JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar, J.—Heard Sri Ram Karan Agarwal, learned counsel for petitioners and Manish Mathur, learned counsel for respondents. 2. Facts in brief of the present case are that Sri B.D. Atthi (now deceased) moved an application for release under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, owner of premises having House No. 72, Purana Quila, Lucknow, under the tenancy of Smt. Y.C. Trikha, and after her death her legal heirs/petitioners are lawful tenants of the premises in question. 3. In the said application it is stated by landlord-owner that his family consists following members : 1. Self, aged about 56 years (now deceased) 2. Smt. Ratno Devi, aged about 54 years (wife, now deceased) 3. Ashok Atthi, ages about 28 years. 4. Smt. Kiran Atthi, wife of Sri Ashok Kumar Atthi, aged about 25 years. 5. Km. Shushma Atthi, aged about 22 years, daugher 6. Master Ashish @ Tinku, aged about 3 years, grandson 4. House in question is let out by Smt. Y.C. Trikha when her sons and daughters are minor. However, when they become major and one of his son who is an Engineer, married on 27.7.1978 and Km. Shushma Atthi daughter of applicant is a heart-patient, as such he needs separate accommodation for her proper medical facilities, so looking into the circumstances of his family, house in question is required for personal need, house No. 72 situated at Purana Quila, Lucknow consists following accommodations under the tenancy of the tenant : 1. One shop in which the applicant carries his tailoring work 2. Room 3. Verandah 4. One small box room attached with the room 5. Kotheri 6. Kitchen 7. Latrine 8. Bathroom 5. Accordingly, a P.A. Case No. 64 of 1978 registered before the Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge, Lucknow and written statement as well as additional written statement filed by tenant/petitioner. The Prescribed Authority for the purpose of assessing the need of parties in question issued Commission and learned Commissioner submitted report dated dated 19.7.1982(Annexure No. 5 to the writ petition). 6. During the pendency of the matter, original landlord Sri B.D. Atthi died, as such his legal heirs/successor substituted, and the original tenant B.D. Trikha also died, substituted by legal heirs and successors. 7. 6. During the pendency of the matter, original landlord Sri B.D. Atthi died, as such his legal heirs/successor substituted, and the original tenant B.D. Trikha also died, substituted by legal heirs and successors. 7. Thereafter, considering the material facts and evidence on record on merit, the Prescribed Authority after taking into consideration the Commissioner’s report, allowed the release application vide order dated 24.8.1982 against which tenant petitioners filed an appeal(registered Appeal No. 76 of 1982, Smt. Y.C. Trikha and others v. B.D. Atthi and others), allowed vide judgment and order dated 16.5.1983 passed by the appellate authority/IV Additional District Judge, Lucknow. 8. Aggrieved by the same, the landlord/respondents filed a Writ Petition No. 4149 of 1983 (B.D. Atthi v. IVth Additional District Judge, Lucknow and others), disposed of by means of order dated 25.1.1989 with the following directions : “The offer which has been made by the tenant could also have been considered by the lower appellate Court and can even now be considered and the offer which has been made by the tenant is worth consideration that the landlord may retain the shop in his possession and the entire premises which is in possession of the tenant and the tenant may be allowed to stay in the remaining portion of the house which is in possession of the landlord minus the outer room in which the landlord is running his tailoring business. There appears to be no reason that if there is such a direction, formal allotment order may not be passed in favour of the tenant. As no such direction can be given by this Court, consequently the writ petition is allowed and the order Annexure No. 7 passed by the appellate Court dated 16.5.1983 is quashed in part and the case is sent back to the lower appellate Court to decide the question of alternative accommodation, i.e. whether one room in the premises in possession of the tenant can be given to the landlord or the tenant may shift in the accommodation in possession of the landlord minus the room in which running his tailoring business. The lower appellate Court will pass the necessary order in the case after considering all these facts in accordance with law. The writ petition stands disposed of in these terms. There will be no order as to costs.” 9. The lower appellate Court will pass the necessary order in the case after considering all these facts in accordance with law. The writ petition stands disposed of in these terms. There will be no order as to costs.” 9. In view of the above said factual background, the matter again came up for consideration before the appellate authority/VIth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow and the said authority vide order dated 9.10.2001, dismissed the Rent Appeal No. 76 of 1982. 10. Further, while dismissing appeal, the appellate authority given an observation, quoted as under : ÞÁR;fFkZxu dks funsZ'k fn;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr lEifr dk dCtk ÁkIr djus ds lkFk gh dSaV jksM iqjkuk fdyk fLFkr viuh fdjk;snkjh dh lEifIr esa ls mlesa fLFkr ,d nqdku ls lyxz ySfVªu ,oa nqdku ls lyxz cjkens dks NksM+dj 'ks"k vko'kh; Hkkx [kkyh djsaxsA mUgsa ;g Hkh funsZ'k fn;k tkrk gS fd fu.kZ; dh frfFk ds lkr fnu ds vanj viuh fdjk;snkjh dh dSaV jksM iqjkuk fdyk y[kuÅ fLFkr mijksDr lEifr ds ,d nqdku ls layxz ySfVªu ,oa nqdku ls lyxz cjkens dks NksM+dj 'ks"k vkoklh; LFkku vihYdkrkZxu }kjk Á'Uxrz vkokl [kkyh djus ij mldk dCtk ÁkIr djds [kkyh djus dh lwpuk vius Hkou Lokeh ftyk eftLVªsV fdjk;k fu;a=d ,oa fu"dklu vf/kdkjh dks nsaxsA vfiYdkrkZxu ÁR;kfFkxu }kjk [kyh fd; tk jgs bl ifjlj ds vkcaVu gsrq lEcaf/kr vf/kdkjh ds leN ÁFkZuk i= ÁLrqr dj ldrs gSaA lEcaf/kr fdjk;k fu;a=d ,oa fu"dklu vf/kdkjh ds ;g visNks dh tkrh gS fd ÁR;kfFkZxu ds }kjk [kkyh fd;s tk jgs bl ifjlj dk vkcaVu ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk fjV la[;k 4149@73 esa ikfjr fu.kZ; fnukad 25-1-1989 ds vkyksd esa ,oa bl fdjk;snkjh ds vkyksd esa djsaxs dh ÁR;kfFkZxu viuh fdjk;snkjh dh lEifr dk mijksDr vkoklh; LFkku vfiYdkrkZxu dks vkoklh; LFkku miyC/k djk;s tkus gsrq [kkyh dj jgsa gSaAÞ 11. Aggrieved by the same, tenant/petitioners filed present writ petition challenging order dated 16.5.1983 (Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition) passed by Prescribed Authority/First Additional Civil Judge, Lucknow in P.A. Case No. 64 of 1976 (B.D. Atthi v. Smt. Y.C. Trikha), and order dated 9.10.2001 (Annexure No. 2 to writ petition) passed by VIth Additional District Judge, Lucknow in P.A. No. 76 of 1982 (Y.C. Trikha v. B.D. Atthi and others). 12. 12. Learned counsel for petitioners while arguing the writ petition submits that impugned orders dated 24.8.1982 and 9.10.2001 passed by Prescribed Authority as well as Appellate Authority are illegal and arbitrary in nature while passing the same authorities under rent control Act has failed to take into consideration the need of the tenant/petitioners and further wrongly held that the need of the landlord/respondents is bona fide and genuine in comparison to the need of petitioners. 13. He further submits that the respondents also failed to take into consideration that landlords got sufficient accommodation with them in which they are residing, so findings in respect to bona fide need as given by the Courts below are contrary to the facts of the case, accordingly, if the tenant/petitioners will be evicted from the premises in question, they will be thrown out of the street. Keeping in view the said facts, orders passed by Court below are perverse in nature and liable to be set aside. 14. On the other hand, Sri Manish Mathur, learned counsel for respondents submits that orders passed by Courts below are perfectly valid and in accordance with law as both the Courts below on the basis of material evidence on record came to the conclusion that the need of landlord/respondents is genuine and bona fide, thus there is neither any infirmity or illegality in the impugned orders under challenge in the present case. 15. He further submits that Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority had given concurrent finding of fact that tenant/petitioners does not make any effort to search alternative accommodation in present case, as such as per the settled proposition of law in this regard which governs the field, the comparative need of tenant cannot be considered, accordingly present writ petition filed by tenants lacks merit and liable to be dismissed. 16. After hearing the argument advanced by learned counsel for parties and going through the material on record, it is clearly established that after considering the comparative hardship and need between the parties, the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 24.8.1982 allowed the release application holding therein that the need of landlord/respondents is genuine and bona fide in comparison to the petitioner/tenants. 17. 17. Further, a finding of fact has also been given by the Prescribed Authority while allowing the application for release to the effect that from the document on record, it is established that tenant/petitioners are not able to prove and make out a case that they had search alternative accommodation in the matter in question and further also recorded that no efforts have been made by tenant/petitioners for search of alternative accommodation. 18. Aggrieved by order dated 24.8.1982, an appeal filed, allowed by appellate authority vide order dated 26.5.1983, challenged before this Court by way of Writ Petition No. 4149 of 1983 (B.D. Atthi v. IVth Additional District Judge, Lucknow and others), allowed vide judgment and order dated 25.1.1989 in view of the findings given therein as quoted above and matter remanded to the appellate authority to decide the same. 19. Accordingly, thereafter, Appellate Authority vide judgment and order dated 9.10.2001 dismissed the appeal with observation as mentioned therein. While dismissing appeal, the appellate authority also given a finding of fact that till date of moving and pendency of release application, the tenant/petitioners had not make any effort to search alternative accommodation, so their comparative hardship cannot be considered. 20. The Rent Control Legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The Legislative intent has to be respected by the Courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to Legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The Legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords both. 21. The Courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting Rent Control Legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of landlord the Court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlord too are week and feeble and feel humble as held by Hon’ble Mr. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlord too are week and feeble and feel humble as held by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Kukharji, J. in the case of Prabhakaran Nair v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1987 (4) SCC 238 , as under : “tenants are in all cases not the weaker sections. There are those who are weak both among the landlords as well as the tenants”. 22. In the case of Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and others v. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1998 SC 602 , this Court emphasized the need of social legislation like the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival interests so as to be just to law and held that, the law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society. While the shortage of accommodation makes it necessary to protect the tenants to save them from exploitation but at the same time the need to protect tenants is coupled with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred with a benefit disproportionately larger than the one needed. Socially progressive legislation must have a holistic perception and not a shortsighted parochial approach. Power to legislate socially progressive legislations is coupled with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and unreasonability. A legislation impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the cost of constraints by placing shackles on the other section, not only entails miscarriage of just (SIC) but may also result in constitutional invalidity. 23. In the case of Arjun Khiamal Makhijani v. Jamnadas C. Tuli (SIC) and others, (1989) 4 SCC 612 , Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with Rent Control Legislation observed that provisions contained in such legislations are capable of being categorized into two : those beneficial to the tenants and those beneficial to the landlord. As to a legislative provision beneficial to landlord, an assertion that even with regard to such provision an effort should be made to interpret it in favour of the tenant is a negation of the very principle of interpretation of a beneficial legislation. 24. As to a legislative provision beneficial to landlord, an assertion that even with regard to such provision an effort should be made to interpret it in favour of the tenant is a negation of the very principle of interpretation of a beneficial legislation. 24. In view of the above said facts, the core question which is to be decided in the present case whether the need of landlord in respect to the premises in question in respect to which the release application has been moved, is bona fide or not and the same is in accordance with the provisions as provided under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 which is quoted herein below : Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. “21: Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant.— (1) The Prescribed Authority may on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant form the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely- (a) that the building is bona fide required either in in its existing from or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade, or calling or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust;” 25. The word “bona fide” has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 : 1999 SCFBRC 330, as under : “The term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state or mind. Requirement is not mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by “required bona fide” is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the absence of felt need which is an outcome of sincere,honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. A requirement in the absence of felt need which is an outcome of sincere,honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the Court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord.” 26. This Court in the case of Pramod Kumar v. VI Additional District Judge, Bijnor and others, 2000(1) ARC 185, has defined ‘bona fide need’ on the basis of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in Muttu Lal v. Radhey Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 and Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1979 SC 272 : 1986 SCFBRC 346, as under : “The word ‘bona fide’ means genuinely and sincerely i.e. in good faith in contradiction to mala fide. The requirement of an accommodation is not bona fide if it is sought for ulterior purpose but once it is established that the landlord requires the accommodation for the purpose which he alleges there is of ulterior motive to evict the tenant that requirement should be bona fide” 27. In the same manner the word “bona fide” has been interpreted in the case of Jagdish Chandra v. District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others, 2008 (2) ARC 756 and Hariom v. Additional District Judge and others, 2009 (2) ARC 802. 28. In the same manner the word “bona fide” has been interpreted in the case of Jagdish Chandra v. District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others, 2008 (2) ARC 756 and Hariom v. Additional District Judge and others, 2009 (2) ARC 802. 28. The Apex Court in the case of Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 353 , held as under : “The rent controller should not proceed on the assumption that the landlord’s requirement is not bona fide. When the landlord shows a prima facie case a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide is liable to be drawn. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without giving possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlords, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.” 29. In the case of B. Balaiah v. Lachaiah, AIR 1965 AP 435 , it was held that the words “for his own use” must receive a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction. It has been further held that while casting its judicial verdict, the Court shall adopt a practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life. 30. Further in the case of K.V. Muthu (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “Son” as understood in common parlance means a natural son born to a person after marriage. It is the direct blood relationship which is the essence of the term in which “Son” is usually understood, emphasis being on legitimacy. In legal parlance, however, “Son” has a little wider connotation. It may include not only the natural son butalso son’s son, namely, the grand child, and where the personal law permits adoption, it also includes an adopted son.” 31. Further, the word ‘reasonable requirement’ has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan and others, (1979) 1 SCC 275, that the words ‘ reasonable requirement’ undoubtedly postulates that there must be an element of need as opposed to mere desire or wish. Further, the word ‘reasonable requirement’ has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan and others, (1979) 1 SCC 275, that the words ‘ reasonable requirement’ undoubtedly postulates that there must be an element of need as opposed to mere desire or wish. The distinction between ‘desire’ and ‘need’ should be kept in mind but not so as to make the genuine need as a mere desire. 32. Moreover, the Apex Court in the case of Mst. Bega Begum (Supra) has held that it is not doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree of eviction is passed but such an event would happen eventually whenever a decree for eviction is passed and merely because the tenant will be ousted from the premises where he was running his activity cannot be itself be considered to be a hardship and be availed ground for refusing the landlord a decree for eviction. 33. In the case of Atma S. Berar v. Mukhtiar Singh, 2003 (2) SCC 3 , after placing reliance on the earlier judgment given by the Apex Court in the case of Pravita Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, 1996 (5) SCC 353 , held as under : “The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a compete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate for him a residential standard of their own. The High Court need not be solicitous and venture in suggesting what would be more appropriate for the landlord to do. That was the lookout of the appellant and not of the High Court. The gratuitous advice given by the High Court was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property.” 34. That was the lookout of the appellant and not of the High Court. The gratuitous advice given by the High Court was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property.” 34. Moreover, in the present case, the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the need of landlord/respondents is genuine and bona fide, thus keeping in view the said facts as the jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to this Court while exercising the power of judicial review, further the High Court should not interfere and scrutinize the judgments passed by the Courts below, it will be apparent that finding recorded by the Court below are based on facts that the Court should not reverse the finding recorded by Courts below and substitute finding of facts, it is own motion can set aside the judgment passed by the Courts below/tribunal, same are contrary to the facts, perverse in nature, the said two conditions does not exist in the instant case. 35. In view of the said material facts on record, I find no illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders under challenge in the present case. 36. Further, in the instant case, both the Courts below had given a concurrent finding of fact that since the date of moving the application for release, the tenant/petitioners do not make any efforts to search the alternate accommodation, as such in view of the said facts, once it is established that the need of landlord/respondents is genuine and bona fide then the comparative hardship of the tenant cannot be compared and balance of convenience/comparison will telt against him as hold by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Bhutada v. G.R. Mundada, AIR 2003 SC 2713 , held that bona fide requirement implies an element of necessity. The necessity is a necessity without regard to the degree to which it may be. For the purpose of comparing the hardship the degree of urgency or intensity of felt need assumed significance. 37. The necessity is a necessity without regard to the degree to which it may be. For the purpose of comparing the hardship the degree of urgency or intensity of felt need assumed significance. 37. In the above authority it has also been held in para 13, that tenant must show as to what efforts he made to purchase or take on rent other accommodation after filing of the release application which is quoted below : “In Piper v. Harvey, 1958(1) All ER 454, the issue as to comparative hardship arose for the consideration of Court of appeals under the Rent Act, 1975. Lord Denning opined; “when I look at all the evidence in his case and see the strong case of hardship which the landlord put forward, and when I see that the tenant did not give any evidence of any attempts made by him to find other accommodation, to look for another house, either to but or to rent, it seems to me that there is only one reasonable conclusion to be arrived at, and that is that the tenant did not prove ( and the burden is on him to prove) the case of greater hardship.” Hudson, L.J., opined: “ the tenant has not been able to say any thing more than the minimum which every tenant can say, namely, that he was in fact been in occupation of the bungalow, and that he has not at the moment any other place to go to. He has not, however, sought to prove any thing additional to that by way of hardship such as unsuccessful attempts to find other accommodation, or, indeed, to raise the question of his relative financial incompetence as compared with the landlord.” On such state of the case, the Court answered the issue as to comparative hardship against the tenant and ordered his eviction.” 38. In the case of Salim Khan v. IVth Additional District Judge, Jhansi and others, 2006(1) ARC 588, has held as under : “In respect of comparative hardship, tenant did not show what efforts they made to search alternative accommodation after filing of release application. This case sufficient to tilt the balance of hardship against them vide Bhutada v. G.R. Mundada, 2003 SC 2713; 2005(2) ARC 899. Moreover, rent of Rs. 6/- per month which the tenants are paying is virtually as well as actually no rent. This case sufficient to tilt the balance of hardship against them vide Bhutada v. G.R. Mundada, 2003 SC 2713; 2005(2) ARC 899. Moreover, rent of Rs. 6/- per month which the tenants are paying is virtually as well as actually no rent. By paying such insignificant rent they must have saved a lot of money. Money saved is money earned. They must, therefore, be in a position to take another house on good rent. Further, they did not file any allotment application for allotment of another house. Under Rule 10(3) of the Rules framed under the Act, a tenant, against whom release application has been filed, is entitled to apply for allotment of another house immediately. Naturally such person is to be given preference in the matter of allotment. Respondents did not file any such allotment application. Thus, the question of comparative hardship has also to be decided against the tenants.” The said view has been further reiterated in the following cases : (1) Jai Raj Agarwal v. Bhola Nath kapoor and others, 2005(3) ARC 417. (2) Rulemuddin and others v. Abdul Nadeem, 2007(2) ARC 62. (3) Mohabbey Ali v. Taj Bahadur and others, 2009 (2) ARC 715. (4) Raj Kumar v. Lal Khan, 2009 (2) ARC 740 (5) Ashis Sonar and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, 2009 (3) ARC 269. In the case of Jagdish Chandra v. District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others, 2008 (2) ARC 756, this Court after relying on the judgment given by the Apex Court in the case of Bega Begam and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1979 SC 272 :1986 SCFBRC 346 held as under : “In every case where an order of eviction is passed the tenant will come on the street. The fact that all tenants will come on street if eviction is ordered, is not at all relevant for consideration of a comparative hardship of the respective parties. It is for the tenant to find out alternative accommodation. In absence of any material to show that any attempt was made by the such tenant to find out alternative accommodation release application cannot be rejected on ground that such tenant would suffer greater hardship if the release application is allowed.” 39. It is for the tenant to find out alternative accommodation. In absence of any material to show that any attempt was made by the such tenant to find out alternative accommodation release application cannot be rejected on ground that such tenant would suffer greater hardship if the release application is allowed.” 39. Further, in the instant case, the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 24.8.1982 and the appellate authority vide order dated 9.10.2001 have given a concurrent finding of fact that the need of the landlord is genuine and bona fide. 40. It is well settled preposition of law that this Court while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot set aside the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below but the same can be done only if they are perverse in nature and contrary to law. The said two conditions do not exist in the present case. 41. In the case of Mohd. Gayas v. Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kanpur, 2009(2)ARC 719, this Court in Paragraph 6 held as under : “6. So far the question of comparative hardship is concerned, I have looked into various affidavits and two judgments and I find that the Courts below have very well assessed the evidence and tried to balance the comparative hardship. The conclusion arrived by the two Courts that in the event of refusal of release, the landlord will suffer greater hardship, does not call for any interference. The findings on the ‘bona fide need’ and ‘comparative hardship’ are all findings of fact and it cannot be interfered in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the writ petition lacks merit and stands dismissed. 42. In the case of Raj Kumar v. Lal Khan, 2009(2) ARC 740, this Court in Paragraph 7 held as under : “7. The lower Appellate Court has recorded categorically that the landlord requires the accommodation in question bona fidely. He had instituted the release application in the year 2002. A notice was already given to him in the year 2001 but the tenant has not made any effort to search out an alternative accommodation even on receipt of the notice. This is sufficient to debar him from consideration of his hardship by the Court. He had instituted the release application in the year 2002. A notice was already given to him in the year 2001 but the tenant has not made any effort to search out an alternative accommodation even on receipt of the notice. This is sufficient to debar him from consideration of his hardship by the Court. However, the lower Appellate Court has also recorded a specific and categorical finding of fact that the need of the landlord is genuine and he will suffer greater hardship. The lower Appellate Court while recording its finding on the comparative hardship has placed reliance on two decisions; Heera Lal(deceased) through its legal representative v. Vth Additional District Judge, Bareily, 2006(2) ALR: 2006 (1) ARC 142 and Rajednra v. Gopal Krishna, 1994 (2) ARC 11 .” 43. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order dated 24.8.1982 passed by Prescribed Authority thereby allowing the release application by order dated 9.10.2001 passed by the Prescribed Authority thereby dismissing the appeal and same needs no interference by this Court while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 44. For the foregoing reasons, writ petition filed by petitioners lacks merit and liable to be dismissed. 45. Accordingly, the same is dismissed with observation that direction as given by appellate authority vide order dated 9.10.2001 while dismissing appeal filed by petitioners/tenants are uncalled for, rather the same is in contravention to the provisions as provided under the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 which governs the field in respect to allotment of premises, are set aside. 46. No order as to costs. —————