Judgment : This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order, dated 10.02.2009, passed by the Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad (Appellate Authority) in R.A.No.94 of 2008, whereby and whereunder, the Appellate Authority has set aside the orders of the Principal Rent Controller, Secunderabad, passed in R.C.No.137 of 2006, dated 27.03.2008. 2. The parties hereinafter will be referred to as they are arrayed before the Principal Rent Controller for the sake of convenience. 3. The petitioner is a landlady. Her simple case is that she is the owner of the shop bearing No.1-2-74 to 76, admeasuring about 1400 square feet, situated at Parklane, Secunderabad (hereinafter referred to as petition schedule shop). The respondent is her tenant and the agreed rent is Rs.900/- per month. The petitioner’s sons and husband are carrying on business under the name and style of “Ramesh Watch Company” from a tenanted shop bearing No.127 and 128 (old) corresponding to 1-6-55 (new), situated at Parklane, Secunderabad, and an eviction petition had been instituted against Ramesh Watch Company for its eviction from the said premises in R.C.No.140 of 2004 on the file of the Principal Rent Controller, at Secunderabad, and the said R.C. has been allowed on 31.03.2006 ordering the eviction of Ramesh Watch Company. As a result of eviction order passed against Ramesh Watch Company, the shop in the occupation of the respondent is urgently required by her for the purpose of her family biasness which is being carried on by her husband and sons and the requirement of petition schedule shop is, therefore, genuine and bona fide. She got issued a lawyer’s notice, dated 21.06.2006, to the respondent to vacate the premises and as the respondent gave a reply through his Advocate and raised untenable grounds, she filed R.C. No.137 of 2006. 4. The respondent filed a counter affidavit admitting that he is the tenant of the petition schedule shop, but he denied that the petition schedule shop is required by the petitioner bona fidely for her business. His case is that this petition has been filed only for the purpose of evicting him and that the landlady owns several movable and immovable commercial properties in twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and the addresses of properties given by the respondent in the counter are as follows: 1. His case is that this petition has been filed only for the purpose of evicting him and that the landlady owns several movable and immovable commercial properties in twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and the addresses of properties given by the respondent in the counter are as follows: 1. Premises bearing No.130, Parklane, Secunderabad, which is adjacent to the alleged business premises of Ramesh Watch Company, which is owned by the landlady for the last 15 years. 2. Commercial property in Plot No.3, admeasuring 10000 square feet consisting of ground + three floors, situated at Begumpet, opposite to Shopper’s Stop, Secunderabad, and the said premises is vacant. 3. Commercial property consisting of ground + three floors admeasuring 600 square feet and this property is also vacant. 5. It is also the case of the respondent that there are other movable and immovable properties which are owned and possessed by the petitioner and her family members at P.G. Road, Secunderabad, and other places in Secunderabad which are more suitable for their business purpose. The landlady has suppressed all these facts. She is bound to disclose all these properties owned and possessed by her. The further case of the respondent is that the husband of the landlady approached the respondent and demanded a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- towards Pagidi (according to Sri Balchand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, Pagidi means amount kept with the landlord as security), in the event of respondent wants to continue as a tenant in the said shop. It is also the case of the respondent that he has been carrying on his business since more than four decades and the entire family is serving out of the income derived from the business carried in the schedule premises and if he is evicted it will cause great hardship and loss to him. 6. On behalf of the petitioner, the petitioner herself was examined as P.W.1 and her son was examined as P.W.2 and Exs.P-1 to P-6 were marked. On behalf of the respondent, the respondent himself was examined as R.W.1 and Exs.R-1 to R-11 were marked. 7. 6. On behalf of the petitioner, the petitioner herself was examined as P.W.1 and her son was examined as P.W.2 and Exs.P-1 to P-6 were marked. On behalf of the respondent, the respondent himself was examined as R.W.1 and Exs.R-1 to R-11 were marked. 7. The learned Rent Controller, having observed that an eviction order has been passed in R.C.No.140 of 2004 evicting the petitioner from a shop in which the landlady has been doing business and, therefore, her requirement is bona fide and that the said premises is only at a distance of 100 yards from the petition schedule shop and therefore the petition schedule premises appears to be more suitable to the landlady. Having referred to the judgment in MONINGI JAGANNADHAM VS. TANKALA LAKSHMI KANTHAMMA ( 1985 (1) ALT 509 ), wherein it was held that the landlady who has not disclosed that she had other smaller non-residential buildings, would not disentitle her for eviction of the tenant, allowed the RC. 8. Being aggrieved by the same, the tenant carried the matter in appeal. The learned Appellate Authority observing that the landlady herself admitted in her cross-examination that her husband is getting rental income from residential as well as commercial premises and that there were talks between the landlady and the respondent for enhancement of rent and that her sons are doing business of Ramesh and Watch Company, at Park Lane, Secunderabad, and that her sons have been doing business in the premises shown in Exs.R-5, R-6, R-7 and R-9 and that the building shown in Ex.R-9 stands in the name of her son and Sadguru building stands in the name of her husband, came to the conclusion that the landlady is having several nonresidential premises. The Appellate Authority has also taken into consideration the evidence of the landlady, wherein she admitted that the tenant did not have any other premises except the petition schedule shop. Referring to Ex.R-10, the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the properties are in the name of sons of the landlady and Ex.R-11 also shows that her sons are the owners of the premises therein. Referring to Ex.R-10, the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the properties are in the name of sons of the landlady and Ex.R-11 also shows that her sons are the owners of the premises therein. The Appellate Authority also came to the conclusion that since the landlady did not plead in her petition about the size and suitability of the premises and also failed to aver that she has no other non-residential premises in the suit and not suitable for the business of her sons, there is no need to consider the factors such as size, quality, suitability and convenience, etc. The Appellate Authority has distinguished the decision cited by the landlady in BOCHU RAMAKRISHNAIAH AND OTHERS VS. GOLLA VENKATA KOTESHWAR RAO AND OTHERS ( 2003 (2) ALD 517 ) and the unreported decision in C.R.P.No.6019 of 2005. Referring to the decision of this Court in MOHD. ABDUL REHMAN AND OTHERS VS. B. MANORAMA AND ANOTHER (2008 (4) ALD 702)and relying on the said decision and holding that the landlady has several residential and non-residential properties in twin cities, and further observing that the respondent proved the said fact, the appellate authority allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Principal Rent Controller. 9. Aggrieved by the same, the landlady filed the present revision petition. 10. Sri Venkataramana, learned Senior Counsel for the landlady, submits that the sons of the landlady who are doing Watch Company business have to vacate the premises in view of the eviction order passed against them and that the landlady is aged about 83 years old and she does not own any other non-residential premises and that the premises now shown by the tenant in Exs.R4 to R9 and R10 are not in the name of the landlady and that she is not even joint owner of those premises and that Ex.R11 encumbrance certificate proves the same and that the burden lies on the tenant to prove that the landlady is having some other non-residential premises and that basing on the photographs showing the name board of the business no decision can be taken. It is also his submission that the Appellate Court failed to consider the above aspects. It is also his submission that certain admissions made by the respondent in his evidence towards eviction were not taken into consideration by the appellate authority. It is also his submission that the Appellate Court failed to consider the above aspects. It is also his submission that certain admissions made by the respondent in his evidence towards eviction were not taken into consideration by the appellate authority. It is also his submission that the findings of the appellate authority are mere surmises and conjectures and the tenant failed to prove that the landlady herself owns a nonresidential premises in the city. With reference to the claim of the additional evidence his submission is that there is no provision to receive the documents at this stage. 11. Sri Balchand, learned counsel for the tenant, submits that additional evidence can be received even at the revisional stage. His main submission is that the landlady is guilty of suppression of facts and she did not refer to the other non-residential premises standing in the name of her husband and her sons. His main submission is that the landlady and her family members own several non-residential premises and that her husband got own business and children having separate business in their premises and more over they have taken a multi-storied building adjoining the suit premises on lease for 20 years and have sub-let the shops in that multi-storied building. It is also his submission that the husband of the landlady has his own business and that her sons are well settled in the business and that Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, does not apply to the facts of the present case. The question of suitability, size etc., does not arise since the landlady does not whisper about the other non-residential premises already occupied by her husband, sons and their family members. It is also his submission that the sons of the landlady are not depending on her and they have got their independent business. The words used ‘for the purpose of business which he is carrying on, on the date of application’ does not apply since the landlady is not carrying on any business on the date of application. When she is seeking the eviction of tenant for the purpose of business of her sons, the other non-residential premises in possession of her sons should be taken into consideration and when they are holding other non-residential premises the question of evicting the tenant does not arise. When she is seeking the eviction of tenant for the purpose of business of her sons, the other non-residential premises in possession of her sons should be taken into consideration and when they are holding other non-residential premises the question of evicting the tenant does not arise. It is also argued that the sons of the landlady have purchased the premises bearing No.1-6-53/248 and in view of the specific provision of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, wherein no word such as other family members have been incorporated the decisions rendered in view of the specific words used in other enactments do not apply to the facts of the present case. It is also his submission that the general observations if any made by the Apex Court cannot be taken into consideration in view of the specific provision in the AP Act. It is submitted that the married sons and daughters cannot be treated as dependents. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel have been discussed in later paras. 12. The points that arise for consideration are; 1. Whether the landlady who is in possession of several non-residential buildings can seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement without any reference to the suitability and size of the building required? 2. Whether the petitioner can invoke Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act in the circumstances of the case? 3. Whether the subsequent events can be taken into consideration? 4. Whether the matter is required to be remanded to enable the parties to lead further evidence? POINT NO.1: 13. Learned counsel for the landlady placed reliance on B. Artho Thyadi (died) by LRs v. G. Kamaraju ( 1988 (2) ALT 109 ), wherein this Court while dealing with the dispute between landlord and tenant with reference to non-residential building observed as follows. “Section 10(3)(a)(iii) says that if the landlord requires a non-residential building, the Controller can put him in possession provided the landlord is not occupying a nonresidential building in the city which is owned or to the permission of which he is entitled (a) for the purpose of business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application and (b) for the purpose of a business which he bona fide proposes to commence.” 14. The question whether the landlord who is in possession of non-residential premises can seek eviction of his tenant came up for consideration in several decisions. The settled legal position appears to be where a landlord is already in occupation of a nonresidential premises and when he wants to evict a tenant from another non-residential premises for expansion of his business or for starting a fresh business for his bona fide requirement which includes the requirement of his children or any other person dependant on him then the issues such as convenience, size, suitability, location of the non-residential premises already in possession of the landlord and the premises in the occupation of a tenant have to be compared. If the premises already in occupation of a landlord is not sufficient, suitable in its size, location for the purpose of expansion of his business or for starting a fresh business, then the landlord though he may be in possession of a non-residential premises can evict a tenant from another nonresidential premises in which the tenant is doing business. But, however, the important question that arise for consideration in this revision is when a landlady is in possession of not only one non-residential premises, but several non-residential premises and when she wants to evict the tenant from a non-residential premises whether she can invoke Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Another important aspect that arises for consideration is whether a landlady is required to plead and prove that she has been in possession of several non-residential premises and none of those non-residential premises are suitable for expansion of business which she is carrying on as on the date of the application or for commencing of a new business. 15. Thus, as per Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, much stress has been given on the words the business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application. Of course, in this case, the sons of the landlady were carrying on business in one of the premises from which they are ordered to be evicted and therefore the requirement of the landlady comes under the first part i.e., for the purpose of business which she is carrying on, on the date of application, but however the fact remains that the landlady has to prove that she is not occupying any other non-residential building in the city. When a landlord seeks eviction of a tenant on the ground, that his sons or other family members require the non-residential premises in the occupation of a tenant, then in all fairness the other non-residential premises owned by the landlord and his sons or other family members for whose benefit the eviction of tenant is sought have to be taken into consideration. When we are extending the benefit of personal requirement and saying that requirement of sons and other family members of landlord is also the requirement of landlord, on the same analogy we have to treat the non-residential premises standing in the name of his sons and other family members as the non-residential premises held by the landlord. Therefore, again it has to be seen when the landlady in this case is in possession of several non-residential premises whether she can invoke Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. 16. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is as follows. Therefore, again it has to be seen when the landlady in this case is in possession of several non-residential premises whether she can invoke Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. 16. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is as follows. Section 10(3)(a):- A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building- (i) in case it is a residential building- (a) if the landlord is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned and he requires it for his own occupation; (b) if the landlord who has more buildings than one in the city, town or village concerned is in occupation of one such building and he bona fide requires another building instead for his own occupation; (ii) in case it is a non-residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, if the landlord requires it for his own use and if he is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise; (iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a nonresidential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise- (a) for the purpose of business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application, or (b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence: Provided further that where a landlord has obtained possession of a building under this clause he shall not be entitled to apply again under this clause- (i) in case he has obtained possession of a residential building, for possession of another residential building of his own; (ii) in case he has obtained possession of a non-residential building for possession of another non-residential building of his own…….” 17. On behalf of the landlady reliance is placed on M/s Vijayalaxmi Printing Press v. N. Shankar ( 1991(1) ALT 249 ). In that case the landlord himself was a statutory tenant of a building belonging to a third party. On behalf of the landlady reliance is placed on M/s Vijayalaxmi Printing Press v. N. Shankar ( 1991(1) ALT 249 ). In that case the landlord himself was a statutory tenant of a building belonging to a third party. It was argued that the landlord is disentitled to seek possession of the non-residential premises occupied by the tenant. The Apex Court in case between Padmanabha Setty v. Papiah Setty ( AIR 1966 SC 1824 ) resolved the controversy and held that the landlord, who is only a statutory tenant, is not debarred from seeking possession of his own non-residential building. It is not incumbent on such a landlord to first vacate the non-residential premises in his occupation as a condition precedent for maintaining an eviction petition in respect of his own non-residential premises in the occupation of his tenant. The said principle has been followed by the Full Bench of this Court in M/s Vijayalaxmi Printing Press’s case (2 supra). 18. Reliance is also placed by the learned counsel for the landlady on P. Lingamma v. P. Venugopal ( 2008 (6) ALD 663 ). In that case, the landlords filed an eviction petition on the grounds of willful default and for bona fide requirement. The landlords case is that the second petitioner-landlord is carrying on business in a rented mulgi and requires the mulgi in possession of a tenant for his own purpose. In that case a plea was taken that the landlord is having adjacent premises which is recently let out. However, on evidence, it was found that the neighbouring mulgi has fallen to the share of his brother PW.2 and it is not owned by the landlord. With reference to the non-pleading in the eviction petition about the non-availability of non-residential premises this Court observed that the requirement of such pleading in the eviction petition would assume more importance in the event the tenant is able to show that the landlord does hold or is otherwise entitled to any other non-residential premises. 19. A reference is made to the judgment of the Apex Court in Duggi Veera Venkata Gopala Satyanarayana v. Sakala Veera Raghavaiah ( AIR 1987 SC 406 ). 19. A reference is made to the judgment of the Apex Court in Duggi Veera Venkata Gopala Satyanarayana v. Sakala Veera Raghavaiah ( AIR 1987 SC 406 ). In that case the Apex Court came to the conclusion that the landlords did not suppress any fact at the trial and disclosed the non-residential buildings owned by him but not in their occupation and that the Courts observed that the landlords have come forward with a clean and clear case with reasons as to why they choose the disputed shop room for the proposed business to be commenced by the landlord. It was further observed that it will be a futile exercise to remand the matter to the Rent Controller to allow the parties to amend the pleadings and to adduce further evidence. In that case it was also observed that the disputed shop room is centrally located in the heart of Guntur city in a business locality and it is the best place for commencement of readymade garment shop. Thus, on facts it was found that the landlord was not in possession of any other non-residential premises or that he was entitled to any other non-residential premises in that case. 20. Each case has to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Where in a case the landlord is in possession of several non-residential premises and is entitled for their possession and when he is seeking eviction of a tenant from a non-residential premises it appears that the landlord must plead that the other non-residential premises held by him are not suitable in size, location etc., for the business he proposes to start or for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, on the date of application. 21. Reliance is also placed on Mandalal Srikishan Malpani v. Ayodhya Devi Asaws ( 1986 (2) APLJ 327 ). On facts, it was found that the landlady has been living since a long time with her husband, husband’s brother, his wife and three children and that, therefore, the family of the landlady must be said to be consist of seven members. She purchased the building and sought eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement and this Court observed as follows. She purchased the building and sought eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement and this Court observed as follows. “In case of a non-residential building owned by a Hindu joint family, the requirement of a member of the joint family would be the requirement of the landlord and the business being carried on or proposed to be carried on by a member of such family would satisfy the requirement of the clause. Similarly, where one or more of the several co-owners propose to commence a business, or require the premises for the purpose of a business which they are carrying on, the requirement of the clause would be satisfied. We must emphasize again that whether the business in question is that of the landlord or not is always a question of fact to be determined by the Court in each case in the light of the pleadings, and the evidence adduced by the parties. The burden, however, is upon the landlord to allege and prove all the necessary facts to satisfy the requirement of the said clause.” 22. Therefore, even if there is a proposal to commence business by a member of family or by a co-owner such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. Thus, there cannot be any doubt to say that the requirement of a member of joint family ie., son, daughter or by a co-owner or a dependent has to be deemed to be the requirement of the landlord. In the case on hand, the landlady became too old and her case is that she requires the premises for her family business i.e., for the purpose of business of her sons on the ground that the premises which were are occupied by her sons as tenants has to be vacated in view of the eviction orders passed in respect of said premises. 23. Sri Balchand, learned counsel for the tenant, has taken me through the several Acts of different States, wherein different wording have been used with reference to ‘bona fide’ requirement. Under Section 5(1)(c) of the Assam Act, 1972, it is worded as “for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held”. 23. Sri Balchand, learned counsel for the tenant, has taken me through the several Acts of different States, wherein different wording have been used with reference to ‘bona fide’ requirement. Under Section 5(1)(c) of the Assam Act, 1972, it is worded as “for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held”. Under Section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Act, 1947, under Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Act, 1947 and Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Act, 1961, almost same wordings have been used as used in Assam Act. Under Section 14(e) of the Delhi Act, 1958, it is mentioned as “for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held”. Under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Act 1965 it is mentioned as “for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him”. Under Section 12(1)(e) and (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Act, 1961, it was mentioned as follows. “For the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held”. Thus, there is variation in the exact words used in various Acts with regard to scope and ambit of the requirement. While some Acts confined the requirement of landlord only the other Acts extend it to the members of the family and to the dependents of the landlord. 24. As far as bona fide requirement is concerned, the term ‘bona fide’ means honestly, in good faith, without fraud or deception, without an ulterior motive. The word ‘require’ is something more than a mere wish or desire. The landlord must show the circumstances proving his necessity. As far as State of AP is concerned Section 10(3)(a)(iii) makes it clear that a landlord may seek eviction of the tenant in case if he is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under the Act or otherwise. 25. Sri S. Balchand has relied on Ramesh v. Balreddy ( AIR 1990 SC 1376 ). 25. Sri S. Balchand has relied on Ramesh v. Balreddy ( AIR 1990 SC 1376 ). In that case, landlord sought eviction of the tenant on the ground that his daughter required the premises for starting a separate clinic. She was assisting her husband in running a clinic. The apex Court found that the landlord was in possession of several other premises and was in the habit of starting eviction proceedings to pressurize the tenants to agree to raise the rent and if they agreed the eviction cases were withdrawn. On evidence, it was found that the landlord had been forcing the tenants to raise the rent from time to time. It was finally held that married daughter cannot be treated as dependent on her father. 26. Reliance is also placed on Narasaiah v. Narasimha Reddy ( 1995 (1) ALT 734 ), wherein it was held that the landlord who is in occupation of a non-residential building which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled to under the Act or any other law should not be permitted to recover possession of another non-residential building belonging to him by evicting the tenants therefrom. 27. In D. Devaji v. Sudarashana Rao (1994 Supp (1) SCC 729), the Apex Court observed as follows. The object of the Act is to enable the landlord to recover possession of his non-residential building in occupation of a tenant, if his requirement is bona fide for the purpose of the business which he is carrying on or which he bona fide proposes to commence. The landlord should not be in possession of another non-residential building or of which he is entitled to be in possession in the city, town or village concerned. The intendment of the legislature thereby is clear that a landlord who is in occupation of a non-residential building which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled to under the Act or any other law should not be permitted to recover possession of another non-residential building belonging to him by evicting the tenants therefrom. 28. Thus, the view taken in Vidyabai v. Shankarlal (AIR 1980 AP 184) was approved by the Apex Court. 29. Reliance is placed on Jupudi Sriranganayakulu v. Bonagiri Subbalakshmi ( 1997(4) ALT 740 ). In that case, the landlady was not examined, but her husband was examined. 28. Thus, the view taken in Vidyabai v. Shankarlal (AIR 1980 AP 184) was approved by the Apex Court. 29. Reliance is placed on Jupudi Sriranganayakulu v. Bonagiri Subbalakshmi ( 1997(4) ALT 740 ). In that case, the landlady was not examined, but her husband was examined. The case of the landlord was that the premises is required for use by her husband. This Court held that the said fact is proved by her by examining her husband. When the fact is pleaded is proved it is not necessary to the Court to probe into the competency or otherwise of the witness who is examined to prove the said fact. Thus, it was held that for the requirement of the husband landlady can seek eviction of the tenant. 30. Reliance is placed on OmPrakash v. Basanthilal ( 1999 (9) SCC 618 ) . In that case, the landlord sought eviction of the tenant on the ground that he required the said nonresidential accommodation for the purpose of setting up a new business for his son who was unemployed. When the matter came up for consideration, the Apex Court observed as follows. “A perusal of the provisions of Section 10(3)(iii)(b) and (c ) would show that both are mutually exclusive and operate in different fields. The ingredients of both the clauses are different and distinct. For the purpose of seeking relief of eviction under Section 10 (3)(iii)(b), a landlord has to satisfy different requirements than the requirements contemplated under Section 10(3)(iii)(c ) of the Act.” 31. Reliance is also placed on Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar ( AIR 1988 SC 1060 ). In that case, the landlord sought eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act for the occupation of his son. While referring to the fulfillment of conditions under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, the Apex Court observed that the landlord in order to succeed his petition should establish that he bona fidely requires the premises in addition to proving the other ingredients referred to therein. Reliance is also placed on Murugesan v. Ramalingam Pillai (Dead) (1995-SCC-Supp3-107), wherein while dealing with the same provision and on finding clear evidence to the effect that the landlords did not have any other shop except the shop in dispute, eviction was ordered. 32. Reliance is also placed on Murugesan v. Ramalingam Pillai (Dead) (1995-SCC-Supp3-107), wherein while dealing with the same provision and on finding clear evidence to the effect that the landlords did not have any other shop except the shop in dispute, eviction was ordered. 32. In M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal ( AIR 2001 SC 522 ), the Delhi High Court dealt with the provisions of Section 14(1)(E) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, but however on appreciation of evidence it was found that the alternate accommodation are being used by the servants of the landlord and in the above circumstances eviction order was passed. 33. Reliance is also placed on Kishan Chand v. Jagdish Pershad ( 2003 (9) SCC 151 ). In that case the landlord concealed the fact that his son owns a flat. Then the Apex Court found fault with the said landlord and held that he is guilty of concealment of residential accommodation held by his son. In that case the landlord was in possession of 13 rooms. Even a suggestion was given that he was in possession of 35 rooms and no suggestion was given to the tenant that he is giving exaggerated version and in the above circumstances the eviction petition was dismissed. Except the fact that premises is residential premises in that case, other circumstances are almost similar to the case on hand. 34. He has also relied on Rajinder Dhada v. Jagjit Singh ( 2002 (10) SCC 665 ), wherein the Apex Court while dealing with the provisions of Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, observed that the children for whose benefit the landlady is seeking eviction should prove that those children were dependent upon her. 35. The Apex Court, in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Pehal ( AIR 2002 SC 2256 ), after referring the case of B. Balaiah v. Chandoor lachaiah (AIR 1965 (1) (AP) 435), which was approved in Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by LRs (1979) 1 SCC 273 2001 SCC 273 , held as follows. “Our conclusions are crystallized as under: (i) the words ‘for his own use’ as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 must receive a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction. “Our conclusions are crystallized as under: (i) the words ‘for his own use’ as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 must receive a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction. (ii) The expression – landlord requires for ‘his own use’ is not confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but also of the normal ‘emanations’ of the landlord is included therein. All the cases and circumstances in which actual physical occupation or user by someone else, would amount to occupation or user by the landlord himself, cannot be exhaustively enumerated. It will depend on a variety of factors such as inter-relationship and interdependence – economic or otherwise, between the landlord and such person in the background of social, socio-religious and local customs and obligations of the society or region to which they belong. (iii) The tests to be applied are: (i) whether the requirement pleaded and proved may properly be regarded as the landlord’s own requirement? And, (ii) whether on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case actual occupation and user by a person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord as ‘his own’ occupation or user? The answer would, in its turn, depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationship and/or dependence between the landlord pleading the requirement as ‘his own’ and the person who would actually use the premises; (ii) the circumstances in which the claim arises and is put forward, and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim. The Court on being satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim, as distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold the landlord’s claim. (iv) While casting its judicial verdict, the Court shall adopt a practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life. (v) In the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord ‘for his own use’ within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii). 36. (iv) While casting its judicial verdict, the Court shall adopt a practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life. (v) In the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord ‘for his own use’ within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii). 36. Referring to the judgment of Devaji’s case in Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah and sons v. Pushpa Trading Company ( AIR 1999 SC 1503 ), the Apex Court held that the aspects of quality, size and suitability of the building have been totally put out of consideration. This would frustrate the purposes of the Act. Thus what the Apex Court held is that the aspect of quality, size and suitability can be taken into consideration. 37. Therefore, the settled legal position appears to be that where in a case the landlord is in possession of other non-residential premises then the landlord must prove that the other premises is not sufficient considering the aspects of quality, size and suitability of the building. Where in a case the landlord is in possession of several non-residential premises and failed to plead and prove that the other premises are not suitable for his business then his claim cannot be accepted. Then his requirement cannot be treated as bona fide requirement. Point No.2: 38. The petitioner’s case is very simple. On the date of filing of the petition her age was shown as 80 years and the occupation is shown as landlady. It is the case of landlady that her husband and sons have been carrying on business of watches and running the shop for more than 50 years and as a result of eviction order passed against Ramesh Watch Company, the shop in occupation of the respondent is urgently required by the petitioner for the purpose of her family business and that her requirement is genuine and bona fide. Thus it is clear that she has not whispered anything with regard to other premises which are in the occupation of her husband and Sons. Of course there are some decisions which go to show that there is no need to refer to the other nonresidential premises which are in the occupation of the landlord/landlady. Thus it is clear that she has not whispered anything with regard to other premises which are in the occupation of her husband and Sons. Of course there are some decisions which go to show that there is no need to refer to the other nonresidential premises which are in the occupation of the landlord/landlady. Of course depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case it may not be required for a landlord to specifically plead about the availability of other non-residential premises but certainly the same amounts to suppression of facts. Whether such plea is necessary or not or whether it amounts to suppression of facts or not have to be decided basing on the facts and circumstances of each case and there cannot be any hard and fast rule on this aspect. 39. The petitioner herself was examined as PW.1 and her son namely Kishore Chutani was examined as PW.2. As seen from the evidence of PW.1, she admitted that her husband has got his own business at her residence and he is also having rental income from the residential portions as well as commercial premises. PW.1 has also admitted that her relationship with the tenant is cordial and the tenant has been paying rents regularly. She has also admitted that there were talks between herself and the respondent for enhancement of rent. Thus, it is clear that there was demand for enhancement of the rent. Of course, she has denied the suggestion that she demanded Rs.5,00,000/- as pagidi (amount to be kept as security with the landlady). According to PW.1, she has five sons namely Ramesh, laxman, Chandru, Ashok and Kishore and all her sons have been doing business in Ramesh Watch Company at Parklane, Secunderabad, and settled in business. She further stated that her elder son sits in Sadguru building, second son sits in Parklane, third son sits in Satguru building, fourth and fifth sons in Ramesh Watch Company at Parklane, Secunderabad. When she was shown Ex.R5 photo pertaining to petition schedule premises, she admitted that in the adjacent to the building shown in Ex.R5 one of his son is carrying on business. Ex.R6 is the photo showing Sadguru building. Ex.R7 is the photo in which two shops are shown wherein her sons are doing business. Thus, it is clear that all the sons of the landlady have been doing business in different premises. Ex.R6 is the photo showing Sadguru building. Ex.R7 is the photo in which two shops are shown wherein her sons are doing business. Thus, it is clear that all the sons of the landlady have been doing business in different premises. She further admitted that the building shown in Ex.R9 photo belongs to them which consist of cellar and three upper floors. According to the landlady this building stands in the name of her son Ashok. She further stated that there are 12 flats in Sadguru building and the said building stands in the name of her husband. According to the landlady they are owning six flats in their residential building. There are two flats in Srinath complex standing in the name of her sons. She herself is having a bungalow at Balamrai. 40. She has also admitted that they owned bungalow at Motilalnagar, Begumpet. She has also admitted that the respondent is the tenant in the schedule premises since more than 50 years and that he does not have any other business except in the petition schedule premises. 41. Pw.2 is the son of landlady. His evidence shows that the premises under the occupation of the respondent is in Parklane, Secunderabad and it is about 100 yards from the premises where they are carrying on business and from which they are ordered to be evicted. The version of PW.2 is that his mother (landlady) does not own any commercial property in Secunderabad. PW.2 did not whisper anything in his chief affidavit with reference to the admissions made by her mother in her evidence. His evidence further shows that Ramesh Watch Company is a registered partnership firm with the partners G.D. Sugani, Ramesh G. Sugani, Laxman Sugani, Chandu Sugani. They are carrying on business in the name of Ramesh Watch Company at present in the premises of 800 sq.ft. He has denied the suggestion that he is carrying on business in the shop adjacent to the petition schedule premises in the name and style of Ramesh Watch Company, Swiss Watch Gallery. He admitted that the photographs shown to him in Ex.R7 pertains to Ramesh Watch Swiss Watch Gallery. According to him, it is his service centre. However, he admitted that there is a cloth banner as Ramesh Watch Sales and Services in front of the shop shown in Ex.R7. He admitted that the photographs shown to him in Ex.R7 pertains to Ramesh Watch Swiss Watch Gallery. According to him, it is his service centre. However, he admitted that there is a cloth banner as Ramesh Watch Sales and Services in front of the shop shown in Ex.R7. He further admitted that the shop shown in Ex.R7 is in an extent of 600 sq.ft., and the property shown in Ex.R7 consists of ground and first floor. He further admitted that the petition schedule premises is intervened by one shop with the shop shown in Ex.R7. Thus the evidence of PW.2 clearly shows that they are in possession of another premises which is just intervened by one shop to the petition schedule shop. With reference to the property covered under the sale deed dated 16.03.1990 in respect of property No.1-6-53/248, old No.130 the case of PW.2 is that it is not their property and himself and his brothers are not the owners of the said property but, he has admitted that their names are shown in the encumbrance certificate. He further admitted that the building comprising of ground ad two upper floors adjacent to the petition schedule premises belong to their family and he further admitted that it is his mother’s property. The extent of each floor is 1500 sq.ft., and the distance between the petition schedule premises and the shop shown in Ex.R7 is only 100 yards. He further admitted that they have double storied building at Motilal Nehru Nagar and they are running ladies hostel in that house. According to him, it is in residential area. He further admitted that the board Ramesh Watch Company is erected to the building shown in Ex.R6. When it is suggested to him that his elder brother gave evidence in RC No.140 of 2004 claiming that property and that eviction orders were passed on the ground that they are owners of the other properties, he simply denies the knowledge about the eviction orders passed therein. However, he admits that an appeal is pending against the said order. Thus the evidence of PW.2 who is no other than the son of the landlady itself shows that there is a building comprising of ground and two upper floors adjacent to the petition schedule premises and it is in the name of his mother i.e., landlady. However, he admits that an appeal is pending against the said order. Thus the evidence of PW.2 who is no other than the son of the landlady itself shows that there is a building comprising of ground and two upper floors adjacent to the petition schedule premises and it is in the name of his mother i.e., landlady. Thus, the evidence of PW.2 is self contradictory and contradicts the version of her mother. 42. The respondent was examined as RW.1. He has categorically deposed that the requirement of the petitioner is not bona fide and genuine. The documents in Ex.R10 and R11 prima facie show that the sons of the petitioner are owners of the property No.1-6-53/248 and Ex.R7 shows that the sons of the petitioner are carrying on similar business in the premises appearing in Ex.R7. According to RW.1 the petitioner has suppressed the fact that there are other commercial properties stand in the name of the sons of the petitioner. The specific case of RW.1 is that, the petitioner apart from demanding increase of rent, demanded Rs.5,00,000/- pagidi and since he was unable to meet the demand of the landlady eviction petition has been filed. It is also elicited that the name of the landlady is not shown as owner in Ex.R10. The evidence of RW.1 further shows that he is using the schedule premises for selling readymade garments and textiles and for tailoring and first floor is used for tailoring and as godown. 43. The learned Rent Controller observed that thought the petitioner’s sons and husband have some other commercial mulgies in twin cities, the requirement of the petitioner for carrying on business of Ramesh Watch Company in the petition schedule premises can only be treated as a bona fide requirement basing on the fact of suitability. It has to be seen that the petitioner never whispered about the other commercial premises belonging to her family in her petition nor stated that the other premises are not suitable for carrying on business of Ramesh Watch Company. It has to be seen that the petitioner never whispered about the other commercial premises belonging to her family in her petition nor stated that the other premises are not suitable for carrying on business of Ramesh Watch Company. Therefore, the point whether the petition schedule premises alone is suitable for carrying on the business of Ramesh Watch Company and the other premises which are in the occupation of the landlady or in the possession of her husband or sons are not suitable was not even whispered by the landlady and this aspect was not taken into consideration by the learned Rent Controller. 44. The appellate authority came to the conclusion that the landlady admitted that she owned several commercial residential premises in twin cities and that the said fact reveals that the landlady suppressed all the material facts and filed the eviction petition against the tenant with mala fide intention. The appellate authority, having taken into consideration the admissions made by the landlady and holding that the landlady never pleaded suitability of the petition schedule premises reversed the finding of the Rent Controller. A reading of the order of the appellate authority gives an impression that the appellate authority has considered the entire evidence in correct perspective and had taken into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. 45. Learned counsel for the respondent Sri Balchand submits that unless the approach of the appellate Court is wrong no interference is required and in support of his contention he relied on a decision reported in Vatcha Chandra Kumari v. Atava Narasimha Rao ( 1997(3) ALT 459 ), wherein this Court observed as follows. If the approach of the appellate Court is wrong and contrary to the known principles of law or if the conclusion is not borne out from the facts on record or if the finding is vitiated by error of law, this Court is entitled to interfere. 46. The conduct of the parties and the fact that the landlady and her other family members have been in possession of several other non-residential premises and that there was an attempt to enhance the rent in respect of the petition schedule premises cannot be ignored. 46. The conduct of the parties and the fact that the landlady and her other family members have been in possession of several other non-residential premises and that there was an attempt to enhance the rent in respect of the petition schedule premises cannot be ignored. Though it may be a fact that the premises in which PW.2 is carrying on business is ordered to be evicted, but that circumstance alone is not sufficient to seek eviction of the tenant. 47. A reading of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) makes it very clear that the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant provided he is not occupying a non-residential building in the city which is owned or to the possession of which he is entitled to. That means where a landlord is in occupation of a non-residential premises then the issue of size and suitability of the building already in the occupation of landlord have to be considered only in case where the landlord is in occupation of one non-residential premises and when he seeks eviction of a tenant from another non-residential premises. But, these aspects of quality, size and suitability will not apply where the landlord is in occupation of several nonresidential premises, particularly when the landlord does not plead about the other nonresidential premises possessed by him. In such a situation unless the landlord pleads and proves that all other premises which are in his possession or for the possession of which he is entitled to are not suitable in quality, size for the purpose of continuing his business or enlargement of their business, he cannot seek eviction of the tenant. Moreover these aspects need not be considered where the landlord has suppressed about the possession of several other non-residential premises in his possession. Since it is clear that the landlady owns other premises she cannot evict the respondent-tenant. Point No.2 is answered accordingly. POINT NO.3: 48. In support of his contention that the subsequent events can be taken into consideration, Sri S. Balchand, learned counsel for the tenant, has relied on Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram ( AIR 1992 SC 700 ). In that case, the landlord sought eviction of the tenant who was a tenant in the ground floor. The landlord was in occupation of two upper floors. He claimed that the accommodation in his occupation was insufficient for the requirement of himself and the members of his family. In that case, the landlord sought eviction of the tenant who was a tenant in the ground floor. The landlord was in occupation of two upper floors. He claimed that the accommodation in his occupation was insufficient for the requirement of himself and the members of his family. The claim of the landlord was not accepted by the Additional Rent Controller. The matter was carried in revision. In the revision the landlord sought to plead certain subsequent developments that the health of his first son was impaired by cardiac problems and that there was also an addition to the family by subsequent births of grand children and the second son of the landlord also, in the meanwhile, got married. The High Court permitted the landlord to raise these pleas and proceeded to dispose of the revision petition. The counsel for the tenant failed to appear at the rivisional hearings. No affidavit was filed by the tenant denying the version of the landlord. Then the revision was allowed then the matter was carried to the Apex Court. The Apex Court observed as follows. “The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the list. But, this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a ‘cautious cognizance’ of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mound the relief.” 49. However, in that case the matter was again remitted to the High Court requesting the High Court to give an opportunity to both the parties to raise their pleas to take into account the subsequent events as well as those now sought to be raised by the tenant. In that case, the observations of Justice Krishna Iyer were quoted from the judgment in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders (1975) 3 SCR 958 ), which is as follows. “It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. “It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justified bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice – subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling report to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad.” 50. In the above decision, the Apex Court also considered the point as to how the additional material placed before the Court can be taken into consideration and it was held as follows. “When subsequent events are pleaded in the course of an appeal or proceedings of revision, the Court may, having regard to the nature of the allegations of fact on which the plea is based, permit evidence to be adduced by means of affidavits as envisaged in Rule 1 of Order 19, CPC. The Court may also treat any affidavit filed in support of the pleadings itself as one under the said provision and call upon the opposite side to traverse it. The Court, if it finds that having regard to the nature of the allegations, it is necessary to record oral evidence tested by oral cross-examination, may have recourse to that procedure. It may record the evidence itself or remit the matter for an enquiry and evidence. All these depend upon the factual and situational differences characterizing a particular case and the nature of the plea raised. There can be no hard and fast rule governing the matter. The procedure is not to be burdened with technicalities.” 51. It may record the evidence itself or remit the matter for an enquiry and evidence. All these depend upon the factual and situational differences characterizing a particular case and the nature of the plea raised. There can be no hard and fast rule governing the matter. The procedure is not to be burdened with technicalities.” 51. Thus, it is clear that where it appears that the document sought to be filed as additional evidence appears to be necessary to pronounce judgment in a more satisfactory manner the Court can look into those documents. Of course, subject to the condition that there is no dispute with regard to those documents. If there is any dispute with regard to subsequent events the same required to be proved in accordance with law and if necessary additional evidence has to be taken. 52. Reliance is also placed on P. Ramachander Rao v. K. Dayanand ( (2005) 13 SCC 159 ), wherein this Court, relying on the judgment in D. Devaji v. K. Sudarashana Rao (1994 Supp (1) SCC 729) and Vidya Bai v. Shankerlal (AIR 1980 AP 184), dismissed the appeal filed by the landlord taking into consideration the fact that the landlord admitted in his evidence that after filing of eviction petition he has constructed two mulgies in his building at Ramkot and that he wants to use these two mulgies for himself i.e., for the purpose of business of his sons. Holding that the landlord owns two other Mulgies, it was observed that the claim made by the landlord cannot be countenanced. 53. In case between State of Rajasthan v. T.N. Sahani ( 2001 (10) SCC 619 ), the Apex Court observed as follows. “It is entirely for the Court to consider, at the time of hearing of the appeal on merits, whether the documents which are sought to be filed as additional evidence, need to be looked into to pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. If that be so, it is always open to the Court to look into the documents and for that purpose, amended provision of Order 41 Rule 27(b) CPC can be invoked.” 54. If that be so, it is always open to the Court to look into the documents and for that purpose, amended provision of Order 41 Rule 27(b) CPC can be invoked.” 54. He has also placed reliance on Seshambal (Dead) through LRs v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building (2010 (2) SCALE 414 = AIR 2010 SC 1521 ), wherein the Apex Court, while referring the judgments of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders ( 1975(1) SCC 770 ), Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal ( 2002 (2) SCC 256 = AIR 2002 SC 665 ), Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad ( AIR 1981 SC 1711 ) and Baba Kashinath Bhinge v. Samast Lingayat Gavali (1994 Supp (3) SCC 698) held that the Court is not precluded from taking a ‘cautious cognizance’ of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief. In Hasmat Rai’s case ( AIR 1981 SC 1711 ), the Supreme Court observed that if the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open tohim to point out such events and the court, including the appellate court, has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate upon the same. 55. Therefore, where a landlord seeks eviction of a tenant it is necessary for him to establish that he needs the premises and the need subsists till a decree is passed in his favour. In a case where such need is available at the time of filing of the petition but becomes extinct by the time matter attain finality in appeal or revision no decree will be justified, for that purpose the Court should take subsequent events into consideration and mould the relief accordingly. In the light of the discussion made supra and in view of the legal position it is clear that subsequent events can be taken into consideration. Point No.4: 56. The respondent tenant has filed CRPMP No.1346 of 2011 to receive the documents filed along with the said petition as additional evidence and he has also filed another application in CRPMP No.1347 of 2011 seeking permission to amend the counter. Point No.4: 56. The respondent tenant has filed CRPMP No.1346 of 2011 to receive the documents filed along with the said petition as additional evidence and he has also filed another application in CRPMP No.1347 of 2011 seeking permission to amend the counter. The case of the tenant is that the husband of landlady and her two sons Ashok Chugani and Kishore Chugani have obtained the entire building bearing No.131 consisting of ground floor shop bearing No.1-6-52 admeasuring 1504 sq.ft with a Mezzanine floor situated at Parklane, Secunderabad on lease for 20 years with the right of sub-letting and subletting the same at higher rents. It is also his case that the business of Ramesh Watch Company has already been expanded and show-room of Ramesh Watch Company has been opened at Kukatpally at shop No.109 below Swagath Hotel, Alluri Trade Centre, opposite to Kukatpally Housing Board Colony, Kukatpally and another showroom is opened at Inorbit mall High Tech City. 57. The case of the landlady as seen from the counter affidavit is that her husband has started a business establishment namely Ramesh Watch Company nearly 40 to 50 yeas ago in the premises No.1-6-55, situated at Parklane, Secunderabad and the said business has achieved great name and reputation in the business sector and the title ‘Ramesh Watch Company’ has become a unique brand image in sale of watch business. It is also her case that her family is a huge family consisting of her husband, herself and five sons, who are aged about 50 years or more and all of them have got married and have separate families with sons and daughters and all consist huge family. Her further case is that though all her family members have other commercial properties in twin cities but all the said properties are occupied by various tenants and none of the properties has been in vacate position to accommodate Ramesh Watch Company business. It is also her case that all her family members are using the name Ramesh Watch Company as brand name. It is also her case that all her family members are using the name Ramesh Watch Company as brand name. Referring to premises No.1-6-53/248 consisting of ground floor her case is that it was purchased by her five sons collectively but his son Laxman is in occupation of the said property doing his independent business without paying rents or share to other brothers and the business of Ramesh Watch Company is separately employed 30 employees as such said business needs to be shifted to the petition schedule premises which has 1400 sq.ft. It is also her case that plot No.8 of Begumpet is not vacant though it is belonged to her sons Ashok and Kishore, who are nothing to do with the partnership business of Ramesh Watch Company of Parklane. She has also admitted that her husband and two sons have obtained premises No.1-6-52 old No.131, admeasuring 1504 sq.feet at Parklane, Secunderabad on a monthly rent of Rs.40,000/- and that the said Ashok and kishore are not related to the unregistered partnership business of Ramesh Watch Company. Therefore, obtaining lease premises by the said sons is of no consequence and the same cannot be related to Ramesh Watch Company in any manner. Even the said leased property is not vacant to accommodate the said Ramesh Watch Company business. She also says that Shop No.109 at Kukatpally and the business therein is completely independent belonging to her grand-son Rohit Chugani and he has nothing to do with the Ramesh Watch Company business. Similarly Titan Showroom at Trimulghiry is belonged to her another grand-sons Rajesh Chugani and Sachin Chugani and they are not related to Ramesh Watch Company. 58. Therefore, the facts mentioned in the counter affidavit filed in IA No.1346 of 2011 themselves are sufficient to say that the petitioner is guilty of suppression of the real facts and that she has got large family and her family members have several other nonresidential premises in twin cities, therefore it is clear that she cannot seek eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. 59. In view of the facts stated in the counter affidavit by the landlady herself, I am of the view that there is no need to receive additional evidence and there is no need now to permit the respondent to amend the counter though the subsequent events can be taken into consideration. 59. In view of the facts stated in the counter affidavit by the landlady herself, I am of the view that there is no need to receive additional evidence and there is no need now to permit the respondent to amend the counter though the subsequent events can be taken into consideration. Hence, both the CRPMP Nos.1346 and 1347 of 2011 are dismissed. 60. In the circumstances, there is no need to remand the matter to the lower Court. 61. In view of the above discussion, I see no reasons to interfere with the well reasoned order passed by the appellate authority. The CRP is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed. 62. Accordingly, the CRP is dismissed with costs.