ORDER Abhay M. Naik, J. 1. This reference has been received by us by virtue of order of BrOrs. Shri S.K. Seth, J. dated 1.3.2007, who noticed various conflicting decisions of Single Bench of this Court on the point that whether an application for eviction submitted under Section 23-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') would continue to be maintainable after the death of landlord of the specified category described under Section 23-J of the said Act. 2. Short facts leading to the reference are that Leelawatibai, widow of Ghanshyamdas alongwith her sons submitted an application for eviction under Section 23-A of the Act with allegations that the suit premises is owned by herself and her sons, which is in occupation of the Defendant-non-applicant as tenant on rent 'Rs.40/-p.m. The house comprising the suit premises belonged to Ghanshyamdas. After his death, it devolved upon the applicants including Leelawatibai. Various Ors. portions of the said house are occupied by four Ors. tenants. It is stated in the application that the suit premises was let out for residential purpose to the non-applicant, which is required bonafide by the applicant for the residence of herself and Ors. members of her family which include sons, daughter-in-laws and grand children. Applications for eviction of Ors. tenants have also been submitted for bonafide residential need. 3. Non-applicant submitted his reply admitting therein his status as tenant in the suit premises. However, it was contended that the suit premises was owned by Jethalal, who happened to be father of Ghanshyamdas and Devidas. Legal heirs of Devidas and Ghanshyamdas are co-owners and the eviction proceedings at the instance of Leelawatibai, widow of Ghanshyamdas and her sons alone is not maintainable. Alleged bonafide need was also refuted with an allegation that the same is not genuine and the applicants have Ors. suitable accommodations for their residence. 4. The eviction application was submitted on 28.3.1994. On 16.3.1998, applicants No. 2 to 7-revisionists submitted an application under Order 22 Rule 3 of Code of Code of Civil Procedure informing thereby that Leelawatibai had died on 27.1.1998. Her legal representatives were already on record as applicants No. 2 to 7. This being so, a prayer was made for deleting the name of Leelawatibai from the cause title of the application for eviction. Her legal representatives were already on record as applicants No. 2 to 7. This being so, a prayer was made for deleting the name of Leelawatibai from the cause title of the application for eviction. On 7.4.1998, learned Rent Controlling Authority allowed the said application and granted permission to delete the name of Leelawatibail from the cause title of the application for eviction. Thereafter, the application for eviction proceeded on merits. Ultimately, a final order was passed on 29.6.2001 by the Court of Rent Controlling Authority, Ujjain dismissing thereby the application for eviction with finding that the applicants failed to establish their case. Aggrieved by the same, applicants-revisionists submitted the present civil revision before this Court under Section 23-E of the Act. 5. It came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge, brOrs. S.K. Seth, J., who noticed that learned Single Judges of this Court in the case of Mahesh Chand and Ors. v. Nishar Khan 2008 (I) MPWN 71 , Smt. Jarina v. Smt. Hazzani and Anr. 2001 (II) MPACJ 169 and Santosh Kumar Jaiswal v. Joseph and Anr. 1995 MPACJ 273 have held that after the death of landlord of the specified category under Section 23-J, application for eviction does not survive and is liable to be dismissed. Learned Single Judge further noticed that Ors. learned Single Judges of this Court in the cases reported as Nabi Ahmed v. Ramprakash Rastogi and Ors. 1989 MPRCJ 482, Narain v. Basant Rao 1991 (1) MPWN 166, Hemant Kumar v. Shankarlal and Ors. 1997 (2) MPLJ 671 , Girish Chandra Chaturvedi and Anr. v. Smt. Pushpa Bhopatkar and Ors. 1999 (II) MPJR SN 11 have held that despite the death of landlord of the specified category under Section 23-J of the Act, the application for eviction may be pursued by the legal representatives. 6. Thus, there being apparently a clear conflict, a request was made for placement of the papers before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of an appropriate Bench for resolving the conflict. Consequently, the case is listed before this Division Bench on reference. 7. Shri G.M. Chaphekar and Shri A.S. Kutumbale, learned senior Advocates made their respective submissions. 8. 6. Thus, there being apparently a clear conflict, a request was made for placement of the papers before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of an appropriate Bench for resolving the conflict. Consequently, the case is listed before this Division Bench on reference. 7. Shri G.M. Chaphekar and Shri A.S. Kutumbale, learned senior Advocates made their respective submissions. 8. It has been contended by Shri G.M. Chaphekar, learned senior counsel that Leelawatibai was admittedly falling in the specified category of landlords under Section 23-J of the Act and was entitled to submit an application under Section 23-A of the Act for eviction. She was covered under the definition of landlord within the meaning of Section 23-J of the Act, which reads as follows: 23-J. Definition of landlord for the purposes of Chapter III-A.-For the purposes of this Chapter 'landlord' means a landlord who is- (i) a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of defence Services; or (ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or State Government; or (iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or (iv) physically handicapped person; or (v) a servant of any Government including a member of defence services who, according to his service conditions, is not entitled to Government accommodation on his posting to a place where he owns a house or is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of a penal rent on his posting to such a place. 9. Section 23-A enables the landlord as defined hereinabove to submit an application for eviction on the grounds enumerated thereunder. Application in question was based on Clause (a) of Section 23-A which reads as follows: 23-A (a) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required "bona fide" by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, or for any person for whose benefit, the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such persons has no Ors. reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. Explanation. reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. Explanation. For the purposes of this clause, "accommodation let for residential purposes" includes (i) any accommodation which having been let for use as a residence is without the express consent of the landlord, used wholly or partly for any non-residential purpose; (ii) any accommodation which has not been let under an express provision of contract for non-residential purpose; 10. The aforesaid provisions clearly enabled Leelawatibai to submit an application for eviction for occupation of the suit premises as residence for herself and for members of her family. Accordingly, the application was submitted by the applicants before the Court of Rent Controlling Authority on the ground of bonafide requirement for herself and Ors. members of her family. Thus, the application at the time of presentation before the Court of Rent Controlling Authority was unquestioningly competent. The application for eviction was submitted on 28.3.1994, whereas Leelawatibai died on 27.1.1998. Since the requirement as alleged in the application for eviction was also of the members of the family covered under the said Act, it is contended that the same could not have been dismissed on the ground of death of Leelawatibai. 11. Shri A.S. Kutumbale, learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondents contended that provisions contained in Order 22 of the Code of Code of Civil Procedure have no application to the application for eviction submitted under Section 23-A of the Act because it does not amount to plaint. It is further contended by Shri A.S. Kutumbale, learned senior counsel for the Respondents that no specific procedure has been provided for Rent Controlling Authority in the event of death of landlord in an application for eviction pending before him. 12. We are not inclined to accept this contention because Rule 16 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Rules, 1966 postulates that Rent Controlling Authority may be guided by the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. For convenience Rule 16 is reproduced below: 16. Code of Code of Civil Procedure to be generally followed.-In deciding any question relating to procedure not specifically provided by the Act and these rules, the Rent Controlling Authority shall as far as possible, be guided by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil procedure, 1908. 13. For convenience Rule 16 is reproduced below: 16. Code of Code of Civil Procedure to be generally followed.-In deciding any question relating to procedure not specifically provided by the Act and these rules, the Rent Controlling Authority shall as far as possible, be guided by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil procedure, 1908. 13. This being so, we hold that Rent Controlling Authority will not be unjustified in applying the provisions of Order 22 of Code of Code of Civil Procedure It may be further seen that non-applicants did not make any opposition in writing to the application under Order 22 Rule 3 C.P.C., which was allowed on 7.4.1998 by the Rent Controlling Authority, who permitted the remaining applicants, who happened to be legal heirs of Leelawatibai to pursue the application for eviction. The order dated 7.4.1998 directing thereby the remaining applicants to delete the name of Leelawatibai and, thus, to pursue the application for eviction implicitly, was not challenged by the Respondent at the right juncture. Instead, the non-applicant, continued to contest the application for eviction by participating in the proceedings for eviction before the Rent Controlling Authority. 14. We may successfully refer to the following passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shantilal Thakordas and Ors. v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala (1976) 4 SCC 417 . If the law permitted the eviction of the tenant for the requirement of the landlord "for occupation as a residence for himself and members of his family", then the requirement was both of the landlord and the members of his family. On his death the right to sue did survive to the members of the family of the deceased landlord. We are unable to take the view that the requirement of the occupation of the members of the family of the original landlord was his requirement and ceased to be the requirement of the members of his family on his death. After the death of the original landlord the senior member of his family takes his place and is well competent to continue the suit for eviction for his occupation and the occupation of the Ors. members of the family. 15. It is further contended on behalf of the Respondents that Leelawatibai was the only landlord of specified category, whereas the Ors. applicants did not fall in the said category. members of the family. 15. It is further contended on behalf of the Respondents that Leelawatibai was the only landlord of specified category, whereas the Ors. applicants did not fall in the said category. This being so, after the death of Leelawatibai, the Rent Controlling Authority ceased to have jurisdiction to entertain the application for eviction under Chapter III-A of the said Act. This has been countered by Shri G.M. Chaphekar, learned senior counsel that once the application for eviction was competent at the time of presentation, jurisdiction of the Rent Controlling Authority to deal with it is not affected by subsequent death of the landlord falling under the specified category. 16. It is true that Leelawatibai alone was landlord falling under the specified category. This being so, she was well competent to submit an application for eviction on the ground under Section 23-A (a) of the Act. It has not been disputed by the learned senior counsel for the Respondents that the application for eviction during the life time of Leelawatibai could not have been legally dismissed merely on account of inclusion of her sons as applicants No. 2 to 7. The question before us would be that whether the death of landlord falling under the specified category would make the application for eviction incompetent. 17. Shri G.M. Chaphekar, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the following passage of the Apex Court decision in the case of Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd v. Nageshwara Rao AIR 1956 SC 213 The validity of a petition must be judged on the facts as they were at the time of its presentation, and a petition which was valid when presented cannot, in the absence of a provision to that effect in the statute, cease to be maintainable by reason of events subsequent to its presentation. 18. Shri A.S. Kutumbale, learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondents has been unable to point out any specific provision which would make the application for eviction of present nature (projecting need of landlord of the specified category as well as members of his family) non-maintainable by reason of death of such landlord. 19. 18. Shri A.S. Kutumbale, learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondents has been unable to point out any specific provision which would make the application for eviction of present nature (projecting need of landlord of the specified category as well as members of his family) non-maintainable by reason of death of such landlord. 19. In view of this we hold that the application for eviction filed by the landlord of specified category for the bonafide residential need of himself or his family members will not abate on his death during the pendency of application for eviction before the Court of Rent Controlling Authority and his legal representatives shall have right to pursue the proceedings for eviction under Chapter III-A of the Act. 20. Now, we may deal with the status of various single bench authorities cited at bar and Ors. relevant authorities. Case of Mahesh Chand 2008 (1) MPWN 71 though reproduced in toto does not make it clear that whether the eviction was sought by the landlord of specified category for the need of herself alone or also for the members of her family. In former kind of requirement, decision may be held good. However, in later kind of requirement, we hold that it would not be a good law. 21. In case of Smt. Jarina 2001 (II) MPACJ 169 an application for eviction was submitted for the bona fide requirement of the deceased landlady Hazzanibai herself alone. This being so, it has been rightly held by the learned Single Judge that the cause of action for eviction under Chapter III-A of the Act based on the alleged need did not survive, after the death of the landlady. 22. In case of Gangadhar v. Shantaram Lokre reported as 1994 JLJ 408 , the landlady had filed an application for eviction under Section 23-A of the Act with the assertion that she is widow and she bona fide requires house for the residence of her sons and grandsons. Clause (a) of Section 23-A enables a landlord to submit an application for eviction before the Rent Controlling Authority on the ground that the premises is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or by any member of his family. Clause (a) of Section 23-A enables a landlord to submit an application for eviction before the Rent Controlling Authority on the ground that the premises is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or by any member of his family. In the case of Gangadhar (supra), Smt. Radhabai, being widow, at the time of filing of the application for eviction, was a landlady falling in the specified category under Section 23-J of the Act and the application for eviction was, thus, well competent. This being so, the learned Single Judge had rightly found the same to be maintainable. 23. In case of Narain v. Basant Rao 1990 MPJR 517, it was held that the landlady Smt. Ansuyiyabai was alive on the date of passing of the order for eviction by the Rent Controlling Authority. This Court placing reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Smt. Phool Rani and Ors. v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia AIR 1973 SC 2110 reiterated the following observation of the Supreme Court: - ... the estate is entitled to the benefit which, under a decree, has accrued in favour of the Plaintiff and therefore the legal representatives are entitled to defend further proceedings, like an appeal, which constitute a challenge to that benefit. This being not a situation herein, we are not concerned with it, at present. 24. In case of Indarmal v. Dropadabai 2004 (2) MPLJ 314 an application for eviction was submitted by the widow Smt. Surajbai for bona fide requirement of her son, which is permissible in view of language of Clause (b) of Section 23-A of the Act. Thus, application for eviction was well competent and son of the deceased applicant, on his substitution, during pendency of the application itself could have continued with the proceedings for eviction before the Rent Controlling Authority. This, too, has been, thus, decided in consonance with the opinion of the present Division Bench. 25. In case of Hemant Kumar v. Shankarlal reported as 1997 (2) MPLJ 671 , an application for eviction under Chapter III-A of the Act was submitted by the landlady on the ground of her own bona fide need for business. Learned Single Judge held that the son of the landlady can pursue the matter for the need of his son. In case of Hemant Kumar v. Shankarlal reported as 1997 (2) MPLJ 671 , an application for eviction under Chapter III-A of the Act was submitted by the landlady on the ground of her own bona fide need for business. Learned Single Judge held that the son of the landlady can pursue the matter for the need of his son. The son of the landlady was handicapped person and was permitted to pursue the proceedings for eviction under Chapter III-A. Thus, the situation in case of Hemant Kumar was all together different. 26. In the case of Girish Chandra Chaturvedi and Anr. v. Smt. Pushpa Bhopatkar and Ors. 1999 (II) MPJR SN 11, legal heirs of widow landlady are allowed to continue the proceedings after the death of landlady. 27. In the case of Santosh Kumar Jaiswal v. Joseph and Ors. 1999 (II) MLJR 19, the death of the landlady falling in specified category occurred after the order of eviction was passed by the Rent Controlling Authority. This being not the situation in the instant case, we are not concerned with it. However, by way of caution, we hasten to add that the earlier contrary view expressed by the Hon'ble Judge Shri R.C. Lahoti (as he then was, later on became Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India) in the case of Narain (Supra), was not taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge, which derived strength from Supreme Court's decision in Phool Rani's case which has been reiterated in following cases. In case of Shantilal Thakordas and Ors. v. Chimanlal Manganlal Telwala reported as (1976) 4 SCC 417 , it has been observed: If the law permitted the eviction of the tenant for the requirement of the landlord "for occupation as a residence for himself and members of his family", then the requirement was both of the landlord and the members of the family. On his death the right to sue did survive to the members of the family of the deceased landlord. We are unable to take the view that the requirement of the occupation of the members of the family of the original landlord was his requirement and ceased to be the requirement of the members of his family on his death. In case of Raghunath G. Panhale (dead) by L.Rs. v. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. We are unable to take the view that the requirement of the occupation of the members of the family of the original landlord was his requirement and ceased to be the requirement of the members of his family on his death. In case of Raghunath G. Panhale (dead) by L.Rs. v. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. reported as (1999) 8 SCC 1 , it has again been observed: - 12. Learned Counsel for the Respondent, however, raised anOrs. point regarding abatement and relied upon Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia to contend that while the matter was in the trial Court, the original Plaintiff died, that the cause of action based on his bona fide requirement ceased to exist and the suit could not have been continued by his heirs. This was because the original Plaintiff's requirement would not be same as that of his heirs. It is true, the above judgment does support the above contention. On the main point, the above decision was overruled in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala where it was held that if the original Plaintiff pleaded that it was his own need and that of the family members, the cause of action would survive on his death to his heirs. In Shantilal case it was pointed out that if the landlord claimed possession on the ground of bona fide requirement for himself and his family members, his family members could continue the same eviction case, after the landlord's death, without amendment since the cause of action would survive to them. 28. In case of Shakuntala Bai and Ors. v. Narayan Das and Ors.s reported as (2004) 5 SCC 772 , it has been observed: 15. As the preamble shows, the Madhya Pradesh Control Act, 1961 has been enacted for expeditious trial of eviction cases on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlords and generally to regulate and control eviction of tenants. If the subsequent event like the death of the landlord is to be taken note of at every stage till the decree attains finality, there will be no end to litigation. By the time a second appeal gets decided by the High Court, generally a long period elapses and on such a principle if during this period the landlord who instituted the proceedings dies, the suit will have to be dismissed without going into merits. By the time a second appeal gets decided by the High Court, generally a long period elapses and on such a principle if during this period the landlord who instituted the proceedings dies, the suit will have to be dismissed without going into merits. The same thing may happen in a fresh suit filed by the heirs and it may become an unending process. Taking into consideration the subsequent events may, at times, lead to rendering the whole proceedings taken infructuous and colossal waste of public time. There is no warrant for interpreting a rent control legislation in such a manner, the basic object of which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The object is not to deprive the owners of their properties for all times to come. 29. In the result, we answer the reference in the following manner: (1) In an application for eviction by landlord of specified category under Section 23-J of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act based on the bona fide requirement of the landlord himself and any Ors. person permitted under Clause (a) or (b) of Section 23-A of the Act, the death of landlord will not result into abatement of the proceedings and legal heirs substituted in place of the landlord may continue the proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority; (2) In case of death of landlord during the pendency of the application for eviction under Chapter III-A based on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord alone, it would come to an end on death of the landlord and substitution of the legal heirs may not be permitted, because the cause of action, as pleaded in the application would come to an end with the death of the landlord. (3) If the death of the landlord takes place after the eviction order is passed in his favour, the legal representatives of the landlord nevertheless may continue the revisional proceedings to defend the order of eviction. 30. We may further observe here that the single bench decisions of this Court contrary to the aforesaid are not good law and are not binding. The order of reference may be placed before the learned Single Judge for deciding the civil revision against the order of Rent Controlling Authority, on merits in accordance with law. 30. We may further observe here that the single bench decisions of this Court contrary to the aforesaid are not good law and are not binding. The order of reference may be placed before the learned Single Judge for deciding the civil revision against the order of Rent Controlling Authority, on merits in accordance with law. It is made clear that we have merely decided the question of reference and learned Single Judge while deciding the civil revision is well empowered to appreciate the findings with regard to the existence of ground for eviction under Clause (a) of Section 23-A of the Act. No order as to costs.