JUDGMENT : 1. Petitioner by Shri A. S. Garg, senior Advocate with Shri M. L. Pathak, Advocate. Respondents No. 1 and 2 by Shri B. L. Jain, Advocate. Respondents No. 3 and 4 by Shri B. L. Pavecha, senior Advocate with Shri Yogesh Mittal, Advocate. Being aggrieved by the order dated 4-5-2010 passed by 10th Addl. District Judge, Ujjain in Civil Suit No. 8-A/2006, whereby prayer of respondents No. 3 and 4 to recall the plaintiff petitioner for cross-examination was allowed and respondents No. 3 and 4 were also permitted to get the document Ex.P/43 to P/47 examined through handwriting expert, present petition has been filed. 2. Short facts of the case are that petitioner filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The suit was contested by the respondents. On the basis of the pleadings learned trial Court framed the issues and fixed the case for evidence. After completion of evidence of petitioner case was fixed for recording of evidence of respondents. During cross-examination of respondent No. 3 Prakash, documents Ex.P/43 to P/47 were tendered in evidence by the petitioner of which the execution was admitted by respondent No. 3. After completion of the evidence of respondents No. 3 and 4 applications were filed, wherein it was alleged that there is interpolation in the documents, therefore, respondents No. 3 and 4 be permitted to recall the petitioner for cross-examination and the respondents No. 3 and 4 be also permitted to get the documents examined through handwriting expert. The application was opposed by the petitioner. After hearing the parties learned Court below allowed the application against which present petition has been filed. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner argued at length and submits that impugned order is illegal, incorrect and deserves to be set aside. Learned counsel submits that sub-Rule 4 of Order 7, Civil Procedure Code permits the petitioner to produce the document in cross-examination. It is submitted that the document was tendered by the petitioner in cross-examination and execution of the document was admitted by respondent No. 3. Thereafter respondent No. 3 had no right to recall the petitioner for further cross-examination. It is submitted that at the most respondent No. 3 could have given the explanation and nothing more. It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case petition be allowed and the impugned order be set aside. 4. Thereafter respondent No. 3 had no right to recall the petitioner for further cross-examination. It is submitted that at the most respondent No. 3 could have given the explanation and nothing more. It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case petition be allowed and the impugned order be set aside. 4. Shri B. L. Pavecha, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 3 and 4, submits that no illegality has been committed by the learned Court below in allowing the application filed by respondents No. 3 and 4. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision in the matter of K. K. Velusamy vs. N. Palanisamy, reported in 2011 AIR SCW 2296, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the provisions of Order 18, Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code can be invoked in appropriate cases to re-open the evidence and/or recall witnesses for further examination. It was further held that deletion of Order 18, Rule 17-A does not mean that no evidence can be received at all after party closes his evidence. On the strength of the aforesaid position of law learned counsel for respondents No. 3 and 4 submits that petition be dismissed. 5. From perusal of the record it is evident that documents Ex.P/43 to P/47 were tendered in evidence in cross-examination of respondent No. 3 on 13-11-2009. Thereafter, case was fixed for evidence on 30-12-2009 and lastly on 1-1-2010 when the cross-examination was completed. The application was filed by respondents No. 3 and 4 on 15-2-2010. Previously Rule 17-A of Order 18, Civil Procedure Code was enforced according to which there was a provision for production of evidence not previously known or which could not be produced despite due diligence. This provision was deleted by the Amendment Act No. 1999 which came in force w.e.f. l-7-2002. However, Rule 17 of Order 18 remained in force, which reads as under :- "Court may recall and examine witness.- The Court may at any stage of a suit recall any witness who has been examined and may (subject to the law of evidence for the time being in force) put such questions to him as the Court thinks fit." 6. In the matter of K. K. Velusamy (supra), wherein the suit was filed on 26-3-2007 and case was fixed for final arguments on 11-11-2008, the application was filed under section 151, Civil Procedure Code with a prayer to re-open the evidence for the purpose of further cross-examination of plaintiff and the attesting witnesses, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under :- "There is no specific provision in the Code enabling the parties to re-open the evidence for the purpose of further examination-in-chief or cross-examination. Section 151 of the Code provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Code to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. In the absence of any provision providing for re-opening of evidence or recall of any witness for further examination or cross-examination, for purposes other than securing clarification required by the Court, the inherent power under section 151 of the Code, subject to its limitations, can be invoked in appropriate cases to re-open the evidence and/or recall witnesses for further examination. This inherent power of the Court is not affected by the express power conferred upon the Court under Order 18, Rule 17 of the Code to recall any witness to enable the Court to put such question to elicit any clarification. The respondent contended that section 151 cannot be used for re-opening evidence or for recalling witnesses. Submission cannot be accepted as an absolute proposition. However, section 151 of the Code cannot be routinely invoked for re-opening evidence or recalling witnesses." "The deletion of the said provision does not mean that no evidence can be received at all, after a party closes his evidence. It only means that the amended structure of the Code found no need for such a provision, as the amended Code contemplated little or no time gap between completion of evidence and commencement and conclusion of arguments." 7. Keeping in view the aforesaid position of law and the fact that the documents Ex.P/43 to P/47 were tendered in evidence for the first time in cross-examination by respondent No. 3, this Court is of the opinion that no illegality has been committed by the learned Court below in allowing the application filed by the respondent No. 3. Keeping in view the aforesaid position of law and the fact that the documents Ex.P/43 to P/47 were tendered in evidence for the first time in cross-examination by respondent No. 3, this Court is of the opinion that no illegality has been committed by the learned Court below in allowing the application filed by the respondent No. 3. However, it is made clear as a word of caution that the power under section 151 or Order 18, Rule 17 of the Code is not intended to be used routinely, merely for the asking. If so used, it will defeat the very purpose of various amendments to the Code to expedite trials. But where the application is found to be bona fide and where the additional evidence, or documentary, will assist the Court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice, and the Court is satisfied that non-production earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons, the Court may exercise its discretion to recall the witnesses or permit the fresh evidence. But if it does so, it should ensure that the process does not become a protracting tactic. The Court should firstly award appropriate costs to the other party to compensate for the delay. Secondly the Court should take up and complete the case within a fixed time schedule so that the delay is avoided. Thirdly if the application is found to be mischievous, or frivolous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it should be rejected with heavy costs. If the application is allowed and the evidence is permitted and ultimately the Court finds that evidence was not genuine or relevant did not warrant the re-opening of the case recalling the witnesses, it can be made a ground for awarding exemplary costs apart from ordering prosecution if it involves fabrication of evidence. If the party had an opportunity to produce such evidence earlier but did not do so or if the evidence already led is clear and unambiguous, or if it comes to the conclusion that the object of the application is merely to protract the proceedings, the Court should reject the application. If the evidence sought to be produced is an electronic record the Court may also listen to the recording before granting or rejecting the application. It is further made clear that since the learned Court below has also given right to respondent Nos. If the evidence sought to be produced is an electronic record the Court may also listen to the recording before granting or rejecting the application. It is further made clear that since the learned Court below has also given right to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to adduce evidence by way of examining the documents by the handwriting expert, therefore, the petitioner shall also be at liberty to adduce the evidence in rebuttal, if any in that regard only. 8. With the aforesaid observations petition stands disposed of. No order as to costs.