Research › Search › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 1210 (CAL)

Rai Chattopadhyay v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

2011-08-30

G.C.GUPTA, RAGHUNATH RAY

body2011
JUDGMENT GIRISH CHANDRA GUPTA, J. 1. THE applicant before us is the 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge at Chinsurah in the district of Hooghly. She has come up with a prayer which reads as follows:- An order for expunging/deleting the adverse remarks made against the petitioner as contained in order dated 11.03.2011 passed by the Honble Bench comprising the Honble Justice Girish Chandra Gupta and the Honble Justice Raghunath Ray in CRM 293 of 2011 (Shri Debnath alias Debnarayan Bhandari vs. State of West Bengal) and modifying/altering the direction to the learned Registrar General of this Honble Court accordingly. Paragraph 24 of her application is however restricted to a prayer as follows:- Your petitioner therefore submits that your Lordships would be graciously pleased to expunge the adverse remarks made against the petitioner passed in CRM 293 of 2011 (Shri Debnath alias Debnarayan Bhandari vs. State of West Bengal) so far as putting the same in her service records as that would seriously prejudice the petitioners service career. 2. OUR order dated 11th March 2011 reads as follows:- The petitioner before us is the husband of the complainant wife. A bare perusal of the complaint would indicate that the allegations primarily are directed against the father-in-law. The conduct of the father-in-law was the cause of discontent. When the complainant raised her voice against the conduct of the father-in-law other members of the family allegedly made a common cause against her. Surprisingly, the learned Sessions Judge-in-Charge granted the prayer of the father-in-law amongst others but withheld the prayer of the husband. This sort of slipshod way of disposing of the matters is not acceptable. Concessions on the part of the learned Public Prosecutor is of no significance. The learned Sessions Judge-in-Charge, Hooghly, Sri R. Chattopadhyay, is cautioned to be more careful in future in discharging his judicial duty. For the reasons already indicated, there is no reason why the prayer of the husband should be rejected. 3. ACCORDINGLY, his prayer is allowed on the following terms and conditions. (i) The petitioner shall make himself available for interrogation by the Investigating Agency as and when required; (ii) No direct or indirect threat or any inducement would be made to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any Police Officer. 4. (i) The petitioner shall make himself available for interrogation by the Investigating Agency as and when required; (ii) No direct or indirect threat or any inducement would be made to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any Police Officer. 4. THIS order of anticipatory bail would remain operative for a period of 30 (thirty) days from date. He shall be entitled to apply for regular bail. If and when such an application is made, the same shall be considered on its own merit by the appropriate regular court. THIS application is, thus, disposed of. The learned Registrar General of this Court is directed to communicate a copy of this order to the said Sri R. Chattopadhyay, Sessions Judge-in-Charge, Hooghly, and to keep a note of this order in his service records for future reference. The material portion of the complaint referred to in our order dated 11th March 2011 when rendered in English would read as follows:- After six months had passed from the date of marriage one morning when I went to serve tea to my father-in-law, as was my usual practice, he told me to sit by him and asked me to establish with him physical relationship which was not likely to create any difficulty. 5. HE would take care of his son. The complainant left the room of the father-in-law. Thereafter day after day the father-in-law continued to repeat his aforesaid proposal. The complainant out of fear could not disclose the fact to the other members of the matrimonial home. After a few days the father-in-law attempted to hug her. The complaint unable to tolerate the torture disclosed the matter to her husband and thereafter to the other members of the family of the husband. After the matter became public the husband of the complainant Debnath Bhandari, the fatherin- law Dinabandhu Bhandari, the mother-in-law Chandana Bhandari, the younger sister of the father-in-law Sandhya Sashmal, the uncle-in-law Ananda Bhandari and his wife Kalyani Bhandari, the grandmother-in-law Sailabala Bhandari and the son of the father-in-laws sister Sanjay Karmakar (older than the husband of the complainant) collectively continued to assault and mentally torture the complaint. The aforesaid torture was continued by the accused persons at regular intervals of one or two days. 6. The aforesaid torture was continued by the accused persons at regular intervals of one or two days. 6. THE applicant in her order dated 22nd December 2010 after recording the submissions of the learned Advocate for the accused persons went on to record her order as follows:- Ld. P.P.-in-Charge on behalf of the State however submits that as the primary duty to discharge matrimonial obligation lies on the accd. petitioner no.1, husband as such he opposes the prayer for bail of the accd. petitioner no.1 and leaves the matter of other accd. petitioners to the discretion of the Court. Perused the materials on C.D. Considered the submissions of both sides. The fact of marriage is not denied. On the ground that prima facie materials available on record I am not inclined to allow the prayer of the accd. petitioner no.1 at this moment. So the prayer for anticipatory bail in respect of the accd. petitioner no.1 is rejected. However I allow the prayer of the accd. petitioners no.2 to 8 u/s 438 CrPC. Pursuant to our order dated 11th March 2011 a copy thereof was sent to the applicant. She thereafter appears to have moved the Honble Supreme Court by way of special leave petition with a prayer for liberty to implead the learned Registrar General of High Court at Calcutta seeking expunction of certain remarks passed by us in our order dated 11th March 2011. The averments made in that application are not however known to us because no copy thereof has been disclosed. That application, it appears, was withdrawn and the order passed by the Apex Court in CRLMP (S) No.10110 and 10670 were disposed of by Their Lordships by an order dated 13th May 2011 which reads as follows:- Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw this petition with a liberty to the petitioner to approach the High Court for expunction of certain remarks which are passed by the Division Bench. Permission is granted. The application for permission to file SLP is disposed of as withdrawn with the liberty as prayed for. The application seeking expunction of our remarks contains the following among other averments:- First the said adverse remarks was made in the absence of the petitioner, who had no opportunity of putting forward her representation or defence before this Honble Court. The application for permission to file SLP is disposed of as withdrawn with the liberty as prayed for. The application seeking expunction of our remarks contains the following among other averments:- First the said adverse remarks was made in the absence of the petitioner, who had no opportunity of putting forward her representation or defence before this Honble Court. (Para 14) Second: The order dated 22.12.2010 is a reasoned order and sets out the submission of the contending parties and the materials contained in the case diary considered by the petitioner before passing the order, with due care and caution and upon application of mind. (Para 15) Third: The petitioner has not yet been confirmed in her service and the issue of confirmation would come up before the concerned authority very soon. The above mentioned adverse remark would have a negative impact and lead to a great uncertainty and doubt as far as her confirmation in service is concerned. (Para 18) Fourth: There is no evidence on record bearing on the petitioners judicial conduct and justifying the adverse remark. (Para 20) Fifth: Your petitioner submits that the observation regarding the performance of duty and note of the order in her service records is in the nature of a censure, which is a penalty specified in the West Bengal Judicial Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 2002 and can only be imposed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. (Para 19) 7. MR. Lahiri, learned Senior Advocate appearing in support of this application made submission before us in respect of each of the aforesaid averments noted herein and drew our attention to the following judgments and also supplied us xerox copies thereof which in chronological order are as follows:- (a) The judgment in the case of KP Tiwary vs. State of M.P. reported in 1994 (Suppl.) 1 SCC 540 wherein the following observations made by the High Court were expunged. The fact that the final grant was made without hearing the State Government and without verifying the fact, points to the interestedness of Shri K.P. Tiwari, learned First Additional Sessions Judge in the non-applicants. Indeed this interestedness is apparent in all the five cases. The impression that one gets is that Shri K.P. Tiwari, First A.S.J. has been won over by the non-applicants and therefore was open to write any judgment, or order, releasing non-applicants on bail. Indeed this interestedness is apparent in all the five cases. The impression that one gets is that Shri K.P. Tiwari, First A.S.J. has been won over by the non-applicants and therefore was open to write any judgment, or order, releasing non-applicants on bail. It is therefore a case where the non-applicant (sic) not only have shown disregard to law and the judicial process but are also reasonably suspected of exercising corrupt influence over Shri K.P Tiwari, the First A.S.J. This Court has necessarily to recall such orders. 12. Indeed, it (court) will be failing in its duty if it accepts corrupting influence of the non-applicants (sic) and permits illegal orders to remain effective. (b) The judgment in the case of B.K. Thakur vs. Union of India and Ors reported in 1997(4) SCC 65 wherein the following remarks of the High Court were expunged by the Apex Court. The learned Special Judge, therefore, in view of the stringent law on the point should have taken care in not making haste, by granting bail to the accused opposite parties and when the seized contraband was of a considerable magnitude, serious view of the matter should have been taken and bail should not have been granted so lightly believing the plea taken by the accused persons. it appears to me that bail has been granted for extraneous considerations. (c) The judgment in the case of K a Judicial Officer, reported in 2001(3) SCC 54 wherein the following remarks of the High Court were expunged. Thus prima facie, no offence either under Section 380 or 201 or120B IPC is made out against the petitioners. (The manner in which the cognizance of the said offences came to be taken clearly suggests that the Magistrate wanted to rope in the petitioners in a criminal case in order to pressurise them to have the dais in Courtroom No.8 and other civil work as noted in the petition carried out as desired by her) which matter could well be taken up by the Judge-in-Charge/District and Sessions Judge with the appropriate authority in CPWD on administrative side. In passing the impugned order dated 1-7-1999 the Magistrate had thus exceeded the jurisdiction (defying all judicial norms). This order (being gross abuse of process of court), therefore, deserves to be set aside under Section 482 CrPC. In passing the impugned order dated 1-7-1999 the Magistrate had thus exceeded the jurisdiction (defying all judicial norms). This order (being gross abuse of process of court), therefore, deserves to be set aside under Section 482 CrPC. Having arrived at this conclusion it is not necessary to examine the plea raised on the petitioners behalf regarding the applicability of Section 197 CrPC. Consequently, the petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings under Sections 380/201/120B IPC initiated against the petitioners by the Magistrate, are hereby quashed. (d) The judgment in the case of Prakash Singh Teji vs. Northern India Goods Transport Company Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. Reported in 2009(12) SCC 577 wherein the following remarks of the High Court were expunged. Before parting, we wish to make it clear that the learned Judge who passed the impugned judgment and decree need be careful in future, rather than adopting a hasty, slipshod and perfunctory approach as is manifest from the judgment delivered by him in this case. We further direct that a copy of this order shall be placed on the personal/service record of the officer, while another copy be placed before the Honble Inspecting Judge of the officer for His Lordships perusal. (e) The judgment in the case of K A judicial officer vs. Registrar General, High Court of AP, reported in 2010(11) SCC 722 wherein the following remarks of the High Court were expunged. 10. This attitude of the learned District Judge is out of sheer arrogance and disrespect to the lawful orders passed by subordinate courts. Even if he is disagreeable with the findings reached by the subordinate courts in granting injunction in favour of the defendants in the suits filed by them, unless those orders are set aside or modified, as the case may be, in parallel proceedings, he cannot nullify those injunction orders so granted in favour of the defendants which can be done only by the appellate court in the appeal, if any filed. Admittedly, no such appeals were preferred against the temporary injunction orders granted in favour of the defendants. Admittedly, no such appeals were preferred against the temporary injunction orders granted in favour of the defendants. In the absence of the same, granting injunction in favour of the plaintiffs will not only create law and order problem but also diminish the image of the judiciary among the general public and the implementing agencies of the injunction order like police, as they will be in a turmoil situation as to which injunction order would be implemented. It must be remembered that it is the duty of every member of the legal fraternity to ensure that the image of the judiciary is not tarnished and its respectability eroded. The manner in which proceedings were taken by the learned Judge exposes a total lack of respect for judicial discipline. Judicial authoritarianism is what the proceedings in the instant case smack of. It cannot be permitted under any guise. Judges must be circumspect and self-disciplined in the discharge of their judicial functions. Further, the impugned order, if allowed to stand, will create a law and order problem and lead to unrest and fight among the parties with each one having injunction order in their favour. 11.We are deeply perturbed and pained with the attitude of the learned District Judge in granting injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. For the reasons best known to the learned District Judge, he appears to have decided to grant injunction in favour of the plaintiffs in support of which, the above reasons were assigned with contradictory observations as already pointed out. For the forgoing reasons, we cannot sustain the impugned order passed by the lower court and same is liable to be set aside. (f) The judgment in the case of Mona Panwar vs. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad through its Registrar General and Ors. Reported in 2011(3) SCC 496 wherein the following remarks of the High Court were expunged. 8. THE learned Single Judge of the High Court, who heard the matter, was of the view that the appellant had done the gravest injustice to Respondent 3. According to the learned Single Judge though the appellant is a lady Magistrate yet she could not think about the outcome of ravishing the chastity of the daughter-in-law by her father-in-law and the nature of crime committed by the accused. According to the learned Single Judge though the appellant is a lady Magistrate yet she could not think about the outcome of ravishing the chastity of the daughter-in-law by her father-in-law and the nature of crime committed by the accused. After going through the order dated 1-8-2009, passed by the appellant, the learned Single Judge expressed the view that the order indicated total non-application of mind by the appellant. The learned Single Judge noticed that the incident had occurred inside the room in the early hours of 19-6-2009 and there was no mention of any witness in the application filed by the respondent but in the order passed by the appellant it was noted that the victim was in the knowledge of all the facts and that the witnesses were also known to her, which indicated non-application of mind by the appellant. 9. THE learned Single Judge while setting aside the order dated 1-8-2009, passed by the appellant, observed that the order was a blemish on justice meted out to a married lady who was ravished by her own father-in-law. The learned Single Judge expressed the view that the appellant had passed the order ignoring all judicial disciplines and had not at all applied her judicial mind and had only referred to some of the judgments of the Allahabad High Court, which were contrary to the opinion expressed by the Apex Court rendered in many decisions. After observing that a judicial order should be passed by applying judicial mind, the learned Single Judge severely criticised the conduct of the appellant and recorded his serious displeasure against appellant for passing such type of illegal orders. The learned Single Judge further warned the appellant for future and cautioned the appellant to be careful in passing the judicial orders. 10. THE learned Single Judge observed that the appellant should have thought that rape not only causes physical injury to the victim but also leaves scars on the mind of the victim for the whole life and implants the victim with such ignominy which is worse that her death. The learned Single Judge expressed the view that he was inclined to refer the matter to the Administrative Committee for taking action against the appellant but refrained from doing so because the appellant is a young officer and has a long career to go. Mr. The learned Single Judge expressed the view that he was inclined to refer the matter to the Administrative Committee for taking action against the appellant but refrained from doing so because the appellant is a young officer and has a long career to go. Mr. Lahiri during his submissions contended that his client has come up in a post decisional hearing and is therefore entitled to place the fact and law on the subject before this Court. When we enquired of him as to the reasons which led the applicant to allow the prayer of all the accused persons except the husband when the root of all discontent was the conduct of the father-in-law, he submitted that the reasons which led the applicant to pass that order are contained in the order itself. He cannot be called upon to express any further reason. He in support of his submission relied upon the judgment in the case of B.K. Thakur (supra) wherein Their Lordships opined as follows:- The learned Single Judge (Narayan Roy, J.) called for a report from the appellant as to the circumstances under which bail was granted. (We fail to appreciate how the learned Single Judge could have asked the subordinate judicial officer to send up a report in defence of his judicial order. Reasons in support of a judicial order can appear only in the order itself and it is an unwholesome practice to compel a judicial officer to write a report subsequently in defence of his conclusions.) Considering his submission we naturally enquired of him justification for the first point taken by him, as indicated above, because after perusing the order passed by the applicant we had passed the order dated 11.3.2011. Mr. Lahiri had no answer to offer. 11. ON 4th August 2011 the submissions of Mr. Lahiri were concluded but he reserved his right to make further submission and we passed the following order. Mr. Lahiri, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the applicant concluded his submissions. He, however, prayed for leave to make further submissions, if any further instructions are received by him from his client. Let the matter be listed on Tuesday (9.8.2011) at 2 P.M. as prayed for on behalf of the State. ON 12th August 2011 the learned Advocate General was heard. After the learned Advocate General had concluded his submission Mr. He, however, prayed for leave to make further submissions, if any further instructions are received by him from his client. Let the matter be listed on Tuesday (9.8.2011) at 2 P.M. as prayed for on behalf of the State. ON 12th August 2011 the learned Advocate General was heard. After the learned Advocate General had concluded his submission Mr. Lahiri prayed for a weeks time and we passed the following order on 12th August 2011. 12. THE matter is further adjourned at the instance of Mr. Lahiri, learned Counsel for the applicant, for a week. Let it be listed on 19th August, 2011 marked For Orders. On 19th August 2011 when the matter was taken up for hearing Mr. Lahiri prayed for leave to file a supplementary affidavit. He submitted that he wants to disclose the reasons which led the applicant to pass the order dated 22nd December 2010 and therefore he had advised his client to affirm an affidavit which in fact was affirmed on 18th August 2011. The strategy adopted by the learned Advocate to file an affidavit after conclusion of the hearing appeared a little unusual to us but we granted him leave to do so and at the same time recorded the gist of the submission made by the learned Advocate General on 12th August 2011. The order dated 19th August 2011 passed in the presence of Mr. Lahiri and the learned Advocate General reads as follows:- On 12th August, 2011, when the matter was taken up for hearing, the learned Advocate General, West Bengal, appearing for the State, submitted that the order passed by us on 11th March, 2011, contained cogent reasons for passing the order and the order, according to him, was perfectly justified. Mr. Lahiri, learned Counsel, for the applicant, on that day submitted before us that he would like to take further instruction in the matter. Today when the matter was called on for hearing, he prayed for leave to file a supplementary affidavit. Copy of such affidavit has already been given to the learned Advocate General, West Bengal. He does not want to file any opposition to such affidavit. Today when the matter was called on for hearing, he prayed for leave to file a supplementary affidavit. Copy of such affidavit has already been given to the learned Advocate General, West Bengal. He does not want to file any opposition to such affidavit. From the supplementary affidavit, it appears, that the applicant has offered the following explanation:- The applicants states that after careful perusal of the materials available on record and the case diary no ingredient of offence against the father-in-law of the de facto complainant under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was found. The allegation as made against her father-in-law of the de facto complainant in the written complaint was not corroborated in the statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure whereas there was specific allegation against the husband of the de facto complainant that since they started living separately at the intervention of the panchayat people, the husband inflicted physical and mental torture on the wife, including the allegation against him for claim of dowry. 13. THE explanation offered in paragraph 8 of the supplementary affidavit quoted above is not even remotely hinted at in her order dated 22nd December 2010. From the complaint lodged by the wife against the eight accused persons including her father-in-law and the husband it would appear that each one of the accusation is directed against the accused persons collectively except for what had allegedly transpired between the complainant and the father-in-law which was the root of discontent and the acts of assault by the husband during the period of six months when the couple resided separately in a rented accommodation. It is alleged that the couple came back to the father-in-laws house and ultimately the complaint was driven out by all the accused persons after assaulting her. The indecent proposal to the daughter-in-law by the father-in-law and the attempt to ravish or the attempt to hug allegedly made by the father-in-law were acts done in the privacy of the bedroom of the father-in-law and the scope for any third party having any personal knowledge about the matter is unlikely. What would transpire from the statements made under Section 161 of CrPC is that the complainant has been residing at her parental house for more than 8/9 years. The complaint was lodged on 3rd November 2010. What would transpire from the statements made under Section 161 of CrPC is that the complainant has been residing at her parental house for more than 8/9 years. The complaint was lodged on 3rd November 2010. The explanation belatedly resorted to, by way of a supplementary affidavit, we are sorry to say, is an attempt to explain the unexplainable. 14. THE first point urged by the applicant is in any event without any substance. The accused had come up before us because his prayer for pre-arrest bail was rejected by the learned Session Judge. The correctness of the order passed by the applicant was in issue before us. We were called upon to examine the same. We examined the order of the applicant and allowed the prayer for pre-arrest bail indicating our reasons. It is difficult to accept the proposition that before doing so we should have given notice to her. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in the case of P.K. Dave vs. Peoples Union of Civil Liberties (Delhi) and Ors. Reported in 1996(4) SCC 262 wherein the following views were expressed:- When the orders passed by the appellant came under scrutiny of the court and the circumstances under which the order had been passed would appear from the relevant discussion made by the different officers and the court was examining the reasonableness and propriety of the orders passed by the appellant, any comments made by the court without issuing notice to the appellant cannot be ipso facto expunged merely on the ground that the appellant had no opportunity of hearing. That apart the appellant has now approached this Court and apart from raising the legal contentions that the High Court did not issue any notice to him he has the full opportunity of indicating the circumstances under which he passed the order and those circumstances are now being scrutinised by this Court. In this view of the matter we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submissions made by Mr. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the remarks and the strictures given by the court should be expunged on the sole ground that the appellant had not been given notice nor he had any opportunity of hearing before the High Court. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the remarks and the strictures given by the court should be expunged on the sole ground that the appellant had not been given notice nor he had any opportunity of hearing before the High Court. The second point contained in paragraph 15 of the application noticed above contending that the order dated 22nd December 2010 was passed with due care and caution and upon application of mind has not impressed us. We were and still are of the opinion that the applicant had passed the order merely on the basis of the concession made by the learned Public Prosecutor without independently applying her mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and without even perusing the nature of accusation. If she had perused the statements made under Section 161 CrPC, she could not have missed the fact that the complaint related to an alleged incident which was more that 8/9 years old because the complainant was residing with her parents for more than 8/9 years according to the witnesses. The order was as such clearly bad. 15. THE third point of Mr. Lahiri recorded above, except with respect to prejudice which shall be dealt with separately, was altogether unknown to us. It would appear from our order dated 11th March 2011 that we have referred to the learned Judge as His (?Sri etc.). In any event this point is not of any significance because it is not her case that due to lack of experience she committed the mistake. She has not as a matter of fact owned her mistake. She on the contrary has sought to justify her conduct as indicated above while dealing with her first point. 16. THE fourth point of Mr. Lahiri is clearly wrong. To start with we did not pass any adverse remarks. We have pointed out the mistake which is apparent from face of the records. That as a matter of fact was the reason for allowing the prayer for pre-arrest bail. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State supported our order which we already have indicated. The remarks objected to are an integral part of the reasoning. The remarks passed by us were neither irrelevant nor foreign to the matter in issue. They were also inextricably intertwined with the findings and the order recorded by us. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State supported our order which we already have indicated. The remarks objected to are an integral part of the reasoning. The remarks passed by us were neither irrelevant nor foreign to the matter in issue. They were also inextricably intertwined with the findings and the order recorded by us. If those remarks are deleted the order dated 11th March 2011 passed by us would be robbed of its very rationale. We are also supported in our views by the judgment in the case of RK Laxmanan vs. AK Srivastava a and Ors. Reported in 1975(2) SCC 466 and the judgment in the case of Lashkari Ram and Others vs. Mast Ram Tanta and Anr. Reported in 1998(6) SCC 666 . The applicant is averse to judicial finding. We fail to understand how does she propose to tolerate the litigant public and those interested in the outcome thereof. The Sanyal Committee in that regard opined as follows:- While comments on judicial proceedings which are pending may have an adverse influence on such proceedings, the same cannot be said with regard to comments or reflections on a judicial proceeding after it has been finally disposed of. Once this stage is reached, the Judge, in Benthams phrase, is given over to criticism and public interest demands that no undue fetters should be placed upon the right of individuals to reflect on the conduct of the Judge or the parties in the proceeding or to comment upon the decisions in the proceedings. In the words of Professor Laski the examination of what he (the Judge) has done, the analysis of his reasoning, the weighing of his results, the discussion of his conduct, are essential to the formation of the opinion, which in a democratic state, ultimately determines the trend of legislation. Without scrutiny of this kind, the dangers of judicial conservatism would be immeasurable. Apart from anything else, such criticism would act as a necessary corrective to the judiciary. 17. THE right to criticise judicial conduct and judicial decision in relation to proceedings which are no longer pending cannot, however, be of an absolute character. Without scrutiny of this kind, the dangers of judicial conservatism would be immeasurable. Apart from anything else, such criticism would act as a necessary corrective to the judiciary. 17. THE right to criticise judicial conduct and judicial decision in relation to proceedings which are no longer pending cannot, however, be of an absolute character. Without any limitations, it may result in encouragement of scandalous attacks but when kept within proper bounds, it is bound to serve a very useful purpose Reference in this regard may also be made to the judgment in the case of Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. The Attorney General of Trinadad and tobago reported in AIR 1936 PC 141 wherein the following view was expressed. But whether the authority and position of an individual Judge or the due administration of justice is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising in good faith in private or the path of criticism is a public way: the wrongheaded are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men. 18. THE views expressed in the aforesaid judgment were applied by the Apex Court in the case of P.N. Duda vs. P. Shiv Shanker reported in AIR 1988 SC 1208 . The judgments cited by Mr. Lahiri are all distinguiashable on facts. In the case of KP Tiwary (supra) motive was attributed to the learned Judge deciding the matter. Same was the case in the case of BK Thapar (supra) In the case of K, a Judicial Officer (supra) an oblique motive was attributed by the High Court. In the case of Prakash Singh Teji (supra) it would appear from paragraph 11 of the judgment that the judicial officer had owned his mistake but tried to explain away that the mistake was neither deliberate nor intentional. It is in those facts that the Apex Court considering that to err is human expunged the remarks of the High Court. In the case of Prakash Singh Teji (supra) it would appear from paragraph 11 of the judgment that the judicial officer had owned his mistake but tried to explain away that the mistake was neither deliberate nor intentional. It is in those facts that the Apex Court considering that to err is human expunged the remarks of the High Court. In the present case before us far from admitting her mistake, the applicant appears to assert that the High Court was wrong. In the case of K, a Judicial Officer reported in 2010(11) SCC arrogance and disrespect to the lawful orders passed by the subordinate courts was attributed. It was also remarked that the learned District Judge had for reasons best known to him passed the order of injunction whereby a veiled attack upon his integrity was there. In the case of Mona Panar (supra) the appellant had passed the impugned order following the law laid down by the High Court itself which had not been taken into consideration by the High Court while finding fault with the order. Therefore none of the judgments cited by Mr. Lahiri does really assist the applicant. We merely pointed out in a veiled language that the order dated 22nd December 2010 was passed without reading the papers which was not acceptable and therefore the order was reversed and the prayer allowed. The caution expressed in our order was nothing more than an advice. But advice we now realise is seldom welcome. Those who need it most, like it least. as opined by Dr. Johnson. It is though our constitutional duty exercising supervisory jurisdiction which has been uniformly accepted in almost all the judgments cited by Mr. Lahiri and in particular in the case of K a judicial officer reported in 2001(3) SCC 54 . 19. NOW what remains is the fifth point of Mr. Lahiri. We express no opinion whether the order passed by us was in the nature of a penalty. Our intention was not to penalize her. By directing that a copy of the order be kept in her service book we merely wanted to make the administrative wing of the High Court aware that there was need to watch her performance. We do not however want for a moment that any act of ours should be deemed to have visited the applicant with any penal consequences. By directing that a copy of the order be kept in her service book we merely wanted to make the administrative wing of the High Court aware that there was need to watch her performance. We do not however want for a moment that any act of ours should be deemed to have visited the applicant with any penal consequences. We therefore would follow the procedure laid down in the matter of K, a Judicial Officer reported in 2001(3) SCC 54 also drawn to our attention by Mr. Lahiri wherein Their Lordships laid down the following procedure:- We must not be understood as meaning that any conduct of a subordinate judicial officer unbecoming of him and demanding a rebuff should be simply overlooked. But there is an alternate safer and advisable course available to choose. The conduct of a judicial officer, unworthy of him, having come to the notice of a Judge of the High Court hearing a matter on the judicial side, the lis may be disposed of by pronouncing upon the merits thereof as found by him but avoiding in the judicial pronouncement criticism of, or observations on the conduct of the subordinate judicial officer who had decided the case under scrutiny. Simultaneously, but separately, in-office proceedings may be drawn up inviting attention of Honble Chief Justice to the facts describing the conduct of the Subordinate Judge concerned by sending a confidential letter or note to the Chief Justice. It will thereafter be open to the Chief Justice to deal with the subordinate judicial either at his own level or though the Inspecting Judge or by placing the matter before the full court for its consideration. The action so taken would all be on the administrative side. The Subordinate Judge concerned would have an opportunity of clarifying his position or putting forth the circumstances under which he acted. He would not be condemned unheard and if the decision be adverse to him, it being on administrative side, he would have some remedy available to him under the law. He would not be rendered remediless. 20. The Subordinate Judge concerned would have an opportunity of clarifying his position or putting forth the circumstances under which he acted. He would not be condemned unheard and if the decision be adverse to him, it being on administrative side, he would have some remedy available to him under the law. He would not be rendered remediless. 20. FOLLOWING the aforesaid procedure our direction contained in the order dated 11th March 2011 directing the learned Registrar General of this Court to keep a note of this order in the service records of the learned Sessions Judge-in-Charge is deleted and is substituted by a direction upon the learned Registrar General to bring the entire episode including the records to the notice of the Honble Chief Justice for such action as His Lordship may think fit and proper. It is clarified that the observations/findings made herein shall not preclude the High Court administration from arriving at its own conclusion on the basis of evidence. This application is, thus, disposed of and there shall be no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, be delivered to the learned Advocates for the parties, if applied for, upon compliance of all formalities.