JUDGMENT Alok Aradhe, J. 1. In this appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short 'the 1996 Act'), the Appellant has called in question the legality and validity of the order dated 11-2-2010 as well as order dated 10-5-2010. 2. Facts giving rise to filing of the appeal are that the Respondent No. 1 under a supply order dated 16-2-2004 supplied gas cylinders of oxygen acetylene and carbon-dioxide. However, the amount on account of the aforesaid supply which was due and payable to the Respondent No. 1 was not paid. Accordingly, the Respondent No. 1 filed an application before facilitation council seeking recovery of Rs. 8,14,941/- together with the interest which was quantified at Rs. 1,84,752/-. By a communication dated 11-11-2005 the Appellant was asked to file the written statement. However, the Appellant sought ninety days time to file the written statement by letter dated 18-5-2006. However, despite a lapse of about eight months, the written statement was not filed. Eventually, by a communication dated 22-7-2007, the Defendant was directed to file the written statement. The proceedings were fixed for 8-8-2007. However, in the absence of the parties the proceedings were adjourned to 12-9-2007. On 12-9-2007, on a prayer made by the Appellant the proceedings were adjourned to 23-10-2007. On 23-10-2007, the Appellant made a prayer for certain documents. Since the Appellant did not file any written statement, the council vide order dated 12-11-2007 passed an award directing the Appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 8,14,941/- and an amount of Rs. 1,84,752/- by way of interest within a period of thirty days. 3. The Appellant challenged the vires of the provisions of the M.P. Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 2006 Act') as well as the Rules framed thereunder in the writ petition W. P. No. 3387/2007 before this Court. This Court vide order 19-3-2008, admitted the writ petition only on the question of vires. However, it was clarified that against the award dated 23-10-2007 the Appellant should avail the remedy before the appropriate forum. On 19-3-2008, the Appellant received another order dated 26-2-2008 by which earlier award dated 23-10-2007 was modified suo motu in exercise of power under Section 33 of the 1996 Act. However, it was clarified that against the award dated 23-10-2007 the Appellant should avail the remedy before the appropriate forum. On 19-3-2008, the Appellant received another order dated 26-2-2008 by which earlier award dated 23-10-2007 was modified suo motu in exercise of power under Section 33 of the 1996 Act. The Appellant filed special leave petition against order dated 19-3-2008 passed by the facilitation council before the Supreme Court which was dismissed in limine. 4. The Appellant thereafter filed an objection under Section 34 of the 1996 Act against the awards dated 23-10-2007 and 26-2-2008 before the trial Court. The Respondents raised an objection to the maintainability of the proceeding under Section 34 of the 1996 Act on the ground that the Appellant has failed to comply with the provisions of Section 19 of the 2006 Act. The trial Court vide order dated 11-2-2010 held that the Appellant has failed to comply with the mandate contained in Section 19 of the 2006 Act and has not deposited 75% of the amount as per terms of the award. Accordingly, the objection preferred by the Appellant under Section 34 of the Act was rejected. The Appellant thereafter filed an application for review which was also rejected vide order dated 10-5-2010. 5. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the trial Court without any adjudication grossly erred in holding that amount as required under Section 19 has not been deposited. It was also submitted that facilitation council has not assigned any cogent reason while rejecting the objection preferred by the Appellant. The composition of the council was not in accordance with Section 21(1) of the 2006 Act as the award was passed by four members. It was further submitted that before passing the award no conciliation proceedings were initiated by the council. It was further submitted that against an award of Rs. 8,14,941/- and interest of Rs. 1,84,752/- the Appellant has deposited various amounts on 12-3-2009, 11-7-2009 and 23-12-2009 which come to Rs. 21,63,558/-. In support of his submissions, learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Snehadeep Structures Private Limited v. Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited 2010(3) MPLJ (SC) 11 : (2010) 3 SCC 34 . 6. 1,84,752/- the Appellant has deposited various amounts on 12-3-2009, 11-7-2009 and 23-12-2009 which come to Rs. 21,63,558/-. In support of his submissions, learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Snehadeep Structures Private Limited v. Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited 2010(3) MPLJ (SC) 11 : (2010) 3 SCC 34 . 6. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 submitted that the amount which is legally due to the Respondent No. 1 has been withheld by the Appellant since 2004 and the Appellant has been adopting dilatory tactics. There is no quoram prescribed under the 2006 Act. Section 18(2) of the 2006 Act only makes the provisions of Section 65 to 81 of the 1996 Act applicable to the proceedings under 2006 Act. The provisions of the 2006 Act have an overriding effect. Sections 15 and 16 of the 2006 Act provide the basis for computation of the amount. 75% of the amount awarded has to be deposited in order to challenge the award as per terms of the award. It was further submitted that the proceeding at this point of time under Section 34 of the 1996 Act would not be maintainable before the trial Court as the Appellant has failed to comply with the mandate contained in Section 19 of the Act. In support of his submissions learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 has placed reliance on the decisions in Modern Industries v. Steel Authority of India Limited (2010) 5 SCC 44 and Snehadeep Structures Private Limited (supra). 7. I have considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties. The 2006 Act is an act to provide for facilitating the promotion and development and enhancing the competitiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises and for the matters connected therewith. Chapter V of the Act deals with the delayed payments to micro and small enterprises. Section 15 provides that where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any service to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment on or before every date or where there is no agreement, before the appointed day i.e. the day following immediately after expiry of 15 days from the day of acceptance or day of deemed acceptance of any goods or any services by a buyer from a supplier. Section 16 provides for date from which and a rate at which the interest shall be paid. Section 19 of the Act provides that no application for setting aside any decree/award/order made by council shall be entertained by the Court unless the Appellant, not being a supplier, has deposited with it 75% of the amount in terms of the decree/award/order as the case may be in the manner directed by such Court. Section 20 provides for establishment of micro and small enterprises facilitation council. Section 21 mandates that facilitation council shall consist of not less than 3 but not more than 5 members. Section 24 of the Act provides that provisions of Sections 15 to 23 shall have overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force. 8. The Supreme Court has considered the provisions of 2006 Act in the case of Snehdeep Structures Private Ltd. (supra) and has held that requirement of pre deposit of interest is introduced by the legislature as a disincentive to prevent the dilatory tactics employed by the buyers against whom the small scale industry might have procure the award. The application preferred by an Appellant shall not be entertained by any Court unless the Appellant has deposited 75% of the amount in terms of the decree/award. 9. In the backdrop of aforesaid legal position, the facts of the case may be seen. The trial Court while passing the order dated 11-2-2010 has merely recorded a conclusion that the Appellant has not complied with the direction contained in order dated 7-2-2009 passed by this Court in WP No. 1602/2009. An order passed by the authority should reflect application of mind. While emphasizing the need for assigning reasons it was held that giving of reasons minimizes the chances of arbitrariness and hence, it is an essential requirement of the rule of law. In Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 732 it has been held by the Supreme Court that reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. Absence of reasons renders the order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. It has further been held that recording of reasons is a principle of natural justice. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. Absence of reasons renders the order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. It has further been held that recording of reasons is a principle of natural justice. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. In Justice R. S. Bachawat's 'Law of Arbitration and Conciliation' 5th Edition, 2010 (Chief Editors Mr. Anirudh Wadhwa and Mr. Anirudh Krishnan) at page 1315 (Vol. I) it has been observed as under: The literal meaning of "reason" is a ground or motive for a belief or a course of action, a statement in justification or explanation of belief or action. Only justifications which are rational and provide sufficient grounds as an explanation can fulfil this requirement. 10. In the light of aforesaid enunciation of law, if the impugned order is seen, it does not contain any reason but merely the conclusions. The order passed by the trial Court is cryptic and arbitrary. Section 19 of the 2006 Act provides that no application for setting aside any decree or order shall be entertained by any Court unless 75% of the amount as awarded by the tribunal has been deposited. The expression 'entertain' has been considered by the Supreme Court to mean "adjudicate upon or proceed to consider on merits" [See: Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punnu Sahu (dead) through LRs. AIR 1970 SC 1384 ] Thus, until and unless the Appellant deposits 75% of the amount in terms of the award, his application for setting aside the order passed by the facilitation council cannot be considered on merits. 11. For the aforementioned reasons, the interest of the justice would be best served if the Appellant is afforded an opportunity by way of last indulgence to deposit 75% of the amount in terms of the award passed by the facilitation council before the trial Court within a period of thirty days. The orders dated 11-2-2010 and 10-5-2010 are hereby set aside. The Appellant shall compute the amount by taking into account the provisions contained in Sections 15 and 16 of the 2006 Act and shall deposit the same along with a chart. It would also be open to the Respondent No. 1 to submit a chart to indicate 75% of the amount payable in terms of the order passed by the facilitation council. It would also be open to the Respondent No. 1 to submit a chart to indicate 75% of the amount payable in terms of the order passed by the facilitation council. The trial Court shall afford an opportunity of hearing to the parties and shall pass a reasoned order in this regard within a period of two months from the date of production of certified copy of the order. Needless to say that the Respondent No. 1 would be at liberty to raise all the objections with regard to the maintainability of the proceedings before the trial Court. 12. With the aforesaid directions, the appeal is disposed of.