HOOJA, C.—The questions of referred by the learned Division Bench of this Court of consideration of the Full Bench, are as under:- (1) Whether the Larger Bench in its judgment `Bagga vs. Surendra Singh' as reported in 1991 RRD page 1 has laid down a good law by providing for conferment/acquisition of khatedari rights on a trespasser on the basis of `adverse possession' vis-a-vis the provision of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act of 1955 as a measure of land reform? (2) Whether extinguishment of tenancy right under Section 63(1)(iv) of the Act of 1955 creates khatedari right in trespasser on the basis of adverse possession; or such land after extinction of tenancy right reverts of landholder- the State Government? (3) Whether the Board of Revenue has legislative power to lay down a new law for grant of khatedari right in addition to and over and above what is provided under the Act, as has been done by the Larger Bench of this Court in 1991 RRD page 1? (4) Whether the judgment of the Larger Bench as reported in 1991 RRD page 1 should be revoked/annulled in light of the provision of the Act of 1955 and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as reported in RLW 2008(1) RJ page 1101. 2. The thumbnail sketch of the case, in which the matter has been placed before us for examining the above questions, can be briefly mentioned as follows:- History of litigation Initially respondent/plaintiff Shri Sitaram filed a regular suit in the year 1975 for the land bearing khasra No. 349 measuring 1 bigha 1 biswa in Village Shriramjipura, Tehsil Sanganer District Jaipur under Section 88 & 188 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter called "the Act") against Shri Ghasi, Phoolya and Kalya in the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Jaipur (II) with submissions that he is in continuous cultivatory possession of the land in question, even prior to Samvat 2008. On the day of filing the suit, the land in question was entered in the name of defendant Ghasi and Kalya. The plaintiff brought this suit basically on the premise of adverse possession. During the pendency of the suit Shri Ghasi and Shri Phoolya (the defendants) died and their legal representatives were brought on record. After having received the reply of the plaint the Trial Court framed the following issues in the suit:- 1. The plaintiff brought this suit basically on the premise of adverse possession. During the pendency of the suit Shri Ghasi and Shri Phoolya (the defendants) died and their legal representatives were brought on record. After having received the reply of the plaint the Trial Court framed the following issues in the suit:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is in possession of land bearing khasra No. 349 area 1 bigha 1 biswa of village Shriamjipura (Tehsil Sanganer) since Samvat 2008? 2. Whether the land bearing khasra No. 349 measuring 1 bigha 1 biswa has been mistakenly entered in the name of Shri Ghasi by the Settlement Department. And after the death of Shri Ghasi, the land in question has been entered wrongly in the khatedari of Shri Phoolya? 3. Whether the plaintiff has acquired khatedar rights in agricultural land bearing khasra No. 349 and the plaintiff has a right to get his khatedari declared on this land? 4. Whether the plaintiff has not mentioned that how his suit is within the limitation and on this very basis the plaint may be amended? 5. Whether the suit is within limitation? 6. Whether defendant No. 1 has sold the land in question to Shri Rameshwar through registered sale deed and the mutation has also been sanctioned to this effect. Therefore, whether Shri Rameshwar is the khatedar tenant in possession of the land in dispute? 7. Whether Shri Rameshwar is a necessary party in the suit? 8. Whether the State is a necessary party in the suit? 9. Whether the transfer of this disputed land in favour of Shri Rameshwar during the pendency of the suit has no legal effect? 10. Relief. 3. On the basis of the material available on the record, the Trial Court decreed the suit on 5.2.1997 filed by the plaintiff Sitaram on the basis of adverse possession and declared plaintiff Shri Sitaram as khatedar tenant of khasra No. 349 measuring 1 bigha 1 biswa of village Shriamjipura and also restrained the defendants by permanent injunction not to interfere with the peaceful possession of Shri Sitaram on the disputed land. The learned Trial Court directed the Tehsildar to mutate the name of Shri Sitaram (plaintiff) as khatedar tenant of the land bearing khasra No. 349 in the revenue records. 4. The learned Trial Court directed the Tehsildar to mutate the name of Shri Sitaram (plaintiff) as khatedar tenant of the land bearing khasra No. 349 in the revenue records. 4. Defendant Shri Jagdish and others (legal representatives of Phoolya) along with Shri Rameshwar Lal assailed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court dated 5.2.1997 by filing the first appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Ajmer on 17.2.1997. The Revenue Appellate Authority, Ajmer dismissed the first appeal on 30.5.1997 and upheld the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. 5. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of both the Subordinate Courts Shri Jagdish and others along with Shri Rameshwar filed second appeal before Division Bench of this Court. During the pendency of the appeal Shri Rameshwar Lal (appellant) died. Since the legal representatives of Shri Rameshwar Lal were not brought on record in time, therefore, the appeal was abated on 21.5.2002. Against this order of abatement, Shri Jagdish and others, along with the legal heirs of Shri Rameshwar filed a writ petition in the Rajasthan High Court (Single Bench C.W. No. 7551/2002). The Hon'ble Single Bench of the Rajasthan High Court quashed the order of Division Bench of this Court dated 21.5.2002 and remanded the matter back to this Court. Thereafter, Hon'ble Division Bench accepted the application filed by the legal heirs of Shri Rameshwar Lal and legal heirs of the deceased Shri Rameshwar were brought on record and then learned Division Bench heard the second appeal on merits. 6. In the appeal before the Division Bench, it was argued that the decision of the Larger Bench of this Court cited in RRD 1991 Page 1 "Bagga vs. Surendra Singh" does not lay down a good law and in light of Hemaji Waghaji Jat vs. Bhikhabhai Khengar Bhai Harijan & Ors. cited in AIR 2009 (SC) 103 decided by the apex Court and the full bench decision of M.P. High Court, the larger bench decision should be declared per incurium. It was also contended before the Division Bench that there is no provision in Rajasthan Tenancy Act for according tenancy rights on the basis of adverse possession. cited in AIR 2009 (SC) 103 decided by the apex Court and the full bench decision of M.P. High Court, the larger bench decision should be declared per incurium. It was also contended before the Division Bench that there is no provision in Rajasthan Tenancy Act for according tenancy rights on the basis of adverse possession. It was also argued that to regulate the tenancies in agricultural land in the State, a special Act has been enacted, therefore, the general provisions of Indian Limitation Act shall not apply and consequently khatedari rights cannot be conferred by the Courts on the basis of adverse possession. Accordingly on the basis of arguments advance, the matter has been placed before us to examine and answer the questions formulated and referred by the learned Division Bench reproduced in para 1 above. 7. At the onset of the hearing, some preliminary objections were raised by learned counsels on the reference made by the Division Bench. 8. Shri Ashok Nath, learned counsel, contended before the bench that this reference has been made under Section 11 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 and under this provision only that question can be referred which has emerged and arisen during the hearing of the case. He submitted that this was a case between two individuals wherein the Government was not impleaded as a party and Shri Rameshwar Lal on his heirs were also not made party. He submitted that part 2 of question No. 2 which relates to whether land reverts to the landholder i.e. State after extinction of tenancy rights, has not emerged from the matter in question and there cannot be any question regarding vesting of the land in the State. He urged the Court to declare part 2 of question No. 2 as imaginary question. 9. Shri Sunil Pareek, learned counsel contended that the Division Bench which has referred the matter has given its opinion on all the issues raised in this reference. He submitted that this reference has no purpose and validity as the referring Division Bench has itself given its answers to all questions raised in this reference. 10. 9. Shri Sunil Pareek, learned counsel contended that the Division Bench which has referred the matter has given its opinion on all the issues raised in this reference. He submitted that this reference has no purpose and validity as the referring Division Bench has itself given its answers to all questions raised in this reference. 10. Shri P.S. Dashora, learned counsel contended that the referring Bench had a fundamental question before them that whether tenancy rights can be declared on the basis of adverse possession or not but the learned Division Bench has raised four questions instead of this basic question. He also objected that part 2 of question No. 2 cannot be raised in the reference because it did not arise from the particular case being heard by the referring bench. He submitted that no answer for such hypothetical question is required to be given. 11. Shri Vijay Soni, learned counsel, argued that this reference should have been made to the three member bench not to the full bench. He alleged that the constitution of the bench is not as per the legal precedents and relied on AIR 2002 page 296 to support his contention. 12. Per contra, the learned counsel for the appellant Shri Hemant Sogani replying to the preliminary objections submitted that technically this is correct that part 2 of question No. 2 did not emerge before referring Division Bench while hearing this case but part 2 of question No. 2 is directly related to question No. 1 and well shall have to seek the answer for such a problem which is going to arise if Section 63(1)(iv) is implemented. He further submitted that part 2 of question No. 2 is a natural consequence and it is not a question in an independent situation. He also submitted that though earlier Shri Rameshwar was not a party in Trial Court but he is party at both the appellate stages. He urged the Court that this reference is not faulty but it is justifiable and valid reference, which will be a guiding precedent for all Revenue Courts of the State. 13. Shri R.K. Gupta, learned counsel, contended that part 2 of question No. 2 is a consequential issue and it is necessary to consider this part of question, otherwise the rights on such lands where khatedari rights are extinguished, will be in abeyance. 13. Shri R.K. Gupta, learned counsel, contended that part 2 of question No. 2 is a consequential issue and it is necessary to consider this part of question, otherwise the rights on such lands where khatedari rights are extinguished, will be in abeyance. He further submitted that this reference is congruent to the provisions of Section 11 of Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. The learned counsel also attracted the attention of the bench towards Sections 188 of Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, wherein it has been clearly mentioned that the land which is not on tenancy to an individual belongs to the State. 14. Shri Hagami Lal, learned counsel contended that the preliminary objections raised by the counsels are not maintainable and this reference is a competent reference because in the light of the provisions of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 khatedari rights cannot be conferred on the basis of adverse possession. He submitted that the Courts cannot go beyond the explicit provisions of the statute and there is no para-materia of Article 64 and 65 of Indian Limitation Act in Rajasthan Tenancy Act. 15. Having heard the preliminary objections and the replies thereon from the counsels of the parties and amicus curiae (s), this bench, in order to make the legal position clear, wishes to refer to Section 11 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956:- 11. Power to refer to a Bench:- "The Chairman or any other member of the Board sitting singly for the disposal of any case or proceeding may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, refer any question of law or custom having the force of law or of the construction of any document arising before him in such case or proceedings, for the opinion of a Bench, and the case or proceeding shall be disposed of in accordance with such opinion." 16. The above provision unequivocally manifests that the referring Division Bench was competent to make this reference as the bench was in conundrum on the legal position on the issues raised. It is also justifiable to look into these questions afresh as recently there has been a shift in legal perspective of the superior Courts especially of the Apex Court on the issue of adverse possession. Evidently, the above section gives power of reference to any question of law after reasons to be recorded in writing. It is also justifiable to look into these questions afresh as recently there has been a shift in legal perspective of the superior Courts especially of the Apex Court on the issue of adverse possession. Evidently, the above section gives power of reference to any question of law after reasons to be recorded in writing. Therefore, it is amply clear that after recording reasons in writing, any Member of the Board is vested with the power to refer the matter on any question of law. Referring Division Bench has narrated in detail the reasons why they are differing with the legal proposition created by the larger bench in 1991 RRD page 1 and have enumerated grounds on the basis of which they are referring the matter for decision on substantial points. Hon'ble Division Bench in their opinion found their views inconsistent with the views given by the larger bench. So being the bench of lesser strength, they have no option except to refer the matter. 17. Hence, the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel Shri Sunil Pareek has no force because the bench, has referred the matter after recording reasons in writing, as required under Section 11 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. 18. There has also been an objection in this case that this reference should have been heard by a three member bench and not by the five member bench and a case law AIR 2002 page 296 was also cited before the bench. Since the Apex Court has settled this issue in the case of "Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr." reported in AIR 2005 Supreme Court 752 by observing following exception of the general rule of judicial discipline and proprietary: "A Bench of lesser quorum cannot doubt the correctness of the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of lager quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration." 19. On the same analogy, referring Division Bench did not refer the matter straightaway to full bench, but has requested to Chairman for constitution of the Full Bench to answer the questions. On the same analogy, referring Division Bench did not refer the matter straightaway to full bench, but has requested to Chairman for constitution of the Full Bench to answer the questions. Hence, the objections raised by the learned advocate Shri Vijay Soni have no significant value. Therefore, the constitution of this bench is a per the provisions of law and this bench is competent to answer the questions raised in this reference. 20. As regarding part 2 of question No. 2 :"or such land after extinction of tenancy rights reverts to the land holder i.e., the State Government" it is very clear that this appeal was preferred by some individuals against Shri Sitaram who claims to be in adverse possession on the land in dispute. In this case, the State Government was not made a party in the lower Courts. In the process of deciding this appeal or in the proceeding before the Division Bench this issue was not raised. It was also not an issue before any of the subordinate Courts so as to decide where the land will revert back after extinction of tenancy rights. The very language of Section 11 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 reveals that only those questions of law or custom arising from the proceeding of the Court can be referred. Since, this part of the question has not been a part of the proceeding in this case; therefore, considering the seriousness of the preliminary objection, this bench is of the opinion that this part of the question is a hypothetical one and it hardly requires to be answered by this bench. Hence, this part of question is not being answered. 21. Therefore, as discussed above, this bench is of the opinion that this reference is competent and is fully justified to be considered except part 2 of question No. 2. Thus the preliminary objection raised by learned counsels are decided accordingly. 22. On the principal questions which we have to answer, Shri Hemant Sogani, counsel for appellants argued on merits that the judgment of the larger bench (RRD 1991 page 1) is misleading as some of the citations referred in the judgment are wrong and misquoted. Thus the preliminary objection raised by learned counsels are decided accordingly. 22. On the principal questions which we have to answer, Shri Hemant Sogani, counsel for appellants argued on merits that the judgment of the larger bench (RRD 1991 page 1) is misleading as some of the citations referred in the judgment are wrong and misquoted. Hence further submitted that the doctrine of adverse possession does not apply in matters related to tenancy because the real land owner is the State and lands are given on tenancy or lease by the State. He further submitted that the tenants have restricted rights but not proprietary rights; therefore, the law of adverse possession does not provide any right, title to the person who is in adverse possession of the land given on tenancy by the State. He relied on (1994) 5 SCC page 562 wherein it has been inferred by the Apex Court that tenancy rights are although hereitable and transferable, but still are insufficient to constitute ownership. He further submitted that in the doctrine of adverse possession, the possession should be primarily adverse against the true owner. He relied on 2008 SCC (15) page 150 and AIR 1997 (SC) page 2930in support of his argument. He argued that in agricultural lands the true owner is the State and land is given on tenancy only and adverse possession by some individual on the lands already given to a tenant does not confer any right, title to such adverse possessor. 23. Shri Sogani further contended, that khatedari rights cannot be acquired by adverse possession because the special statute does not provide for such conferment. He placed reliance on the following citations AIR 1923 (Privy Council) page 118, AIR 1970 (SC) page 1019, AIR 2001 (M.P.) page 268 and AIR (Nagpur) page 49. 24. He emphasized that the definition of tenant given in Section 5(43) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 does not include a trespasser. He argued that when the legislature has clear intention that the trespasser cannot become a tenant how can the Courts confer khatedari rights on a person who has adverse possession on the land given by the State on tenancy. He argued that when the legislature has clear intention that the trespasser cannot become a tenant how can the Courts confer khatedari rights on a person who has adverse possession on the land given by the State on tenancy. He urged the Court that explicit provisions have been provided for acquisition of tenancy rights under Sections 12(2), 13, 15, 15AAA, 15B and 19 of the Act but there is no provision for acquisition of tenancy right on the basis of adverse possession. 25. Shri Sogani further submitted that the duty of the Court is to interpret law as it stands. In this case, the special Act regulating tenancy of agricultural land in Rajasthan does have provisions for conferment of khatedari rights on various grounds but not on the basis of adverse possession and it also has the provisions of limitation of its own. The Courts should keep in mind the intention of legislature. They cannot add words to the explicitly written provisions of a statute. He cited in support of his arguments AIR 2010 (SC) page 2777, AIR 2010 (SC) page 3455, (2010) 4 SCC page 653, (2009) 3 SCC 553 and AIR 2002 (SC) page 834. 26. He argued that the long accepted wrong version cannot be perpetuated and therefore the larger bench decision in Bagga vs. Surendra Singh case is a bad law and does not hold good now. He further submitted that Articles 64 and 65 of the Indian Limitation Act also do not apply on the tenancy matters in Rajasthan as the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 is a special Act and the legislature has deliberately kept away from making similar provisions in the Tenancy Act. He also referred to Section 214 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 pertaining to limited application of provision of Indian Limitation Act. 27. The learned counsel further argued that a person who is tenant pays rent to the State. It is the basis of relationship of a tenant and the land owner, therefore, without the consent of the land owner no such tenancy rights can be conferred on a trespasser. An adverse possession cannot be conferred any right, title on the basis of adverse possession in light of the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955; therefore, the decision of the larger bench may be declared per incuriam. An adverse possession cannot be conferred any right, title on the basis of adverse possession in light of the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955; therefore, the decision of the larger bench may be declared per incuriam. He contended with reference to question No. 1, that the judgment of larger bench in Bagga vs. Surendra Singh is not a good law because it is against the explicit provisions provided in the special statute. He also submitted that extinguishment of tenancy right under Section 63(1)(iv) of the Act of 1955 does not suo-moto create any khatedari right in a trespasser on the basis of adverse possession because there is no para-materia of Article 64 and 65 of Indian Limitation Act in the special statute. He emphasized that intentional omission is also a part of legislative intention and the State legislature deliberately chose to be away from similar provisions of Article 64 and 65 of Indian Limitation Act. He also made it clear that the Board of Revenue and the other Courts do not have legislative power to lay down a new law for grant of khatedari right on the basis of adverse possession. The learned counsel also urged the Court to declare the larger bench judgment as reported in 1991 RRD page 1 as per incuriam. 28. Shri Sogani further argued that Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 is undoubtedly a special Act dealing into the rights, duties and various aspects of the tenancies and provides for restricted application of provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and Indian Limitation Act. He submitted that if we carefully read the Third Schedule of the Act, there is no reference to filling of suits on the basis of adverse possession. He argued that under the provisions of the Act, limitation is mainly guided by the Third schedule not by the provisions of Indian Limitation Act. Referring to Sections 45, 180 and 183 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, he further argued that when the Act even prohibits subletting and trespassing therefore providing khatedari rights on the basis of adverse possession is against the very spirit of the special statute. He also submitted that in RRD 1991 page 1 the Court has not carefully considered the provisions of the Act and RBJ 1994 page 50 is distinguishable from the present case and not a binding precedent. 29. He also submitted that in RRD 1991 page 1 the Court has not carefully considered the provisions of the Act and RBJ 1994 page 50 is distinguishable from the present case and not a binding precedent. 29. Shri P.S. Dashora, Amicus Curiae, argued that the judgment of Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court cited in RBJ 1994 page 50 and larger bench decision of this Court cited in RRD 1991 page 1 are not binding as the statute does not provide for conferment of khatedari rights on the basis of adverse possession. He submitted that Courts cannot legislate what is not provided in the statute. The buttress his contention, he cited 2002 DNJ (SC) page 232, AIR 2002 (SC) page 1334 and AIR 2005 (SC) 752 . 30. Shri R.K. Gupta, Amicus Curiae, submitted that the special statute on agricultural tenancies provided for the similar provision to Section 27 of Indian Limitation Act as Section 63(1)(iv) in Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. But the State legislature intentionally did not make provision similar to Article 64 and Article 65 of the Indian Limitation Act. He therefore contended that no suit can be brought on the basis of adverse possession (1961 RRD page 368). He also argued that the tenancy rights are not proprietary rights, therefore, the provisions of Rajasthan Escheats Act do not apply on agricultural holdings of the tenant, and in the case the tenant dies not without a legal heir his agricultural land will be dealt as per provisions of Section 63(1)(iv) of the Act. He also raised a question that if it is accepted that a trespasser who has hostile possession on government land for more than 30 years, can get rights, whether this could ever mean that he will have all the rights, that the State has. He argued that how can a trespasser have different rights in case of adverse possession on the land of a tenant and that of the State Government. He further submitted that regarding limitation the Tenancy Act has Third Schedule with provisions for limitation on various matters. 31. Learned counsel Shri Hagami Lal Choudhary reiterated that the Tenancy Act is a special Act and the provision of Section 88 (declaration of khateari rights) is very comprehensive. He also referred to Section 60 regarding abandonment of tenancy. He further submitted that regarding limitation the Tenancy Act has Third Schedule with provisions for limitation on various matters. 31. Learned counsel Shri Hagami Lal Choudhary reiterated that the Tenancy Act is a special Act and the provision of Section 88 (declaration of khateari rights) is very comprehensive. He also referred to Section 60 regarding abandonment of tenancy. He argued that a trespasser cannot be treated as a tenant on the basis of adverse possession nor can be bring suit under Section 88 of the Act. He submitted that as the Rajasthan High Court has given a clear pronouncement that khatedari rights can be conferred on the basis of adverse possession under Section 88 of the Act (1994 RBJ page 50), therefore, this matter should be referred to the Hon'ble High Court under Section 12 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. 32. Countering the above contentions, Shri J.S. Sankhla appearing for the respondents contended that the tenancy rights for all purposes are proprietary rights and the doctrine of adverse possession applies to land tenancies also. He argued that Hon'ble High Court in 1994 RBJ page 50 has ruled that a person who is in adverse possession can bring a suit under Section 88 of the Act. He further submitted that the provisions of Indian Limitation Act also apply to the matter related to agricultural holdings in the State. He contended that decision of the larger bench in "Bagga vs. Surendra Singh" has laid down a good law and there is no occasion to shift to the other perspective as suggested by the referring Division Bench. He argued that the referring D.B. had to comply with the larger bench decision instead of referring it to the Full Bench. 33. Shri Y.D. Sharma, contended that the provisions of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, do not prohibit the declaratory suits on the basis of adverse possession. He submitted that the Hon'ble High Court has explicitly made it clear that such suits can be brought under Section 88 of the Act. He submitted that the judgment of larger bench and Hon'ble High Court judgment as reported in 1994 RBJ page 50 are binding on the Board of Revenue. Therefore, the referring D.B. could have decided the case in light of this judgment. He further submitted that this reference is based on imagination and presumptions; hence, it doesn't require any answer. 34. He submitted that the judgment of larger bench and Hon'ble High Court judgment as reported in 1994 RBJ page 50 are binding on the Board of Revenue. Therefore, the referring D.B. could have decided the case in light of this judgment. He further submitted that this reference is based on imagination and presumptions; hence, it doesn't require any answer. 34. Shri Ashok Nath, the learned counsel contended that the larger bench decision as reported in RRD 1991 page 1 is a good law. He submitted that tenancy rights are proprietary rights and the provisions of Indian Limitation Act also apply on the tenancy related matters. He argued that there is no prohibition in the special statute for conferring khatedari rights on the basis of adverse possession. He submitted that this reference is not maintainable as the High Court decision (1994 RBJ page 50) is a binding precedent on us specifically on this issue. He contended that the referring bench should have referred this matter a further to the High Court directly under Section 12 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. 35. Shri Khadag Singh, learned counsel submitted that tenancy rights are proprietary rights because land is a property and the rights thereon are in inheritable and transferable. All the ingredients of property viz. possession, enjoyment and disposition are there in agricultural tenancy, therefore, these rights are to be treated as property as per Section 3 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. He further referred to Section 15(1) of the Act which clearly mentions that amongst others, every person who acquires khatedari rights under any other law for the time being in force shall also be a khatedar tenant. In this case he stated that, the law in force would be the Indian Limitation Act. He submitted that under Section 88 of the Act a trespasser or a person with adverse possession can also file a suit for declaration of khatedari rights. He emphasized that it is misleading and erring finding that there is no provision for declaration of khatedari rights on the basis of adverse possession in the Act. He contended that a tenant has a perpetual lease, therefore, whatsoever rights the tenant has they will vest in the adverse possessor. Therefore, the doctrine of adverse possession is applicable in agricultural tenancies. He contended that a tenant has a perpetual lease, therefore, whatsoever rights the tenant has they will vest in the adverse possessor. Therefore, the doctrine of adverse possession is applicable in agricultural tenancies. This theory and entitlement derives from the Limitation Act and it covers all the properties including agricultural lease and tenancies. 36. Shri V.R. Rathore, Smt. Poonam Mathur, Shri S.P. Singh, Shri O.L. Dave, Shri Pradeep Vishnoi, Shri J.P. Mathur, Shri Anil Sharma, Shri Brahamanand Sharma, Shri J.K. Purohit, Shri Ajit Singh also emphasized that the judgment of the larger bench in "Bagga vs. Surendra Singh" and judgment of Hon'ble High Court cited in RBJ 1994 page 50 are good laws and have binding force on this Court. 37. Having benefited from the erudite submissions made by learned advocates, we have given our thoughtful and serious consideration to the rival contentions of the learned counsels of the parties and learned amicus curiae(s). 38. A careful reading of the judgment passed by the Larger Bench cited in 1991 RRD page 1 gives clear picture that it has been passed on the basis of following propositions:- 1. The general law of limitation is applicable to proceedings under the Tenancy Law. Application of Section 27 of the Limitation Act is not excluded. 2. By adverse possession, the trespasser acquires khatedari rights under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. 39. In this regard, we have to be very prudent in examining these propositions in the light of arguments advanced, provisions of relevant laws and judicial pronouncements. 40. It is a fact that the state Legislature has enacted. The Rajasthan Tenancy Act and Rajasthan Land Revenue Act for regulating tenancies of agriculture holdings in the state. Both these laws are special laws, wherein the provisions pertaining to terms and conditions of the tenancies, maintenance of Revenue record, survey and settlements, transfer of tenancies, inheritance, creation of Courts, resolution of disputes etc. have been provided. The Acts are comprehensive in nature and coverage. 41. It is also settled proposition that the provisions of the State Special statute will prevail over provisions contained in general law. have been provided. The Acts are comprehensive in nature and coverage. 41. It is also settled proposition that the provisions of the State Special statute will prevail over provisions contained in general law. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held in AIR 1963 (SC) 1077 : "a general act must yield to a special act dealing with a specific subject matter and that if an act directs a thing to be done in a particular way, it shall be deemed to have prohibited the doing of that thing in any other way..." This view has been consistently upheld in jurisdicial pronouncements e.g. reported in AIR 1931 (PC) page 149, AIR 1961 (SC) 117), and (1998) 7 SCC page 162. 42. It is also noted that Rajasthan Tenancy Act, a special Act was brought about with the object of providing certain measures of land reforms and its provision has overriding effect, though they may not always be consistent with the provisions of general law. Having made the general law if the legislature subsequently makes a special Act and provides for special provisions, it can be safely assumed that the legislature had in mind the provisions prevailing in general laws but chose to make a special law with a specific objective and lay down provisions which are different or in exception to the general law. 43. It is also well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language implied in a statute is determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the Courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent not bound in the statute. Hon'ble Supreme Court in 2001(9) SCC page 673 `P. Nirathilingam vs. Annaya Nadar & Ors.' has observed that "Interpretation which defeats that very intent and purpose for which a statute was enacted should be avoided even if such interpretation has long been accepted and followed." Herein also on the basis of long possession, no ground has been incorporated in Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 on which khatedari rights can be given on the basis of adverse possession having foundation of long cultivatory possession. 44. In the context the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, which is a special law has its own provisions for limitation in various matters. 44. In the context the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, which is a special law has its own provisions for limitation in various matters. Such provisions are enumerated in Third Schedule of the Act which provides for period of limitation in various matters which are somewhat different from the provisions of Indian Limitation Act. In addition the Act has also provided Section 214 wherein the extent of applicability of the Indian Limitation Act has been given, Section 214 of the Act reads as under: (1) The suits and applications specified in the Third Schedule shall be instituted and made within the time prescribed therein for them and every such suit instituted or application made after the expiry of the period of limitation so prescribed shall be dismissed: Provided that any such suit or application, for which the period prescribed by the said schedule is shorter than then period prescribed by the law in force before the commencement of this Act, may be instituted or made within six months next after the commencement of this Act or within the period of limitation prescribed by the aforesaid law, whichever period expires first: Provided further that any such suit or application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the said Schedule but for which no period is prescribed by the aforesaid law may be instituted or made within the period prescribed by the said Schedule computed from the date of the commencement of this Act. (2) If the payment of rent has been suspended under the order of a competent authority on account of an agricultural calamity, the period of suspension shall be excluded in the computation of the period of limitation prescribed for a suit for the recovery of such rent. (3) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (1) and (2) the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (Central Act IX of 1908) shall apply to suits, appeals, applications and proceedings under or in pursuance of this Act. 45. The scope of Section 214 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 makes it explicity clear that this provisions has been introduced with a view of regulate the period of limitation prescribed in the Third Schedule. It has been made applicable to suits, application and proceedings under Rajasthan Tenancy Act and this section has been enacted to serve this purpose. 45. The scope of Section 214 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 makes it explicity clear that this provisions has been introduced with a view of regulate the period of limitation prescribed in the Third Schedule. It has been made applicable to suits, application and proceedings under Rajasthan Tenancy Act and this section has been enacted to serve this purpose. This is also settled law that law of limitation is a rules of procedure and does not create any substantive rights in favour of any person nor do they define or create causes of action, but simply prescribe that the remedy can be exercised only upto a certain period and not subsequently. Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in AIR 2001 M.P. page 268 also held that:- "where special period of limitation is prescribed under the Special Act, the same shall prevail over the limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963." 46. Section 214(1) of the Act says that the suits and applications specified in the Third Schedule shall be instituted and made within the time prescribed therein for them. It is also evidently clear that as per Section 214(3) of the Act provisions of Indian Limitation Act are application to the Act subject to the Third Schedule, meaning that Limitation Act shall apply for deciding the limitation in cases for which no time limit is specified in the Third Schedule for filing suits, appeals applications and proceedings under or in pursuance of the Act, this section only speaks about the time limit for instituting suits etc. and not for conferment of khatedari rights on adverse possession. As discussed earlier, conferment of khatedari right to a trespasser on the basis of adverse possession are not envisaged in any of the section of the Act, being a special law for agricultural tenancies, which are clearly not full proprietary rights. 47. As per observations of the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 2001 (M.P.) page 268 while relying on Apex Court decision in the case of `Mathura Lal vs. Keshar Bai cited in AIR 1971 Supreme Court page 310, it has been held that:- "In the case governing the Special Acts dealing with specified rights created or recognized subject to Limitation Act. Restrictions in the absence of any provisions, no such contingency could arise as special always excludes the general. Restrictions in the absence of any provisions, no such contingency could arise as special always excludes the general. There could be no mixing up of the two." 48. In the case of `Tulsi Ram Jiyan Lal Lodi vs. Hyder Lalla Pinjara' reported in AIR 1944 Nagpur page 250 rendered by a full bench, it has been observed that:- "The legislature when applying Section 28, Limitation Act, 1908 (Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963), to suits between tenant and trespasser which provisions extinguishes the tenant's right after exclusion for the prescribed period did not confer by implication tenancy right on the trespasser against the landlord." 49. It was repeatedly argued during the hearing that the provisions of Indian Limitation Act, specially Articles 64 and 65 will apply to the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. In this context, it is necessary to point out that the Indian Limitation Act is mainly a procedural law though under Article 64 and 65, rights can be claimed by individuals on the basis of possession and title. We are of the view that as Articles 64 and 65 of the Indian Limitation Act are substantive in terms of providing rights to an individual on the basis of title and possession; they cannot be taken to be applicable to the Rajasthan Tenancy Act merely with reference to Section 214 (3) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. While we do find provisions in Rajasthan Tenancy Act i.e. Section 63(1)(iv) which corresponds to Section 27 of the Indian Limitation Act, we do not find any clear cut para materia reference of Articles 64 and 65 of the Indian Limitation Act in the provisions of Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Hence the argument that Article 64 and 65 become applicable in Rajasthan Tenancy Act through the door of a very procedural Section 214(3) would be drawing a very far fetched interpretation and building substantive rights, where none exists. In this context, it is also relevant to dwell upon the intention of the legislature it would appear that the state legislature has deliberately chosen not to make similar provision for Articles 64 and 65 of the Indian Limitation Act in the special statute of the State though Article 27 have found a corresponding place in Section 63(1)(iv) of the Act. 50. 50. On the basis of above analysis, we cannot infer that Articles 64 and 65 will ipso facto become the part of the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and thereby confer rights and opportunities not specifically mentioned anywhere in the Act. Hence, the provisions of law of limitation have limited application in the matters pertaining to the tenancy law in the State and further the extinguishment of the right under Article 27of the Limitation Act will not automatically result in the accrual of tenancy rights. 51. Now coming to the second proposition laid by the larger bench in 1991 RRD page 1 that by adverse possession the trespasser acquires khatedari rights. 52. It is clear from the preamble and the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act that it is a measure of land reforms intended to provide khatedari rights on agriculture land with a view of ameliorate the conditions of the farmers and cultivators. Under the Special Act, Sections notably 12(2), 13, 15, 19, 189(2), 193 and 194(2) provide for conferment and accrual of khatedari rights meaning thereby providing wide and en masse coverage and opportunities. 53. Section 7 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 provides that State is the land owner in respect of the land held by the tenant directly from the State Government. After resumption of jagirs and abolition of biswedari system, the revenue land now fully vests in the State Government who is the landholder having the proprietary right. Hence, no one else is allowed to have the proprietary right over agricultural land. In simple words, State is the owner of all revenue lands and for the purpose of land reforms, provisions have been made for conferment of the khatedari rights to the tenants and sub-tenants. 54. Hence, no one else is allowed to have the proprietary right over agricultural land. In simple words, State is the owner of all revenue lands and for the purpose of land reforms, provisions have been made for conferment of the khatedari rights to the tenants and sub-tenants. 54. Viewing from another angle, definition of tenant as narrated in Section 5 sub-clause 43 is as under:- "5(43) `Tenant' shall mean the person by whom rent is, or , but for a contract, express or implied, would be, payable and, except when the contrary intentions appears, shall include- (a) In the Abu area, a permanent tenant or a protected tenant, (b) In the Ajmer area, an ex-proprietary tenant or an occupancy tenant or a hereditary tenant or a non-occupancy tenant or a Bhooswami or a Kashtkar, (c) In this Sunel area, an ex-proprietary tenant or a pakka tenant or an ordinary tenant, (d) a co-tenant, (e) a grove-holder, (f) a village servant, (g) a tenant holding from a land owner (h) a mortgage of tenancy rights, and (i) a sub-tenant, but shall no include a grantee at a favourable rate of rent or an ijaredar or thekadar or a trespasser." 55. This definition is exhaustive and specifically exclude the trespasser within the ambit of the tenant. A khatedar tenant is one of the tenants mentioned in Section 14 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Such a tenant has a right to bequeath his interest under Section 39 of the Tenancy Act and can transfer his interest under Section 41 of the same Act on condition specified in Sections 42 and 43. His interest in heritable under Section 40 as well, but it is not sufficient in law to make him the owner of the property. A khatedar tenant admittedly is a person by whom rent is payable. The effect of it in law is that such a person cannot be deemed to be an absolute of unlimited owner which is necessary before the right of the adverse possession can be exercised. 56. As we have a special statute to regulate and administer various aspects of tenancies in the state we shall have to refer t the specific provisions provided in this Act. 56. As we have a special statute to regulate and administer various aspects of tenancies in the state we shall have to refer t the specific provisions provided in this Act. As we have already discussed that rights of a tenant in agricultural tenancies are heritable and transferable yet they do not constitute ownership and hence they are not proprietary rights (1994) SCC 5 562. It has also been considered earlier that the existing provisions in Rajasthan Tenancy Act do not allow conferment of tenancy rights on the basis of adverse possession and there is no para materia or Articles 64 and 65 of the Indian Limitation Act. 57. The M.P. High Court in its full bench decision cited in AIR 2001 MP 268 unequivocally inferred that no mode other than the modes prescribed for conferment, acquisition or accrual of Bhumiswami rights in the special statute can be created or presumed to exist so as to entitle even a trespasser to become a tenant by adverse possession. The existing definition of a tenant given in Section 4(43) of the Act explicitly prohibits a trespasser to be a tenant. More importantly the land owner in the State is the State Government therefore any adverse possession against the tenant cannot be considered against the true owner. We are in agreement with the arguments advanced by learned advocate for the appellants that in matters of agricultural tenancies in the State the basic condition of acquiring title on the basis of adverse possession can never be fulfilled because the land holder/owner is the state. We are fortified by the citations mentioned in 2007(1) RRT SC 311 in this regard. In these circumstances we are of the opinion that in agricultural tenancies the law of adverse possession does not apply in our State. 58. It is also settled position that when Special Act is silent on a particular subject, then apart from the general law, intention of the legislature for enactment of the special law is paramount and due consideration must be given to the aims and objects for which special statute has been promulgated. 58. It is also settled position that when Special Act is silent on a particular subject, then apart from the general law, intention of the legislature for enactment of the special law is paramount and due consideration must be given to the aims and objects for which special statute has been promulgated. In the Right of above scenario, applying the same principle in the case in hand, here the intention of the legislature is clear as to not to give the trespasser a status of the tenant by virtue of the exclusion clause contained under Section 5(43) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. 59. The observations arrived in para 15 to 17 of the judgment in question RRD 1991 page 1 also make it clear that the learned larger bench was impliedly of the view that the possession of a trespasser during the continuance of a lease does not become adverse against the lessor which is in possession by receipt of rent from his lessee. It has also been observed that in revenue cases, State continues to be the owner of the land as lessor and the tenant in the capacity of lessee. Therefore, a suit for declaration by trespasser on the ground that he has acquired khatedari rights by adverse possession will not bind the State. 60. In view of the facts and circumstances narrated above, there can be no escape from the conclusion that no made other than the modes prescribed for conferment, acquisition or accrual of tenancy rights can be created or presumed to exist or assumed as to entitled a trespasser having inferior rights to become a land owner or a tenant by adverse possession. The ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of `Deendayal & Anr. vs. Rajaram' (AIR 1970 Supreme Court page 1019) can be safely applied to the legislative scheme underlying the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 which says: "It is one thing to say that a tenant who was in possession of the tenancy holding at the time of this possession had lost his rights in the holding but it is another thing to say that a trespasser had become the tenant of that holding at the end of the prescribed period." 61. The Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1956 is exhaustive and the principles available in general law that the extinguishment of the title of the rightful owner will operate as good title of the wrong doer or extinguished in favour of true owner is wholely alien to the scheme of the above act. 62. The ratio of the full bench case cited in AIR 1923 privy council page 118 has given edifice to the legal structure that:- "Limitation Act, Sec. 28 Mere lapse of time does not transfer right in property.-A right of property which is vested in one person is not transferred by the mere lapse of time to the person actually in possession." 63. The Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in "Punja Ram vs. Ramu Chintoo' reported in AIR 1940 Nagpur page 49 (FB) has also observed that a tenancy cannot be acquired by adverse possession. Bare perusal of the judgment cited in 1991 RRD page 1 clearly shows that it was passed on the principles enunciated in AIR 1980 MP page 183. It will be in the interest of justice to mention that judgment cited in AIR 1980 MP page 183 has been overruled by the Full Bench of the same High Court in the case of "State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Balveer Singh" cited in AIR 2001 MP page 268 (FB). 64. The larger bench of this Court erred in holding that though tenancy law is a special enactment but it is also part of the general law of the land. This bench does not conform to the views expressed by the larger bench in this respect. Rajasthan Tenancy Act is a special statute and it outweights the general law as far as the tenancy matters are concerned. The full bench decision of the M.P. High Court cited in AIR 2001 MP 268 removes all confusions in this regard:- "In view of the facts and circumstances noticed hereinabove, there can be no escape from the conclusion, that no mode other than the modes prescribed for conferment, acquisition or accrual of Bhumiswami rights can be created or presumed to exist or assumed so as to entitle a cultivator or tiller of the soil or even a trespasser having inferior rights to become a Bhumiswami envisaged under Section 157 of the Code or a tenant as envisaged under the Code by prescription or by adverse possession. The ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dindayal vs. Rajaram ( AIR 1970 SC 1019 ) (supra) can be safely applied to the legislative scheme underlying the provisions of the Code and nature of the rights with reference to the soil or land as envisaged under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959." 65. It is also evident that the larger bench of this Court did not consider this vital issue that there is no provisions to confer tenancy rights in the special statute and the applicability of Indian Limitation Act provisions have also been restricted by the legislature in Section 214 of the Act. Which the legislature did not intend to provide for the tenancy rights to the adverse possessor how can the Courts grant it and under what provisions? The larger bench though did accept the principle of the law that the tenant has no title to the land and he is merely a lessee. In such a situation when the tenancy rights are not ownership rights, how can the law of adverse possession operates against the tenant who is not a true owner. 66. In our humble opinion the view taken by the larger bench of this Court is erroneous and does not stand to the legal scrutiny, it has some innate contradictions of law points which create more confusion that clarity. 67. So as per the discussion given above, two propositions created by the learned Larger Bench in 1991 RRD page 1 have not considered the important legal points as enumerated above. So in the eyes of the law, the concept created by learned larger bench in 1991 RRD page 1 has become no longer a good law. 68. Much reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for respondents and learned amicus curiae (s) on the judgments pronounced in citations `Shri Khuman Mal vs. Sri Bheru' RBJ 1994(1) page 50 and `Smt. Anup Kanwar and Ors. vs. Smt. Prem Kanwar & Ors. 2008 RRT (2) page 799 = RLW 2008(1) RJ 479 (HC). In these cases it has been argued by the learned counsel for respondents and amicus curiae (s) that the Hon'ble High Court has explicitly rule that an adverse possessor can bring a suit under Section 88 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act for declaration of his tenancy rights unless such rights are prohibited by law. 69. In these cases it has been argued by the learned counsel for respondents and amicus curiae (s) that the Hon'ble High Court has explicitly rule that an adverse possessor can bring a suit under Section 88 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act for declaration of his tenancy rights unless such rights are prohibited by law. 69. We have respectfully gone through these judgments. One of the cases was related to agricultural tenancy belonging to a member of scheduled caste. The Hon'ble High Court in this case has held that it is well settled proposition of law that State is the owner of land and khatedari rights can be granted only under the provisions of Rajasthan Tenancy Act but one has to justify that this possession over the land is in accordance with law. 70. It seems, that the issue of limitation for claiming the rights on the basis of adverse possession has not been given in the statute nor is there any provision in Rajasthan Tenancy Act to confer khatedari rights to an adverse possession, was not specifically agitated before the Hon'ble High Court. Perhaps this was also not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble High Court that when the true owner of the land is the State how can the adverse possession against a tenant, be construed as adverse possession against the true owner. It further appears that, this issue was also not raised and adjudicated before the Hon'ble bench that Rajasthan Tenancy Act is a special law enacted as a measure of land reform wherein there is no provision to confer khatedari rights merely on the basis of adverse possession or there is no equivalent provision of Articles 64 and 65 of Indian Limitation Act in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. In such circumstances of intention of the legislature is to be seen that whether the legislature deliberately chose not to provide for such conferment of rights. In such circumstances of intention of the legislature is to be seen that whether the legislature deliberately chose not to provide for such conferment of rights. The Hon'ble High Court in its above quoted judgment (1994(1) RBJ page 50) has held:- "...more so, Section 88 of the act under which the present suit has been filed clearly envisages that by adverse possession the trespasser acquires khatedari rights provided that the acquisition of khatedari is not specifically prohibited by law, which means that if a person claiming to have acquired khatedari rights by adverse possession was put in or had obtained possession of the land in contravention of any provisions of law prohibiting or invalidating the transaction which has occasioned such adverse possession or if any such provision of any State was thereby circumvented will not be entitled to acquire khatedari rights unless he shows that right by way of adverse possession is justified and not otherwise prohibited in law." 71. With all humility this bench feels that the real issue pertaining to conferment of khatedari rights entirely on the basis of adverse possession in the background of the provisions mentioned in the special statute was not at all raised and adjudicated before the Hon'ble High Court. Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment cited at (1994) 5 SCC page 562 has held that:- "tenancy rights are not proprietary rights, therefore, law of adverse possession does not apply to the agricultural holdings in the State." More so because Tenancy Act is a Special Act legislated as a measure of land reforms and it does not provide such conferment. It is also very pertinent to refer here the words used in the preamble of Rajasthan Tenancy Act: "An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to tenancies of agricultural lands, and to provide for certain measure of land reforms and matters connected therewith." 72. In this way if tenancy rights are conferred on the basis of adverse possession by the Courts when there is no provision in this Special Act it will be against the basic structure and scheme of the statute. The act was legislated to provide permanent relief to the peasantry. This Act as measure of land reform was put in the ninth schedule of the constitution as a safeguard measure. The act was legislated to provide permanent relief to the peasantry. This Act as measure of land reform was put in the ninth schedule of the constitution as a safeguard measure. In such a case if adverse possession is made a basis of conferment of khatedari rights it will be a retrograde step to land reforms. 73. In these circumstances, this bench is of the opinion that intricate issues involved in this concept with regard to the provisions of conferment of khatedari rights to an adverse possessor were not raised and adjudicated before the Hon'ble High Court. In these cases issue of conferment of khatedari rights on the basis of Articles 64 and 65 of the Indian Limitation Act and allied ground were not in focus before the Hon'ble High Court. Therefore, the above citations do not apply substantially on the basis in hand. 74. However even if for the sake of arguments, we assume that the law of adverse possession is applicable to the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 and a khatedari right can be given under said Act on the ground of adverse possession, then too we need to look at the view cited in Apex Court's judgment in the case of Hemji Vaghaji Jat vs. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan reported in AIR 2009 Supreme Court page 103 wherein it has been held:- "law of adverse possession which ousts an owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate, The law as it exists is extremely harsh for the true owner and a windfall for a dishonest person who had illegally taken possession of the property of the true owner. The land ought not to benefit a person who in a clandestine manner takes possession of the property of the owner in contravention of law. This in substance would mean that the law given seal of approval to the illegal action or activities of a rank trespasser or who had wrongly taken possession of the property of the true owner." 75. In the light of the above discussions, arguments advanced by the learned counsels, supporting the conclusion of the judgment cited in 1991 RRD page 1 and other rulings cited by them do not support them in the peculiar and distinguishable facts of the present case. 76. In the light of the above discussions, arguments advanced by the learned counsels, supporting the conclusion of the judgment cited in 1991 RRD page 1 and other rulings cited by them do not support them in the peculiar and distinguishable facts of the present case. 76. Further, it is undisputed and accepted by all the learned counsels arguing in this case, that the Board of Revenue has no legislative power to lay down a new law. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of `Saathi Devi vs. Prasanna & Ors.' cited in AIR 2010 Supreme Court page 2777 (supra) has held that Courts have not power to legislate. 77. In view of what has been discussed above and the legal precedents, this Bench answers the questions raised by the referring D.B. in the following manner:- (1) Whether the Larger Bench in its judgment `Bagga vs. Surendra Singh' as reported in 1991 RRD page 1 has laid down a good law by providing for conferment/acquisition of khatedari right on a trespasser on the basis of `adverse possession' vis-a-vis the provision of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act of 1955 as a measure of land reform? Answer:- In the view of this bench the Larger Bench in its judgment `Bagga vs. Surendra Singh' as reported in 1991 RRD page 1 has not laid down a good law because the Rajasthan Tenancy Act does not have any provision to confer tenancy rights to the adverse possessor. This bench also infers that providing tenancy rights to the adverse possessor is a retreating step with regard to land reforms and such a conferment of tenancy rights is against the basic spirit of this special legislation. (2) Whether extinguishment of tenancy right under Section 63(1)(iv) of the Act of 1955 creates khatedari right in trespasser on the basis of adverse possession? Answer : In the opinion of this bench extinguishment of tenancy rights create no khatedari rights in the trespasser on the basis of adverse possession. (3) Whether the Board of Revenue has legislative power to lay down a new law for grant of khatedari right in addition to an over and above what is provided under the Act, as has been done by the Larger Bench of this Court in 1991 RRD page 1? (3) Whether the Board of Revenue has legislative power to lay down a new law for grant of khatedari right in addition to an over and above what is provided under the Act, as has been done by the Larger Bench of this Court in 1991 RRD page 1? Answer: In the opinion this bench the Board of Revenue does not have legislative power to lay down a new law for grant of khatedari rights. (4) Whether the judgment of the Larger Bench as reported in 1991 RRD page 1 should be revoked/annulled in light of the provision of the Act of 1955 and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as reported in RLW 2008(1) RJ page 1101. Answer: In the opinion of this bench the judgment of larger bench in Bagga vs. Surendra Singh as reported in 1991 RRD page 1 being not a good law, deserves to be set aside. 78. Before parting with the case we would like to convey our gratitude to all the participating members of the bar who have assisted us in rendering this judgment. 79. Since we have answered the questions referred to us, the matter may now be placed before the concerned bench for decision of the appeal in accordance with law. Pronounced in open Court.