ORDER 1. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants-State and the learned counsel for the respondent-employees in this bunch of writ appeals. 2. This bunch of writ appeals involve the same issue. In some of the cases employees were classified as permanent employees against particular posts by the Labour Court and in some of the case they were so classified by the employer itself. 3. In cases where the employees were classified by the Labour Courts, the State Government, which is the employer, did not challenge the classification by perferring any writ petition. And, in cases where they were classified by the employer itself, obviously, there was no question of challenge to the classification. 4. The respondent-workmen were classified as permanent employees in accordance with the Rule 2 of the M.P. Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Rules, 1963 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Standing Orders']. Since the orders of Classification were not challenged by the employer-State, therefore, the classification of the employees as permanent employees has attained finality, and is no longer open to challenge in these appeals. 5. The employees approached this Court by way of writ petitions claiming regular pay-scales attached to the posts on which they had been classified as permanent employees. By the impugned orders the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions and directed the employer-State to grant regular pay-scales to the employees as applicable to the post on which they had been classified as permanent employees in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders. 6. The issue involved before the learned Single Judge was only about the consequences of the classification of an employee. The classification of the employee itself was beyond the purview of the writ petition, because it had not been challenged by the employer. 7. In these appeals the employer-State has relied upon certain decisions of the Supreme Court of which the decisions rendered in M.P State Ago Industrial Development Corporation and another v.S.c. Pandey, reported in 2006 (2) Vidhi Bhaswar 786 = (2006) 2 SCC 716 and Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd., reported in (2007) 1 SCC 533 are the main cases. 8.
7. In these appeals the employer-State has relied upon certain decisions of the Supreme Court of which the decisions rendered in M.P State Ago Industrial Development Corporation and another v.S.c. Pandey, reported in 2006 (2) Vidhi Bhaswar 786 = (2006) 2 SCC 716 and Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd., reported in (2007) 1 SCC 533 are the main cases. 8. We find that the consideration of the consequences flowing from the unchallenged orders of classification in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is based upon a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of State of M.P. and others v. Hariram and others, reported in 2008 (3) JLJ 41 = 2008 (3) MPLJ 517 . Although in that decision the case reported in Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd. (supra) has not been considered, but the case of M.P. State Agro Industrial Development Corporation (supra) has been considered. We do not find any such difference in the aforesaid two Supreme Court decisions which would call for a departure from the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Hariram and others (supra). 9. Normally if an employee is classified as a permanent employee against a particular post, he should be entitled to all the benefits of that post unless, as held by the Supreme Court, such benefits are excluded either by contract between the employer and employee or by operation of some law. No such contractual or legal restriction has been brought to our notice. 10. Whether an employee comes by way of normal recruitment process or through the process of classification, the fact remains that both i.e. the normally recruited employee and a classified employee work on the same post and performs the same duties. It cannot be held that the classification has any less effect or force as compared to the normal process of appointment, because the classification is also based upon the law in the form of Standing Orders and as such both employees who have been brought into service through either of the two processes permitted by law, as permanent employees against a particular post, should be entitled to the same benefits.
Taking a contrary view would mean that the employees inducted through classification process would be saddled with an undesirable disability throughout their service, as compared to other employees which may tantamount to violation of the principle of "equal pay for equal work". 11. For the aforementioned reasons, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 12. Accordingly, the writ appeals are dismissed.