cogent evidence regarding appointment of the respective workmen on the vacant post, they could not have been classified as permanent employee merely because they rendered six months satisfactory service and secondly, since their regularization was dehors the Adhiniyam of 1994 no right accrued in their favour and were thus rightly repatriated to their status as daily wage labour by cancelling the order of regularization. 7. The Appellate Court i.e. Industrial Tribunal dismissed the appeal by impugned order. Thus giving rise to present writ petition. 8. 7. The Appellate Court i.e. Industrial Tribunal dismissed the appeal by impugned order. Thus giving rise to present writ petition. 8. Petitioner has two fold grievance, firstly that, the Courts below fell into patent error that despite of the fact that there was no material on record that the employees were engaged/appointed against the vacant post, yet merely on the basis that they had completed six months of service, they were directed to be classified as permanent. Placing reliance on the decision in Mahendra L. Jain and others vs. Indore Development Authority and others : (2005) 1 SCC 639 and M.P. Housing Board and another vs. Manoj Shrivastava : (2006) 2 SCC 702 , it is urged that unless proved by the employee by a cogent evidence that he was engaged on a vacant post by due process, he is not entitled for being classified as permanent. In Mahendra L. Jain (supra) it is observed: "29......The 1961 Act itself shows that the employees are to be classified in six categories, namely, permanent, permanent seasonal, probationers, badlies, apprentices and temporary. The recruitments of the Appellants do not fall in any of the said categories. With a view to become eligible to be considered as a permanent employee or a temporary employee, one must be appointed in terms thereof. Permanent employee has been divided in two categories (i) who had been appointed against a clear vacancy in one or more posts as probationers and otherwise; and (ii) whose name had been registered at muster roll and who has been given a ticket of permanent employee. A 'ticket of permanent employee' was thus, required to be issued in terms of Order 3 of the Standard Standing Orders. Grant of such ticket was imperative before permanency could be so claimed. The Appellants have not produced any such ticket. 31. The Standing Orders governing the terms and conditions of service must be read subject to the constitutional limitations wherever applicable. Constitution being the suprema lax, shall prevail over all other statutes. The only provision as regard recruitment of the employees is contained in Order 4 which merely provides that the Manager shall within a period of six months, lay down the procedure for recruitment of employees and notify it on the notice board on which Standing Orders are exhibited and shall send copy thereof to the Labour Commissioner. The only provision as regard recruitment of the employees is contained in Order 4 which merely provides that the Manager shall within a period of six months, lay down the procedure for recruitment of employees and notify it on the notice board on which Standing Orders are exhibited and shall send copy thereof to the Labour Commissioner. The matter relating to recruitment is governed by the 1973 Act and the 1987. In absence of any specific directions contained in the schedule appended to the Standing Orders, the statute and the statutory applicable to the employees of the respondent shall prevail." In M.P. Housing Board and another vs. Manoj Shrivastava (supra) it is held: "19. The appointment made by a person who has no authority therefore would be void. A fortiori an appointment made in violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute or constitutional obligation shall also be void. If no appointment could be made in terms of the statute, such appointment being not within the purview of the provisions of the Act would be void; he cannot be brought within the cadre of permanent employees. The definitions of 'permanent employee' and 'temporary employee' as contained in the must, thus, be construed having regard to the object and purport sought to be achieved by the Act." 9. In view of above proponement of law and in absence of any material on record that the employees were engaged on the vacant post, we have no hesitation in holding that the Courts below were not justified in classifying the employees as permanent merely because they rendered six months of satisfactory service. The impugned order to said extent is not tenable. 10. Secondly, it is urged that, the Adhiniyam of 1994 which was required to be adhered to while regularizing the employees was not followed when the respondents were regularized in the year 1995. It is contended that since the regularization was in violation of statutory Adhiniyam of 1994, the same were void ab-initio and did not create any right in favour of respective employees, who were not entitled for any opportunity of hearing, when the mistake was corrected in the year 1998. Mistaken decision as has been held in Union of India and another vs. Narendra Singh: (2008) 2 SCC 750 can be rectified but only after following due process of law and after affording an opportunity of hearing. Mistaken decision as has been held in Union of India and another vs. Narendra Singh: (2008) 2 SCC 750 can be rectified but only after following due process of law and after affording an opportunity of hearing. The present is not the case that it was the misrepresentation by the employees which led to taking a wrong administrative decision. But it is a case where the employer who was required to adhere to statutory Adhiniyam of 1994 ignores the same. In such case, it was obligatory on the part of the employer to have afforded an opportunity of hearing to respective employees. That having not been done, vitiates the order canceling the order of regularization. The Courts below were well within their jurisdiction in interfering with the order on the ground of violating the principle of natural justice. The petitioner, however, would be at liberty to afford an opportunity of hearing before passing any adverse order. The petition is partly allowed to the extent above. No costs.