Judgment :- Tarun Kumar Gupta, J. This appeal is directed against judgment and decree dated 20th May, 2000 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Additional Court, Hooghly in Title Appeal No.264 of 1996 affirming the judgment and decree dated 9th October, 1996 passed by learned Munsif, Additional Court, Hooghly in Title Suit No.5 of 1991. The appellant/plaintiff’s case, in short, may be summarized as follows:- The suit property which was a dwelling house originally belonged to the predecessor-in-interest of the parties namely Gobindo Gopal Banerjee who died on 15th July, 1974 leaving behind present plaintiffs and defendant No.3 as daughters and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 as son and widow respectively being his only heirs. On his death all the parties of the suit inherited said property each having 1/5 undivided share therein. At that time all said daughters of Gobindo Gopal Banerjee were unmarried, but deceased father left fixed deposit of maturity value of Rs.15,000/- in the joint name of plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.2 and also a fixed deposit of maturity value of Rs.70,000/- in the joint name of defendant No.2 and defendant No.3. After death of Gobindo Gopal Banerjee all the parties of the suit started to possess the suit dwelling house jointly in ejmal. Plaintiff No.1 and plaintiff No.2 were married on 2.05.1984 and 20.07.1980 respectively and after marriage they started to reside in their respective matrimonial house at Durgapur though they often visited their father’s house. On 19th of February, 1975 plaintiffs were induced to execute a power of attorney in favour of their mother defendant No.2 by empowering her to look after the suit property and other properties left away by their father for protecting the interest of plaintiff/daughters. Said power of attorney was obtained by perpetuating fraud and misrepresentation and by exercising undue influence by taking advantage of the confidence and good faith of the plaintiffs upon brother defendant No.1 and mother defendant No.2. During Durga Puja of 1984 when plaintiffs came to visit the suit property they were not accepted by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in good grace. Plaintiffs became suspicious and on enquiry they learnt that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were trying to create documents in respect of shares of plaintiffs in the suit property by virtue of said power of attorney of 1975. 1 and 2 in good grace. Plaintiffs became suspicious and on enquiry they learnt that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were trying to create documents in respect of shares of plaintiffs in the suit property by virtue of said power of attorney of 1975. Plaintiffs on search in registry office came to learn on 12th of October, 1984 that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 fraudulently incorporated a term in said power of attorney empowering defendant No.2 mother to make transfer of the paternal property of the plaintiffs, though plaintiffs never gave any such power to their mother by said power of attorney. The plaintiffs after returning to Durgapur sent a letter under certificate of posting dated 15th of October, 1984 revoking the power of attorney which was received by defendant No.2 mother on 22.10.1984. The plaintiffs in consultation with their lawyer executed a registered deed on 25th November, 1984 whereby the power of attorney dated 19th of February, 1975 was cancelled. But the plaintiffs came to know that defendant No.2 on the strength of said power of attorney which was already revoked, executed purported sale deeds relating to plaintiffs’ share in said dwelling house in favour of defendant No.1 though no consideration was passed. Accordingly, plaintiffs filed said suit praying for declaring said power of attorney dated 19th of February, 1975 as illegal, fraudulent and void document and that said document was revoked by the plaintiffs on the basis of letter dated 15th of October, 1984 together with registered deed of revocation dated 20th November, 1984. Plaintiffs also prayed for declaring two alleged kobalas dated 12th of November, 1984 executed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 as illegal, fraudulent, void and not binding on the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also prayed for permanent injunction against defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for interfering with the peaceful joint possession of the plaintiffs in ‘ka’ schedule property with other consequential reliefs. Though defendant No.3 filed a written statement admitting the genuinity of the deed of settlement through which her share was given to defendant No.1 by her mother defendant No.2 as her guardian, but expressed her ignorance about other matters. She, however, did not contest the suit. Defendant No.2 mother died within few months of filing of the suit and accordingly no written statement was filed on her behalf. She, however, did not contest the suit. Defendant No.2 mother died within few months of filing of the suit and accordingly no written statement was filed on her behalf. The defendant No.1, however, contested the suit by filing written statement denying material allegations of the plaint. He contended inter alia that the suit as it was framed was not maintainable, the suit was not properly valued and that it was barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. It was a further case that plaintiffs being married daughters had no right of residence in the suit dwelling house under Hindu Succession Act. According to defendant No.1 the power of attorney of 1975 was executed by the plaintiffs out of their own volition and knowing its contents and that on the strength of said power of attorney defendant No.2 mother sold plaintiffs’ shares of the suit property to defendant No.1 on receipt of consideration and the plaintiffs had no right to challenge the same. The defendant No.1 made loan from the market for marriage of the plaintiffs. No revocation notice was sent to defendant No.2 and the plaintiffs managed to obtain a manufactured and back dated receipt. Learned Trial Court after contested hearing decreed the suit only in part by allowing a money decree of Rs.14,000/- together with interest thereupon at the rate of nine percent per annum from the date of execution and registration of the impugned kobalas till realization, against defendant No.1 subject to payment of additional Court fees within 60 days from the date of the order thereof failing which the money decree would stand waived. It was further observed that after payment of additional payment of Court fees a final decree would be drawn up and the defendant No.1 would be under obligation to make payment of decreetal dues to the plaintiffs within one month thereof, in default, the plaintiffs would be at liberty to put the decree into execution. As main reliefs of the plaintiffs were denied in the Trial Court, they preferred an appeal in the lower Appellate Court. However, learned Lower Appellate Court did not interfere with the judgment and decree of learned Trial Court. At the time of admission of this appeal Hon’ble Division Bench framed the following substantial questions of law to be determined at the time of hearing of this appeal. However, learned Lower Appellate Court did not interfere with the judgment and decree of learned Trial Court. At the time of admission of this appeal Hon’ble Division Bench framed the following substantial questions of law to be determined at the time of hearing of this appeal. “Whether or not the Courts below failed to consider that late Gobinda Gopal Banerjee left sufficient provision for marriage of the plaintiffs / appellants.” “Whether or not the Courts below failed to appreciate that the alleged loan incurred by the defendant No.1/respondent No. 1 for the marriage of the plaintiff No.1. /appellant No.1 cannot be any reason for sale of the plaintiff’s share in the property in question by the mother of the plaintiffs to the defendant No.1 /respondent No.1.” “Whether or not the Courts below failed to appreciate that the alleged consideration for sale of the plaintiffs’ share in the ‘ka’ schedule property could not be a valid one for non-passing of consideration.” “Whether or not the Courts below erred in law in not considering that the plaintiffs having revoked the power of attorney before the execution of the sale deeds the defendant No.2 had no authority to sell the plaintiffs’ share in the property to defendant No.1.” “Whether or not instead of declaring the impugned sale deeds as void for no passing of consideration the Courts below erred in passing the decree for recovery of Rs.14,000/-as unpaid consideration of the impugned sale deeds.” During hearing of the appeal the following two additional grounds towards substantial questions of law were framed vide Order dated 4th August, 2011:- (i) “Whether the learned Courts below substantially erred in law by placing the burden of proving undue influence exercised at the time of execution of power of attorney on the plaintiffs in place of defendants?” (ii) “Whether the learned Courts below substantially erred in law by overlooking the impact of Section 211 of Indian Contract Act in the matter of execution of kobala in favour of defendant No.1 by defendant No.2 incorporating the shares of plaintiffs?” Mr. Sudish Dasgupta, learned senior advocate for the appellants, has submitted that learned Courts below failed to appreciate that the power of attorney executed by the present appellant/plaintiffs in favour of their mother defendant No.2, since deceased, was vitiated by fraud and undue influence. Sudish Dasgupta, learned senior advocate for the appellants, has submitted that learned Courts below failed to appreciate that the power of attorney executed by the present appellant/plaintiffs in favour of their mother defendant No.2, since deceased, was vitiated by fraud and undue influence. According to him Gobindo Gopal Banerjee, the predecessor-in-interest of the parties of the suit, admittedly died on 15th July, 1974 leaving behind the parties of the suit as his heirs and legal representatives. He has further submitted that on death of Gobindo Gopal Banerjee the plaintiffs/appellants inherited suit dwelling house as well as other properties left by Gobindo Gopal Banerjee each having 1/5 undivided share therein. Mr. Dasgupta has further submitted that admittedly a power of attorney dated 19th of February, 1975 was obtained from the plaintiffs by defendant No.2 mother in collusion with defendant No.1 elder brother giving the impression that said power of attorney was required to be executed by plaintiffs for looking after the suit property and other properties left by Gobinda Gopal Banerjee by their mother on behalf of the plaintiff daughters for safeguarding their interest. According to Mr. Dasgupta by exercising fraud and undue influence the authority of selling plaintiffs’ share in their paternal property was inserted in said power of attorney though plaintiffs were not made aware about said authorization. Mr. Dasgupta has further submitted that during evidence learned Courts below wrongly put the onus upon plaintiffs for proving that power of attorney was vitiated by fraud and undue influence though in terms of Section 16(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 read with Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act the onus is upon the person who was in a position to dominate the will of another, to show that the document was not vitiated by undue influence. According to him, as defendant No.2 mother, since deceased and defendant No.1brother were standing in fiduciary relationship with plaintiffs being sister and daughter respectively, who were of tender age at the relevant time, the contested defendant No.1 should have proved that said power of attorney in 1975 was not vitiated by fraud and undue influence. In this connection Mr. Dasgupta has referred the case laws of Ragunath Prasad vs. Sarju Prasad and Ors as reported in Vol. LI. In this connection Mr. Dasgupta has referred the case laws of Ragunath Prasad vs. Sarju Prasad and Ors as reported in Vol. LI. Indian Appeals page 101 and Krishna Mohan Kul alias Nani Charan Kul and another vs. Pratima Maity and others as reported in (2004) 9 SCC page 468. Mr. Dasgupta has next submitted that said power of attorney of 1975 was revoked by the plaintiffs by sending a letter dated 15th of October 1984 under certificate of posting which was received by power of attorney holder defendant No.2 mother on 22nd October, 1984. According to Mr. Dasgupta there was no specific denial that said notice of revocation sent under certificate of posting was not received by power of attorney holder defendant No.2 mother on 22.10.1984. In this connection he has referred a case law Shibnath Bhadra v. Mrinalini Ghosh as reported in 90 C.W.N. page 413 to show that a notice issued under certificate of posting also carries with it presumption of due service unless rebutted. Mr. Dasgupta has next submitted that plaintiffs later on, after consultation with their lawyer, executed a registered deed dated 25th November, 1984 for revocation of said power of attorney whereby the power of attorney dated 19th of February, 1975 was revoked and cancelled. According to him in spite of revocation of said power of attorney firstly through letter dated 15th of October, 1984 sent under certificate of posting followed by registered deed of revocation dated 25th of November, 1984, the power of attorney holder defendant No.2 mother in collusion with defendant No.1 brother prepared two fictitious kobalas both dated 12th of November, 1984 showing selling of plaintiffs’ share to defendant No.1 at a paltry sum of Rs.7000/- each though the value of said 1/5 share was much more than Rs.7,000/- and though in reality no consideration was passed. In this connection Sri Dasgupta referred the case law of Smt. Renuka Parihar and another vs. Bank of Baroda and others as reported in 1988 (1) Bank CLR 375 page 372 to impress upon this Court that when power of attorney holder mother received the letter of revocation of power of attorney through certificate of posting on 22.10.1984 and was very much aware that plaintiffs were not at all agreeable for allowing power of attorney holder mother to act on behalf of plaintiffs on the strength of said power of attorney of 1975, any further action dealing with plaintiffs’ share on the strength of said power of attorney was unconscientiously and that alleged kobalas both dated 12th of November, 1984 should be treated as execution of kobalas by a person having no authority. Mr. Dasgupta has next submitted that it is true that in the plaint there was no specific prayer for cancellation of power of attorney but according to him, that cannot be taken as a bar to file the suit either under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act or under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. In this connection he has submitted that the plaintiffs have prayed in their plaint for declaration that purported power of attorney dated 19th of February, 1975 was illegal, fraudulent, void and not binding upon the plaintiff and alternatively the same was found to be invalid one, and the same be declared as revoked by the plaintiffs on the basis of letter dated 15th of October, 1984 served upon defendant No.2 on 22nd October, 1984 together with registered deed of revocation dated 20th November, 1984. According to Mr. Dasgupta said prayer together with the prayer for granting other relief or reliefs as in law and equity the plaintiffs may be entitled, may be treated as a prayer for cancellation of power of attorney dated 19th of February, 1975. In this connection he has referred a case law Kedar Lal Seal and another vs. Hari Lal as reported in AIR(39) 1952 Supreme Court page 47, wherein it was held that Court would be slow to throw out a claim on a mere technicality of pleading when the substance of the thing is there and no prejudice is caused to the other side. Sri Dasgupta has next submitted that power of attorney holder has to act for the benefit of the executants of the power of attorney. According to him, it was alleged that Gobindo Gopal Banerjee, the predecessor-in-interest of the parties, died leaving no provision for expenditures for marriage ceremonies of the plaintiffs and accordingly, defendant No.1 brother had to take loan for meeting the expenditure of marriage of plaintiffs, one held in 1980 and other held in 1984. According to Mr. Dasgupta it was not believable as it came out from evidence as well as from a document written under the hand writing of defendant No.1 (Ext.6) that Gobindo Babu left away sufficient money in various bank accounts. Mr. Dasgupta has next contended that even if it is admitted for argument’s sake that for meeting the expenditure of marriage of sisters namely plaintiffs, defendant No.1 elder brother, who was an employee of Indian Railways, had to take loan from others but that cannot be a ground for selling out plaintiffs’ share in the suit dwelling house by power of attorney holder mother defendant No.2 to the brother defendant No.1 even after revocation of power of attorney by the plaintiffs through a letter sent under certificate of posting and duly received by their mother. Mr. Dasgupta has further submitted that there was no evidence whatsoever that valuation of plaintiff’s shares as shown in said alleged kobalas were properly made or that really any consideration was passed. According to Mr. Dasgupta defendant No.1 claimed that the valuation of the property was made by one lawyer but he withheld said witness (lawyer) to substantiate that the amounts as shown in the alleged kobalas as consideration money were prevalent market values. In this connection Mr. Dasgupta has further submitted that contested defendant No.1 has also miserably failed to show that any consideration money whatsoever was passed during execution of those alleged kobalas executed by defendant No.2 mother in favour of defendant No.1 on the strength of power of attorney. In this connection Mr. Dasgupta has referred case laws of Farhat Sheikh v. E. M. Chemical as reported in 1990 (2) CLJ page 397, Hans Raj (deceased) and others vs. Karmi and others as reported in AIR 2004 Punjab and Haryana page 315 and M/s. John Tinson and Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others v. Mrs. In this connection Mr. Dasgupta has referred case laws of Farhat Sheikh v. E. M. Chemical as reported in 1990 (2) CLJ page 397, Hans Raj (deceased) and others vs. Karmi and others as reported in AIR 2004 Punjab and Haryana page 315 and M/s. John Tinson and Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others v. Mrs. Surjeet Malhan and another as reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court page 1411 to impress upon this Court that when power of attorney holder transfer shares of executants of power of attorney without obtaining consent and / or giving prior intimation that too showing below market value consideration and without receiving even the same as consideration, said transaction was clandestine and void and not binding on the original owners. Mr. Dasgupta has referred the case of Garikapati Veeraya V. N. Subbiah Chowdhury and others as reported in AIR 1957 S. C. page 540 to submit that the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intensive unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. According to Mr. Dasgupta the observations of the learned Lower Appellate Court that the plaintiffs being married daughters had no right of residence in the suit dwelling house for not fulfilling the requirement of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is no longer valid as said disabling provision of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has since been repealed with effect from 9th of September, 2005. Accordingly, Mr. Dasgupta has submitted that the concurrent findings of learned Lower Courts vitiated as those were neither based on evidence nor based on sound and proper legal principles and that appeal should be allowed. Ms. Sanghamitra Nandy, on the other hand, has supported the judgments of Lower Courts. According to Ms. Nandy it came out from the evidence on record that in 1975 i.e., in the year of executing power of attorney both the plaintiffs were majors and plaintiff No.1 was already graduate. She further submits that no proof of fraud in executing the power of attorney could be established by the plaintiffs. According to her the case of undue influence was not pleaded before Lower Courts. She further submits that no proof of fraud in executing the power of attorney could be established by the plaintiffs. According to her the case of undue influence was not pleaded before Lower Courts. According to her no presumption of undue influence can arise merely because parties were near relations or that power of attorney holder was mother and executants were daughters. According to her it came out from evidence that plaintiffs gave authority to the mother in said power of attorney to sell plaintiffs’ share in the property of their father lying in Murshidabad. According to Ms. Nandy this admission on behalf of the plaintiffs belied the story of fraud and undue influence for inserting the clause of selling of plaintiffs’ share of paternal property by their mother on the strength of said power of attorney. In this connection, she has referred case laws of Subhas Chandra v. Ganga Prosad reported in AIR 1967 Supreme Court page 878, Afsar Shaikh and another v. Soleman Bibi and others as reported in AIR 19876 Supreme Court 163 and P. Saraswathi Ammal v. Lakshmi Ammal alias Lakshmi Kantam as reported in AIR 1978 Madras page 361. Ms. Nandy has further submitted that in absence of specific prayer for cancellation of power of attorney the suit was hit by section 31 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act. According to Ms. Nandy learned Lower Courts rightly held that in absence of said prayer for cancellation of power of attorney the suit was hit under Section 31 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Ms. Nandy has next submitted that one registered power of attorney can only be cancelled by another registered document and not by any letter. According to her the deed of cancellation was executed on 25th of November, 1984 whereas the kobalas were executed on 12th of November, 1984 i.e., before execution and registration of deed of cancellation. According to Ms. Nandy kobalas dated 12th of November, 1984 executed by power of attorney holder mother defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 was not hit either by letter of cancellation or by deed of cancellation which was executed and registered later on. According to Ms. Nandy no prior permission for sale was needed as power of attorney holder mother defendant No.2 executed those kobalas as per terms of said power of attorney and within her authority. In this connection Ms. According to Ms. Nandy no prior permission for sale was needed as power of attorney holder mother defendant No.2 executed those kobalas as per terms of said power of attorney and within her authority. In this connection Ms. Nandy has further submitted that both the Courts below came to concurrent findings of fact that power of attorney of 1975 was not vitiated by fraud or undue influence and that at the time of execution of kobalas both dated 12th of November, 1984 the power of attorney executed in 1975 was still valid and that these concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered in second appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. In this connection she has referred the case of Chacko and another vs. Mahadevan as reported in (2007) 7 Supreme Court Cases page 363 and AIR 1976 Supreme Court page 163. Ms. Nandy has further submitted that inadequacy of consideration and / or non-passing of consideration cannot vitiated the document and that in spite of the same, title will pass to the vendee. According to her, on the strength of impugned kobalas executed by defendant No.2 mother as power of attorney holder of plaintiffs, in favour of defendant No.1 were valid documents and that plaintiff’s title to suit property passed to defendant No.1 and that plaintiffs were bound by those documents. In support of her contention she has referred the case law AIR 1986 Orissa page 196, AIR 1991 Andhra Pradesh page 50 and AIR 1978 Madras page 361. According to Ms. Nandy though the suit was not maintainable as it was framed but learned Courts below were lenient to pass a money decree in favour of the plaintiffs equivalent to the consideration money of the impugned kobalas and that no interference is called for by this Court at the time of disposal of this Second Appeal. There is no dispute that Gobindo Gopal Banerjee died on 15th of July, 1974 leaving behind the parties of the suits as his only heirs and legal representatives. Admittedly, at the relevant time both the plaintiffs were major unmarried daughters and defendant No.1, 2 and 3 were major son, widow and minor daughter respectively. There is no dispute that Gobindo Gopal Banerjee died on 15th of July, 1974 leaving behind the parties of the suits as his only heirs and legal representatives. Admittedly, at the relevant time both the plaintiffs were major unmarried daughters and defendant No.1, 2 and 3 were major son, widow and minor daughter respectively. There is also no denial that the plaintiffs being major unmarried daughters executed and registered power of attorney on 19th of February, 1975 in favour of their mother defendant No.2, since deceased, for looking after the properties left by their father on their behalf. Plaintiffs took specific plea that by said power of attorney they did not give any authority to their mother to sell their share of said dwelling house on their behalf but defendant No.2 mother in collusion with defendant No.1, elder brother, managed to insert said clause of sale in said power of attorney by exercising fraud as well as by undue influence. For better appreciation of submissions of learned advocates of both sides on this issue it will be worthy to note the relevant provisions of law in this regard. Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 stand as follows:- (1) “A contract is said to be induced by ‘undue influence’ where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another– (a) where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or (b) where he makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress. (3) Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another, enters into a contract with him, and the transaction appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that such contract was not induced by undue influence shall be upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other.” Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 stands as follows:- “Where there is a question as to the good faith of a transaction between parties, one of whom stands to the other in a position of active confidence, the burden of proving the good faith of the transaction is on the party who is in a position of active confidence.” On plain reading of these two provisions it is clear that where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another, enters into a contract with him, and a transaction appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable or when there is a question as to the good faith of a transaction between said parties, the burden of proving that said transaction was not induced by undue influence shall be upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other. In Ragunath Prasad’s case (ibid) as referred by learned senior counsel for the appellants, it was held when it is proved that a person while in a position to dominate one’s will obtained an unfair advantage by executing a document then only the onus will be upon that party who was in a position to dominate the will to show that the document was not vitiated by undue influence. In Krishna Mohan’s case (ibid) as referred by Mr. Dasgupta it was held that in judging the validity of transactions between persons standing in a confidential relation to each other, it is very material to see whether the person conferring a benefit on the other had competent and independent advice as also the age or capacity of the person conferring the benefit. In the case of Subhas Chandra Das Mushib (ibid) as referred by Ms. Nandy, learned advocate for the respondent, Hon’ble Apex Court has elaborately laid down the criteria for declaring a document to be vitiated by undue influence. In the case of Subhas Chandra Das Mushib (ibid) as referred by Ms. Nandy, learned advocate for the respondent, Hon’ble Apex Court has elaborately laid down the criteria for declaring a document to be vitiated by undue influence. According to the Hon’ble Court if there are relations between the donor and done such that the done is in a position to dominate the will of the donor, and the transaction appears to be unconscionable then the burden of proving that the contract was not induced by undue influence is upon the person who was in a position to dominate the will of the other. It was further held with a caution that merely because the parties were nearly related to each other no presumption of undue influence can arise. It came out from the evidence on record that at the relevant time both the plaintiffs were major and plaintiff No.1 was graduate and that the plaintiffs being unmarried daughters of deceased Gobindo Gopal Banerjee executed the impugned power of attorney of 1975 relating to their paternal properties appointing their mother defendant No.2 as power of attorney holder. It further came out from evidence on record that plaintiff No.1 while deposing as a witness admitted that through said power of attorney they gave authority to their mother to sell their shares in the property left by their father at Murshidabad. It also came out that at that time their ‘Pisamosai’ who also deposed as a prosecution witness in said case, acted as an advisor to the plaintiffs and was present at the time of execution of said power of attorney. Said power of attorney was a registered document. Plaintiffs were majors and were of marriageable age. It was very natural that their mother will be a fit person to deal with their share of property even if plaintiffs go away after marriage. The terms of the power of attorney do not seem to be unconscionable. Both the Courts below on perusal of evidence on record, both oral and documentary, came to a concurrent findings of fact that terms of power of attorney were not unconscionable and that the same was not vitiated by fraud or undue influence. These findings of facts cannot be said to be not based on evidence, or perverse. Both the Courts below on perusal of evidence on record, both oral and documentary, came to a concurrent findings of fact that terms of power of attorney were not unconscionable and that the same was not vitiated by fraud or undue influence. These findings of facts cannot be said to be not based on evidence, or perverse. As such, said findings of facts do not call for any interference by this Court at the time of exercising power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Admittedly, plaintiff No.2 was married in 1980 and plaintiff No.1 was married in 1984 and after marriage they started to reside in their matrimonial home at Durgapur. There is no denial that there was some hitch between the parties for whatever reason it may be, resulting sending of a letter dated 15th of October, 1984 under certificate of posting by the plaintiffs to the defendant No.2 mother by which they revoked the power of attorney executed by them in her favour in 1975. It is categorical assertion of the plaintiffs, both in pleadings as well as in the evidence, that said letter of revocation dated 15th of October, 1984 sent under certificate of posting was duly received by defendant No.2 mother on 22nd of October, 1984. It was not denied by contesting defendant No.1 during his evidence. There is also no rebuttal evidence that said letter of revocation dated 15th of October, 1984 sent under certificate of posting was not received by power of attorney holder mother defendant No.2. In S. Nath Badra’s case (ibid) it was categorically held that a notice issued under certificate of posting also carries with it presumption of due service unless rebutted. I have already stated that there is no denial in the evidence of contesting defendant No.1 who admittedly resided with power of attorney holder mother defendant No.2 in the same house, that said letter of revocation was not received by their mother on 22nd of October, 1984. In this connection, Ms. Nandy is fair enough to admit about receipt of said letter of revocation dated 15th of October, 1984 by power of attorney holder mother on 22nd of October, 1984. However, Ms. Nandy has submitted, and rightly submitted, that registered power of attorney can only be revoked by a registered deed of revocation and not by a letter. Said proposition of law is not disputed. However, Ms. Nandy has submitted, and rightly submitted, that registered power of attorney can only be revoked by a registered deed of revocation and not by a letter. Said proposition of law is not disputed. But the fact remains that power of attorney holder mother defendant No.2 in spite of receipt of letter of revocation of said power of attorney on 22nd October, 1984 executed two kobalas both dated 12th of November, 1984 showing selling of plaintiffs’ 1/5th share in favour of defendant No.1 against the recorded consideration amount of Rs.7000/- each. It was also alleged by the appellant/plaintiffs that consideration as shown in the kobalas dated 12th of November, 1984 i.e., Rs.7,000/- each was shockingly low and that in reality no consideration was passed. It appears from evidence on record that contesting defendant No.1 named one lawyer as the person who fixed the consideration amount being the then market price but he did not produce said lawyer in the witness box to prove that the amount of consideration i.e., Rs.7,000/- was the prevalent market price of 1/5 share of the suit dwelling house. When it was specifically pleaded and brought into evidence that the consideration money as shown in the disputed kobalas both dated 12th of November, 1984 were shockingly low then it was duty of the defendant No.1 in whose favour those kobalas were executed to show that the consideration money as disclosed in the kobalas were the then market price. There was further allegation that even said shockingly low amount of consideration as disclosed in the impugned kobalas dated 12th of November, 1984 did not pass from buyer to seller. Defendant No.1 tried to make out a case that at the time of marriage of plaintiff No.1 and plaintiff No.2 in the year 1984 and 1980 respectively he had to incur huge loan from outside and for that purpose those sales were made by power of attorney holder mother on behalf of plaintiffs in favour of defendant No.1 brother. Defendant No.1 tried to make out a further case that he paid the consideration money of Rs.14,000/- in connection with two sale deeds to the seller by taking loan from the market. Defendant No.1 tried to make out a further case that he paid the consideration money of Rs.14,000/- in connection with two sale deeds to the seller by taking loan from the market. Unfortunately, defendant No.1 miserably failed to adduce any evidence, either oral or documentary, to show that he had to take loan from the market or from any other person for paying consideration money as disclosed in the impugned kobalas dated 12th of November, 1984 to the power of attorney holder mother. It is not at all clear why power of attorney holder mother defendant No.2 will sell plaintiffs’ shares in the suit dwelling house to the defendant No.1 on the ground of taking loan by defendant No.1 from market for marriage of his sisters namely plaintiffs. I have already stated that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that defendant No.1 had to take any loan from market for marriage of plaintiffs. Said claim of defendant No.1 was not established. It was also against the evidence on record. Ext.6 is a document written under hand writing of the defendant No.1, to show that their father Gobindo Gopal Banerjee died leaving several fixed deposits and bank accounts. In this connection, it is also pertinent to note the recitals of the impugned kobalas dated 12th of November, 1984 executed by power of attorney holder mother defendant No.2 in favour of her son defendant No.1. In the recitals it was noted that as plaintiffs (plaintiff No.1 in one deed and plaintiff No.2 in another deed) were in need of money, the power of attorney holder mother defendant No.2 was compelled to sell their respective shares in favour of defendant No.1 brother, another co-sharer. Said recitals are also false to the core as there was neither any evidence nor any pleadings that plaintiffs were in need of money for which they requested their power of attorney holder mother to sell their shares of suit dwelling house to defendant No.1 or to any other person. Said recitals are also false to the core as there was neither any evidence nor any pleadings that plaintiffs were in need of money for which they requested their power of attorney holder mother to sell their shares of suit dwelling house to defendant No.1 or to any other person. Even if it is admitted that letter of revocation dated 15th of October, 1984 received by power of attorney holder mother on 22nd October, 1984 did not and could not revoke the registered power of attorney of 1975 but said letter of revocation was at least a clear notice in unequivocal terms the intention of the plaintiffs for revocation of the power of attorney executed by them in favour of their mother in 1975. In view of said communication through said letter of revocation sent under certificate of posting, the execution of impugned kobalas both dated 12th of November, 1984 by power of attorney holder mother in favour of defendant No.1 in the facts and circumstances stated above can only be branded as collusive and devoid of any legal forces. Unfortunately, learned Courts below failed to take note of these circumstances in their proper perspective and as a result came to a wrong conclusion that the impugned sale deeds were valid though no consideration was passed. Ms. Nandy has tried to save the impugned kobalas by submitting that even no consideration was passed at the time of execution and registration of sale deeds still title passes to the buyer on the strength of case laws reported by K. Vijoy Lakshmi (ibid) and Uma Kanta Das and another (ibid), but aforesaid case laws have no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the present case there was revocation of power of attorney of 1975 by a letter sent under certificate of posting and duly received by the power of attorney holder. Even if said letter did not revoke the registered power of attorney as per law but said letter clearly disclosed the intention of the plaintiffs for revocation of power of attorney executed by them in favour of their mother defendant No.2 in 1975. The ground of selling plaintiffs’ share to defendant No.1 as taken during evidence that defendant No.1, brother had to incur expense of the marriage of plaintiffs by taking loan from market, was neither established nor was a ground for making said sale. The ground of selling plaintiffs’ share to defendant No.1 as taken during evidence that defendant No.1, brother had to incur expense of the marriage of plaintiffs by taking loan from market, was neither established nor was a ground for making said sale. In spite of specific assertion that consideration as shown in the impugned sale deeds was too low, defendant No.1 failed to prove that said consideration was reasonable. The recitals of the kobalas i.e., sale by power of attorney holder on account of financial stringency and need of money of the respective plaintiffs were found to be myth. Contesting defendant No.1 also miserably failed to show that any amount was really passed as consideration for impugned sales. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case coupled with evidence on record I am of opinion that learned Lower Courts failed to take note of these facts and circumstances as came out during evidence in proper perspective and that their findings in this regard was rather perverse. They should have declared the execution of the impugned kobalas dated 12th of November, 1984 as void being fictitious documents. Much argument was made by both sides as to the effect of repeal of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act in this case. But I find that repeal of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act with effect from 9th of September, 2005 has little impact in the 26 outcome of this case where the moot question was whether the power of attorney of 1975 was vitiated by fraud and undue influence and whether impugned kobalas executed by power of attorney holder mother in favour of defendant No.1 brother on 12th of November, 1984 were void documents in view of revocation of power of attorney, non-acting of power of attorney holder in the interest of the plaintiffs, false no tings in the recitals of the kobalas as well as for non-passing of consideration money. These points have already been discussed elaborately. As such, no discussion is required regarding repeal of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 with effect from 9th of September, 2005. Ms. Nandy has attacked the very maintainability of the suit under Section 31 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act as no specific prayer for cancellation of the power of attorney of 1975 was made therein. As such, no discussion is required regarding repeal of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 with effect from 9th of September, 2005. Ms. Nandy has attacked the very maintainability of the suit under Section 31 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act as no specific prayer for cancellation of the power of attorney of 1975 was made therein. In Kedar Lal Seal’s case (ibid) Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “The Court would be slow to throw out a claim on a mere technicality of pleading when the substance of the thing is there and no prejudice is caused to the other side, however clumsily or inartistically the plaint may be worded. In any event, it is always open to a Court to give a plaintiff such general or other relief as it deems just to the same extent as if it had been asked for, provided that occasions no prejudice to the other side beyond what can be compensated for in costs.” In this case plaintiffs have elaborately stated in their plaint that power of attorney executed by them in favour of their mother in 1975 was vitiated by fraud and undue influence and that in spite of revocation of said power of attorney through letters sent under certificate of posting and duly received by their mother followed by execution of a registered deed of revocation, their mother as power of attorney holder sold out their respective shares in the suit dwelling house to their brother defendant No.1 showing a low consideration amount though in reality no consideration was passed and said sale was not also made in their interest. They have prayed for declaration that purported power of attorney was illegal, fraudulent, void and not binding upon them and alternatively the same was invalid and the same was revoked by the plaintiffs etc. If we take the pleadings of the plaintiffs in the plaint as a whole it is apparent that they intended for cancellation of the power of attorney dated 19th February, 1975. The contesting defendant No.1 started to contest the suit knowing fully well what was the real intention of the plaintiffs as disclosed through their plaint. In the case in hand within a month or two the power of attorney holder defendant No.2 died resulting ceasing of power of attorney. The contesting defendant No.1 started to contest the suit knowing fully well what was the real intention of the plaintiffs as disclosed through their plaint. In the case in hand within a month or two the power of attorney holder defendant No.2 died resulting ceasing of power of attorney. At this stage, the prayer for cancellation of said power of attorney is redundant. This is more so in view of the above findings of this Court that impugned kobalas dated 12th of November, 1984 were void as power of attorney holder executed those kobalas without receipt of any consideration, on false grounds and against interest of the plaintiffs in spite of full knowledge that plaintiffs revoked said power of attorney through a letter sent under certificate of posting which at least showed clear intention on the part of the plaintiffs for revoking the power of attorney. Accordingly, I set aside the impugned judgments and decrees of Lower Courts. Plaintiffs do get a decree of declaring that purported deeds of sale dated 12.11.1984 being deed No.6875 in respect of ‘ka-1’ schedule property and being deed No.6856 in respect of ‘ka-2’ schedule property both executed and registered by Bela alias Jyotsna Banerjee, defendant No.2 in favour of Amit Kumar Banerjee, defendant No.1 are fraudulent, void, fictitious and not binding upon the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs do also get a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant No.1 from denying plaintiff’s title to the extent of 1/5 share each as well as ejmal possession in ‘ka’ schedule property which included a dwelling house. Learned Lower Court will forward the impugned kobalas to the concerned registry office for noting in record that those two kobalas have been declared to be void. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. However, I pass no order as to costs. Before parting with the case I like to note my apprehension that perhaps this is not the end of litigation between the parties unless good sense prevails upon them. I trust and hope that learned lawyers of the parties will be able to convince their clients that amicable settlement of the dispute will not only save money, energy and time but also salvage the lost sweet relation between brother and sisters. Lower Court records along with a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the Lower Court urgently.