Judgment : HARISH TANDON, J. In all the three writ petitions, an identical point has been involved as to whether the order of dismissal which was passed outside the jurisdiction of this Court can be assailed and/or challenged before it as the same is communicated to the petitioner at his place of residence which is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. Before dealing with the points as enumerated above, some salient facts are required to be spelt out for proper and effective adjudication. WP 7728 (w) of 2010 The petitioner was employed as constable under the Bengal Frontier Border Security Force in the year 1997 under the scheduled caste/scheduled tribe category. After completion of the successful training, the petitioner was transferred to the different places within the country under the Border Security Force and was lastly posted to sector Head Quarter BSF Gauhati on and from 11.8.2004. The scheduled tribe certificate which was submitted by the petitioner at the time of recruitment was sent for verification as to its genuinely to the sub divisional officer, Kalyani who reported that the said certificate is not genuine. Pursuant to the same a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner. In reply to the said show-cause notice the petitioner submitted another letter dated 14.7.2006 claimed to have been issued by the said sub-divisional officer, Kalyani certifying that the certificate, which was submitted by the petitioner at the time of recruitment is genuine. The authorities thereafter sent the subsequent letter for further verification and the said sub-divisional officer, Kalyani intimated that the said letter dated 14.7.2006was never issued from his office and the signature appended thereto is forged. It is further intimated that an FIR in this regard has been lodged with the Haringhata Police Station, Nadia. Thereafter the order of dismissal under section 11(2) of the Border Security Force Act read with Rule 177 of the Border Security Force Rules was passed. The said order of dismissal is received by the petitioner at Patgaon, Gauhati where he was posted, on 19.4.2007. The said order is assailed by the petitioner in this writ petition. In affidavit in opposition the respondent no. 1 and 3 apart from a ground of suppression of material fact have taken a point of territorial jurisdiction as no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this court either wholly or in part. The said order is assailed by the petitioner in this writ petition. In affidavit in opposition the respondent no. 1 and 3 apart from a ground of suppression of material fact have taken a point of territorial jurisdiction as no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this court either wholly or in part. WP 7724 (w) of 2010 The petitioner in this writ petition was appointed as a constable under the Bengal Frontier Border Security Force in the year 2003 under the scheduled caste/scheduled tribe category. After the completion of the training the petitioner was posted to the Demo Platoon as STC BSF Hazaribag. The authorities sent the scheduled tribe certificate which was submitted by petitioner at the time of his recruitment for verification to the District Magistate,24 Pgs, North who thereafter certified that the said scheduled tribe certificate is not genuine. The petitioner was served with a show cause notice and the record of evidence was prepared and ultimately the petitioner was tried by the Summary Security Force Court for an offence under section 23of the BSF Act 1968. The petitioner was thereafter dismissed from service. The petitioner assailed the said order of dismissal before the appellate authority being Director General Hazaribag and the appellate authority set aside the said order of dismissal with a further direction to proceed de novo. Pursuant to the said order of the appellate authority the petitioner was reinstated at the same post at Hazaribag and thereafter deserted himself without any permission from his superior on and from 20th November 2005. An FIR was also lodged by the authorities at Muffasil Police Station, Hazaribag. By three several letters dated 29.11.2005, 10.12.2005 and 6.1.2006 which were sent by the registered post with acknowledgement due, the petitioner was directed to report back to the institution without any further delay. Because of such illegal actions amounting to desertion a court of enquiry was ordered which was finalized on 10th January 2006 and an apprehension rule was forwarded to the Superintendent of Police, 24 Pgs. North, West Bengal but the petitioner could not be traced out. Ultimately a show cause notice was issued under Rule 22(2) of the BSF Rule. Since the authorities did not receive any response and/or reply to the said show cause notice the service of the petitioner was dismissed with effect from 23rd February 2006. North, West Bengal but the petitioner could not be traced out. Ultimately a show cause notice was issued under Rule 22(2) of the BSF Rule. Since the authorities did not receive any response and/or reply to the said show cause notice the service of the petitioner was dismissed with effect from 23rd February 2006. The petitioner has prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondent no. 2 and 3 to cancel, rescind and/or withdraw the order of dismissal passed by the respondent authorities in this writ petition. At the time of admission of the instant writ petition the respondent no. 1, 2 and3 took a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the instant writ petition before this court for want of territorial jurisdiction as well as non-disclosure of cause of action having arisen within the jurisdiction of this court either wholly or in part. WP 9048 (w) of 2010 The petitioner was employed as constable under the Central Reserved Police Force Organization and after successful training was posted at different places and lastly was posted at Imphal in the state of Manipur. To combat the terrorists and/or naxalists, the Director General, Central Reserved Police Force constituted a battalion namely 204 Cobra BM (CRPF) and the petitioner was proposed to the said battalion and was sent to the Shirpuri in the state of Madhya Pradesh for specialized training programme. On 23rd August 2009 the petitioner along with some other personnel went to the local market for buying the items of necessity. It is alleged by the petitioner that some of the senior officers started beating one of such trainee mercilessly which resulted into a protest by 800 numbers of trainees. Because of the said protest the said superior officer aimed at and pointed the gun towards the trainees which cause pandemonium and the said superior officer started beating one of the trainee mercilessly by feast and blows which cause multiple injuries in the chest and the said trainee was admitted to the district hospital for treatment. Because of the said protest the said superior officer aimed at and pointed the gun towards the trainees which cause pandemonium and the said superior officer started beating one of the trainee mercilessly by feast and blows which cause multiple injuries in the chest and the said trainee was admitted to the district hospital for treatment. The said incident was reported to the Director Inspector General, Central Reserved Police Force, Gwalior who intervened in the matter and because of such intervention the rest of the training programme was held peacefully until 31st August 2009 when the petitioner was called by the Commandant in his office and directed him to proceed to the Gwalilor for an enquiry in respect of the said incidence. It is alleged by the petitioner that after reaching Gwalior he was handed over the order of dismissal dated 31.8.2009 without giving an opportunity of hearing. However in affidavit of opposition it is a specific case of the authorities that the few trainees/jawans including the petitioner went out in the Shirpuri market and consumed liquor and fought among themselves which was captured at video by the locales and media persons. The said trainees/jawans were thereafter segregated by the officers and were ordered to be sent for the medical examination. The said trainees/jawans raised objection to such decision as they were under the influence of liquor and some of them trying to strangulate themselves by tying their neck with telephone wire. It is a specific case of the respondent that the petitioner and two others were the main persons to instigate the other jawans to create law and order problem. It is further contended by the respondent that the petitioner was called in the office and after considering all the aspects the competent authority passed an order of dismissal under section 11 of the Central Reserved Police Force Act 1949 read with Rule 27CC(ii) of the CRPF Rule 1955. In paragraph 22 of the said opposition the respondent has set forth an objection as to the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the writ petition as no cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this court inasmuch as the order of dismissal was passed at Shirpuri in the state of Madhya Pradesh and was served upon the petitioner therein. There is no dispute that the order of dismissal which has been assailed in all the three writ petitions were passed outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court. Before proceeding to deal with the point whether this court is competent to entertain the writ petition it would be profitable to quote Article 226 of the Constitution of India which reads thus : “Art. 226. Power of High Court to issue certain writs.- (I) notwithstanding anything in article 32, every high court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any high court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under cause (1), without – (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the high court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is alter, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.” Article 226 of the Constitution confers a power upon the high court to exercise jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action wholly or in part arises. There cannot be a special meaning assigned to the word ‘cause of action’ which would be gathered from the bundle of facts which, if proved, would entitle the suitor to get the relief. The jurisdiction of the high court to entertain the writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is assumed if the cause of action, wholly or in part arises within its territory. The sit us of case of action is sine qua non to exercise the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution. For ascertaining cause of action as pleaded in the proceeding the court should look into the writ petition alone to find out the cause of action as the cause of action has no nexus whatsoever to the defence which may be set up by the adversary. For ascertaining cause of action as pleaded in the proceeding the court should look into the writ petition alone to find out the cause of action as the cause of action has no nexus whatsoever to the defence which may be set up by the adversary. The facts which is pleaded in the writ petition must have a reasonable nexus for which the relief is claimed and not the other facts which has nothing to do with the ultimate relief claimed therein. Mere sit us of the office of one of the respondent who has nothing to do with the facts constituting the cause of action does not confer the jurisdiction upon the court. It is however tried to be contended by the petitioners that the sit us of the residence of the petitioners are within the jurisdiction of this court and it cannot be said that the part of the cause of action did not arise herein. It is no doubt true that the cause of action implies a right to sue and the question as to whether the high court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition should be arrived on the basis of averments made in the writ petition. Even a small fraction of cause of action confers jurisdiction upon the high court to entertain the writ petition. Admittedly the writ petitioners in WP no. 7728 (w) of 2010 and WP no. 9048 (w) of 2010 were served the order of dismissal at the place of their posting which is admittedly outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court but so far as the writ petitioner in WP no. 7724 (w) of 2010 is concerned, the said order of dismissal is served by registered post at the residential address of the writ petitioner which is admittedly within the jurisdiction of this court. Admittedly all the actions which has been done are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court even an order of dismissal is passed after holding an enquiry by an authority situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court. In case of Oil & Natural Gas Commission Vs. Admittedly all the actions which has been done are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court even an order of dismissal is passed after holding an enquiry by an authority situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court. In case of Oil & Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711 the Supreme Court held that mere submission of an offer from Calcutta when admittedly all other works under the contract was to be executed outside the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High court does not create a fraction of the cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court in these words : “7. The learned counsel for ONGC contended that on these averments no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and hence the writ petition filed by NICCO and another was not entertain able by that High Court. He submitted that ONGC had decided to set up a Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit at Hazira in Gujarat. EIL was appointed by ONGC as its consultant. In that capacity, EIL issued the advertisement from New Delhi calling for tenders and this advertisement was printed and published in all the leading newspapers of the country including the Times of India in circulation in West Bengal. The tenders or bids were to be forwarded to EIL at New Delhi. EIL was expected to scrutinize the tenders and make its recommendations to the Tender Committee constituted by ONGC. The final decision was, however, to be taken by the Steering Committee at New Delhi presided over by the Chairman, ONGC. Accordingly, the tender of NICCO was examined by EIL at New Delhi and it recommended its rejection on the ground that NICCO did not satisfy the experience criteria requisite for the grant of contract. On the first occasion, the Tender Committee did not agree with the said recommendation and directed the EIL to call NICCO at the clarificatory meeting proposed to be held in New Delhi. In obedience to the said direction, EIL invited NICCO along with the other bidders, but once again recommended its rejection on the ground that it did not satisfy the experience criteria. The Tender Committee which met in New Delhi reviewed its earlier decision and accepted the recommendation of EIL which was also accepted by the Steering Committee at New Delhi on 27-1-1993. The Tender Committee which met in New Delhi reviewed its earlier decision and accepted the recommendation of EIL which was also accepted by the Steering Committee at New Delhi on 27-1-1993. It was at this point of time that the decision to award the contract to CIMMCO was taken at New Delhi. Counsel for ONGC, therefore, contended that all these events took place outside the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and merely because NICCO had read the advertisement in the Times of India in circulation in West Bengal and had forwarded its tender from its registered office in Calcutta and followed it up by a revised offer, it cannot be said that any part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court for the simple reason that if these facts were to give a cause of action, every tenderer would sue ONGC in the local court from where he forwarded the tender and that would make ONGC run about from court to court all over the country. Counsel further submitted that nor can the fact that NICCO sent representations including fax messages from its registered office to ONGC at Calcutta to which ONGC showed the courtesy of replying confer jurisdiction. In support of this contention, he placed strong reliance on the decision in State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties. Learned counsel for CIMMCO buttressed these submissions by inviting our attention to certain other decisions of this Court, namely, Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, R. Bejal v. Triveni Structurals Ltd., Subodh Kumar Gupta v. Shrikant Gupta and certain decisions of different High Courts. On the other hand, counsel for NICCO, while reiterating that the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22 and 26 constituted an integral part of the cause of action, submitted that by the introduction of clause (2) in Article 226 of the Constitution, the Legislature intended to widen the High Courts jurisdiction and thereby extend its beneficent reach even to cases where a part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. In the alternative, he submitted that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that the High Court of Calcutta lacked jurisdiction, this Court sitting in appeal should not interfere with the verdict of the High Court as ONGC had neither alleged nor showed that there had been a failure of justice. In the alternative, he submitted that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that the High Court of Calcutta lacked jurisdiction, this Court sitting in appeal should not interfere with the verdict of the High Court as ONGC had neither alleged nor showed that there had been a failure of justice. In this connection, he placed reliance on the spirit of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He, therefore, contended that this Court should examine the appeal on merits and not confine itself to the question of territorial jurisdiction. Lastly, he submitted that on merits NICCO had made out a good case for the grant of relief sought by it. 8. From the facts pleaded in the writ petition, it is clear that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court on the plea that a part of the cause of action had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the Times of India at Calcutta. In response thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta office and revised the rates subsequently. When it learnt that it was considered ineligible it sent representations, including fax messages, to EIL, ONGC, etc., at New Delhi, demanding justice. As stated earlier, the Steering Committee finally rejected the offer of NICCO and awarded the contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27-1-1993. Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that those would be scrutinized at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15- 11993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27-1-1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.” In case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Swaika Properties reported in (1985) 3 SCC 217 somewhat similar question cropped up whether a notice issued under section 52(1) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act 1959 by the state government of Rajasthan which was served upon the company situated in Calcutta, creates jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court to entertain a writ petition challenging the said notice, the apex court by holding that mere service of notice under section 52 of the said Act at the registered office of the company situated in Calcutta could not give rise to the cause of action within the territory observed : “7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that the cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a rule nisi on the petition filed by the respondents under Article 226 of the Constitution or to make the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order restraining the appellants from taking any steps to take possession of the land acquired. Under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the Act the appellants were entitled to require the respondents to surrender or deliver possession of the lands acquired forthwith and upon their failure to do so, take immediate steps to secure such possession under subsection (6) thereof. 8. Under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the Act the appellants were entitled to require the respondents to surrender or deliver possession of the lands acquired forthwith and upon their failure to do so, take immediate steps to secure such possession under subsection (6) thereof. 8. The expression “cause of action” is tersely defined in Mullas Code of Civil Procedure: “The ‘cause of action’ means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court.” In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose.” The apex court in case of National Textile Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Haribox Swalram reported in (2004) 9 SCC 786 held that the communication is received and the reply to the correspondences made at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action so as to confer jurisdiction upon the court under Article 226(2) of the Constitution to entertain a writ petition in these words : “12. In the present case, the textile mills are situate in Bombay and the supply of cloth was to be made by them ex-factory at Bombay. According to the writ petitioners, the money was paid to the mills at Bombay. The learned Single Judge after a detailed discussion of the matter held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The Division Bench has reversed this finding on the ground that concluded contract had come into existence which could be cancelled only after giving an opportunity of hearing and consequently, the question of revocation of the contract at its Calcutta address would constitute a cause of action. In our opinion, the view taken by the Division Bench is wholly erroneous in law. It was nowhere pleaded in the writ petition that the appellant herein had initiated any action under Section 11 of the Act by issuing any notice to the writ petitioner for cancellation of the contract. In fact, it is stated in para 18 of the petition that the Central Government did not follow the procedure prescribed in Section 11 for cancellation of contract. In fact, it is stated in para 18 of the petition that the Central Government did not follow the procedure prescribed in Section 11 for cancellation of contract. Regarding the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, the relevant statement was made in para 73 of the writ petition wherein it was stated as under: “73. Your petitioner carries on business and maintains all accounts at the aforesaid place of business within the jurisdiction. Your petitioner states that by reason of the aforesaid, your petitioners have suffered loss and damage at its said place of business within the jurisdiction. All notices and correspondences referred to hereinabove addressed to your petitioner has been received by your petitioner at your petitioners place of business within the jurisdiction. In the circumstances, this Honble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the present application.” 12.1. As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. However, in order to avoid any further harassment to the parties and to put an end to the litigation, we would examine the matter on merits as well. 13. Chapter II of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983 deals with taking over of the management of certain textile undertakings. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 lays down that on and from the appointed day, the management of all the textile undertakings shall vest in the Central Government. Sub-section (7) of Section 3 is important and it reads as under: “3. (7) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that any liability incurred by a textile company in relation to the textile undertaking before the appointed day shall be enforceable against the textile company concerned and not against the Central Government or the Custodian.” 13.1. This provision is very clear and says in no uncertain terms that any liability incurred by a textile company in relation to the textile undertaking shall not be enforceable against the Central Government or the Custodian. This provision is very clear and says in no uncertain terms that any liability incurred by a textile company in relation to the textile undertaking shall not be enforceable against the Central Government or the Custodian. The effect of this provision was examined in Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. National Textile Corpn. (South Maharashtra) Ltd. where the question of payment of gratuity of a workman who left the employment just a few months before “the appointed day” came up for consideration. It was held that the language of sub-section (7) of Section 3 is clear and unambiguous inasmuch as in the said provision it has been declared that any liability incurred by the textile company in relation to the textile undertaking before the appointed day shall be enforceable against the textile company concerned and not against the Central Government or the Custodian. It was also held that the words “any liability” in subsection (7) of Section 3 are of wide amplitude to cover every liability that was incurred by the textile company in relation to the textile undertaking before the appointed day. The Court thus rejected the contention that sub-section (7) of Section 3 must be so construed as to exclude its applicability in respect of liability for payment of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act. The Court also examined the provisions of the Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Ordinance, 1995 (Ordinance 6 of 1995) which was later on replaced by the Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1995 and held as under: “The provisions of Ordinance 6 of 1995 also show that the liabilities for the period prior to the takeover of the management are to be discharged from the amount payable to the owner of the textile undertaking for the acquisition of the undertaking and not by the NTC. It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that NTC is liable in respect of the gratuity amount payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act to Respondent 2.” In case of Alchemist Ltd. Vs. State of Sikkim reported in (2007) 11 SCC 335 the Supreme Court was dealing a case where the company having its registered and cooperate office at Chandigarh applied in terms of an advertisement published in the daily newspaper by the State Bank of Sikkim seeking strategic partner with transfer of management. State of Sikkim reported in (2007) 11 SCC 335 the Supreme Court was dealing a case where the company having its registered and cooperate office at Chandigarh applied in terms of an advertisement published in the daily newspaper by the State Bank of Sikkim seeking strategic partner with transfer of management. By a letter dated 20.2.2004 the bank informed the company about the acceptance of the proposal subject to consideration and approval of the government of Sikkim which was received by the company at Chandigarh. Subsequently the bank withdrew the said communication as the approval is not granted by the government of Sikkim. A writ petition was filed before the high court of Punjab & Haryana. The question that came up for consideration was whether the writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 (2) of the Constitution. The company sought to contend that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the said high court as the acceptance of the letter of revocation were received at the registered office of the company. By negating such contention it is held : “25. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to several decisions of this Court and submitted that whether a particular fact constitutes a cause of action or not must be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case. In our judgment, the test is whether a particular fact(s) is (are) of substance and can be said to be material, integral or essential part of the lis between the parties. If it is, it forms a part of cause of action. If it is not, it does not form a part of cause of action. It is also well settled that in determining the question, the substance of the matter and not the form thereof has to be considered. 26. In Union of India v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. the registered office of the Company was situated at Ludhiana, but a petition was filed in the High Court of Calcutta on the ground that the Company had its branch office there. The order was challenged by the Union of India. 26. In Union of India v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. the registered office of the Company was situated at Ludhiana, but a petition was filed in the High Court of Calcutta on the ground that the Company had its branch office there. The order was challenged by the Union of India. And this Court held that since the registered office of the Company was at Ludhiana and the principal respondents against whom primary relief was sought were at New Delhi, one would have expected the writ petitioner to approach either the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or the High Court of Delhi. The forum chosen by the writ petitioners could not be said to be in accordance with law and the High Court of Calcutta could not have entertained the writ petition. 27. In State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties the Company whose registered office was at Calcutta filed a petition in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the notice issued by the Special Town Planning Officer, Jaipur for acquisition of immovable property situated in Jaipur. Observing that the entire cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, the Supreme Court held that the High Court of Calcutta had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 28. This Court held that mere service of notice on the petitioner at Calcutta under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 could not give rise to a cause of action unless such notice was “an integral part of the cause of action”. 29. In ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu this Court held that when the Head Office of ONGC was not located at Calcutta, nor the execution of contract work was to be carried out in West Bengal, territorial jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the High Court of Calcutta on the ground that an advertisement had appeared in a daily (The Times of India), published from Calcutta, or the petitioner submitted his bid from Calcutta, or subsequent representations were made from Calcutta, or fax message as to the final decision taken by ONGC was received at Calcutta inasmuch as neither of them would constitute an “integral part” of the cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta under Article 226(2) of the Constitution. 30. 30. In CBI, Anti-Corruption Branch v. Narayan Diwakar, A was posted in Arunachal Pradesh. On receiving a wireless message through Chief Secretary of the State asking him to appear before CBI Inspector in Bombay, A moved the High Court of Guwahati for quashing FIR filed against him by CBI. An objection was raised by the department that the High Court of Guwahati had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. But it was turned down. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the objection that Gauhati High Court could not have entertained the petition. 31. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. a question of territorial jurisdiction came up for consideration. A filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Gujarat claiming benefit of the Passport Scheme under the EXIM policy. Passport was issued by Chennai Office. Entries in the passport were made by the authorities at Chennai. None of the respondents was stationed within the State of Gujarat. It was, therefore, contended that the Gujarat High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The contention, however, was negatived and the petition was allowed. The respondents approached the Supreme Court.” In another judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Eastern Coalfield Ltd. Vs. Kalyan Banerjee reported in (2008) 3 SCC 456 the apex court was considering a matter where the order of termination was assailed before the Calcutta High Court. In the said case the employee was posted in Magma in the district of Dhanbad, Jharkhand and the services of the respondent was terminated at Magma but the writ petition was filed before the Calcutta High court challenging the said order of termination. The apex court held that the entire cause of action arose at Magma area within the state of Jharkhand in these words : “6. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of or in the nature of mandamus is conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Article 226(2), however, provides that if cause of action had arisen in more than one court, any of the courts where part of cause of action arises will have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 7. Article 226(2), however, provides that if cause of action had arisen in more than one court, any of the courts where part of cause of action arises will have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 7. “Cause of action”, for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, for all intent and purport, must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It means a bundle of facts which are required to be proved. The entire bundle of facts pleaded, however, need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved is material facts whereupon a writ petition can be allowed. 8. The question to some extent was considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Unionof India3 stating: (SCC p. 261, para 18) “18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the Court.” 9. As regards the question as to whether sit us of office of the appellant would be relevant, this Court noticed decisions of this Court in Nasiruddin v. STAT and U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U.P. to hold: (Kusum Ingots case, SCC p. 263, paras 26-27) “26. The view taken by this Court in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad that the sit us of issue of an order or notification by the Government would come within the meaning of the expression ‘cases arising’ in Clause 14 of the (Amalgamation) Order is not a correct view of law for the reason hereafter stated and to that extent the said decision is overruled. In fact, a legislation, it is trite, is not confined to a statute enacted by Parliament or the legislature of a State, which would include delegated legislation and subordinate legislation or an executive order made by the Union of India, State or any other statutory authority. In a case where the field is not covered by any statutory rule, executive instructions issued in this behalf shall also come within the purview thereof. In a case where the field is not covered by any statutory rule, executive instructions issued in this behalf shall also come within the purview thereof. Sit us of office of Parliament, legislature of a State or authorities empowered to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any cause of action or cases arising. In other words, framing of a statute, statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon a court only because of the sit us of the office of the maker thereof. 27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority.” 10. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. has been followed by this Court in Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd. stating: “26. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India a three-Judge Bench of this Court clearly held that with a view to determine the jurisdiction of one High Court vis-à-vis the other the facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be made and the facts which have nothing to do therewith cannot give rise to a cause of action to invoke the jurisdiction of a court. In that case it was clearly held that only because the High Court within whose jurisdiction a legislation is passed, it would not have the sole territorial jurisdiction but all the High Courts where cause of action arises, will have jurisdiction.” 11. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India this Court held: “12. The expression ‘cause of action’ has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India this Court held: “12. The expression ‘cause of action’ has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense ‘cause of action’ means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above, the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in ‘cause of action’. (See Rajasthan High Court Advocates Assn. v. Union of India.)” 12. In UttaranchalForestRangers Assn. (Direct Recruit) v. State of U.P. this Court held: “44. The second impugned order dated 12-4-2004 is further vitiated for the following reasons: (a) Forum.—The seniority list under challenge in the second writ petition was the seniority list of the Uttaranchal State Government of 2002 and such challenge could not have been made before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. (b) Parties.—None of the direct recruits who would be directly affected by the order were made parties to the writ petition. Therefore, the High Court did not have the benefit of competing arguments in the matter. Even though, the Principal Secretary of the State of Uttaranchal was made a party, the said party was never served. The only respondent which was heard was the State of U.P. which had no stake in the matter at all since all of the writ petitioners before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court were employees of the State of Uttaranchal on the relevant date. It is, therefore, evident that the relevant material was not placed before the Allahabad High Court for the purpose of deciding the writ petition. Accordingly, the permission had to be taken from this Court by the present appellants to prefer the SLPs.” These directions are authorities for the proposition that only that court will have jurisdiction within which the entire cause of action had arisen. In this case, no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 13. Accordingly, the permission had to be taken from this Court by the present appellants to prefer the SLPs.” These directions are authorities for the proposition that only that court will have jurisdiction within which the entire cause of action had arisen. In this case, no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 13. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma area within the State of Jharkhand, we are of the opinion that only because the head office of the appellant Company was situated in the State of West Bengal, the same by itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court, particularly when the head office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the respondent.” However the apex court in case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 held that if a small fraction of the cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the high court the high court assumes the territorial jurisdiction but the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the high court to decide the matter on merit but in appropriate cases the high court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum convenience. The petitioner in WP no. 7728(w) of 2010 was served with a show-cause notice at the place of his posting at Gauhati; the reply to the said show-cause notice was also submitted by the petitioner at Gauhati and the enquiry was conducted by the officer stationed at Gauhati and the order of dismissal was received by the petitioner at Gauhati. Therefore no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The petitioner in WP no. 9048 (w) of 2010 was posted at Manipur and was sent under the specialized programme to Shirpuri in the state of Madhya Pradesh the alleged act of misconduct occurred at Shirpuri and the order of dismissal was served upon the petitioner at Gwalior. Therefore no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this high court. The petitioner in WP no. Therefore no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this high court. The petitioner in WP no. 7724(w) of 2010 received the order of dismissal at his residence while posted at Hazaribag, Jharkhand the enquiry was conducted at Hazaribag and the order of dismissal was passed at Hazaribag and as such the communication of the order of dismissal at the residence of the petitioner does not constitute the cause of action amenable to be challenged before this court. All the writ petitions have been found not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. Therefore there is no occasion on the part of this court to consider the said writ petitions on merit. The petitioners are not precluded from assailing and/or challenging aforesaid orders before the proper court. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. However there shall be no order as to costs.