JUDGMENT : All the writ petitions mentioned above are similar in nature. Accordingly, with the consent of parties, the aforesaid matters are taken up for analogous hearing and are decided by this common judgment. 2. Writ Petition No.648/2011 is taken as a leading matter. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of this matter are as under:- The petitioners are the land owners/Bhumiswami of the land comprised in Survey Nos. 1018 and 1345 situated at village Barhi, Tahsil & District Bhind. The petitioners are farmers and their livelihood is totally based on the aforesaid agricultural land. By letter dated 6.5.2010, a proposal was submitted by Divisional Manager, M.P.Road Development Corporation, Gwalior (respondent No.4) to respondent No.3/Sub-Divisional Officer-Cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Bhind in respect of acquiring 12.826 Hect. Land situated in aforesaid village for the purpose of construction of border check-post at Bhind-Itawah Road. The said Sub-Divisional Officer-Cum-Land Acquisition Officer was invested/delegated with the powers of “Collector” as defined under Section 3(C) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The Collector is specially appointed as “Appropriate Government”. A Draft Notification under section 4(1) of the Act was submitted on 6.7.2010 by respondent No.3 to respondent No.2. On 16.7.2010 a notification under section 4(1) of the Act was published in daily newspapers. Vide order sheet dated 4.8.2010 the Sub-Divisional Officer directed for issuance of notices to land owners under section 5-A of the Act. In turn, the land owners submitted their objections on 17.8.2010 before the respondent No.3. On 16.9.2010 the Sub-Divisional Officer directed the Revenue Inspector to make inspection of the spot and submit his report. On 8.10.2010 the concerned Revenue Inspector submitted his report to respondent No.3. On 9.11.2010 the respondent No.3 himself rejected the objections preferred by the petitioners without assigning any reasons. On 2.12.2010 notification under section 6 of the Act was published in the daily newspapers. This petition is filed against the notification, Annexures P/1 and P/2. Annexures P/1 and P/2 are the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively. 3. Shri S.P.Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a notification under Section 5-A of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') was issued, against which certain petitioners submitted their objections. Annexures P/1 and P/2 are the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively. 3. Shri S.P.Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a notification under Section 5-A of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') was issued, against which certain petitioners submitted their objections. In the objections preferred by the petitioners, the petitioners informed the respondents that there is an alternative piece of land available for this purpose which can be used by the respondents. It is further submitted in the objections that their land is agricultural land and their existence is based on farming on this land. Since alternative Government land in vicinity is available, the Government may examine the same and should not act on Section 5-A notice. Shri Jain raised following points - (i) Section 4 of the Act is not complied with, which vitiates the entire action. The Competent Authority has not formed the opinion. (ii) Section 5-A of the Act is grossly violated. (iii) Wide publicity and all modes prescribed under the Act for publicity were not adhered to. (iv) Notice is not served on all. 4. Elaborating the aforesaid, Shri Jain submits that the language of Section 4 of the Act is very clear. The Appropriate Government/District Collector was under a statutory obligation to form an opinion. He relies on the opening words of Section 4(1), which reads “whenever it appears to the”. Shri Jain submits that the requirement of this language is that the aforesaid authority has to apply his mind. In support of this, he relied on 2010 (1) MPLJ 451 (Malwa I.T.Park Ltd. and others vs. State of M.P and others) and (2005) 7 SCC 627 (Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur Chenai and others). 5. In support of second contention, Shri Jain submits that the Appropriate Government is District Collector in this matter whereas decision has been taken by Land Acquisition Officer (for short, L.A.O.), which is not permissible. He submits that since the foundation itself is not sustainable, the entire building of land acquisition rest on it cannot sustain judicial scrutiny. He further submits that no decision is taken by the Collector on his objections. There is no application of mind by the L.A.O. and by the Collector on the objections raised by the petitioners. He submits that since the foundation itself is not sustainable, the entire building of land acquisition rest on it cannot sustain judicial scrutiny. He further submits that no decision is taken by the Collector on his objections. There is no application of mind by the L.A.O. and by the Collector on the objections raised by the petitioners. He relied on AIR 2008 SC 261 (Devinder Singh & others vs. State of Punjab and others), which reads as under:- “32. When an order is passed without jurisdiction it amounts to colourable exercise of power. Formation of opinion must precede application of mind. Such application of mind must be on the materials brought on records. The materials should be such which are required to be collected by the authorities entitled therefor. The authorities must act within the four-corners of the statute. An opinion formed even on the basis of an advice by an authority which is not contemplated under the statute render the decision bad in law. A statutory authority is bound by the procedure laid down in the statute and must act within the four-corners thereof.” 6. He further submits that as per the judgment of Supreme Court in 2007 (3) MPLJ 439 (Kunwar Pal Singh (dead) by L.Rs. vs. State of UP and others), the respondents were required to adopt all modes for publication as per the Mandate of the Act. The relevant paragraph 16 reads as under:- “16. Section 6(2), on a plain reading, deals with the various modes of publication and they are : (a) publication in the Official Gazette, (b) publication in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language and © causing public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality. There is no option left with anyone to give up or waive any mode and all such modes have to be strictly resorted to. There is no option left with anyone to give up or waive any mode and all such modes have to be strictly resorted to. The principle is well settled that where any statutory provision provides a particular manner for doing a particular act, then, that thing or act must be done in accordance with the manner prescribed therefor in the Act.” The same view is followed by Allahabad High Court in the case reported in AIR 1993 ALLAHABAD 14 (Ram Kumar Bhatia and others vs. The State of UP and others). 7. In support of the contention that notices should be given and served to all, Shri Jain cited (1992) 2 SCC 168 (Madhya Pradesh Housing Board vs. Mohd. Shafi and others) (Para 8), which reads as under:- “8. It is settled law that the process of acquisition has to start with a notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, which is mandatory, and even in cases of urgency, the issuance of notification under Section 4 is a condition precedent to the exercise of any further powers under the Act. Any notification which is aimed at depriving a man of his property, issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act has to be strictly construed and any serious lapse on the part of the acquiring authority would vitiate the proceedings and cannot be ignored by the courts. The object of issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Act is twofold. First, it is a public announcement by the government and a public notice by the Collector to the effect that the land, as specified therein, is needed or is likely to be needed by the government for the “public purpose” mentioned therein; and secondly, it authorises the departmental officers or officers of the local authority, as the case may be to do all such acts as are mentioned in Section 4(2) of the Act. The notification has to be published in the locality and particularly persons likely to be affected by the proposal have to be put on notice that such an activity is afoot. The notification has to be published in the locality and particularly persons likely to be affected by the proposal have to be put on notice that such an activity is afoot. The notification is, thus, required to give with sufficient clarity not only the “public purpose” for which the acquisition proceedings are being commenced but also the “locality” where the land is situate with as full a description as possible of the land proposed to be acquired to enable the “interested” persons to know as to which land is being acquired and for what purpose and to take further steps under the Act by filing objections etc., since it is open to such persons to canvass the non-suitability of the land for the alleged “public purpose” also. If a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is defective and does not comply with the requirements of the Act, it not only vitiates the notification, but also renders all subsequent proceedings connected with the acquisition, bad.” 8. Learned counsel further submits that the perusal of the note sheets of the acquisition proceedings (Annexure R/7 with the return of the State Government) would show that in a mechanical manner the entire decision was taken. He placed reliance on the order sheet dated 6.9.2010, which reflects that petitioners' objections were placed on record which contained the averments that in the vicinity Government land is available and, therefore, the land of petitioners should not be acquired depriving them from their source of livelihood. 9. The reliance is also placed on the order sheet dated 9.11.2010, which clearly shows that the S.D.O./L.A.O. himself rejected the objections. Shri Jain submits that it is not permissible in the teeth of Section 5-A of the Act. These powers to take a decision are vested in Appropriate Government/Collector in this case. 10. Per Contra, Shri M.P.S. Raghuvanshi, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the Government has taken a policy decision of construction of integrated check-posts which will be equipped with electronic equipments. These check-posts will be installed in public interest to check theft of tax, terrorist activities and with a view to realise various taxes etc. He submits that the aforesaid decision is based on the recommendation of Planning Commission and pursuant to an examination in detail by Expert Bodies. 11. These check-posts will be installed in public interest to check theft of tax, terrorist activities and with a view to realise various taxes etc. He submits that the aforesaid decision is based on the recommendation of Planning Commission and pursuant to an examination in detail by Expert Bodies. 11. Learned Additional Advocate General supported the action of the respondents and submits that on 9.11.2010 (Annexure R/7) the objections were rightly rejected. He heavily relied on Annexure R/7 (page 52) to submit that the decision of rejection was approved by the Collector. He further submits that it is open to the petitioners to invoke Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of compensation. By placing reliance on Annexure R/1, State submits that Shri D.R.Kurre was delegated as Land Acquisition Officer and he is competent to perform his duties. Reliance is also placed on Annexure R/9 with additional return, a Gazette Notification, to show that the respondent-authorities were competent to exercise their powers. 12. Shri Sarvesh Singh Chouhan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.4 submits that Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation (MPDRC) is the agency to construct the aforesaid checkposts. He submits that after detailed examination by his experts, the land was selected. The choice of land is prerogative of the State. He relies on 2006 (4) M.P.H.T. 494 (DB) (Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. Narmada Hydroelectric Development Corporation and others) (para 94), which reads as under:- “94. In this regard we may refer with profit to the additional return filed by the Government of M.P. wherein notification has been issued under Section 3(c). Said notification reads has been brought on record as Annexure R-3M. It stipulates that the State Government in exercise of his power under Section 3(c) has designated all the Dy. Collectors who have completed five years of service and have passed the requisite departmental examination or the persons who have been granted relaxation from passing those examination, they will function as Collector under the Land Acquisition Act within their territory. Thus, the Deputy Collectors were appointed as Land Acquisition Officers and hence, they cannot be said to lack jurisdiction to decide the land acquisition cases.” He further placed reliance on 2003 (4) MPLJ 577 (Malkhan Singh and others vs. State of M.P. and others) (paragraphs 7 and 10), which reads as under:- “7. Thus, the Deputy Collectors were appointed as Land Acquisition Officers and hence, they cannot be said to lack jurisdiction to decide the land acquisition cases.” He further placed reliance on 2003 (4) MPLJ 577 (Malkhan Singh and others vs. State of M.P. and others) (paragraphs 7 and 10), which reads as under:- “7. We are in no doubt that the expression “business of the government of the State” is wider than the expression “executive action of the Government of a State” which is used in Article 166(1). It is only the executive action of the State under Clause (3) of the Article 166, the Governor has to make rules for the transaction of the business of the government of the State. The business can be allocated under the Rules of Business or the instructions issued. As pointed out hereinabove, Rules of Business empowers the Minister-in- Charge of the Revenue Department to make standing orders with regard to disposal of cases under this charge relating to sections 4, 6 and 17 of the Act. The validity of the order or the action taken by the Collector in view of the authorization is not open to challenge. It would be deemed to be the action taken by the State Government, nor it would constitute the delegation of Minister's power as has been held by the Constitution Bench of 7 Judges of the Supreme Court in Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1974 SC 2192 . 10. Now, coming to the third objection of appellants with regard to alternative sites available and, therefore, their lands may not be acquired. Suffice it to say that availability of the alternative sites cannot be a ground to resist the acquisition of the land, it is for the authorities concerned to seek and judge which land is more suitable and appropriate to set up the rehabilitation and resettlement sites for the project-affected families. The subjective satisfaction of the respondents was enough that the said lands alone would be most suitable for the aforesaid purposes. Thus, this satisfaction of the respondents is not open to challenge in writ petition. Learned Single Judge has taken a proper view of the matter. The subjective satisfaction of the respondents was enough that the said lands alone would be most suitable for the aforesaid purposes. Thus, this satisfaction of the respondents is not open to challenge in writ petition. Learned Single Judge has taken a proper view of the matter. It may also be pertinent to point out that the entire exercise of resettlement and rehabilitation of the Sardar Sarovar Dam project-affected families is being monitored by the Supreme Court through the aegis of Chairman of the Redressal Committees so nominated and, therefore, also we find no merit and substance in the appeal. The appeal is accordingly summarily dismissed.” On the strength of these authorities, Shri Chouhan submits that the scope of judicial review in these matters is very limited and court cannot substitute its opinion in place of administrative opinion. He submits that this Court cannot sit as an appellate authority to examine the correctness of the decision of the respondents to chose the land. 13. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 14. Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act reads as under:- “4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon.-- (1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of the notification. (2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either, generally or specially authorised by such Government in this behalf, and for his servants and workmen,-- to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality; to dig or bore in the sub-soil; to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for such purpose; to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line of the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon; to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches; and, where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crop, fence or jungle: Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enclosed court or garden attached to a dwelling-house (unless with the consent of the occupier thereof) without previously giving such occupier at least seven days' notice in writing of his intention to do so.” 15. Section 5-A of the Act reads as under:- “5A. Hearing of objections.-- (1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under section 4, subsection (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be. (2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that Government. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final. (3) For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if the land were acquired under this Act.” 16. A bare perusal of Annexure R/1 shows that Shri D.R.Kurre was given power to act as Land Acquisition Officer. This is not in dispute between the parties that Collector is “Appropriate Government” in the present matter. Thus, it is required to be examined whether mandate of Section 5-A of the Act is complied with or not. 17. A bare perusal of Annexure R/7 dated 9.11.2010 clearly shows that the objections are rejected by the L.A.O. This decision of rejection is not taken by the Appropriate Government. It is interesting to note that on 16.9.2010 the L.A.O. directed the Revenue Inspector to inspect the spot and produce his report before him. Further, order sheet dated 8.10.2010 shows that said report was placed before him. However, there is no discussion or reasons assigned in the order dated 9.11.2010 (Annexure R/7) as to why the objections taken by the petitioners are not found to be trustworthy/acceptable. This is settled in law that the reasons are heartbeat of conclusion. The report of Revenue Inspector is filed by the petitioners as Annexure P/7. A bare perusal of this report shows that a finding is given by the said authority that there exists a Government land in vicinity which is in a rough and rugged condition. He further recommended that the land may be inspected by the Engineer whether it can be used for the purpose in question. Thus, even this report does not suggest that the petitioners' objections were either not acceptable or frivolous in nature. On the contrary, he gave a finding that the Government land in vicinity is available and it should be inspected by an Engineer. The reliance placed on page 52 (Annexure R/7) by the State to submit that Collector has approved the decision of L.A.O., is of no substance. A bare perusal of this order sheet, which contains no date, shows that the award was passed and this award was placed before the Collector/Appropriate Government for its approval. The reliance placed on page 52 (Annexure R/7) by the State to submit that Collector has approved the decision of L.A.O., is of no substance. A bare perusal of this order sheet, which contains no date, shows that the award was passed and this award was placed before the Collector/Appropriate Government for its approval. Thus, it is crystal clear that the decision as required to be taken as per Section 5-A of the Act is never taken by the “Appropriate Government”. Whatever decision was taken by the L.A.O. by order dated 9.11.2010 was also not placed before the Collector/Appropriate Government. 18. State has filed its return and additional return. In para 6(b) of page 7 of the main return it is stated that “as per section 3(C), power has been delegated to the Deputy Collector also, who is Land Acquisition Officer. In spite of it, notification has been issued in the name of Appropriate Government. As far as before issuing the notification it was not necessary even to record any satisfaction by the Appropriate Government.” In the additional return at page 5, it is stated that “in such situation, the Appropriate Government, after the aforesaid notification, is the Collector, who is Ex-Officio Deputy Secretary of the Revenue Department of the State Government. Therefore, the entire allegations levelled in this paragraph are contrary to law and the matter is not required even to send to the Appropriate Government, i.e., the Collector.” Section 5-A of the Act makes it crystal clear that any person whose land is sought to be acquired has a right to object within thirty days from the date of publication of notification and every such objection is required to be made to the Collector in writing. The Collector is obliged to give an opportunity to the objector of being heard in person and after hearing of such objections and after making such further enquiry, as he deems necessary, will make a report/reports in respect of land to Appropriate Government, containing his recommendation on the objections together with the record of proceedings. In the present case, it is admitted position that the powers of “Collector” were vested with Land Acquisition Officer. The Collector was “Appropriate Government”. In the present case, it is admitted position that the powers of “Collector” were vested with Land Acquisition Officer. The Collector was “Appropriate Government”. Thus, as per mandate of section 5-A, the Land Acquisition Officer/Collector was required to hear the objections, make the enquiry and then was required to send his report along with the record to Appropriate Government, i.e., District Collector. However, the record shows that he himself has rejected the objections. Thus, the case of the petitioners is established that the entire proceeding is vitiated. More so, when he has not assigned any reason for rejecting the objections of the farmers. 19. Before dealing further on this issue, I deem it proper to trace the history of section 5-A of the Act. The Apex Court in Dev Sharan v. State of U.P., reported in (2011) 4 SCC 769 held as under:- “26. Initially, Section 5-A was not there in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but the same was inserted long ago by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1923 vide Section 3 of Act 38 of 1923. 27*. The history behind insertion of Section 5-A, in the Act of 1894 seems to be the basis of a decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in J.E.D. Ezra v. Secy. of State for India6. In that case, the properties of Ezra were sought to be acquired under the preamended provision of the Act for expansion of the offices of Bank of Bengal. In challenging the said acquisition, it was argued that the person whose property is going to be taken away should be allowed a hearing on the principles of natural justice. However the Judges found that there was no such provision in the Act. 28. In order to remedy this shortcoming in the 1894 Act, an amendment by way of incorporation of Section 5- A was introduced on 11-7-1923. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the said amendment is as follows: “The Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 does not provide that persons having an interest in land which it is proposed to acquire, shall have the right of objecting to such acquisition; nor is the Government bound to enquire into and consider any objections that may reach them. The object of this Bill is to provide that a Local Government shall not declare, under Section 6 of the Act, that any land is needed for a public purpose unless time has been allowed after the notification under Section 4 for persons interested in the land to put in objections and for such objections to be considered by the Local Government.” (Gazette of India, Part V, dated 14-7-1923, p.260.) The said amendment was assented to by the Governor General on 5-8-1923 and came into force on 1-1-1924. 29. The importance and scheme of Section 5-A was construed by this Court in several cases. As early as in 1964, this Court in Nandeshwar Prasad v. U.P. Govt. speaking through K.N. Wanchoo, J. (as His Lordship then was) held: (AIR p.1222, para 13) “13. ... The right to file objections under Section 5-A is a substantial right when a person s property is being . threatened with acquisition and we cannot accept that that right can be taken away as if by a side wind....” 30. The same view has been reiterated by another three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Munshi Singh v. Union of India8. In SCC para 7 of the Report this Court held that Section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome principle of giving proper and reasonable opportunity to a landloser of persuading the authorities that his property should not be acquired. This Court made it clear that declaration under Section 6 has to be made only after the appropriate Government is satisfied on a consideration of the report made by the Collector under Section 5-A. 31. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai9 this Court held that the right which is conferred under Section 5-A has to be read considering the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution and, so construed, the right under Section 5-A should be interpreted as being akin to a fundamental right. This Court held that the same being the legal position, the procedures which have been laid down for depriving a person of the said right must be strictly complied with.” In Anand Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2010) 11 SCC 242 : “41. The power of eminent domain, being inherent in the Government, is exercisable in the public interest, general welfare and for public purpose. The power of eminent domain, being inherent in the Government, is exercisable in the public interest, general welfare and for public purpose. Acquisition of private property by the State in the public interest or for public purpose is nothing but an enforcement of the right of eminent domain. In India, the Act provides directly for acquisition of particular property for public purpose. Though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right but Article 300-A of the Constitution mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. That Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable right to an individual is beyond any doubt. As a matter of fact, this Court has time and again reiterated that Section 5-A confers an important right in favour of a person whose land is sought to be acquired. 42. When the Government proceeds for compulsory acquisition of a particular property for public purpose, the only right that the owner or the person interested in the property has, is to submit his objections within the prescribed time under Section 5-A of the Act and persuade the State authorities to drop the acquisition of that particular land by setting forth the reasons such as the unsuitability of the land for the stated public purpose; the grave hardship that may be caused to him by such expropriation, availability of alternative land for achieving public purpose, etc. Moreover, the right conferred on the owner or person interested to file objections to the proposed acquisition is not only an important and valuable right but also makes the provision for compulsory acquisition just and in conformity with the fundamental principles of natural justice.” In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai and Others, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 627 , the Apex Court held as under:- “6. It is not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of .eminent domain. may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid. 9. Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of .eminent domain. may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid. 9. It is trite that hearing given to a person must be an effective one and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion as regards the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The State in its decision-making process must not commit any misdirection in law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution it has been held to be akin to a fundamental right. 16. However, considerations of the objections by the owner of the land and the acceptance of the recommendations by the Government, it is trite, must precede a proper application of mind on the part of the Government. As and when a person aggrieved questions the decision-making process, the court in order to satisfy itself as to whether one or more grounds for judicial review exist, may call for the records whereupon such records must be produced. The writ petition was filed in the year 1989. As noticed hereinbefore, the said writ petition was allowed. This Court, however, interfered with the said order of the High Court and remitted the matter back to it upon giving an opportunity to the parties to raise additional pleadings. 19. Furthermore, the State is required to apply its mind not only on the objections filed by the owner of the land but also on the report which is submitted by the Collector upon making other and further enquiries there-for as also the recommendations made by him in that behalf. The State Government may further inquire into the matter, if any case is made out there-for, for arriving at its own satisfaction that it is necessary to deprive a citizen of his right to property. It is in that situation that production of records by the State is necessary. 28. The State Government may further inquire into the matter, if any case is made out there-for, for arriving at its own satisfaction that it is necessary to deprive a citizen of his right to property. It is in that situation that production of records by the State is necessary. 28. Although assignment of reasons is the part of principles of natural justice, necessity thereof may be taken away by a statute either expressly or by necessary implication. A declaration contained in a notification issued under Section 6 of the Act need not contain any reason but such a notification must precede the decision of the appropriate Government. When a decision is required to be taken after giving an opportunity of hearing to a person who may suffer civil or evil consequences by reason thereof, the same would mean an effective hearing. 29. The Act is an expropriatory legislation. This Court in State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma19 observed that in such a case the provisions of the statute should be strictly construed as it deprives a person of his land without consent. [See also Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan20 and CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd.21] There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that in a case of this nature due application of mind on the part of the statutory authority was imperative.” 20. The aforesaid analysis by the Apex Court shows that the basic purpose of introducing section 5-A of the Act was to ensure fair play in action to ensure that power of eminent doman which is inherent in the Government is exercised in public interest, in general welfare and for public purpose and for doing the same the action is taken in a bonafide, just and proper manner. The purpose of section 5-A was also to ensure that the person whose land and source of livelihood is sought to be taken, gets an effective opportunity and his contention is taken into account while dealing with his objections. In other words, principles of natural justice were engrafted in section 5-A of the Act. 21. The Apex Court in Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P., reported in (2011) 5 SCC 553 , held as under:- (i) Eminent domain is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and appropriate property belonging to citizens for public use. In other words, principles of natural justice were engrafted in section 5-A of the Act. 21. The Apex Court in Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P., reported in (2011) 5 SCC 553 , held as under:- (i) Eminent domain is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and appropriate property belonging to citizens for public use. To put it differently, the soverign is entitled to reassert its dominion over any portion of the soil of the State including private property without its owner's consent provided that such assertion is on account of public exigency and for public good. (ii) The legislations which provide for compulsory acquisition of private property by the State fall in the category of expropriatory legislation and such legislation must be construed strictly. (iii) However, compulsory taking of one's property is a serious matter. If the property belongs to economically disadvantaged segment of the society or people suffering from other handicaps, then the court is not only entitled but is duty bound to scrutinize the action/decision of the State with greater vigilance, care and circumspection keeping in view the fact that the land owner is likely to become landless and deprived of the only source of his livelihood and/or shelter.” 22. Inherent right of eminent domain of a sovereign State cannot be used to the detriment of a economically disadvantaged segment of the society without scrutinizing objection and without following the method prescribed under the Act including mandate of section 5-A. The Apex Court held that in cases of acquisition of private property by the State, the courts are under a duty to scrutinize the action with great vigilance, care and circumspection keeping in view the fact that the land owner is likely to become landless and deprived of the only source of livelihood or shelter. The Court further held that the State Legislation/Act falls in the category of expropriatory legislation and such a legislation must be construed strictly. Following this dicta, the result is inevitable that mandate of section 5-A is grossly violated by the respondents. The Land Acquisition Officer, who was, at best, vested with the powers of “Collector”, himself decided the objections whereas he was required to send it with his report and record to Appropriate Government, the District Collector. The Land Acquisition Officer directed for production of a spot inspection report by the Revenue Inspector. The Land Acquisition Officer, who was, at best, vested with the powers of “Collector”, himself decided the objections whereas he was required to send it with his report and record to Appropriate Government, the District Collector. The Land Acquisition Officer directed for production of a spot inspection report by the Revenue Inspector. The Revenue Inspector gave the report stating that there exists a Government land in vicinity, the same is uneven. He recommended that the said land may be inspected by the Engineer to examine its usefulness for the purpose. No further action was taken on this by the Land Acquisition Officer. Thus, the petitioners objections preferred under Section 5-A of the Act were not dealt with in a fair, proper and transparent manner. No reasons are assigned by the Land Acquisition Officer while rejecting the objections. The Apex Court in Kranti Associates Private Limited v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, has held as under:- “(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasijudicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”. 23. As analyzed above, the principles of natural justice were engrafted in Section 5-A. It is nicely stated about that principle that- “Principles of natural justice are to some minds burdensome but this price - a small price indeed - has to be paid if we desire a society governed by the rule of law.” It is also nicely stated about that principle that- “........even God himself did not pass [a] sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. Adam (says God), where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?....” 24. In Lloyd v. McMahon, reported in 1987 AC 625 (pp.702 H-703 B), it was held as under:- “My Lords, the so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. Adam (says God), where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?....” 24. In Lloyd v. McMahon, reported in 1987 AC 625 (pp.702 H-703 B), it was held as under:- “My Lords, the so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. To use the phrase which better expresses the underlying concept, what the requirements of fairness demand when any body, domestic, administrative or judicial, has to make a decision which will affect the rights of individuals depends on the character of the decision-making body, the kind of decision it has to make and the statutory or other framework in which it operates. In particular, it is well established that when a statute has conferred on any body the power to make decisions affecting individuals, the courts will not only require the procedure prescribed by the statute to be followed, but will readily imply so much and no more to be introduced by way of additional procedural safeguards as will ensure the attainment of fairness.” 25. The Apex Court in Radhe Shyam (supra) held as under:- “45. The amplitude, ambit and width of the rule of audi alteram partem was lucidly stated by the three- Judges Bench in Sayeedur Rehman v. State of Bihar ( (1973) 3 SCC 333 ) in the following words: “11...... This unwritten right of hearing is fundamental to a just decision by any authority which decides a controversial issue affecting the rights of the rival contestants. This right has its roots in the notion of fair procedure. It draws the attention of the party concerned to the imperative necessity of not overlooking the other side of the case before coming to its decision, for nothing is more likely to conduce to just and right decision than the practice of giving hearing to the affected parties.” 46. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr.( (1978) 1 SCC 405 ), Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for himself, Beg, C.J. And Bhagwati, J. highlighted the importance of the rule of hearing in the following words: “43.Indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes it, applies when people are affected by acts of authority. It is the hone of healthy Government, recognised from earliest times and not a mystic testament of Judge-made law. Indeed, from the legendary days of Adamand of Kautilyas Arthashastrathe rule of law has had this stamp of natural justice which makes it social justice. We need not go into these deeps for the present except to indicate that the roots of natural justice and its foliage are noble and not new-fangled. Today its application must be sustained by current legislation, case law or other extant principle, not the hoary chords of legend and history. Our jurisprudence has sanctioned its prevalence even like the Anglo-American system. 47. The Court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent permissible in a given case. It must not be forgotten that natural justice is pragmatically flexible and is amenable to capsulation under the compulsive pressure of circumstances. The audi alteram partem rule is not cast in a rigid mould and judicial decisions establish that it may suffer situational modifications. The core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise. 49. In Munshi Singh v. Union of India ( (1973) 2 SCC 337 ) the three-Judge Bench of this Court emphasised the importance of Section 5-A in the following words: “7. Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A makes it obligatory on the Collector to give an objector an opportunity of being heard. After hearing all objections and making further inquiry he is to make a report to the appropriate Government containing his recommendation on the objections. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections is then final. The declaration under Section 6 has to be made after the appropriate Government is satisfied, on a consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-A(2). The legislature has, therefore, made complete provisions for the persons interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their objections.” In view of mandatory requirement of Section 5-A and its interpretation by Apex Court, I am unable to hold that judgment relied upon by Mr. The legislature has, therefore, made complete provisions for the persons interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their objections.” In view of mandatory requirement of Section 5-A and its interpretation by Apex Court, I am unable to hold that judgment relied upon by Mr. S.S.Chouhan in Narmada Bachao Andolan's case (supra) is of no assistance to him. In para 42 of judgment of Anand Singh's (supra) the Apex Court emphasized the need of assigning reasons about unsuitability of land, in view of this, the judgment of Malkhan Singh's case (supra) is of no help to respondents. 26. However, so far the contention of Shri Jain mentioned in (iii) above, it is relevant to mention here that the Apex Court in Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition C.M.D.A Vs. J. Sivprakasam and Others reported in (2001) 1 SCC 330, held as under:- “If there is failure to publish in two daily newspapers or if the publication is in two newspapers that have no circulation at all in the locality, the notification under Section 4(1) and the consequential acquisition proceedings will be vitiated, on the ground of non compliance with an essential condition. If the two newspapers, carrying the publication of the notification have reasonably wide circulation in the locality then the requirements of Section 4(1) are complied with and all persons concerned in the locality shall be deemed to have notice of the notification. In that event, neither the notification under Section 4(1), nor the consequential acquisition proceedings would be open to challenge, on the ground of violation of Section 4 of the Act.” 27. Apart from this legal position, fact remains that petitioners have gathered knowledge about section 4 notification and actually submitted their objections. The basic purpose of publication etc. is to ensure circulation and communication of section 4 notification. Once petitioners have submitted their objections, I do not deem it proper to further deal with this issue. More so, when the Apex Court has held that such publication is sufficient in this regard. 28. In view of aforesaid analysis, it is clear that the decision making process of the respondents is vitiated, polluted and runs contrary to the mandate of section 5-A of the Act. The principles of natural justice were violated. The Land Acquisition Officer rejected the objections without application of mind and without assigning reasons therefor. 28. In view of aforesaid analysis, it is clear that the decision making process of the respondents is vitiated, polluted and runs contrary to the mandate of section 5-A of the Act. The principles of natural justice were violated. The Land Acquisition Officer rejected the objections without application of mind and without assigning reasons therefor. The Land Acquisition Officer had no jurisdiction and authority to reject the objections. The Land Acquisition Officer was only required to make a report with respect to a piece of land and send it to the Appropriate Government together with the record of proceedings, which was admittedly not done in the present case. Thus, the very purpose of section 5-A proceedings is defeated and such a proceeding cannot sustain judicial scrutiny. 29. Result is inevitable. The order Annexure P/2, i.e. Section 6 notification is quashed and set aside. However, liberty is reserved to the respondents to proceed from the stage defect is pointed out. 30. With the aforesaid, petitions are allowed. No costs.