JUDGMENT 1. THESE two revisional applications under Article 227 of the Constitution are directed against the judgment and order dated February 18, 2011 passed by the Chairperson, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta (hereafter the appellate tribunal) dismissing Appeal Nos. 24 of 2010 and 38 of 2010 filed by the respective petitioners. The appeals were directed against judgment and order dated June 10, 2010 passed by the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Kolkata 1 (hereafter the tribunal), whereby the application filed by the opposite parties 1 to 2 under Section 17(1) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereafter the Act) registered as O.A./Sarfaesi 4 of 2010 was allowed. By the impugned judgment and order, the appellate tribunal recorded a finding that sale of a residential flat, bearing no.1C, admeasuring super built-up area of 2,800 sq.ft. approx. with two car-parking spaces in the semi-basement area situated at premises no.7/1, Queens Park, Kolkata 700 019 in the name of the opposite parties 2 and 3 (hereafter the said property) by ING Vysya Bank (hereafter the bank) was tainted with fraud and material irregularity resulting in suffering of substantial injury by the opposite parties and, consequently, the decision of the tribunal setting aside the sale was affirmed and the appeals dismissed. 2. THE facts giving rise to O.A./Sarfaesi No.4 of 2010 before the tribunal are noted first. a. THE opposite parties 1 to 3 (hereafter the borrowers) were granted credit facilities by the bank. From time to time, the facilities were enhanced. However, the borrowers committed default and in due course of time, their account was classified as non-performing asset. THE bank issued notice under Section 13(2) of the Act on January 17, 2009 calling upon them to explain why measures in terms of Section 13(4) thereof shall not be taken. THEy responded thereto by submitting an objection dated March 20, 2009. Allegedly, without proper disposal thereof, possession notice dated August 10, 2009 was issued by the bank followed by taking of symbolic possession of the said property. b. THE authorized officer of the bank, thereafter, issued a notice dated November 10, 2009 inviting sealed bids from interested parties for sale of the said property. It was notified that the reserve price is Rs.1,48,00,000/- only and that 10% of the reserve price had been fixed as deposit on account of earnest money. b. THE authorized officer of the bank, thereafter, issued a notice dated November 10, 2009 inviting sealed bids from interested parties for sale of the said property. It was notified that the reserve price is Rs.1,48,00,000/- only and that 10% of the reserve price had been fixed as deposit on account of earnest money. It was further notified that the said property could be inspected between December 10, 2009 and December 17, 2009 from 11 A.M. to 4 P.M. THE date and time of opening of the bids/offers was fixed on December 18, 2009 at 12.30 P.M., in the regional office of the bank. c. Being desirous of purchasing the said property, the petitioner in C.O. 721 of 2011 (hereafter Oasis) submitted its bid with the bank together with a bankers cheque dated December 8, 2009 for a sum of Rs.14,80,000/- towards earnest money deposit. d. THE borrowers then approached the tribunal with an application under Section 17(1) of the Act on December 17, 2009, registered as O.A./Sarfaesi No. 92 of 2009. On December 17, 2009 itself, the tribunal passed an order of status quo subject to payment of a sum of Rs.15,00,000/- by the borrowers to the bank within December 26, 2009. e. THE representative of Oasis had been to the venue on the scheduled date and time for ascertaining the fate of its offer, when it was informed of the order dated December 17, 2009 passed by the tribunal. He was further informed that the bank would take a decision for sale of the said property on or after December 27, 2009 and the offer submitted on December 10, 2009 was returned to him. f. THE borrowers feeling aggrieved by the order of the tribunal dated December 17, 2009 questioned its propriety before this Court in an application under Article 227 of the Constitution, registered as C.O. 4036 of 2009. A learned Judge of this Court by order dated December 23, 2009 directed the petitioners before it (the borrowers) to furnish a bank guarantee of Rs.10,00,000/- on or before January 2, 2010. On January 4, 2010, C.O. 4036 of 2009 was taken up for consideration by the learned Judge once again. THE order passed on that date records adjournment of hearing for a week on the prayer of the learned advocate for the borrowers. It further records the submission of Mr. On January 4, 2010, C.O. 4036 of 2009 was taken up for consideration by the learned Judge once again. THE order passed on that date records adjournment of hearing for a week on the prayer of the learned advocate for the borrowers. It further records the submission of Mr. Aniruddha Roy, learned Advocate for the bank that bank guarantee for a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- had not been furnished by the borrowers with the tribunal in terms of the order passed on December 24, 2009. g. On that very day, the bank issued a further notice of sale in respect of the said property. It was published in the daily issues of THE Statesman and Aajkal on January 5, 2010. It was mentioned therein that the auction proposed to be conducted on December 18, 2009 had been postponed/deferred in view of the order of the tribunal dated December 17, 2009 and that since the borrowers had failed to comply with the order of the tribunal and the period for compliance had since expired, the said property was again put up on auction on as is where is and whatever there is basis. THE secured debt was Rs.42,75,878/- together with further interest and other charges from November 1, 2009. THE regional office of the bank was again the venue for opening of bids, the last date for submission of bids was January 6, 2010 before 11.30 A.M. and the bids were to be opened on the same date at 12.30 P.M. THE reserve price and the earnest money deposit as well as other terms and conditions were the same, as mentioned in the earlier sale notice dated November 10, 2009. h. Oasis submitted its bid (Rs.1,48,11,111/-) on January 6, 2010 for purchase of the said property together with deposit on account of earnest money. None else submitted its bid. Oasis being the sole bidder and its bid being more than the reserve price fixed by the bank in the sale notice, the same was accepted. After acceptance of the bid of Oasis, it was directed to deposit 25% of the bid amount in course of the day, which was duly complied with by it by depositing a bankers cheque for the sum of Rs.1,33,31,111/-. After acceptance of the bid of Oasis, it was directed to deposit 25% of the bid amount in course of the day, which was duly complied with by it by depositing a bankers cheque for the sum of Rs.1,33,31,111/-. After receipt of the aforesaid cheque, the bank issued a letter dated January 6, 2010 acknowledging receipt of the entire consideration amount and assured to execute the sale certificate in favour of Oasis on realization of the bankers cheque. On January 9, 2010 sale certificate in terms of the provisions contained in Rule 9(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (hereafter the Rules) was issued in favour of Oasis by the bank in Appendix 5. i. In the meanwhile, O.A./Sarfaesi No. 92 of 2009 was taken up for consideration by the tribunal on January 7, 2010. None appeared for the borrowers. Submission made on behalf of the bank to the effect that the borrowers have defaulted in complying with the order of this Court dated December 24, 2009 and consequent action taken by the bank for sale of the said property under the provisions of the Act were recorded. THE bank was directed to file written objection and the application, for further consideration, was posted on March 4, 2010. j. This Court once again took up C.O. 4036 of 2009 for consideration on January 11, 2010. An accommodation was prayed for on behalf of the borrowers. THE learned Judge directed de-listing of the application for the time being but proceeded to record the submission of Mr. Roy that since no bank guarantee in terms of the earlier order had been furnished by the borrowers, the bank had sold the secured assets to Oasis. k. A petition by way of put up was filed by the borrowers on January 14, 2010 before the tribunal in connection with O.A./Sarfaesi No.92 of 2009 claiming relief in terms of prayers contained therein. Upon hearing learned advocates for the parties, the tribunal expressed the view that with the disposal of the said property by way of sale in favour of Oasis, O.A./Sarfaesi No.92 of 2009 had become infructuous. THE tribunal further expressed the view that the borrowers ought to file further application as per law if they intended to proceed further in the matter. Accepting the contention of the learned advocate for the bank, the put up petition was dismissed as not maintainable. THE tribunal further expressed the view that the borrowers ought to file further application as per law if they intended to proceed further in the matter. Accepting the contention of the learned advocate for the bank, the put up petition was dismissed as not maintainable. These developments led the borrowers to file a further application under Section 17(1) of the Act on January 21, 2010, giving rise to O.A./Sarfaesi No. 4 of 2010. In such application the bank and its authorized officer were impleaded as defendants 1 and 3 respectively, while Oasis was defendant no.2. The borrowers challenged propriety, legality and validity of the sale conducted by the bank. The said application was heard on contest and by judgment and order dated June 10, 2010, it was ordered by the tribunal as follows: (a). The sale held on 6.1.2010 and the sale certificate issued on 9.1.2010 therefor by the 3rd defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant, are hereby set aside subject to the applicants payment of Rs.42,75,878/- (Rupees forty two lakh seventy five thousand eight hundred seventy eight only) to the first defendant bank within three weeks from the date of this order and in the event of Applicants defaulting the said payment, this Application shall stand dismissed. (b). In case of payment of the aforesaid amount to the 1st defendant bank by the Applicants, the 1st defendant bank or the 3rd defendant shall refund the purchase money of Rs. 1,48,11,111/- (Rupees one crore forty eight lakhs eleven thousand one hundred eleven only) together with 8% p.a. simple interest from 7.1.2010 till the date of payment to the Auction purchaser, i.e. the 2nd defendant within seven days after the receipt of the amount of Rs.42,75,378/- from the Applicants. (c). No order as to costs. Accordingly, the application is allowed. 3. PARAGRAPHS 31 and 38 of the judgment and order of the tribunal contained the reasons in support of the ultimate conclusion and, therefore, are reproduced below: 31. It appears that only the 2nd defendant had offered the bid and paid the entire balance amount of Rs.1,33,31,111/- immediately on very next date. It really wonders how the 2nd defendant had come to know that the sale would be struck in his favour and shall get ready with the entire balance sale consideration of more than Rs.1.33 crores on the same day. It really wonders how the 2nd defendant had come to know that the sale would be struck in his favour and shall get ready with the entire balance sale consideration of more than Rs.1.33 crores on the same day. The bank should not have issued sale notice immediately on 4.1.2010 for publication in Newspapers on 5.1.2010, particularly when the matter was adjourned from 4.1.2010 to 11.1.2010 before the Honble High Court and without waiting for outcome of the same. The bank had published the notice in haste that too giving a days time both to public to participate in the auction and to the borrower to pay such huge dues which really strikes into ones heart. The manner in which the sale was conducted by the bank is regrettable and shall not receive stamp of approval. 38. In the aforesaid circumstances it is my considered opinion that the sale was not only held in contravention of the Rules but also the manner in which it was held suggests that it was done in a suspicious manner and that has caused wrongful loss to the applicants and ultimate wrongful gain to the defendant No.2. 4. IN the appeals filed against aforesaid judgment and order before the appellate tribunal, the bank and Oasis raised the following points: (i) A second application under Section 17(1) of the Act is not maintainable while the first application under the same section is pending; (ii) The bank had proceeded in accordance with law to effect sale of the said property; (iii) The borrowers had lost their right of redemption; and (iv) The tribunal had returned perverse findings. It appears on perusal of the appellate tribunals judgment and order that the point of maintainability was answered against the bank and Oasis by observing that measures taken by the bank under Section 13(4) of the Act could be challenged by filing separate applications and that O.A./Sarfaesi No.4 of 2010 having been filed within 16 days from the date of sale, the application was not barred by limitation. 5. 5. INSOFAR as the procedure adopted by the bank for effecting sale of the said property, the appellate tribunal was of the following view : The materials on record suggest that the failure on the part of the respondent to deposit an amount of Rs.10 lakhs as directed by the Honble High Court while modifying the order of the Tribunal came as a blessing in disguise. Curiously enough, neither the Bank nor Mr. Aggarwal chose to wait till 11.1.2010, which was the date fixed by the Honble Court on 4.1.2010. The notice dated 4.1.2010 was published immediately thereafter i.e. on 5.1.2010 and tender was opened on 6.1.2010. The speed, which is unfortunately not reflected in most of the matters, no doubt gives scope for suspicion. The purchaser appellant had been ready through out and eager to purchase the property. Fortune smiled on him since there was none else competing. In the process, the respondent-borrower missed an opportunity. Serious grievances were raised regarding the valuation of the property and contention of the appellant-bank in this regard could not really inspire confidence. When a borrower is thus thrown out of his own valuable property and that too, without being given a reasonable and proper opportunity of redemption, the only inference possible is that of substantial injury suffered by him. 6. REGARDING the borrowers right to redeem the said property is concerned, no clear-cut finding appears to have been given. It was held that with the issuance of sale certificate as per Rule 9(7) of the Rules [sic 9(6)], a sale for the purpose of the Act is rendered complete and absolute, and that there is no requirement of registration under the provisions of the Registration Act; but the complexion is significantly different where the sale is not conducted in the proper and transparent manner and if a sale is made in a suspicious manner thereby raising controversy, such sale could still be challenged notwithstanding the aforesaid legal provision. Since the sale was vitiated by material irregularity resulting in suffering of loss by the borrowers, it was further held that such a sale could not pass the test of legal scrutiny. The findings of fact reached by the Tribunal were accepted, and resultantly the appeals stood dismissed. Mr. Agarwal, appearing in person for Oasis, and Mr. Since the sale was vitiated by material irregularity resulting in suffering of loss by the borrowers, it was further held that such a sale could not pass the test of legal scrutiny. The findings of fact reached by the Tribunal were accepted, and resultantly the appeals stood dismissed. Mr. Agarwal, appearing in person for Oasis, and Mr. Roy assiduously contended that the tribunal and the appellate tribunal acted illegally in declaring the sale to be vitiated not on the basis of proven facts but merely on the basis of suspicion and, therefore, interdiction of this Court is warranted to set things right. According to them, the sale was conducted strictly in terms of the provisions of the Rules. The Courts attention was drawn to the order of the tribunal dated December 17, 2009. It was contended that the sale of the said property was protected by the default clause contained therein, which became operative once the borrowers failed to put in the bank guarantee in terms of the order dated December 24, 2009 of this Court. It was further contended that the notice dated January 4, 2010 was issued in continuation of the previous notice dated November 10, 2009, whereby more than 30 (thirty) days time was given to the borrowers to liquidate their dues as well as to parties interested in the said property to put in their bids/offers. The process of sale of the said property that had been initiated with the previous notice, it was further contended, culminated in acceptance of the bid of Oasis and subsequent issuance of the sale certificate and that in view of the default clause in the order dated December 17, 2009, there was no further requirement of compliance with provisions of Rule 9(1) of the Rules. They argued that the borrowers had utterly failed to justify why the order of this Court dated December 24, 2009 was not honoured and, consequently, forfeited their right of redemption by failing to repay the outstanding dues in full before the sale was confirmed in favour of Oasis. They submitted in unison that there was no interim order restraining the bank from proceeding with the sale on January 4, 2010 and by issuing the sale notice on that date, even though C.O.4036 of 2009 was pending, no illegality was committed warranting setting aside of the sale by casting aspersions. 7. They submitted in unison that there was no interim order restraining the bank from proceeding with the sale on January 4, 2010 and by issuing the sale notice on that date, even though C.O.4036 of 2009 was pending, no illegality was committed warranting setting aside of the sale by casting aspersions. 7. IT was further contended that the findings of the tribunal and the appellate tribunal regarding maintainability of the second application under Section 17(1) of the Act are perverse, and therefore, cannot stand the test of judicial review under Article 227. 8. BOTH Mr. Agarwal and Mr. Roy prayed for setting aside of the judgments and orders of the subordinate tribunals and dismissal of O.A./Sarfaesi No.4 of 2010. Mr. Basu, learned senior advocate for the borrowers duly assisted by Mr. Joy Saha, learned advocate contended that concurrent findings of fact having been returned by the subordinate tribunals and the view taken by them being a plausible view in the circumstances, this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction may not interfere therewith and substitute such view. 9. THE point of maintainability of O.A./Sarfaesi No.4 of 2010 was countered by submitting that the bank and Oasis cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time. Reference was made to the submission advanced on behalf of the bank on January 14, 2010 before the tribunal. On that day, the tribunal on acceptance of the submission made by the learned advocate for the bank had held that O.A./Sarfaesi No.92 of 2009 had become infructuous upon sale of the said property being effected, dismissed the put up petition as not maintainable and granted liberty to the borrowers to take further action according to law. It was urged on behalf of the borrowers that once they filed O.A./Sarfaesi No.4 of 2010 availing the liberty granted by the said order, objection regarding its maintainability had been taken on the ground that it is barred by law. Mr. Basu advanced the contention that sale of the said property was never challenged in the previous application under Section 17(1) of the Act and since such sale provides a new cause of action to the borrowers, O.A./Sarfaesi No.4 of 2010 was well-nigh maintainable. 10. Mr. Basu advanced the contention that sale of the said property was never challenged in the previous application under Section 17(1) of the Act and since such sale provides a new cause of action to the borrowers, O.A./Sarfaesi No.4 of 2010 was well-nigh maintainable. 10. ON merits, it was contended that the borrowers had failed to comply with the Courts order dated December 24, 2009 owing to a bereavement in their family but were ready with three separate pay orders totaling Rs.10,00,000/- on January 11, 2010 when C.O. 4036 of 2009 was taken up for consideration. Unfortunately, the said fact was not recorded since it was not brought to the Courts notice. However, copies of the relevant pay orders were referred to, forming part of the applications. It was further submitted that the borrowers had arranged funds for repaying the outstanding dues of the bank and are ready and willing to bear the amount of interest that has been directed by the tribunal to be paid to Oasis by the bank while returning to the former the sum of Rs.1,48,11,111/-. On behalf of the borrowers it was also argued that the sale effected on January 6, 2010 is contrary to the provisions contained in Rule 9 read with Rule 8 of the Rules and, therefore, was rightly set aside. 13. It was, accordingly, prayed that the revisional applications be dismissed. 14. This Court has heard learned advocates for the parties as well as Mr. Agarwal and perused the materials on record. 15. The point of maintainability of the second application under Section 17(1) of the Act dated January 21, 2010 has to be dealt with first, for, if it is decided in favour of the bank and Oasis, it would be unnecessary to deal with the other points. 11. SECTION 13(4) of the Act authorizes a secured creditor to take measures specified therein after the procedural safeguards mentioned in SECTION 13(2), (3) and (3A) thereof have been extended to a borrower. Once the stage contemplated in SECTION 13(4) of the Act is reached and the borrower has failed to discharge his liability, the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the measures mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) thereunder for recovering its secured debt. Once the stage contemplated in SECTION 13(4) of the Act is reached and the borrower has failed to discharge his liability, the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the measures mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) thereunder for recovering its secured debt. Right of a borrower to apply before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (hereafter the DRT) having jurisdiction under SECTION 17(1) of the Act accrues once measures in terms of SECTION 13(4) thereof are taken, and not before. After possession of the secured asset is taken over by the secured creditor, the borrower may approach the DRT voicing a grievance, inter alia, that his account has been declared nonperforming asset not in accordance with law or that his objection in response to the notice under SECTION 13(2) of the Act has not been dealt with in the manner it is incumbent in law on the secured creditor to deal therewith. The challenge could succeed, it could fail even. If the challenge fails and, thereafter, the secured creditor were to proceed further for disposal of the secured asset by way of sale for recovery of the secured debt and in the process, inter alia, does not either value the secured asset appropriately or does not extend opportunity to the borrower to seek redemption or does not give wide publicity of the intention to transfer by way of sale, all in contravention of the statutory requirements, could it be contended that the previous SECTION 17(1) application having failed, the dismissal of such application would foreclose the right of the borrower to question the subsequent actions of the secured creditor? The answer cannot but be in the negative. 12. The answer cannot but be in the negative. 12. IN the considered opinion of this Court, since the secured creditor after taking over possession of the secured asset of a borrower is empowered to transfer the same, inter alia, by sale for recovery of its dues in terms of Section 13(4)(a) of the Act, notwithstanding that an earlier application under Section 17(1) of the Act challenging the preceding actions of the secured creditor [starting with issuance of notice under Section 13(2) and ending with taking over possession under Section 13(4)(a)] is either pending or has been disposed of, issuance of the notice of sale by the secured creditor [in terms of provisions contained in Rule 9(1) of the Rules read with Rule 8(6) thereof] would give rise to a fresh cause of action for the borrower and such action can legitimately be questioned on justifiable grounds by presenting a further application to the DRT under Section 17(1) of the Act. It is not the law that once an application filed under Section 17(1) of the Act questioning the action of the secured creditor in taking possession of the secured asset is disposed of in favour of the bank, that would foreclose the right of a borrower to approach the tribunal at a later stage in respect of further actions taken by it for disposal of the secured asset by sale. One may, at this stage, profitably refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 366 (Authorized Officer, Indian Overseas Bank and anr. v. Ashok Saw Mill). The question that arose for determination before the Court was whether the tribunal would have jurisdiction to consider and adjudicate with regard to post Section 13(4) events or whether its scope in terms of Section 17 of the Act would be confined to the stage contemplated under Section 13(4). The answer to the question is to be found in paragraphs 35, 36, 37, and 39 which are quoted below: 35. The answer to the question is to be found in paragraphs 35, 36, 37, and 39 which are quoted below: 35. In order to prevent misuse of such wide powers and to prevent prejudice being caused to a borrower on account of an error on the part of the banks or financial institutions, certain checks and balances have been introduced in Section 17 which allow any person, including the borrower, aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor, to make an application to the DRT having jurisdiction in the matter within 45 days from the date of such measures having taken for the reliefs indicated in subsection (3) thereof. 36. The intention of the legislature is, therefore, clear that while the banks and financial institutions have been vested with stringent powers for recovery of their dues, safeguards have also been provided for rectifying any error or wrongful use of such powers by vesting the DRT with authority after conducting an adjudication into the matter to declare any such action invalid and also to restore possession even though possession may have been made over to the transferee. 37. The consequences of the authority vested in the DRT under sub-section (3) of Section 17 necessarily implies that the DRT is entitled to question the action taken by the secured creditor and the transactions entered into by virtue of Section 13(4) of the Act. The legislature by including sub-section (3) in Section 17 has gone to the extent of vesting the DRT with authority to even set aside a transaction including sale and to restore possession to the borrower in appropriate cases. Resultantly, the submissions advanced by Mr. Gopalan and Mr. Altaf Ahmed that the DRT has no jurisdiction to deal with a post-Section 13(4) situation, cannot be accepted. 39. We are unable to agree with or accept the submissions made on behalf of the appellants that the DRT had no jurisdiction to interfere with the action taken by the secured creditor after the stage contemplated under Section 13(4) of the Act. On the other hand, the law is otherwise and it contemplates that the action taken by a secured creditor in terms of Section 13(4) is open to scrutiny and cannot only be set aside but even the status quo ante can be restored by the DRT. 13. On the other hand, the law is otherwise and it contemplates that the action taken by a secured creditor in terms of Section 13(4) is open to scrutiny and cannot only be set aside but even the status quo ante can be restored by the DRT. 13. IT is, therefore, clear that even post-Section 13(4) steps taken by a secured creditor to recover its secured debt in terms of the provisions of the Act could be subjected to challenge before the DRT, implying thereby that separate applications based on distinct and clear cause of action, arising subsequently, on legally tenable grounds are not ruled out. 14. IN the present case, the bank initially took symbolic possession of the said property. As soon as possession was taken over, a right accrued in favour of the borrowers to challenge such action. O.A./Sarfaesi No.92 of 2009 was filed questioning the notice dated January 17, 2009 issued under Section 13(2) of the Act and for restraining the bank from taking further steps under Section 13(4) thereof till its disposal. One of the grounds in such application was that no advertisement in terms of the requirement of Rule 8(2) of the Rules was published and no possession notice under Rule 8(1) thereof was affixed on a conspicuous portion of the said property. This Court is not called upon to decide whether the bank had complied with the statutory requirements or not while taking possession of the secured assets; but it stands to reason that the first application under Section 17(1) of the Act was confined to challenging the propriety of the actions of the bank in taking over possession, although symbolic, in terms of provisions contained in clause (a) of Section 13(4) of the Act, whereas the second application questioned propriety of the sale in pursuance of the notice dated January 4, 2010. Grievance voiced in the two applications being based on distinct and separate causes of action, O.A./Sarfaesi No.4 of 2010 was maintainable. The decisions cited by Mr. Agarwal and Mr. Roy have been considered. The ratio of the said decisions does not persuade the Court to take a contra view. 15. THE point regarding maintainability is misconceived and, accordingly, stands overruled. 16. THE tribunal as well as the appellate tribunal returned findings that the sale in question stands vitiated by fraud and procedural irregularity. Agarwal and Mr. Roy have been considered. The ratio of the said decisions does not persuade the Court to take a contra view. 15. THE point regarding maintainability is misconceived and, accordingly, stands overruled. 16. THE tribunal as well as the appellate tribunal returned findings that the sale in question stands vitiated by fraud and procedural irregularity. On the basis of the materials on record before the tribunals as well as before this Court, it is difficult to concur with the tribunals that the bank and Oasis practiced a fraud. THE finding relating to fraud rests more on suspicion rather than proven facts. That Mr. Agarwal could arrange Rs.1,33,11,000/- within 24 hours speaks volumes about his resourcefulness but that by itself, without anything more, cannot be just ground to invalidate the sale. However, there can be no two opinions that the manner in which the bank proceeded to sell the said property left a lot to be desired and such sale cannot, in the opinion of this Court, be held to have been conducted in bona fide exercise of power by the bank. In terms of the notice of sale dated November 10, 2009, the bids/offers were scheduled to be opened on December 18, 2009. Owing to the interim order dated December 17, 2009 passed by the tribunal, the bank did no more but to return the bids received and informed, inter alia, the representative of Oasis that a decision would be taken regarding sale after December 27, 2009. With the return of the bid submitted by the representative of Oasis to him, the process initiated by the sale notice dated November 10, 2009 stood abandoned. Once abandoned, the earlier process could not have been revived by referring to the notice dated November 10, 2009 but the process for sale ought to have been started afresh. It would have been a different story altogether and this Court would have accepted the contentions of Mr. Agarwal and Mr. Roy if the bank, instead of returning the bids received by it in response to the sale notice dated November 10, 2009 had retained the same without opening them, awaiting further orders of the tribunal. In the event of the default clause becoming operative, the bids could have been processed for taking a final decision in respect of sale of the said property. In the event of the default clause becoming operative, the bids could have been processed for taking a final decision in respect of sale of the said property. To the mind of this Court, return of the bids marked the end of the process. The bank, if it intended to put up the said property for sale once again, which it did by issuing the sale notice dated January 4, 2010, was required to repeat the procedure envisaged in Rule 9(1) read with Rule 8(6) of the Rules meaning thereby that, between the date of publication of the notice and the date of sale of the immovable property in respect whereof such notice had been issued, a hiatus of 30 (thirty) days ought to have been maintained. The above-referred statutory provisions appear to have been honoured in the breach. 17. THIS Court records its inability to accept the argument of Mr. Agarwal and Mr. Roy that the notice dated January 4, 2010 was issued in continuation of the notice dated November 10, 2009 and, therefore, it was not necessary for the bank to maintain the hiatus of 30 (thirty) days. Mere indication in the subsequent sale notice that all terms and conditions of the previous sale notice remain unchanged cannot tilt the scales in favour of the petitioners. The object of the statutory provisions has to be borne in mind. The mandate for issuance of newspaper advertisements giving 30 (thirty) days notice is intended to achieve two-fold purpose, viz. (i) to enable the borrower to liquidate the outstanding dues; and (ii) to give adequate time to the interested parties to inspect the immovable property put up on sale and to quote a price commensurate with its value so as to enable the secured creditor to have the best of offers and after acceptance of the best offer, to apportion its dues and to return the balance amount to the borrower. It is true that the borrowers had been extended reasonable time to clear their liability but the salutary purpose sought to be achieved by giving sufficient time to interested parties to submit their bids/offers was rendered nugatory by reason of the hasty publication of notice on January 5, 2010 and giving scope for response by them within approximately 30 (thirty) hours instead of the statutory minimum of 30 (thirty) days. The notice of sale is inexplicably short, not worthy of fetching the best of offers. The sale of the said property in favour of Oasis by the bank undoubtedly is vitiated by gross procedural impropriety, operating to the serious prejudice of the borrowers. 18. IN view of the above findings, the other contention that the right of redemption was legally lost recedes to the background and need not require consideration. This Court, accordingly, rules that the judgment of the tribunal setting aside the impugned sale and affirmation thereof by the appellate tribunal does not warrant any interference. The impugned judgment is upheld. 19. IN the result, C.O. No. 721 of 2011 stands dismissed. 31. IN course of hearing, Mr. Basu submitted that the borrowers are willing to bear the amount of interest that the bank has been directed to pay while returning the amount received from Oasis. IN such circumstances, C.O. No. 998 of 2011 stands disposed of by modifying the order of the tribunal in the following terms. It is directed that instead of the bank paying the interest component, the borrowers shall bear the same. The bank shall quantify the interest component and inform the borrowers within 7 days from date and within 3 (three) weeks thereafter, the borrowers shall put in the requisite amount i.e. Rs.42,75,878/- + interest @ 8% p.a. from January 7, 2010 till June 30, 2010 (the time-frame fixed by the tribunal for the borrowers to make payment) to the credit of the bank, for onward transmission of the principal amount as well as the interest to Oasis. 20. IT is made clear that in the event the borrowers fail to make payment within the time-frame as stipulated above, the default clause in the judgment and order of the tribunal dated June 10, 2010 shall become operative and O.A./Sarfaesi No.4 of 2010 shall stand dismissed. For doing justice between the parties, this Court considers it proper to pass one other direction. Since the bank is at fault for the mess and has retained the amount of Rs.1,48,00,000/- paid by Oasis so long, and further regard being had to the probability that the said amount must have been utilized by it, it is desirable that the bank pays to Oasis interest on such amount, calculated from July 1, 2010 till date of return thereof, at such rate it considers fit and proper. It is ordered accordingly. 21. THERE shall be no order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date.