JUDGMENT : Regardbeing had to the similar controversy involved in the bunch of cases, they wereheard analogously together with the consent of the learned Counsel for theparties and by a common order all the aforesaid writ petitions are beingdisposed of. Facts of Writ Petition No. 4506/2011 are narrated, as under : - 2.Petitioner/association, namely All India Cafe and Sheesha Association through its President, has filed the present petition initiallychallenging order dated 18-5-2011 and 21-7-2011 passed by the AdditionalDistrict Magistrate, Indore under the provisions ofSection 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by which the DistrictMagistrate has imposed a ban on smoking of hukka inthe restaurants in question. Contention of the petitioner is that thepetitioner/association is a society formed by persons associated with theoperation of business Cafe and Sheesha Lounges andthey have obtained necessary permission from the Municipal Corporation to runrestaurants. It has also been stated that at present there are about 16 membersin the association who are operating Cafe and Sheesha Lounges in the city of Indore .The petitioners have enclosed Annexure P-1 collectively, which are licensesgranted by Municipal Corporation. Indore forrunning restaurants. One such license enclosed at Page 23 is valid up to 31-3-2011 . The petitionershave further stated that they are carrying out their lawful business, afterobtaining lawful permission and they are also maintaining proper health andhygiene facilities an quality product are being served for consumption of theconsumers manufactured by the reputed companies, duly approved by theauthorities/labs after testing it. The petitioners have further stated thatCafe and Sheesha Lounges are providing service to theirconsumers by offering refreshment, coffee, food andalso by providing them hukka (a device to facilitatesmoking and flavoured smoking). The same is beingoffered to them in the form of Sheesha , but inreality the tobacco content in the said product remains minimal and containsmore herbal flavours than nicotine. The petitionershave also stated that they are following the prescribed norms as provided underthe Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibitions of Advertisement &Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act,2003, and therefore, by no stretch of imagination, the impugned orders couldhave been passed. The petitioner/association have further stated that variousnews items were published in local dailies against their business and basedupon the news-paper reports, the District Magistrate has taken action againstthe Cafe and Sheesha Lounges in the township of Indore . The petitioner/association have further stated that variousnews items were published in local dailies against their business and basedupon the news-paper reports, the District Magistrate has taken action againstthe Cafe and Sheesha Lounges in the township of Indore . It has also been stated that safer hukka smoking is provided through a water-filtered glassbowl, which acts as a barrier for most harmful substances of tobacco. Thepetitioners have also stated that they have submitted various representationsto the authorities against the threats, which were received by them in respectof closure of their business and the some of the representations dated 28-12-2010 are on record as Annexure P-3 and Annexurc P-4. The petitioners'contention is that the Additional District Magistrate without there being anymaterial on record has passed the impugned order dated 18-5-2011 by which a banhas been imposed in respect of hukka bars/ Sheesha Lounges/ Sheesha Cafes inthe township of Indore . Learned Counsel for thepetitioner has vehemently argued before this Court that the order dated 18-5-2011 passed under Section 144 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure was valid for a period of two months, asprovided under Section 144 itself. However, another order dated 21-7-2011 was issued again for aperiod of two months and now finally another order has been issued on 26-9-2011 . The learned Counsel forthe petitioners has vehemently argued before this Court that in case an orderhas to be issued under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 fora period of more than two months, it is only the State Government, who is competentto pass an order, as provided under Section 144 (4) of the Code of CriminalProcedure. His contention is that the continuance of order passed under Section144 beyond the period of two months is not within the domain of the DistrictMagistrate, and thereafter, the impugned orders passed subsequently on 21-7-2011 and 26-9-2011 deserve to bequashed on this ground alone. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has alsovehemently argued before this Court that the District Magistrate was not havingany material to form an opinion as provided under Section 144 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure. He has simply and mechanically followed the observationsmade by the Chief Medical & Health Officer and newspaper clippings. He hasslapped the order upon the petitioners under Section 144 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure. He has simply and mechanically followed the observationsmade by the Chief Medical & Health Officer and newspaper clippings. He hasslapped the order upon the petitioners under Section 144 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure. Learned Counsel has vehemently argued that in the absenceof any material and in the absence of any subjective satisfaction of theDistrict Magistrate, the impugned order dated 18-5-2011 , 21-7-2011 and 26-9-2011 deserve to bequashed. Lastly, he has submitted before this Court that the petitionerassociation as well as all restaurant owners, who are at present running hukka bars/ sheesha lounges/ sheesha cafes are ready to abide with the provisions of theCigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibitions of Advertisement &Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act,2003 and Prohibition of Smoking in Public Places Rules, 2008 and therefore, theimpugned orders deserve to be set aside. 3.Reply has been filed on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh . Shri Bhuvan Deshmukh , learned Government Advocate appearing with Shri Alok Kumar Singh. AdditionalDistrict Magistrate on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh submits that the impugned orders do notwarrant any interference. He has vehemently argued before this Court that themembers of the petitioner association were running hukka bars/ sheesha lounges/ hukka centres and on each and every table of it, hukka was being provided to the customers. He hasvehemently argued before this Court that Rules of 2008 known as"Prohibition of Smoking in Public Places Rules, 2008" prohibitssmoking at public place. Restaurant is certainly a public place, as definedunder Rule 2 (b) of the Smoke Free Rules, 2008. He has further argued beforethis Court that by virtue of provisions of Prohibition of Smoking in PublicPlaces Rules, 2008, Rule 3(1) (c), no ashtrays, matches, lighters or otherthings designed to facilitate smoking can be provided at public place and as hukka is certainly a device to facilitate smoking cannot beprovided in a public place; meaning thereby, that on each and every table in arestaurant, placing a hukka or any other device tofacilitate smoking is not at all permissible in the eye of law. He has furtherargued before this Court that after taking into account the overall situationthat the smoking with the aid of hukka in arestaurant is harmful and dangerous to human life, birth and safety and furtherafter taking into account the entire material on record, the DistrictMagistrate has rightly passed the order dated 18-5-2011 . He has furtherargued before this Court that after taking into account the overall situationthat the smoking with the aid of hukka in arestaurant is harmful and dangerous to human life, birth and safety and furtherafter taking into account the entire material on record, the DistrictMagistrate has rightly passed the order dated 18-5-2011 . He has further vehemently argued before thisCourt that the District Magistrate is competent to pass order under Section 144of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a period of two months. He has alsostated that the District Magistrate has not extended the period of order dated 18-5-2011 for a period of further twomonths. On the contrary, fresh order dated 21-7-2011 has been passed, keeping in view the materialavailable before the District Magistrate. He has further argued before thisCourt that last order dated 26-9-2011 has again been passed by the District Magistrate based upon his subjectivesatisfaction and on the basis of the material available before him, andtherefore, it is not a case where an order has been passed for a period of sixmonths. He has argued that in case the order is required to be passed for aperiod of more than two months, it is certainly the State Government, who has topass necessary orders, as provided under Section 144 (4) of the Code ofCriminal Procedure. His contention is that all the petitions deserve to bedismissed as the order dated 26-9-2011 has been passed, based upon the subjective satisfaction of the DistrictMagistrate, on the basis of material placed before him. Learned GovernmentAdvocate for the respondent/ State has also argued before this Court that afterconducting raid on hukka bars, material product usedfor smoking was sent for chemical analysis. The Public Analyst, State FoodLaboratory has vide his report dated 24-8-2011 (Annexure R-6) has informed tothe Chief Medical & Health Officer, Indore thatthose substances/products, which are being used for smoking in hukka , were containing nicotine. Percentage of nicotinefound in the products is also mentioned in the report dated 24-8-2011 submitted by the PublicAnalyst, State Food Laboratory. Learned Government Advocate has vehementlyargued before this Court that the report submitted by the Public Analyst, StateFood Laboratory establishes that the tobacco in some quantity was being usedin-each and every substances/products which were being used for smoking in hukka bars/ sheesha lounges. Learned Government Advocate has vehementlyargued before this Court that the report submitted by the Public Analyst, StateFood Laboratory establishes that the tobacco in some quantity was being usedin-each and every substances/products which were being used for smoking in hukka bars/ sheesha lounges. Hehas argued before this Court that such type of smoking in a public place is notpermissible, keeping in view the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products(Prohibitions of Advertisement & Regulation of Trade and Commerce,Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003 and the Rules, 2008 framed thereunder. He has also drawn attention of this Court towards the interim orderdated 13-7-2011 passed bythe Division Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of Crusade Against Tobacco (A Branch of the Neli Charitable Trust) and others Vs. Union of India and others, in Public InterestLitigation No. 111/2010. His contention is that in the light of the orderpassed by the Division Bench of Bombay High Court in the aforesaid case, thequestion of granting permission to Sheesha lounges/ hukka bars does not arise. He has further argued beforethis Court that keeping in view the totality of the facts and circumstances ofthe case, the orders passed by the District Magistrate do not warrant anyinterference and the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. 4. Shri Anand Agrawal , learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 7/Indore Municipal Corporation,vehemently argued before this Court that the petitioners are, in fact,permitting young people to smoke by providing hukka on each and every table in restaurants. He has further argued before this Courtthat the Bombay High Court in an interim order passed in the case of Crusade Against Tobacco (A Branch of the Neli Charitable Trust) (supra), has dealt with the provisions of the COPTA and theRules of 2008 framed there under. He has argued before this Court that hukka smoking cannot be permitted in a restaurant/ Sheesha Lounges, as prayed by the petitioners. LearnedCounsel for the Municipal Corporation has further contended that the provisionsof the Act of 2003 and Rules of 2008, as considered by the Division Bench ofBombay High Court in their interim order dated 13-7-2011 are being considered by the Indore Municipal Corporation. LearnedCounsel for the Municipal Corporation has further contended that the provisionsof the Act of 2003 and Rules of 2008, as considered by the Division Bench ofBombay High Court in their interim order dated 13-7-2011 are being considered by the Indore Municipal Corporation. He has also informed that the Indore Municipal Corporation is also taking appropriate steps to incorporate certainconditions, which have been incorporated by the Bombay Municipal Corporation inrespect of smoking and the matter has already been placed before theMayor-in-Council and on similar lines, general conditions of license in respectof the restaurants/hotels and other places are being incorporated. Hiscontention is that by no stretch of imagination, smoking can be permitted asprayed by the petitioners and the impugned orders passed by the DistrictMagistrate are based upon material available before him, do not warrant anyinterference. He has prayed for dismissal of all the writ petitions. LearnedCounsel for the Indore Municipal Corporation has alsobrought to the notice of this Court that the licenses enclosed along with thewrit petitions are expired licenses and at present no licenses have beenissued, and therefore, the petitioners are not at all entitled even to operatea restaurant. He has prayed for dismissal of all the writ petitions. 5.Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6.The matter is being disposed of at motion hearing stage with the consent of thelearned Counsel for the parties. 7.In the present case, the petitioner/association, who is representing the causeof Cafe and Sheesha owners in the township of Indore has filed this present petition initially beingaggrieved by the order dated 18-5-2011 passed by the Additional DistrictMagistrate, Indore imposing restriction in respect ofsmoking hukka . This Court has carefully gone throughthe order dated 18-5-2011 and the order only imposes a ban by prohibiting smoking in hukka bars/ Sheesha Lounges and the aforesaid order wasvalid only for a period of two months and the same has come to an end. Anotherorder was issued on 21-7-2011 and the validity of the same has also come to an end. The third order wasissued on 26-9-2011 and the material on the basis of which the order has beenissued and on the basis of which, the District Magistrate has formed hisopinion, has been brought to my notice by Shri Alok Kumar Singh, Additional District Magistrate. The third order wasissued on 26-9-2011 and the material on the basis of which the order has beenissued and on the basis of which, the District Magistrate has formed hisopinion, has been brought to my notice by Shri Alok Kumar Singh, Additional District Magistrate. Section144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under : - "144.Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger.- (1)In cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate, a Sub-DivisionalMagistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the StateGovernment in this behalf, there is sufficient ground for proceeding under thissection and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, such Magistratemay, by a written order stating the material fact of the case and served in themanner provided by Section 134, direct any person to abstain from it certainact or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possessionor under his management, if such Magistrate considers that such direction islikely to prevent, or tends to prevent, obstruction, annoyance or injury to anyperson lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or adisturbance of the public tranquility, or a riot, or an affray. (2)An order under this section may, in cases of emergency or in cases where thecircumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon theperson against whom the order is directed, be passed exparte . (3)An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or topersons residing in a particular place or area, or to the public generally whenfrequenting or visiting it particular place or area. (4)No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months fromthe making thereof: Providedthat, if the State Government considers it necessary so to do for preventingdanger to human life, health or safety or for preventing a riot or any, affray,it may, by notification, direct that an order made by a Magistrate under thissection shall remain in force for such further period not exceeding six monthsfrom the date on which the order made by the Magistrate would have, but forsuch order, expired, as it may specify. (5)Any Magistrate may, either on his own motion or on the application of anyperson aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made under this section, byhimself or any Magistrate Subordinate to him or by his predecessor-in-office. (5)Any Magistrate may, either on his own motion or on the application of anyperson aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made under this section, byhimself or any Magistrate Subordinate to him or by his predecessor-in-office. (6)The State Government may either on its own motion or on the application of anyperson aggrieved, rescind or alter an order made by it under the proviso tosub-section (4). (7)Where an application under sub-section (5), or sub-section (6) is received, theMagistrate, or the State Government, as the case may, be shall afford to theapplicant an early, opportunity of appearing before him or it, either in personor by pleader and showing cause against the order, and if the Magistrate or theState Government, as the case may be, rejects the application wholly or in parthe or is shall record in writing the reasons for so doing." 8.Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the District Magistrate,Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate, especiallyempowered by the State Government to pass an appropriate order, directing anyperson to abstain from certain act or the conduct or to take certain order withrespect to certain property in his possession or under his management, if suchMagistrate is of the opinion that such direction is likely to prevent, or tendsto prevent, obstruction, annoyance of injury to any person lawfully employed,or danger to human life, substantiated in the present case. Sheesha Lounges/ Hukka Bars are providing hukka (a device designed to facilitate smoking) on each and every table and as perthe report of the Public Analyst, material, which is being used in the hukka is certainly containing nicotine. It goes beyondsaying that hukka is harmful to human life andcreates danger to human life and health. As many as 9 lakhs people are dying on account of tobacco related cancers in this country. ThisCourt has carefully gone through the material produced before the DistrictMagistrate and the decision of the District Magistrate was justified in formingthe opinion, based on the material, which was placed before him, by passing anappropriate order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,thereby closing down hukka smoking activities in Sheesha Bars/ Sheesha Lounges/ Hukka Centres . ThisCourt has carefully gone through the material produced before the DistrictMagistrate and the decision of the District Magistrate was justified in formingthe opinion, based on the material, which was placed before him, by passing anappropriate order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,thereby closing down hukka smoking activities in Sheesha Bars/ Sheesha Lounges/ Hukka Centres . Learned Counselfor the petitioners has placed heavy reliance upon the judgment delivered bythe Apex Court in the case of Acharya Jagdishwaran and Avadhuta Vs.Police Commissioner, Calcutta and another, reported as AIR 1984 SC 51 , and hiscontention is that prohibitory order can be passed for a maximum period of sixmonths; that too, by the State Government as provided under Section 144 of theCode of Criminal Procedure and as held by the Apex Court in the case of Acharya Jagdishwaran and Avadhuta (supra). This Court has carefully gone through theaforesaid judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners andthe controversy involved in the aforesaid case was altogether different. In theaforesaid case, Anand Margis ,were objecting to the order passed by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta inrespect of performance of Tandva Dance by Anand Margis in a procession orat public places and the Apex Court in those particular circumstances inParagraph 14 has held, as under :- "14.It is the petitioner's definite case that the prohibitory orders under Section144 of the Code are being repeated at regular intervals from August, 1979.Copies of several prohibitory orders made from time to time have been producedbefore us and it is not the case of the respondents that such repetitiveprohibitory orders have not been made. The order under Section 144 of the Codemade in March, 1982 has also been challenged on the ground that the materialfacts of the case have not been stated. Section 144 of the Code, as far asrelevant, provides : - "( i ) In cases, where in the opinion of a District Magistrate,a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or any other Executive Magistrate speciallyempowered by the State Government in this behalf, there is sufficient groundfor proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy isdesirable, such Magistrate may, by a written order stating the material factsof the case and served in the manner provided by Section 134,direct......" Ithas been the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that theright to make the order is conditioned upon it being a written one and thematerial facts of the case being stated. Some High Courts have taken the viewthat this is a positive requirement and the validity of the order depends uponcompliance of this provision. In our opinion, it is not necessary to go intothis question as Counsel for the respondents conceded that this is one of therequirements of the provision and if the power has to be exercised it should beexercised in the manner provided on pain of invalidating for non-compliance.There is currently in force a prohibitory order in the same terms and hence thequestion cannot be said to be academic. The other aspect, viz., the proprietyof repetitive prohibitory orders is, however, to our mind a serious matter andsince long arguments have been advanced we propose to deal with it. In this case, as a fact from October, 1979 till 1982 at theinterval of almost two months orders under Section 144 (1) of the Code havebeen made from time to time. It is not disputed before us that the powerconferred under this section is intended for immediate prevention of breach ofpeace or speedy remedy. An order made under this section is to remain valid fortwo months from the date of its making as provided in subsection (4) of Section144. The proviso to sub-section (4) authorises theState Government in case it considers it necessary so to do for preventingdanger to human life, health or safety, or for preventing a riot, or anyaffray, to direct by notification that an order made by a Magistrate may remainin force for a further period not exceeding six months from the date on whichthe order made by the Magistrate would have; but for such order, expired. Theeffect of the proviso, therefore, is that the State Government would beentitled to give the prohibitory order an additional term of life but thatwould be limited to six months beyond the two months' period in terms ofsub-section (4) of Section 144 of the Code. Several decisions of different HighCourts have rightly taken the view that it is not legitimate to go on makingsuccessive orders after earlier orders have lapsed by efflux of time. A FullBench consisting of the entire Court of 12 Judges in Gopi Molntn Mullick Vs. Several decisions of different HighCourts have rightly taken the view that it is not legitimate to go on makingsuccessive orders after earlier orders have lapsed by efflux of time. A FullBench consisting of the entire Court of 12 Judges in Gopi Molntn Mullick Vs. Taraoni Chowdharani , (1879) ILR 5Cal 7, examining the provisions of Section 518 of the Code of 1861(corresponding to present Section 144) took-the view that such an action wasbeyond the Magistrate's powers. Making of successive orders was disapproved bythe Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bishessur Chuckerbutty Vs. Emperor, AIR 1916 Cal 472. Similarview was taken in Swaminatha Mudallar Vs. Gopalakrishna Naidu ,AIR 1916 Mad 1106(1); Taturam Sahu Vs. State of Orissa , AIR 1953 Orissa 96; Sri Ram Das Gaur Vs. The City Magistrate, Varanasi , AIR 1960 All 397 ; andRam Narain Sah Vs . Parmeshwar Prasad Sah , AIR 1942 Pat 414. We have no doubt that the ratio ofthese decisions represents a correct statement of the legal position. Theproviso to sub-section (4) of Section 144, which gives the State Governmentjurisdiction to extend the prohibitory order for a maximum period of six monthsbeyond the life of the order made by the Magistrate is clearly indicative ofthe position that Parliament never intended the life of an order under Section144 of the Code to remain in force beyond two months when made by a Magistrate.The scheme of that section does not contemplate repetitive orders and in casethe situation so warrants, steps have to be taken under other provisions of thelaw such as Section 107 or Section 145 of the Code when individual disputes areraised and to meet a situation such as here, there are provisions to be foundin the Police Act. If repetitive orders are made it would clearly amount toabuse of the power conferred by Section 144 of Code. It is relevant to advertto the decision of this Court in Babulal Parate Vs. State of Maharashtra , (1961) 3 SCR 423 at P. 437 : AIR 1961 SC 884 at P.891, where the vires of Section 144 of the Code waschallenged. It is relevant to advertto the decision of this Court in Babulal Parate Vs. State of Maharashtra , (1961) 3 SCR 423 at P. 437 : AIR 1961 SC 884 at P.891, where the vires of Section 144 of the Code waschallenged. Upholding the provision, this Court observed : - "Publicorder has to be maintained in advance in order to ensure it and, therefore, itis competent to a Legislature to pass a law permitting an Appropriate Authorityto take anticipatory action or place anticipatory restrictions upon particularkinds of acts in an emergency for the purpose of maintaining public order....." It was again emphasized (at P. 891 of AIR ) : - "But,it is difficult to say that on anticipatory action taken by such an authorityin an emergency where danger to public order is genuinely apprehended isanything other than an action done in the discharge of the duty to maintainorder....." ThisCourt had, therefore, appropriately stressed upon the feature that theprovision of Section 144 of the Code was intended to meet an emergency. Thispostulates a situation temporary in character and, therefore, the duration ofan order under Section 144 of the Code could never have been intended to besemi-permanent in character." 9.In the present case, it is true that initially an order dated 18-5-2011 was passed and a subsequentorder was passed on 21-7-2011 .The fact remains that a third order has been passed on 26-9-2011 based upon fresh material brought tothe notice of the District Magistrate. The report of the Public Analyst is alsoon record and the same establishes that nicotine was being used in Hookas provided by hukka bars,and therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that provisions ofSection 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are certainly applicable in thepresent case. The impugned order dated 26-9-2011 passed by the District Magistrate is valid for a period of two months. The samehas been passed, based upon the fresh material available with the DistrictMagistrate, and therefore, the question of setting it aside on the groundsraised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner does not arise. LearnedCounsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment deliveredby the Orissa High Court in the case of Dhirendranath Swain Vs. The samehas been passed, based upon the fresh material available with the DistrictMagistrate, and therefore, the question of setting it aside on the groundsraised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner does not arise. LearnedCounsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment deliveredby the Orissa High Court in the case of Dhirendranath Swain Vs. Hadi Raul, reported as 2001 Cri.LJ 1998, and hiscontention is that no prohibitory order can be passed under Section 144 (1) ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure after two months from the date of initiating ofproceedings under Section 144. This Court has carefully gone through theaforesaid judgment also and in the present case, prohibitory order has beenpassed only on 26-9-2011 ,based upon material available before the District Magistrate, that too, afterhis subjective satisfaction, and therefore, the judgment relied upon by thelearned Counsel for the petitioner is of no help to the petitioners. LearnedCounsel has also relied upon the judgment delivered by Gauhati High Court in the case of Smt . Premoda Medhi and another Vs. Gauhati Roller Flour Mills Ltd. and another, reported as 2003 Criminal Law Journal 122,and his contention is that exparte order passed underSection 144 requires stating of urgency reasons for passing such order. He hasfurther argued that mere statement that the Magistrate was satisfied aboutbreach of peace and there was possibility of breach of peace will not besufficient to exercise powers conferred under Section 144. This Court hascarefully gone through the aforesaid judgment and in the present case, therewas enough material before the District Magistrate to pass an appropriate orderunder Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and keeping in viewthe totality of the circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion thatthe impugned order dated 29-9-2011 does not warrant any interference. LearnedCounsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued before this Court that smokingcan certainly be permitted in a place reserved in restaurant known as smokingarea or space. It is needless to mention that Cigarettes and Other TobaccoProducts (Prohibitions of Advertisement & Regulation of Trade and Commerce,Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003 read with provisions of theProhibition of Smoking in Public Places Rules, 2008 provide for smoking area orspace. The petitioners are duty bound to follow the statutory provision ascontained in COPTA and Rules, 2008. It is needless to mention that Cigarettes and Other TobaccoProducts (Prohibitions of Advertisement & Regulation of Trade and Commerce,Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003 read with provisions of theProhibition of Smoking in Public Places Rules, 2008 provide for smoking area orspace. The petitioners are duty bound to follow the statutory provision ascontained in COPTA and Rules, 2008. 10.Resultantly, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the impugnedorders dated 18-5-2011 , 21 -7-2011 and the order dated 26-9-2011 passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Indore . It is needless to mentionthat the respondents shall also ensure the implementation of the statutoryprovisions of the COPTA as well as Rules, 2008 framed thereunder in respect of the restaurants, hotels and other public places in the township of Indore as well as in the State of Madhya Pradesh . 11.In India ,tobacco contributes 56.40% and 44.90% cancers in man and woman, respectively.The total number of tobacco related deaths are aboutnine lakhs per year. India has the largest number of cancer cases in the world, which are on account ofconsumption of tobacco. Tobacco smoking results in chronic lung diseases. Deathrate in tuberculosis on account of tobacco smoking is very high in the country.A large number of teen-agers, who use tobacco, are eventually killed by it;meaning thereby, it is a great evil existing in the society. Smoking is notonly confined to tobacco smoking, but devices meant for consumption of tobaccoare used for smoking/consuming other drugs and other intoxicating stuff. Thetobacco in India is consumed by way of Bidis , Cigarettes, Cigars,Cheroots, Chuttas , Reverse Chutta Smoking, Dhumti , Reverse Dhumti Smoking, Pipe, Hooklis , Chillum and Hookah. Thus,hookah is also a device to smoke tobacco. In order to control tobacco smoking,Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibitions of Advertisement &Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act,2003 (hereinafter referred to as 'CO PTA ')was enacted and Rules were framed thereunder ,including the Prohibition of Smoking in Public Places Rules, 2008. Section 4 ofthe COFFA provides that no person shall smoke in any public place, providedthat in a hotel having thirty rooms or a restaurant having seating capacity ofthirty persons or more and in the airports, a separate provision for smokingarea or space will be made. Section 4 ofthe COFFA provides that no person shall smoke in any public place, providedthat in a hotel having thirty rooms or a restaurant having seating capacity ofthirty persons or more and in the airports, a separate provision for smokingarea or space will be made. " Public Place "is defined under Section 3 (1) of the Act of 2003 and the same reads as under : - ""public place" means any place to which the public have access,whether as of right or not, and includes auditorium, hospital buildings,railway waiting room, amusement centres , restaurants,public offices, Court buildings, educational institutions, libraries, publicconveyances and the like which are visited by general public but does notinclude any open space." Section3 (n) defines "smoking" as under : - ""smoking",means smoking of tobacco in any form whether in the form of cigarette, cigar, bidis or otherwise with the aid of a pipe, wrapper or anyother instruments." "Tobaccoproducts" is defined under Section 3 (p) as the products specified in theSchedule to the Act, which includes various tobacco products including cigartobacco, pipe tobacco and hukka tobacco. It is thusclear that smoking in public place including restaurant is prohibited by theLegislature and only exception is made as far as restaurant is concerned thatsmoking is permissible in separate smoking area or space in a restaurant havingseating capacity of 30 persons or more. The Smoke Free Rules, 2008 define"restaurant" in Rule 2 (b) as under : - "(b)"restaurant" shall mean any place to which the public has access andwhere any kind of food or drink is supplied for consumption on the premises byany person by way of business for consideration monetary or otherwise and shallinclude the open space surrounding such premises and includes- ( i ) refreshment rooms, banquet halls,discotheques, canteen, coffee house, pubs, bars, airport lounge, and thelike." Definitionof "public place" defined in Section 3 (1) is further expanded byRule 2 (d) by including the places such as work places, shopping malls andcinema halls. Smoking area or space mentioned in the proviso to Section 4 ofthe Act is defined in Rule 2 (e) as under : - "(e)"smoking area or space" mentioned in the proviso to Section 4 of theAct shall mean a separately ventilated smoking room that:- ( i ) is physically separated andsurrounded by full height walls on all four sides; (ii) has an entrance with an automatically closing doornormally kept in closed position; (iii) has an air flow system, as specified in Schedule I; (iv) has negative air pressure in comparison with theremainder of the building." Rule3 imposes a duty upon the owner and manager of a public place includingrestaurant to ensure that no person smokes in the public place which wouldinclude a restaurant. Rule 3 (1) (c) also contains the following, prohibition : - "Noashtrays, matches, lighters or other things designed to facilitate smoking areprovided in the public place." Rule4 further provides that the owner/manager of the restaurant having seatingcapacity of thirty persons or more may provide for a smoking area or space asdefined in Rule 2 (e); while sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 provides that space shallnot be established at the entrance or exit of the restaurant, hotel and airportand shall be distinctively marked as "Smoking Area" in English andone Indian language, as applicable. Sub-rule (3) Rule 4 reads as under : - "(3)A smoking area or space shall be used only for the purpose of smoking and noother service(s) shall be allowed." 12.It is noteworthy to mention that the Government of India has issued a circularin exercise of powers conferred under COPTA and the Rules framed thereunder . The circular/letter DO No. P-16011/5/08-PH, which appears to have been issued in the year 2008, has beenrelied upon by the Counsel for the hukka bar ownersas well as by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. The circular/ lettergives various clarifications in response to the representation made by theFederation of Hotels and Restaurants Association of India, New Delhi . Some of the clarifications, which are relevantfor the purpose of the present petition are as under:- "(d)As per the provisions of the Act restaurants and hotels are to be smoke free.It is only by way of exception a provision has been made that hotels with 30rooms and more or restaurants with 30 or more seating capacity may createsmoking area or space. The specifications of such 'smoking area or space' areprescribed under the Rules so that the air from the smoking area or space donot mix with the air or the rest of the building so as to protect the publicfrom the ill effects of second hand smoking. (e)The Rule 3 (1) (c), does not prescribe ban on sale of tobacco products, it onlyrequire that no items (lighter, ashtray, matches etc.) should be placed in amanner that facilitates smoking. (g)As per the provisions of the hotels and restaurants are included under thedefinition of public place and as such nobody shall smoke in these places. Itis only by way of exception a provision has been made that hotels with 30 roomand more or restaurants with 30 or more seating capacity may create smokingarea or space. (h)As per the provision of the Act, only the hotels with 30 rooms and more orrestaurants with 30 or more seating capacity and the airports may have asmoking area or space and not any smaller restaurants or hotels. It has been stipulatedthat the said smoking area or space shall not be established at the entrance orexit so as to ensure that people (non-smokers) are not forced to pass throughthe smoking area of space. ( i ) For the effective implementation of the Act, it has beenprovided that no services shall be allowed in the 'smoking area or space'.However, services in the rooms designated as 'smoking room' are notprohibited." Itis contended on the basis of the above circular/letter that services in roomsdesignated as 'smoking room' are not prohibited. Hence, the other services arealso permissible in the smoking area of the restaurant. 13.It is pertinent to note that a Pubic Interest Litigation was preferred beforethe High Court of Judicature at Bombay and the Bombay High Court has passed an interim order in PIL No. 111/2010 on 13-7-2011 . The Bombay High Court hasdealt with the circular issued by Government of India. In the aforesaid case, acondition was imposed by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai vide its circulardated 1-7-2001 for incorporation of Condition Nos. 35 to 37 to the GeneralConditions in respect of licenses, eating house licenses and those conditionswere subjected to judicial scrutiny before a Divisional Bench. The Bombay High Court hasdealt with the circular issued by Government of India. In the aforesaid case, acondition was imposed by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai vide its circulardated 1-7-2001 for incorporation of Condition Nos. 35 to 37 to the GeneralConditions in respect of licenses, eating house licenses and those conditionswere subjected to judicial scrutiny before a Divisional Bench. The DivisionBench by its interim order dated 13-7-2011 has repelled the challenge of the restaurant/ hotel owners against the circulardated 1-7-2011 and has heldthat similar conditions ought to have been incorporated by the Corporations andMunicipal Councils in other region of the State. The Bombay High Court inParagraphs 11 to 18 has held as under:- "11.Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we see no merit in thesubmissions/contentions raised on behalf of the private respondents runningrestaurants with hukka bars. The COPTA is a Centralenactment made pursuant to the resolution passed by the 39th World HealthAssembly on 15 May, 1986 toimplement the measures to ensure that effective protection is provided tonon-smokers from involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke and to protect childrenand young people from being addicted to the use of tobacco. Article 47 of theConstitution of India enjoins the State to achieve improvement of public healthin general. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of COPTA recognizes the factthat tobacco is universally regarded as one of the major public health hazardsand is responsible directly or indirectly for an estimated eight lakh deaths annually in the country. It has also been foundthat treatment of tobacco related diseases and the loss of productivity causedtherein cost the country almost" 13,500 crores annually, which more than offsets all the benefits accruing in the form ofrevenue and employment generated by tobacco industry. The COPTA is enacted toachieve healthier life-style and the protection of life enshrined in theConstitution and seeks to improve public health. The COPTA is enacted toachieve healthier life-style and the protection of life enshrined in theConstitution and seeks to improve public health. Section 2 reads thus : - "2.Declaration as to expediency of control by the Union .- It is hereby declared that, it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the tobacco industry." Aneating house, which is called a restaurant, is declared to be a public place.Section 3 (n) reads thus : - ""smoking",means smoking of tobacco in any form whether in the form of cigarettes, cigar, bidis or otherwise with the aid of a pipe, wrapper or anyother instruments." Section4 imposes a prohibition on smoking in any public place and the proviso theretohas carved out an exception whereby a separate provision for smoking area orspace can be made in certain specified hotels/restaurants. The entire premisesof a hotel or a restaurant referred to in the proviso continue to be a"public place" and "smoking area or space" defined underRule 2 (e) is essentially a part of such public place. This is also clear fromRule 4. Rule 3 casts a statutory obligation on person in-charge of the affairsof public place and sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 prohibits any other services beingallowed in a smoking area or space. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 again carves out anexception in respect of a hotel having 30 rooms or more. Considering the schemeof the Act and the Rules, it is not possible to accept the submission that the"smoking area or space" cannot be considered to be a "publicplace". As discussed above, proviso to Section 4 is in the nature ofexception and there is nothing in the said section or Rule 2 (e), which wouldwarrant the interpretation advanced on behalf of the private respondents. Ifsuch interpretation is accepted, it would also not be in consonance with thesettled norms of interpretation of Statute. An exception cannot be interpretedin the manner which will defeat the substantive statutory provisions. "12.It is also not possible to accept the submission that prohibition contained inRule 3 (1) (c) is not applicable in a "smoking area or space" withina restaurant/hotel and the contention that there is no prohibition againstsupplying ashtray, matches, lighters or other things designed to facilitatesmoking in such smoking area or space. This argument cannot be accepted since itwould defeat the legislative intent. This argument cannot be accepted since itwould defeat the legislative intent. The definition of the word"smoking" includes "any other instruments" and tobaccoproducts defined in Section 2 (p) read with the Schedule includes hookahtobacco. The "smoking area or space" within a public place, which isan exception carved out, is thus in the nature of a concession which has beengiven to an individual and cannot be construed to be conferring any right onthe Owner, Proprietor, Manager, Supervisor or Person-in-Charge of anyrestaurant or hotel. It was also sought to be contended that in view of Rule'4(4), since "services" are allowed to be provided in specifiedseparate smoking rooms in a hotel, there is no justification for prohibitingsuch "services" in a "smoking area or space" in arestaurant or a hotel. This argument clearly overlooks that Rule 4 (4) dealswith only "separate smoking rooms", which cannot be equated with a"smoking area or space". The articles mentioned in Rule 3 (1) (c) arethose "designed to facilitate smoking" and cannot be termed as"services" as contemplated by Rule 4 (3). Rule 4 (3) imposes blanketrestriction against providing any services in "smoking area or space"and such a restriction will obviously apply to such smoking area or space in arestaurant or in hotel. 13.The submission made on behalf of the private respondents on the basis ofinstrument ( i ) is also misconceived. All that thisinstruction means is that the prohibition against providing any services in asmoking area or space does not apply to smoking rooms in a hotel. That is tosay, in a smoking room in a hotel, food and beverages may be provided by way ofroom services, but such services cannot be provided in the smoking area/spacein a restaurant. 14.The rationale underlying instruction ( i ) is obvious. A smoking room in a hotel may be occupied by theguest for one day or several days. Such a guest can not be denied food andbeverages by way of room service or other services like laundry service orentertainment through television watching in the smoking room in a hotel. 15.On the other hand, the customer in a restaurant, who is otherwise not allowedto smoke in any public place including a restaurant [Section 3 ( 1)] is merely given a concession to smoke in a separate areaor space called smoking area or smoking space in the restaurant. 15.On the other hand, the customer in a restaurant, who is otherwise not allowedto smoke in any public place including a restaurant [Section 3 ( 1)] is merely given a concession to smoke in a separate areaor space called smoking area or smoking space in the restaurant. He may smokeone cigarette or more in the smoking area, but the rule making authority, inconsonance with the legislative object as emerging from the Preamble and theStatement of Objects and reasons for the Act,' does not want to encourage thecustomer in the restaurant to spend long hours in the smoking area of therestaurant. He would be encouraged to spend long hours in the smoking area ifhe were to be provided with services like food and beverages there or were tobe provided other services like entertainment through television watching inthe smoking area. 16.It, therefore, stands to reason that the rule making authority, which prohibitsperson-in-charge of public places including restaurants as defined in theSection 3(1) from providing devices like lighter which facilitate smoking andwhich prohibits a restaurants owner from providing any services to thecustomers in the smoking area of the restaurant, could not be attributed theintention to permit the restaurant owner to provide gadgets like hookas in the smoking area of the restaurant. Hooka is more than a device that facilitates smoking. Hooka is the gadget through which the person smokes.Providing a gadget like hooka to young boys and girlswith impressionable minds is not merely facilitating them to smoke, but indeedencouraging and even exciting them to smoke. However, exciting the service maybe, it falls within the mischief of sub-rule (3) of Rule 4. 17.The last submission that the impugned conditions are violative of Article 19 of the Constitution of India, need not detain us long since theimpugned conditions provide what is mandated by the Central Statute and Rulesand are in the nature of reasonable restrictions. Article 19(1) (g) permitsimposition of a reasonable restriction on the ground of protection of theinterests of the general public. Article 47 of the Constitution contains aDirective Principle of the State Policy and provides that the State shallregard the improvement of public health as amongst its primary duties. Whileconsidering the effect of the Directive Principles contained in Part IV of theConstitution of India, particularly in the context of principles ofinterpretation of a statute, in case of U.P. State Electricity Board andanother Vs. Whileconsidering the effect of the Directive Principles contained in Part IV of theConstitution of India, particularly in the context of principles ofinterpretation of a statute, in case of U.P. State Electricity Board andanother Vs. Hari Shanker Jain and others, AIR 1979 SC 65 , the Hon'ble SupremeCourt has observed thus :- 'Themandate of Article 37 of the Constitution is that while the DirectivePrinciples of State Policy shall not be enforceable by any Court, theprinciples are 'nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country' and'it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws'.Addressed to Courts, what the injunction means is that while Courts are notfree to direct the making of Legislation, Courts are bound to evolve, affirmand adopt principles of interpretation, which will further and not hinder thegoals set out in the Directive Principles of State Policy. This command of theConstitution must be ever present in the minds of Judges when interpretingstatutes which concern themselves directly or indirectly with matters set outin the Directive Principles of State Policy." Whileinterpreting the provisions of COPTA and the Rules framed thereunder ,we must have due regard to Article 47 and the fact that the Act was enactedwith the expressly stated objective of improving public health and inaccordance with the resolutions passed by the WHO. Section 2 of COPTA containsdeclaration of expediency to enact the Act in public interest. Hence thechallenge based on Article 19 is also without substance. 18.For the aforesaid reasons we repel the challenge levelled by the private respondents, who are running restaurants with hukka bars against the circular/letter issued on 1-7-2011,by the Mumbai Corporation, Greater Mumbai. In fact, we are of the view thatsimilar conditions ought to be incorporated by the Municipal Corporations andMunicipal Councils in other regions of the State. Counsel forthe State of Maharashtra states that this shall also be done within one month from today. Stand over to 28 July, 2011 ." 14.In the present case, hukka bars/eatinghouses/restaurants are certainly public places, as defined under the Smoke FreeRules, 2008, and therefore, by no stretch of imagination, smoking/using a hukka , can be permitted on each and every table ofrestaurants in question. Stand over to 28 July, 2011 ." 14.In the present case, hukka bars/eatinghouses/restaurants are certainly public places, as defined under the Smoke FreeRules, 2008, and therefore, by no stretch of imagination, smoking/using a hukka , can be permitted on each and every table ofrestaurants in question. Rule 3 (1) (c) of the Smoke Free Rules, 2008 alsocasts a restriction for providing ashtray, matches, lighters or other thingsdesigned to facilitate smoking in the public places, and therefore, by nostretch of imagination, as hukka is only a devicedesigned to facilitate smoking can be provided in the public place. However,all the owners/management of the restaurants, keeping in view the parametersprovided under the Smoke Free Rules, 2008, can certainly make a provision forproviding smoke area or a space, as defined in Rule 2 (e) of the Smoke FreeRules, 2008, but at the same time, the statutory provisions as contained underCOPTA and the Rules framed thereunder are to bestrictly followed. It is impossible to conceive that the COPTA and the Rulesframed thereunder grants a permission to restaurantowners/hotel owners to provide hukka on each andevery table in a restaurant, as argued by the learned Counsel. This Court is ofthe considered opinion that hukka cannot be providedon each and every table in a restaurant. If the restaurant or hotel owners wishto make a provision for smoking, the same has to be in consonance with the Act,2003 and the Rules of 2008. 15.Resultantly, no case for interference is made out in the matter and this Courtis of the considered opinion that the District Magistrate was well within itsdomain to pass orders under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, assmoking hukka is certainly harmful to public healthand there was enough material before the District Magistrate to pass ordersunder Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court is also of theconsidered opinion that even after expiry of the order passed under Section 144of the Criminal Procedure Code, smoking or providing hukka on each and every table in a restaurant is not permissible. This Court is also of theconsidered opinion that even after expiry of the order passed under Section 144of the Criminal Procedure Code, smoking or providing hukka on each and every table in a restaurant is not permissible. The authorities aredirected to ensure strict compliance of Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products(Prohibitions of Advertisement & Regulation of Trade and Commerce,Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003 and Prohibition of Smoking inPublic Places Rules, 2008 in the entire State of Madhya Pradesh, by takingappropriate action against those restaurants and hotels which are not complyingwith the statutory provisions, as contained in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder . Withthe aforesaid observations, the writ petitions stand dismissed. No order as tocosts.