Judgment : 1. These review petitions are directed against the common judgment and order dated July 23, 2004 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court, whereby His Lordship was pleased to dismiss three revisional applications (C.O. Nos.1779 to 1781 of 1999) under Article 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner. In the revisional applications, the petitioner impugned separate but more or less identical judgments and orders dated March 12, 1999 passed by the Additional District Judge, 2nd Court, Hooghly on Misc. Appeal Nos. 108 to 110 of 1989, whereby the judgments and orders under appeal dated August 26, 1989 passed by the learned Munsif, 2nd Court, Arambagh on J. Misc. Case Nos. 110 to 112 of 1980 were set aside and, consequently, the applications under Section 8, West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereafter the Act) filed by the petitioner stood dismissed. 2. The short point that arose for decision before the learned Munsif was whether an application under Section 8 of the Act at the instance of the petitioner, a co-sharer of un-partitioned land adjoining the land transferred, was maintainable or not. The learned Munsif recorded a finding that the “adjoining lands possessed by the petitioner have longer common boundary than the adjoining lands possessed by the opposite parties” and allowed the applications based on the view “that the possession of one co-sharer will be deemed to be the possession of other co-sharers”. The learned Additional District Judge reversed the judgments and orders under appeal relying on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Smt. Rekha Rani Maity & ors. v. Jagatpati Sashmal : 1995 WBLR (Cal) 263, wherein His Lordship held that when there is no partition, it cannot be held that the pre-emptor are holding land adjoining the land transferred. 3. Dr. Indrajit Mandal, learned advocate for the petitioner contended that while dismissing the revisional applications, His Lordship did not notice the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Smt. Bula Kundu v. Sri Nirmal Kumar Kundu and anr. 3. Dr. Indrajit Mandal, learned advocate for the petitioner contended that while dismissing the revisional applications, His Lordship did not notice the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Smt. Bula Kundu v. Sri Nirmal Kumar Kundu and anr. : 2000 (1) CHN 505 , wherein the decision in Rekha Rani Maity (supra) was considered and it was ruled that in an application for pre-emption on the ground of adjoining ownership, it is not necessary that the applicant must be the full owner of the adjoining holding; even a co-sharer of the adjoining holding may apply for pre-emption. According to him, this decision was directly on the issue raised by the petitioner and, therefore, the impugned judgment and order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record for which it ought to be reviewed and the revisional applications reheard. The Court’s attention was also invited to the decision in Ramgati Khan v. Gobinda Chandra Khan : 2006 (4) CHN 328 , wherein another learned single Judge of this Court held that the objection raised to the effect that the pre-emptor being a co owner of the contiguous plot cannot exercise his right of pre-emption cannot be sustained in view of the decision in Bula Kundu (supra). 4. The decision of the Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket, India and another v. Netaji Cricket Club and others : AIR 2005 SC 592 was also relied on by him in support of the proposition that the words “sufficient reason” in Order 47 Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code (hereafter the Code) is wide enough to include a misconception of law or fact by a Court and an application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’. 5. He, accordingly, prayed for setting aside of the impugned judgment and order on review and for re-hearing of the revisional applications. 6. The review petitions were opposed by Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior advocate for the opposite parties. He contended that the grounds urged by the petitioner in support of the prayer for review do not attract the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code and, therefore, the petitions are liable to be dismissed. 6. The review petitions were opposed by Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior advocate for the opposite parties. He contended that the grounds urged by the petitioner in support of the prayer for review do not attract the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code and, therefore, the petitions are liable to be dismissed. According to him, no case of discovery of new or important matter or evidence has been set up by the petitioner which, in spite of exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him when the revisional applications were dismissed by the judgment and order under review. Additionally, it was urged that the petitions do not show the error or mistake apparent on the face of the record with any degree of clarity. Failure of the learned advocate representing a party to bring to the Court’s notice a decision that is relevant and material for a decision on the issue raised, he argued, is not a ground for review under Order 47 Rule 1 and, thus, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief based on the decision in Bula Kundu (supra). That apart, it was submitted that the decision in Ramgati Khan (supra) was rendered after the judgment and order under review was delivered and, therefore, the same can be of no assistance to the petitioner having regard to the explanation in Rule 1 of Order 47. 7. Regarding the Court’s power to review its own judgment and/or order, Mr. Chakraborty relied on the decisions in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and another v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and ors. : AIR 1954 SC 526 , Smt. Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury : AIR 1995 SC 455 , Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi : (1997) 8 SCC 715 , and Tarapada Dey ors. v. Amitava Dey : 2009 (3) CHN 798 . Based thereon, he submitted that this Court cannot be called upon by the petitioner, in the guise of a review petition, to convert itself into a Court of appeal and to re-hear the merits of the matter on the ground that if the revisional applications had been considered by it initially, it could have taken the other view or even a contra view. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. Chakraborty invited the Court’s attention to the decision in State of West Bengal and others v. Kamal Sengupta and another : (2008) 8 SCC 612 , wherein the earlier decision in Netaji Cricket Club (supra) came up for consideration. Referring to paragraph 52 of the decision, he submitted that the Supreme Court doubted the proposition of law laid down in the earlier decision and ultimately ruled that the observation in paragraph 93 thereof must be treated as confined to the fact of the case involving the controversy between the rival cricket associations. Emphasis was laid on paragraph 22 of the decision by him, wherein connotation of the term “mistake or error apparent” was explained. 9. Mr. Chakraborty lastly cited the decision in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh : AIR 1989 SC 1933 for the proposition that it was not open to the learned Judge deciding Bula Kundu (supra) to decide the correctness or otherwise of the view expressed in Rekha Rani Maity (supra). 10. He, accordingly, urged that no review is permissible on facts and in the circumstances of the present case on the basis of the ruling in Netaji Cricket Club (supra), and prayed for dismissal of the review petitions. 11. There can be no two opinions that jurisdiction of the Court while hearing a review petition is limited and a review does not lie to correct a wrong decision. The aggrieved must in such case avail the remedy of appeal, if available. No decision has been placed before this Court, having the effect of a binding precedent, which lays down the law that if attention of the Court dealing with the matter is not drawn to a previous decision that is binding on it and a judgment and/or order is passed in ignorance thereof, the same would constitute a ground for review. It is humanly impossible for a judge to know all previous decisions on the point and if a previous binding decision is not drawn to the judge’s notice, which could persuade him to follow the same, it is the party who did not cite such previous decision favorable to him who must take the blame of not assisting the judge effectively. A judicial decision, rendered previous to the judgment and/or order under review, is not new material within the meaning of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code. A judicial decision, rendered previous to the judgment and/or order under review, is not new material within the meaning of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code. Merely because the decision in Bula Kundu (supra) was not considered while the revisional applications were dismissed is not considered to be sufficient ground to review the judgment and order dated July 23, 2004. This Court quite agrees with the decision of the Delhi High Court in Sanjeev Sarin and another v. Smt. Rita Wadhwa and ors. : 2002 AIHC 628 holding that Order 47 Rule 1 refers to evidence or other matters in the nature of evidence and not the legal authority that was not brought to the notice of the Court on the given date, and the Bench decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in National Insurance Co. v. Sultan Asim and anr. : 2005 AIHC 1616, wherein it was held that a judgment rendered in ignorance of a binding decision of the Court cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record nor can it be said to be discovery of new material. 12. The impugned judgment and order bears no reflection of consideration of the amended provisions of Sections 8 and 2(6) of the Act introduced by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 2000 (hereafter the Amendment Act), which were to operate retrospectively from August 7, 1969, whereby a co-sharer of an adjoining land is entitled to seek pre-emption. However, having regard to the ground that was urged in support of review on the merits of the impugned judgment and order, this Court is in agreement with Mr. Chakraborty that the petitioner has not been able to set up any case for review thereof under Section 114 of the Code read with Order 47 Rule 1 thereof. 13. In course of hearing the review petitions, however, one aspect that shocked the Court’s conscience was the absence of any reason in the impugned judgment and order supporting dismissal of the revisional applications. 13. In course of hearing the review petitions, however, one aspect that shocked the Court’s conscience was the absence of any reason in the impugned judgment and order supporting dismissal of the revisional applications. It had been argued by the learned advocate for the petitioner before His Lordship that in view of the amended definition of the term “co-sharer of a raiyat in a plot of land” in Section 2(6) of the Act, taking effect retrospectively from August 7, 1969, the petitioner was entitled to be treated as co-sharer of the plots of land, which had been transferred to the opposite parties and, as such co-sharer, he could maintain the applications under Section 8. The impugned judgment and order, running into 5 (five) pages, records the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner and those raised on behalf of the opposite parties together with the decisions cited on their behalf covering up to half of page 5. Thereafter, His Lordship proceeded to observe as under: “Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that on a simple reading of the definition in Section 26 [sic Section 2(6)] wherein co-sharer of a raiyat in a plot has been defined which means a person other than the raiyat who an (sic) undemarcated interest in the plot of land along with the raiyat. He goes on urging that this change of word ‘plot’ in respect of holding used in the aforesaid amendment which can be enforced with retrospective effect since 7.8.69 helps him a lot which I am of the view that cannot find favour with this Court as the definition is of no avail to the petitioner in any way and that it cannot be simply said that the impugned order of the First Appellate Court does not suffer from any material illegality calling for any interference. Revision petition, accordingly, dismissed. This order does govern in respect of the other two revision petitions.” 14. Noticing absence of any reason in the impugned judgment and order, which could perhaps be characterized as a serious mistake or grave error as one might call it, this Court had called upon Mr. Chakraborty to advance argument as to why in exercise of the inherent power of Court the impugned judgment and order shall not be set aside. 15. Mr. Chakraborty to advance argument as to why in exercise of the inherent power of Court the impugned judgment and order shall not be set aside. 15. Mr. Chakraborty referred to the decisions in Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee : AIR 1970 SC 997 , Patel Narshi Thakershi and ors. v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji : AIR 1970 SC 1273 , and Lily Thomas v. Union of India : (2000) 6 SCC 224 in support of his argument that inherent jurisdiction of the Court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed without involving inherent jurisdiction and that a Court has no inherent power to review its own judgment/order under Section 151 of the Code; the power of review, if at all, has to be exercised within the narrow confines of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code and under no other provision. 16. He also sought to sustain the impugned judgment and order by arguing that since His Lordship was affirming the judgments and orders of the lower appellate Court, elaborate reasons were not required to be given. Reference in this connection was made to the decision in Girijanandini Devi and others v.Bijendra Narain Choudhary : AIR 1967 SC 1124 , wherein it was observed as follows: “12. ***It is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice.” 17. The decision in K. Venkataramiah v. Seetharama Reddy : AIR 1963 SC 1526 was also relied on by him, wherein it was ruled that non-recording of any reason by the High Court for admitting additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code would not vitiate such admission. 18. Before the submission of Mr. Chakraborty to the effect that even in exercise of inherent power the impugned judgment and order cannot be reviewed exercises this Court’s consideration, it would be profitable to advert to certain basic principles of law. 19. Scott, L.J. attempted to define the words “judicial decision” and “quasijudicial decision” in the decision in Cooper v. Wilson : (1937) 2 KB 309. Chakraborty to the effect that even in exercise of inherent power the impugned judgment and order cannot be reviewed exercises this Court’s consideration, it would be profitable to advert to certain basic principles of law. 19. Scott, L.J. attempted to define the words “judicial decision” and “quasijudicial decision” in the decision in Cooper v. Wilson : (1937) 2 KB 309. The relevant passage reads thus: “A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites: (1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by the parties, and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law. A quasi-judicial decision equally presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and involves (1) and (2), but does not necessarily involve (3) and never involves (4). The place of (4) is in fact taken by administrative action, the character of which is determined by the Ministers free choice.” 20. A judicial decision rendered by a civil Court at the lowest level, not being a Court of Small Causes, which fulfills the character of a judgment as defined in Section 2(9) of the Code, must contain all the requisites (1) to (4) supra. This is also the statutory mandate as ordained by Order 20 Rule 4(2) and Rule 5 of the Code. Insofar as exercise of appellate jurisdiction is concerned, a judgment must conform to the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code. In exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court under Section 115 of the Code or the District Court under Section 115A of the Code, as applicable to the State of West Bengal, is empowered to make such order in the case as it thinks fit. The requirement to record reasons in support of its order, it is noticed, is absent. In exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court under Section 115 of the Code or the District Court under Section 115A of the Code, as applicable to the State of West Bengal, is empowered to make such order in the case as it thinks fit. The requirement to record reasons in support of its order, it is noticed, is absent. Does it mean that the High Court or the District Court need not record reasons in support of its order that it makes while exercising revisional jurisdiction? The question must be answered in the negative. The requirement to record reasons in support of an order made on a revision petition is not excluded in the Code, either expressly or by necessary implication, and therefore, such requirement has to be read into the provisions of Section 115, a fortiorari, also in Section 115A thereof. In all fairness, an order passed by the High Court or the District Court exercising power of revision, even if it may not contain the history of the case, every minute detail of what has been argued by advocates for the parties, and reappreciation and re-assessment of evidence [unless finding(s) on factual aspect(s) returned by the inferior Court are considered to be perverse, and finding(s) on such factual aspect(s) require to be recorded), it must contain the decision of the judge (meaning thereby the rational relation between the matters considered and the conclusions reached) disposing of the whole matter including wherever required, declaring what the law is. Howsoever brief the decision might be, a reading thereof must reveal the reasons that prompted the judge to accept one view in preference to the other view, and thereby decide the fate of the parties before him. That the judge has applied the extant law to the proven facts suggesting application of mind must be reflected. This process, if followed while writing a judgment, would rule out subjectivity and ensure objectivity. Recording of reasons by the Court for its decision is thus one of the fundamental principles on which the judicial system in this country is structured. 21. This process, if followed while writing a judgment, would rule out subjectivity and ensure objectivity. Recording of reasons by the Court for its decision is thus one of the fundamental principles on which the judicial system in this country is structured. 21. Brother Sanjib Banerjee, J. in simple and clear language has formulated the twin tests of “why” and “what” that a judicial decision invariably must meet, the “why” connoting the ‘reason’ for sustaining the “what”, which is the ‘conclusion’ [see In the matter of : Uniworth Resorts Limited, (2008) 1 CAL LT 1 (HC)]. 22. The necessity to record reasons in a judicial order has been emphasized in a catena of Supreme Court decisions. One may only refer to some of such decisions. 23. Reason in a judicial order is considered to be its heartbeat and without the same, the order is lifeless [see State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar : (2004) 5 SCC 568 ]. 24. The Supreme Court in its decision in Cyril Lasrado v. Juliana Maria Lasrado : (2004) 7 SCC 431, while examining an unreasoned order passed by the High Court in exercise of power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution, had the occasion to observe that reasons introduce clarity in an order and on plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of its mind. 25. Any discussion on the issue of necessity to record reasons would be incomplete without reference to a decision of recent origin in Kranti Associates Private Limited v. Masood Ahmed Khan : (2010) 9 SCC 496, authored by Hon’ble Asok Kumar Ganguly, J. The principles were succinctly summed up thus : “47. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion hasbeen exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or ‘rubber-stamp reasons’ is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor, (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731737). (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor, (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731737). (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain, (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA), wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, ‘adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions’. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of ‘due process’.” 26. The position in law is not at all different when a High Court judge exercises power under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power of judicial superintendence that a judge of the High Court exercises there under is not an all pervasive power that can be exercised at the drop of a hat. It is within self imposed limitations that the power is exercised. Whether it is an order rejecting or allowing an application, the Court must, howsoever briefly, indicate its mind as to why it considers it unnecessary/necessary to interfere. The reason(s) assigned would establish the link between the mind of the judge to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at by him. 27. Recording of reasons would also serve one other salutary purpose. While deciding matters that surface, the High Court ought to adopt a holistic approach of leading by example. Unreasoned orders passed by the subordinate Courts and Tribunals are an anathema to securing justice and when questioned in petitions under Articles 226 or 227, are viewed by the High Court with displeasure, and at times with suspicion. One area of concern is that despite arranging legal education courses through the aegis of the Judicial Academies to equip the judicial officers with all the modern techniques for discharging judicial duty effectively and in the process to ensure better administration of justice, the basics of delivering justice at times are forgotten. One area of concern is that despite arranging legal education courses through the aegis of the Judicial Academies to equip the judicial officers with all the modern techniques for discharging judicial duty effectively and in the process to ensure better administration of justice, the basics of delivering justice at times are forgotten. It is not an uncommon feature for High Court judges to deliver lectures in the Judicial Academies stressing on the need for delivering quality judgments. What ought to be borne in mind by a judicial officer to deliver quality judgments need not be dilated here. But one of the focal points of imparting lessons in this respect invariably is the necessity to pass reasoned judgments/orders. There can be no greater disservice to the people and the institution if we, as High Court judges, do not practice what we preach. It does the judiciary no good by acting as super-lords by merely setting forth what the arguments advanced were and accepting the arguments of one of the litigating parties without even expending a single sentence standing for the “why”. It would set a dangerous trend if judicial officers, noticing absence of reasons in judgments/orders passed by the High Court, feel encouraged to follow suit. In fact, disposal of an application for injunction or applications for addition of party/amendment of pleadings by mechanical chant of statutorily sanctified phrases has caught the attention of this Court many a time. It is experienced that a good number of applications are filed challenging unreasoned orders, resulting in addition to the already bursting docket. In the circumstances, it is unthinkable that while writing judgments/orders, a judge of the High Court would enjoy the liberty of writing unreasoned judgments/orders while upholding or criticizing judgments/orders of judicial officers. The occasional aberrations, as and when brought to the Court’s notice, ought to be immediately interdicted and remedied to promote justice. 28. The ratio of the decisions in Girijanandini Devi (supra) and K. Venkataramiah (supra) cited by Mr. Chakraborty do not lend any assistance to him. Insofar as the former decision is concerned, the ratio is not applicable here because the point that was raised before His Lordship could not have been raised before the lower appellate Court, the Act having been amended in 2000. Chakraborty do not lend any assistance to him. Insofar as the former decision is concerned, the ratio is not applicable here because the point that was raised before His Lordship could not have been raised before the lower appellate Court, the Act having been amended in 2000. There was thus no question of affirming the judgment and order of the lower appellate Court by generally concurring therewith, without considering whether the amended provisions of the Act were at all applicable or not. A new point based on the Amendment Act having been raised, it ought to have exercised the consideration of His Lordship and dealt with, with the seriousness and attention it deserved and not in the casual manner in which it was dealt, as reflected supra. Regarding the latter decision, the Supreme Court construed “shall” in Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code as not being mandatory. The requirement to record reasons in support of a judicial decision, over the years, has been recognized to be a duty on the part of the Court and, therefore, this decision is of no help to him. 29. At this stage, it would be worthwhile to note the recent shift regarding requirement to record brief reasons even in appellate orders confirming orders under challenge. One may usefully refer to the decisions in Divl. Forest Officer v. Madhusudhan Rao : (2008) 3 SCC 469 , and Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney : (2009) 4 SCC 240 . In the latter decision, it was held as follows: “5. In our opinion, an order of affirmation need not contain as elaborate reasons as an order of reversal, but that does not mean that the order of affirmation need not contain any reasons whatsoever. In fact, the said decision in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Prabhu Dayal Grover, (1995) 6 SCC 279 , has itself stated that the appellate order should disclose application of mind. Whether there was an application of mind or not can only be disclosed by some reasons, at least in brief, mentioned in the order of the appellate authority. Hence, we cannot accept the proposition that an order of affirmation need not contain any reasons at all. Whether there was an application of mind or not can only be disclosed by some reasons, at least in brief, mentioned in the order of the appellate authority. Hence, we cannot accept the proposition that an order of affirmation need not contain any reasons at all. That order must contain some reasons, at least in brief, so that one can know whether the appellate authority has applied its mind while affirming the order of the disciplinary authority.” 30. Having regard to the expanding horizons of the necessity to record reasons, this Court is unable to accept Mr. Chakraborty’s contention that an appellate judgment/order need not even contain brief reasons, if it affirms the order under challenge. 31. Borrowing wisdom from the decision in Uniworth (supra), it has to be held that there is no element of “why” for the “what” in the impugned judgment and order to stand on and to be fair to Mr. Chakraborty, he did not seek to join issue. 32. Now the crux of the matter, i.e. whether for non-recording of reason the impugned judgment and order deserves to be recalled in exercise of inherent power needs to be considered. 33. What are inherent powers of a Court? The origin of the rule of inherent powers may be traced to the maxim “quadolex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo ipsa, ess uon potest”. It means that when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist [see Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary : (1992) 4 SCC 305 ]. 34. In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd. : (1996) 5 SCC 550 , the Supreme Court explained what inherent powers are, that are preserved by Section 151 of the Code. Relevant passage from the decision reads thus: “22.***Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behavior. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the courts business. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behavior. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the courts business. 23.*** Similarly, where the court is misled by a party or the court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the court has the inherent power to recall its order.***” (emphasis supplied) 35. Section 151 of the Code saves the inherent power of the civil Courts to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of Court. The power is unrestricted and undefined and, therefore, needs to be exercised with care, caution and circumspection and not capriciously or arbitrarily. Its exercise should only be in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae, on sound principles to ensure that real and substantial justice is administered for which alone the Courts exist. 36. That review of a judgment and/or order may be applied for and obtained on the merits thereof if any of the conditions mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code is fulfilled, is not res Integra. At the same time, a judgment/order which apparently appears to be perfectly justified on the merits of the matter before the Court, may also be reviewed not in exercise of power of review conferred by statute but in exercise of the power of procedural review, which is inherent in every Court of plenary jurisdiction, if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the decision suffers from a procedural impropriety striking at its root. 37. In support of the above view, one may usefully refer to the decision in Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Birla Cotton Spg. and Wng. Mills Ltd. : (2005) 13 SCC 777 . It was observed therein as follows: “19. Applying these principles it is apparent that where a court or quasijudicial authority having jurisdiction to adjudicate on merit proceeds to do so, its judgment or order can be reviewed on merit only if the court or the quasijudicial authority is vested with power of review by express provision or by necessary implication. The procedural review belongs to a different category. The procedural review belongs to a different category. In such a review, the court or quasi-judicial authority having jurisdiction to adjudicate proceeds to do so, but in doing so commits (sic ascertains whether it has committed) a procedural illegality which goes to the root of the matter and invalidates the proceeding itself, and consequently the order passed therein. Cases where a decision is rendered by the court or quasi-judicial authority without notice to the opposite party or under a mistaken impression that the notice had been served upon the opposite party, or where a matter is taken up for hearing and decision on a date other than the date fixed for its hearing, are some illustrative cases in which the power of procedural review may be invoked. In such a case the party seeking review or recall of the order does not have to substantiate the ground that the order passed suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or any other ground which may justify a review. He has to establish that the procedure followed by the court or the quasi-judicial authority suffered from such illegality that it vitiated the proceeding and invalidated the order made therein, inasmuch as the opposite party concerned was not heard for no fault of his, or that the matter was heard and decided on a date other than the one fixed for hearing of the matter which he could not attend for no fault of his. In such cases, therefore, the matter has to be reheard in accordance with law without going into the merit of the order passed. The order passed is liable to be recalled and reviewed not because it is found to be erroneous, but because it was passed in a proceeding which was itself vitiated by an error of procedure or mistake which went to the root of the matter and invalidated the entire proceeding. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 Supp SCC 420, it was held that once it is established that the respondents were prevented from appearing at the hearing due to sufficient cause, it followed that the matter must be reheard and decided again.” (underlining for emphasis) 38. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 Supp SCC 420, it was held that once it is established that the respondents were prevented from appearing at the hearing due to sufficient cause, it followed that the matter must be reheard and decided again.” (underlining for emphasis) 38. A judicial decision that does not record any reason at all in support of the conclusion reached therein, in the considered view of this Court, is one other case which ought to fit in the illustrative cases discussed by the Supreme Court in Kapra Mozdoor Ekta Union (supra). Being bereft of reason, such decision is in breach of the principles of natural justice and, therefore, constitutes a procedural error or mistake. To assign reasons is one of the fundamentals of the justice dispensation system and any failure in this behalf has the result of denying justice to the party against whom the decision is rendered. In such case, the party losing the cause is unable to know why the arguments advanced on his behalf did not appeal to the judge to be credit-worthy. However, it is important to distinguish a judicial decision absolutely without any reason and that which contains at least some reason, the adequacy or the sufficiency whereof cannot be scrutinized in exercise of the power of procedural review. 39. This being the legal position, would this Court be unjustified in exercise of its inherent power to recall the impugned judgment and order to prevent injustice to a party? 40. Answer to this question is found in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka : 1993 (4) Supp SCC 595, wherein the Supreme Court held that an order passed by it under mistake could be recalled to avoid injustice. Hon’ble R.M. Sahai, J. (as His Lordship then was) in weighty words expressed as follows: “18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in administrative law as in public law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in administrative law as in public law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the mistake is of the court. In administrative law, the scope is still wider. Technicalities apart if the court is satisfied of the injustice then it is its constitutional and legal obligation to set it right by recalling its order.” (emphasis supplied) 41. The decision in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak : (1988) 2 SCC 602 is another classic example where the Supreme Court ex debito justitiae corrected a mistake committed by it earlier. 42. Hon’ble Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as His Lordship then was) held therein that an order of Court, be it administrative or judicial, which is given per incuriam and in violation of certain constitutional limitations and in derogation of the principles of natural justice, can always be remedied by the Court ex debito justitiae. The basic fundamentals of the administration of justice are that no man should suffer because of the mistake of the Court. No man should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. Rules or procedures are the handmaids of justice and not the mistress of justice. Ex debito justitiae, the Court must do justice to him. If a man has been wronged, so long as it lies within the human machinery of administration of justice, that wrong must be remedied. No man should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. Rules or procedures are the handmaids of justice and not the mistress of justice. Ex debito justitiae, the Court must do justice to him. If a man has been wronged, so long as it lies within the human machinery of administration of justice, that wrong must be remedied. In doing so, even if there are any technicalities, the Supreme Court should not feel shackled and decline to rectify that injustice or otherwise the injustice noticed will remain forever a blot on justice. 43. Hon’ble Ranganath Misra, J. (as His Lordship then was) in a concurring judgment observed that once judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was not open to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the Court, it is not only appropriate but also the duty of the Court to rectify the mistake by exercising inherent powers. Mistake of the Court can be corrected by the Court itself without any fetters. 44. This Court would wish to conclude the discussion on the topic by quoting a passage from the judgment rendered by His Lordship, which is at page 688 of the report. It reads : “To err is human, is the oft-quoted saying. Courts including the apex one are no exception. To own up the mistake when judicial satisfaction is reached does not militate against its status or authority. Perhaps it would enhance both.” 45. Inherent powers, it is said, do not confer, or constitute a source of, jurisdiction and they are to be exercised in aid of a jurisdiction that is already invested. The Courts of law discharge the judicial functions of the State. The High Court derives jurisdiction from Article 227 of the Constitution to exercise its power of superintendence over all subordinate Courts and tribunals throughout its territories. The power is not confined to administrative superintendence only but also includes the power of judicial superintendence and the Courts seek to administer justice between the litigants whenever the occasion so warrants. The High Court derives jurisdiction from Article 227 of the Constitution to exercise its power of superintendence over all subordinate Courts and tribunals throughout its territories. The power is not confined to administrative superintendence only but also includes the power of judicial superintendence and the Courts seek to administer justice between the litigants whenever the occasion so warrants. When it is brought to the notice of the High Court by a party that while exercising power of judicial superintendence it had dismissed its application and that he is groping in the dark to ascertain “why” the point urged by him did not find favour with it, would it be fair and proper to decline the prayer of such party on the specious ground that the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code are not attracted although a judicial satisfaction is reached that the same suffers from a serious mistake or a grave error? Is it not the duty of the judge who delivered the judicial decision, if he is available, or his successor judge in the High Court to rectify the mistake or error committed by the former by recalling it and hearing the matter afresh for delivering a decision in the manner it is incumbent on him in law? To the mind of this Court, no amount of technical rules of procedure can be allowed to prevail over justice. On a procedural review, the mistake or error in procedure ought to be corrected not only to advance the cause of justice but also to instill confidence in the people that the Constitution that they gave unto themselves is not being subverted. 46. This Court, accordingly, in exercise of its power of procedural review recalls the impugned judgment and order dated July 23, 2004 dismissing C.O. Nos.1779 to 1781 of 1999. The revisional applications shall be heard afresh. Put up the same for hearing in the monthly list of November, 2011. 47. In the result, R.V.W. Nos. 3101 to 3103 of 2004 stand disposed of. There shall be no order for costs. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date. LATER : Mr. Chakraborty prays for stay of operation of this order. The prayer is considered and refused. LATER : Mr. Gupta, learned senior advocate prays for staying of operation of this order. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date. LATER : Mr. Chakraborty prays for stay of operation of this order. The prayer is considered and refused. LATER : Mr. Gupta, learned senior advocate prays for staying of operation of this order. Considering such prayer, I find no reason to stay the operation of this order. The prayer for staying stands refused.