JUDGMENT 1. - Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner.This habeas corpus petition has been filed by one Noranglal with the prayer to direct the respondents to release the detenu Geeta from the illegal detention of Hawai Singh Jat @ Ladiya, respondent No. 5 and Kesarev, respondent No. 6 and to set her at liberty forthwith. 2. It is averred in the petition that the daughter of the petitioner. namely Geeta had been kidnapped from his house on 19.4.2011 by Hawai Singh Jat, respondent No. 5. Further, the case of the petitioner is that when he was searching his daughter, Kesar Dev. No. 6 had assured him to trace out his daughter. But on the next day, Kesar Dev also absconded. The petitioner had then reported the matter to the Police Station Laxmangarh, District Sikar and a first information report (No. 97/2011) was registered for the offences under sections 363 and 366, I.P.C. (Annexure- 1). 3. The primary - grievance of the. petitioner is that the report was lodged to the police on 21.4.2011 and even after expiry*of six weeks. no steps have been taken by respondent police officials to trace out his daughter and to investigate into the matter. Thereafter, the petitioner is said to have submittea representation to the S.I1.O. Police Station Laxmangarh, District Sikar for tracing out his daughter and for her release from the illegal detention of respondent Nos. 5 and 6. But according to the petitioner, no heed was paid to the said representation. On 24.5.2011, the petitioner submitted a representation to the District Collector, Sikar stating that respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have abducted his daughter on 19.4.2011 and she is still in their illegal detention. The police is not proceeding with the Investigation nor making any effort to trace her out. He had requested the District Collector for taking steps for recovery and release of his daughter from illegal detention of respondent Nos. 5 and 6. 4. It is submitted by the Counsel for the petitioner that the daughter of the petitioner is in illegal detention of respondent Nos. 5 and 6. Further, he has submitted that though the report in this regard was lodged on 21.4.2011, but the police Is not taking any steps with regard to investigation or for recovery of the daughter of the petitioner Geeta. 5 and 6. Further, he has submitted that though the report in this regard was lodged on 21.4.2011, but the police Is not taking any steps with regard to investigation or for recovery of the daughter of the petitioner Geeta. Therefore, he has submitted that the rights of life and liberty of the detenu has been violated and her detention in the custody of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 is illegal. The respondent police authorities be directed to get the detenu released from the illegal detention of the private respondents. In support of his submission, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the cases of State of Maharashtra and others v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande, 2008 (65) AIC 147 (SC) = 2008 (61) ACC 713 = (2008) 3 SCC 613 and V. Ravi Chandran (Dr.) v. Union of India and others, (2010) 1 SCC 174 . 5. On consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and on perusal of the averments made in the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is revealed that the case of the petitioner is that his daughter has been abducted by two persons, namely Hawai Singh Jat, respondent No. 5 and Kesar Dev, respondent No. 6 on 19.4.2011. Thereafter, the petitioner reported the matter to the police and a regular first information report case to be registered at Police Station Laxmangarh, District Sikar under sections 363 and 366, I.P.C. According to the petitioner, nothing transpired after lodging of the report and as such, he gave a representation to the S.H.O., Laxmangarh and the District Collector, Sikar. So far as the representation to the S.H.O., Police Station Laxmangarh (Annexure-2) is concerned, a perusal of the same goes to show that it is not separate representation but the report submitted to the police on 21.4.2011, on which a first information report under section 154, Cr.P.C. (Annexure-1) was registered at Police Station Laxmangarh, on that day. The present case is a one where offence under' sections 363 and 366, I.P.C. is alleged to have been committed by two persons named in the first information report (No. 97/2011), who are also respondent Nos. 5 and 6 respectively in the present petition. The present case is a one where offence under' sections 363 and 366, I.P.C. is alleged to have been committed by two persons named in the first information report (No. 97/2011), who are also respondent Nos. 5 and 6 respectively in the present petition. Thereafter appropriate steps, as per the case of the petitioner, had not been taken and as such he gave representation of S.H.O., Police Station Laxmangarh and the District Collector, Sikar and has now filed this petition before this Court. In other words, inaction on the part of the police to take steps on the report lodged by the petitioner and their inability to proceed with the investigation has brought the petitioner before this Court by way of filing this petition. 6. So far as the case of Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is concerned it is worthwhile to note that the detenu Bhaurao Punjabrao was running a business of transportation of petroleum products and was also indulging in illegal purchase and sale of blue kerosene oil in black marketing since last five to six years. Certain cases were also registered against him under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. It was on account of continuous activities of Bhaurao Punjabrao in black marketing of essential commodities, the Commissioner of Police, in exercise of powers conferred on him by sub-section (1) read with Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 directed that he be detained. The said order of detention of Commissioner was approved by the State Government. When the detaining authority was satisfied with a view to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of essential commodities to the community. It was necessary to detain him and accordingly the order was passed. 7. It was in these circumstances that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering, in a criminal appeal, against the judgment and order passed by the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) on 17.10.2006. By the impugned order, the learned High Court partly allowed the petition filed by the detenu and had set aside the order of detention dated 27.7.2006 passed by the Commissioner of Police (Nagpur City) under the Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980. By the impugned order, the learned High Court partly allowed the petition filed by the detenu and had set aside the order of detention dated 27.7.2006 passed by the Commissioner of Police (Nagpur City) under the Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held.that the case did not fall within the category of exceptional cases and as such, the High Court had committed an error in setting aside the order of detention at the pre-execution and pre-arrest stage. Therefore, the said order was set aside. It was ordered that it would be open to the authorities to execute the order of detention and the detenu also to challenge the legality thereof on all available grounds. 8. In the case of V. Ravi Chandran (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the case of a boy, name Adithya, who was seven years of age and was born in the United States of America. He was a foreign national. The petitioner Dr. V. Ravi Chandran, father of the boy, had filed the petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court praying for a writ of habeas corpus for production of his minor son Adhithya and for handing over his custody and passport to him.The petitioner Dr. V. Ravi Chandran was an American citizen. He and respondent No. 6 got married on 14.12.2000 at Tirupathi, Andhra Pradesh according to Hindu rites. On 1.7.2002., Adhithya was born in United States of America. In the month of July, 2003, respondent No. 6 approached the New York State Supreme Court for divorce and dissolution of marriage. A consent order governing the issues of custody and guardianship of minor child was passed by the New York State Supreme Court on 18.4.2005. The Court granted joint custody of the child to the petitioner and respondent No. 6 and it was stipulated in the order to keep the other party informed about the whereabouts of the child. On 28.7.2005, a separation agreement was entered between the petitioner and respondent No. 6 for distribution of marital property, spouse maintenance and child support. As regards the custody of minor son Adhithya and parenting time, the petitioner and respondent No. 6 consented to the order dated 18.4.2005. On 8.9.2005, the marriage between the petitioner and respondent No. 6 was dissolved by the New York State Supreme Court. Child custody order dated 18.4.2005 was incorporated in that order. As regards the custody of minor son Adhithya and parenting time, the petitioner and respondent No. 6 consented to the order dated 18.4.2005. On 8.9.2005, the marriage between the petitioner and respondent No. 6 was dissolved by the New York State Supreme Court. Child custody order dated 18.4.2005 was incorporated in that order. Upon the petition for modification of custody filed by the petitioner V. Ravi Chandran and the petition for enforcement filed by him and upon the petition for enforcement filed by respondent No. 6 before the Family Court of the State of New York, on 18.6.2007, an order was passed with the consent of both the parties. The said order was primarily with regard to the custody of the minor child and the conditions in respect of it.On 28.6.2007, respondent No. 6 had brought Adithya to India informing the petitioner that she would be residing with her parents at Chennai. Thereafter on 8.8.2007, the petitioner filed a petition for modification (custody and violation petition) custody before the Family Court of the State of New York on which a show-cause notice was issued to respondent No. 6. The petitioner was granted temporary sole legal and physical custody of Adithya and respondent No. 6 was directed to immdiately turn over the child and his passport to the petitioner and further, her custodial time with the minor child was suspended and it was ordered that the issue of custody of Adhithya shall be heard in the jurisdiction of the United States Courts, specifically, the Albany County Family Court. The Family Court of the State of New York had issued child abuse non-bailable warrants against respondent No. 6. It was in this backdrop of the facts that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had ordered for production of the child and for passing appropriate order in the facts and circumstances keeping in mind the interest of the child and orders of the Courts of the country of which the child was a national. 9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has specifically relied upon para 39 of the judgment passed in the case of V. Ravi Chandran (supra). The learned Counsel for respondent No. 6, in that case, had sought to raise an objection regarding the maintainability of habeas corpus petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Honble Apex Court. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has specifically relied upon para 39 of the judgment passed in the case of V. Ravi Chandran (supra). The learned Counsel for respondent No. 6, in that case, had sought to raise an objection regarding the maintainability of habeas corpus petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Honble Apex Court. But the Hon'ble Court could not be persuaded to accept the said objection. It was observed by the Honble Apex Court that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case which had been noticed by it and the order which they had intended to pass, invocation of jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was held not to be inappropriate. 10. Therefore, it would be seen that the cases of Bhaurao Punjabrao (supra) and V. Ravi Chandran (supra) were having totally different facts and circumstances than the one in hand and it was in the peculiar fact situation of those cases that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered the matter. Consequently, none of the cases referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is of any assistance to the petitioner. 11. Reverting back to the facts of the present case where the daughter of the petitioner had been abducted by respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and despite of first information report having been lodged in the matter, the police authorities were not taking appropriate steps to proceed with the investigation. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered opinion that the habeas corpus petition filed by the petitioner is wholly misconceived. As a matter of fact, even in case of the grievance of the petitioner that after lodging of a regular report, the police is not taking any steps or investigating into the matter, filing of a writ petition directly to this Court by invoking its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not an appropriate remedy for the petitioner. 12. 12. The Honble Supreme Court in the case of Sakirl Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2008) 2 scc 409 = 2008 (62) AIC 236 (SC) = 2008 (60) ACC 689 has authentically laid down the procedure in such cases, to be adopted by an aggrieved person /complainant where either the police is not registering a first information report or that even after registering it, no proper investigation is being made. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paras 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 26, 27 and 28 has observed as under; "11. In this connection we would like to state that if a person has a grievance that the police station is not registering his F.I.R. under section 154, Cr.P.C., then he can under section 154 (3),Cr.P.C. by an application in writing. Even if that does not yield any satisfactory result in the sense that either the F.I.R. is still not registered, or that even after registering it no proper investigation is held, it is open to the aggrieved person to file an application under section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate concerned. If such an application under section 156 (3) is filed before the Magistrate, the Magistrate can direct the F.I.R. to be registered and also can direct a proper investigation to be made, in a case where, according to the aggrieved person, no proper investigation was made. The Magistrate can also under the same provisions monitor the Investigation to ensure a proper investigation." "14. Section 156 (3) states : " 156 (3). Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned. The words "as above mentioned" obviously refer to section 156 (1), which contemplates investigation by the officer-in-charge of the police station. "15. Section 156 (3) provides for a check by the Magistrate on the police performing its duties under Chapter XII, C.P.C. in cases where the Magistrate finds that the police has not done its duty of investigating the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can issue a direction to the police to do the investigation properly, and can monitor the same." "16. The power in the Magistrate to order further investigation under section 156 (3) is an independent power, and does not affect the power of the investigating officer to further investigate the case even after submission of his report vide section 173 (8). Hence the Magistrate can order reopening of the investigation even after the police submits the final report, vide State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha, AIR 1980 SC 326 " "17. In our opinion section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for enduring a proper investigation, and it includes the power to order registration of an F.I.R. and of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the police.. Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. though briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and it will Include all such incidental powers as are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation." "18. It is well-settled that when a power is given to an authority to do something it includes such incidental or implied powers which would ensure the proper doing of that thing. In other words, when any power is expressly granted by the statute, there is impliedly included in the grant, even without special mention, every power and every control the denial of which would render the grant itself ineffective. Thus, where an Act confers jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employ such means as are essentially necessary for its execution." "24. In view of the above mentioned legal position, we are of the view that although section 156 (3) is very briefly worded, there is an implied power in the Magistrate under section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. to order registration of a criminal offence and/or to direct the officer-in-charge of the police station concerned to hold a proper investigation and take all such necessary steps that may be necessary for ensuring a proper investigation including monitoring the same. Even though these powers have not been expressly mentioned in section 156 (3). Cr.P.C., we are of the opinion that they are implied in the above provision." "25. Even though these powers have not been expressly mentioned in section 156 (3). Cr.P.C., we are of the opinion that they are implied in the above provision." "25. We have elaborated on the above matter because we often find that when someone has a grievance that his F.I.R. has not been registered at the police station and/or a proper investigation is not being done by the police, he rushes to the High Court to file a writ petition or a petition under section 482, Cr.P.C. We are of the opinion that the High Court should not encourage this practice and should ordinarily refuse to interfere in such matters an d relegate the petitioner to his alternating remedy, first under section 154 (3) and section 36, Cr.P.C. before the Police Officers concerned, and if that is of no avail, by approaching the Magistrate concerned under section 156 (3)." "26. If a person has a grievance that his F.I.R. has not been registered by the police station his first remedy is to approach the Superintendent of Police under section 154 (3), Cr.P.C. or other police officer referred to in section 36, Cr.P.C. If despite approaching the Superintendent of Police or the officer referred to in section 36 his grievance still persists, then he can approach a Magistrate under section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. instead of rushing to the High Court by way of a writ petition or a petition under section 482, Cr.P.C. Moreover, he has a further remedy of filing a criminal complaint under section 200. Cr.P.C. Why then should writ petitions or section 482 petitions be entertained when there are so many alternative remedies?... "27. As we have already observed above, the Magistrate has very wide powers to direct registration of an F.I.R. and to ensure a proper investigation, and for this purpose he can monitor the investigation to ensure that the investigation is done properly (though he cannot investigate himself. The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under section 482, Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his F.I.R. has not been registered by the police, or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police. The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under section 482, Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his F.I.R. has not been registered by the police, or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police. For this grievance, the remedy lies under sections 36 and 154 (3) before the police officers concerned, and if that is of no avail, under section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate or by filing a criminal complaint under section 200, Cr.P.C. and not by filing a writ petition or a petition under section 482, Cr.P.C." "28. It is true that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to a writ petition, but it is equally well settled that if there is an alternative remedy the High Court should not ordinarily interfere." 13. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case as well as the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sakiri Vasu (supra), we are of the considered opinion that this writ petition be disposed of with the direction to the concerning Magistrate that in case an application is filed by the petitioner, in the light of the aforesaid principles of law, then appropriate orders with regard to prompt investigation and expeditious conclusion of the same be passed. The learned Magistrate shall monitor the investigation upto the time the police submits the conclusion of the investigation in the matter. 14. With the aforesaid directions, this habeas corpus petition is disposed of.Petition Disposed Of. *******