Judgment : Dr. Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J. Aggrieved by the continuance of an order of suspension the petitioner has filed the present writ petition inter alia praying for a writ of Mandamus commanding the respondent No.- 3 herein to cancel and rescind the impugned office order, dated March 17, 2004 and to reinstate the petitioner to service and for other ancillary reliefs. The petitioner was appointed to the post of W.T.A. by the West Bengal State Minor Irrigation Corporation Ltd., a state government undertaking. While the petitioner was working under the said authority, on the basis of a written complaint, lodged with the Ashok Nagar Police Station which was treated as a First Information Report, the petitioner and five others were arrested in connection with a case under Ss. 363/366/372 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was arrested by the police on February 15, 2004. Later he was forwarded to the court of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Barasat. The police started investigation and a special case was started against them. On March 16, 2004, the learned Sessions Judge, Special Court, Barasat, released the petitioner on bail. On March 17, 2004, the respondent No.-3 herein issued an office order placing the petitioner under suspension with effect from February 15, 2004 in terms of the Regulation 52 (III) under Chapter X of the West Bengal State Minor Irrigation Corporation Service Regulations 1980 (the Regulations, for short). He was placed under suspension until further orders. It is the grievance of the petitioner that after he had been released on bail more than five years have elapsed and no disciplinary proceeding has been initiated and the petitioner has also not been reinstated to service. On behalf of the petitioner his learned Advocate had written a letter to the Managing Director, West Bengal State Minor Irrigation Corporation Ltd. on January 7, 2001 inter alia praying for reinstating the petitioner to service forthwith. This has been annexed to the petition as Annexure P-4. The authorities, however, decided to remain silent. In the petition the case made out by the petitioner was that after acquittal by the court of law non-withdrawal of suspension order by itself was a violation of law and the same is liable to be quashed. This inaction on the part of the authority has been challenged in this writ petition. The authorities, however, decided to remain silent. In the petition the case made out by the petitioner was that after acquittal by the court of law non-withdrawal of suspension order by itself was a violation of law and the same is liable to be quashed. This inaction on the part of the authority has been challenged in this writ petition. On behalf of the respondents No.-2 and 3 the Managing Director of the Corporation has affirmed an Affidavit-in-Opposition. In the affidavit it has been specifically stated that immediately after the arrest of the petitioner he was placed under suspension until further orders in terms of Regulation 52 (III) under Chapter X of the Regulations of the Corporation. It has been specifically averred that the petitioner is on bail and has not been exonerated from the criminal charge. The criminal proceeding against the petitioner is still pending. The stand taken by the respondent is that they are not duty bound to reinstate the petitioner in service due to the pendency the criminal proceeding against him and in terms of the relevant Regulation mentioned above. The respondents have annexed to their affidavit a copy of the relevant portion of the West Bengal State Minor Irrigation Corporation Service Regulations 1980. To this affidavit the petitioner has used an Affidavit-in-Reply. In the affidavit he has inter alia stated that he has discharged his duties in the Corporation since 1979. It is his case that he and others have been made accused in a police case arising out of village politics and has been falsely implicated. The order of suspension impugned is not related to his official status or assignment. He has not been charge-sheeted nor any disciplinary proceeding against him has been initiated by the administrative authority. His contention is that a permanent employee cannot be kept under suspension for an indefinite period and the employer also cannot adopt a dilatory tactics to victimize the employee. He has admitted that the appointing authority has the power to suspend an employee under the relevant Regulation when he is under custody for a period exceeding 48 hours under any law proceeding for preventive detention pending drawl of the proceedings against an employee. The order of suspension was issued when then petitioner was already enlarged on bail. Apparently the petitioner has been placed under suspension in terms of Regulation No.-52 (III) of the Regulations, 1980. The order of suspension was issued when then petitioner was already enlarged on bail. Apparently the petitioner has been placed under suspension in terms of Regulation No.-52 (III) of the Regulations, 1980. Regulation 52 (III) reads as follows: An employee of the Corporation who is detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours under any law providing for preventive detention or as a result of a proceeding either on criminal charge or otherwise, shall be deemed to have been suspended by an order of the appointing authority with effect from the date of his detention and shall remain under suspension until further orders. An employee of this Corporation who is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment shall also be dealt with in the same manner, pending decision on the disciplinary action to be taken against him. This portion of the Regulation, as stated before, has been annexed to the Affidavit-in-Opposition of the respondents No.-2 and 3. This has been authenticated by the Managing Director of the Corporation who himself has affirmed the affidavit. The petitioner in the reply has nowhere doubted the authenticity of the said Regulation. Therefore, this may be taken to be the correct Regulation governing the field. Regulation 52 (III) inter alia clearly postulates that when an employee of the Corporation is detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours under any law providing for preventive detention or as a result of a proceeding either on a criminal charge or otherwise, he shall be deemed to have been suspended by an order of the appointing authority with effect from the date of his detention and shall remain as such until further orders. Thus, it is clear that the relevant regulation contains the provision for a deemed suspension in case of detention of an employee in the custody for a period exceeding 48 hours. The order of suspension which was issued subsequently placed the petitioner under suspension retrospectively from the date of his arrest. In the case of a deemed suspension an employee is automatically deemed to be under suspension the moment the period of 48 hours in custody is completed. The order of suspension which was issued subsequently placed the petitioner under suspension retrospectively from the date of his arrest. In the case of a deemed suspension an employee is automatically deemed to be under suspension the moment the period of 48 hours in custody is completed. The Supreme Court in the cases of Union of India-vs.- Rajib Kumar with Union of India – vs.- Bani Singh, reported in A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 2917, interpreted the scope and ambit of Rule 10 (2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rule, 1965 vis-à-vis the other provisions of the said Rule. The said Rule 10 (2) also contains a provision for deemed suspension in case of custodial detention exceeding 48 hours. Rule 10 (2) is pari materia the provisions in Regulation 52 (III) of the present case except that the former does not contain the prescription that the employee shall remain under suspension until further orders as occurring in Regulation 52 (III). It was argued before the Supreme Court that the order of suspension was effective for the period of detention since the expression until further order was omitted consciously. Rejecting such contention, the Supreme Court held that Rule 10 (2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rule, 1965, is a deemed provision and created a legal fiction. An actual order is not required to be passed which is deemed to have been passed by operation of the legal fiction. The Supreme Court also rejected the plea that the order of suspension is effective for the period of detention in view of the provisions contained in Sub-Rules (5) (a) and (5) (c) of the Rule 10. Rule 10 (5) (a) provides that the order of suspension shall continue to remain in force until modified or revoked by competent authority. And Rule 10 (5) (c) empowers the competent authority to modify or revoke the order of suspension. In view of these provisions the Supreme Court held that the order of suspension does not lose its efficacy and is not automatically terminated the moment the detention comes to an end and the person is set at large. Until the order of suspension is modified or revoked by another order the same continues and the employee has no right to be re-instated to service. The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court squarely applies to facts of the case in hand. Until the order of suspension is modified or revoked by another order the same continues and the employee has no right to be re-instated to service. The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court squarely applies to facts of the case in hand. In fact, it applies with greater force as Regulation 52 (III) clearly postulates that an employee shall remain under suspension until further orders. As such the question of automatic lifting of the suspension with the release of the employee on bail does not arise. In the case of BirbhumDistrict Primary School Council –vs.- Md. Mokhatar Hossain, reported in 2009 (I) C.H.N. 476 a Division Bench of this court had to deal with a similar problem. There a head teacher of a primary school was arrested in connection with a complaint and remained in detention for about five months. He was placed under suspension citing his detention in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours. Their Lordships held in that case : The plain words of sub-rule 7(2) of the 2001 Rules can only be understood to continue the suspension that began by virtue of the deeming provision till a further order in that regard is made. To infer that the sub-rule discontinues the suspension on cessation of detention would be to plant words therein and imply casus missus when there is no case of strong necessity to presume the inadvertence in the drafting of the sub-rule. A concern for the manner in which such provision may be relied upon, or misused, should not be a consideration in construing the plain words of the sub-rule or prompt a strained construction thereof. Their Lordships further held : But the fact that Rule 7 (2) of the 2001 Rules leaves open a possibility that an order of suspension that started by virtue of the deeming provision could be allowed to linger indefinitely by mere inaction on the part of the appointing authority, is not a relevant consideration in how the provision may be construed. As has also been held in the said judgment that merely because a suspension that commenced under a legal fiction continues for a long period would not invalidate the suspension or lead to any conclusion that the duration of the suspension stipulated in that rule is till the release of the suspended employee following the detention. As has also been held in the said judgment that merely because a suspension that commenced under a legal fiction continues for a long period would not invalidate the suspension or lead to any conclusion that the duration of the suspension stipulated in that rule is till the release of the suspended employee following the detention. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has relied on a single-judge decision of this court in Tarun Kumar Chakrabnorty –vs.- State and Others, reported in 2006 (1) C.L.J. (Cal) 147. It is true that it was held in that case that if there was no departmental proceeding initiated against the petitioner the order of suspension could not remain and it stood withdrawn after one year automatically. However, the facts of that case were entirely different from the one in hand. In that case a school teacher was suspended in March, 2004. The relevant provision of the Management Rules empowers the management of the school to suspend a teacher or an employee where such suspension is in the interest of the institution pending drawl of proceedings against the person concerned within ninety days from the date of suspension. The rule further proceeds that this order of suspension shall automatically stand withdrawn if the proceedings are not drawn within a period of ninety days and under no circumstances the time limit shall be waived beyond the limit of one year. It was in view of the said provision that the learned single judge held that in the absence of any departmental proceeding the suspension could not continue beyond a period of one year. Thus the factual situation as well as the provisions of law being totally different from those in hand this judgment is of no assistance to the petitioner. Thus applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and followed by the Division Bench of our court, as discussed earlier, it can also be held that merely because the petitioner has been enlarged on bail does not mean that he has to be allowed to resume his duties. Thus applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and followed by the Division Bench of our court, as discussed earlier, it can also be held that merely because the petitioner has been enlarged on bail does not mean that he has to be allowed to resume his duties. The writ petition is disposed of by directing the respondent No.- 3 to consider the representation, dated January 7, 2010, made by the writ petitioner’s learned Advocate and annexed to the writ petition as Annexure P-4, and dispose of the same by a speaking order within a period of four weeks from the date of the communication of the order. There will be no order as to costs.