JUDGEMENT S.K.KATRIAR, J. 1. The petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 14486 of 2009 has preferred this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of ludicature at Patna, and is aggrieved by the order dated 27.11.2009, whereby his writ petition has been dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court, (Reported in AIR 2010 Pat 57 ) wherein it has been held that the informations sought for by him and required to be given have been supplied by respondent No. 2 herein, and the remaining informations sought for have rightly been denied in view of the bar engrafted in section 8(l)(j) of the Right to Information Act 2005 (Act 22 of 2005) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The learned single Judge has also dealt with the question relating to formation/constitution of Benches of the Tribunal. 2. A brief statement of facts essential for the disposal of this appeal may be indicated. Respondent No. 2 had published advertisement No. 6/2000, inviting applications for appointment to the posts of "State Examiner of Questioned Documents", in Police Laboratory in C.I.D., Government of Bihar, Patna. The advertisement, inter alia, stated that written examination will be held if adequate number of applications are received. In view of the position that few applications were received, the Commission exercised the option as per the advertisement, and decided to select the candidates for appointment on the basis of viva voce test. Respondent No. 2 concluded the selection process and made the recommendation(s) to the State of Bihar. The appellant (writ petitioner) is a public-spirited citizen, and submitted application dated 16.12.2008, seeking informations with respect to eight queries relating to the interview which was held on 30.09.2002, and 1.10.2002. Respondent No. 2 sat over the matter. Its inaction led to the appeal in question before respondent No. 3, which rejected the appeal on the ground that the informations which could be supplied have indeed been provided, and the remaining informations need not be given in view of the bar engrafted in section 8(1 )(j) of the Act. The appellant challenged the same by preferring the present writ petition, which has been dismissed by the learned single Judge by the impugned order. The appellant challenged the same by preferring the present writ petition, which has been dismissed by the learned single Judge by the impugned order. The appellant had also raised the issue before respondent No. 3 that his appeal should not have been heard by a learned single-member Bench, and ought to have been heard by all the available members sitting together. This contention has also been rejected by the learned single Judge. 3. While assailing the validity of the impugned action, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the traditional concept of Locus Standi has been completely abandoned under the provisions of the Act. He next submits that the information sought for by paragraph 4 of his communication dated 16.12.2008, is not hit by the bar engrafted in section 8(1) (j) of the Act. He lastly submits that the Commission comprises of all its members and, therefore, the order passed by the Commission by one learned Member is inappropriate and bad in law. 4. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has supported the impugned action. He submits that the requisite foundational facts have not been laid either before respondent No. 3, or in the writ proceeding, or in the present appeal, that the appellant made queries because he had suspected bungling. He, therefore, cannot advance submissions, for which factual foundation has not been laid in his pleadings. He next submits that the principle of Locus Standi can never be abandoned, so long anglo-saxon legal system is followed in our country, otherwise it would lead to collapse of the administrative system, as well as the judicial system. Mere busy bodies would overwhelm the system. He next submits that respondent No. 2 has evolved a foolproof system to supply requisite informations to the information-seekers, which is time- tested and combines a happy blend of confidentiality of the functioning of respondent No. 2 on the one hand, and the queries of information-seekers, on the other. He submits that respondent No. 2 has taken guidance from the reported judgments of the Suprerhe Court on this issue. He relies on the following reported judgments: (i) Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education V. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Sheth [ (1984) 4 SCC 27 ], paragraphs 19, 20, 24, 26, and 28 : ( AIR 1984 SC 1543 ). He relies on the following reported judgments: (i) Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education V. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Sheth [ (1984) 4 SCC 27 ], paragraphs 19, 20, 24, 26, and 28 : ( AIR 1984 SC 1543 ). (ii) H.R Public Service Commission V. Mukesh Thakur (2010 AIR SCW 3636) : ( AIR 2010 SC 2620 ), paragraphs 22 and 26 (wherein the said judgment in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Sheth, ( AIR 1984 SC 1543 ) (supra), has been followed. (iii) Khanapuram Gandaiah v. Administrative Officer & Ors. (2010 AIR SCW 363): ( AIR 2010 SC 615 ). He next submits that the informations not supplied by respondent No. 2 are with respect to third-party interest and can, therefore, be appropriately denied in terms of section 2(n), read with Sections 8(1) (j) and 11, of the Act. He further submits that the examiners have fiduciary relationship with respondent No. 2, and such informations which may have an adverse effect on their fiduciary relationship, is hit by the bar engrafted in section 8(1) (j) of the Act. He next submits that constitution of Benches has been rationalized by respondent No. 3. It is possible to categorise the kind of cases coming up before the Commission into different categories and, according to the importance of each category, and may be heard by Benches of appropriate strength. 5. Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 3 has supported the impugned action. He submits that section 3, read with section 22, of the Act are non-obstante clauses in the Act, and its provisions have over-riding effect over all other Acts. He submits in the same vein that anybody can seek information without the constraint of the principle of Locus Standi, and without the necessity of providing reasons for the same. He next submits that query No. 4, the sole surviving grievance of the appellant, does not seem to be a bona-fide query and seems to raise an issue, which is not meant to serve his purpose. For example, his insistence on having photo copy of the statements of the interviewers with their signatures or their residential addresses cannot serve any public purpose. He lastly submits that the Supreme Court, the High Courts, and the Central Administrative Tribunals, etc. For example, his insistence on having photo copy of the statements of the interviewers with their signatures or their residential addresses cannot serve any public purpose. He lastly submits that the Supreme Court, the High Courts, and the Central Administrative Tribunals, etc. have framed Rules for constitution of Benches according to the category of cases formulated by such Courts or Tribunals. He submits that respondent No. 3 has evolved the practice of assigning all matters to single-member Benches, subject to the statutory provision that it is open to such Benches to refer them to a larger Bench. 6. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. Spirited argument has been advanced on behalf of respondent No. 2 before us that the appellant is a mere busybody, was himself not a candidate and, therefore, he is needlessly meddling with the affairs of respondent No. 2. It appears to us that such a contention advanced on behalf of respondent No. 2 has imperialistic overtones, and cannot be upheld in our democratic set-up governed by the rule of laws. The principle of Locus Standi has been consistently on the wane in the Indian polity ever since promulgation of the Constitution of India. Public interest litigation is one of the most glorious examples of the Indian Judicature where the citizens are entitled to raise an issue, not confined to himself and his personal interests, but on behalf of the community at large or a determinate body of persons. This has been given statutory recognition under the provisions of the Act. Section 6(1) of the Act provides that a person, who desires to obtain any information under this Act, shall make a request in writing or through electronic means in English or Hindi, or in the official language of the area in which the application is being made. Section 6(2) of the Act provides that an applicant making request for information shall not be required to give any reason for requesting the information or any other personal details except those that may be necessary for contacting him. On a perusal of section 6 of the Act, we see no trace of the principle of Locus Standi for any person seeking information under the Act. On a perusal of section 6 of the Act, we see no trace of the principle of Locus Standi for any person seeking information under the Act. This has to be read with section 3 of the Act which is headed "Right to information", and provides that subject to the provisions of this Act, all citizens shall have the right to information. This has to be read harmoniously with some of the other provisions of the Act, particularly section 8 of the Act, which is headed "Exemption from disclosure of information". Law is well settled that the Court shall put a construction on the terms of the statute which shall advance its aims, objects, and the legislative intent. It is evident on a perusal of the aims and objects of the Act and the preamble that the Act seeks to promote transparency of functioning in the public domain, and all informations have got to be supplied with alacrity and without demur, except those which are clearly prohibited by the express terms of the Statute. We would like to emphasise that in case of doubt or difficulty, the Court shall lean in favour of the information-seeker. This is not to dilute some of the stringent provisions of section 8 of the Act which relate to sovereignty and integrity of India etc, In view of a combined reading of section 6, read with section 8, of the Act, the concerned authority is bound in law to provide all informations sought for by any information-seeker without the necessity of satisfying, the principle of Locus Standi, or without the requirement of providing reasons for seeking the information, except the items clearly prohibited by different clauses of section 8 of the Act. 7. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has submitted that the requisite foundational fact has not been laid for some of the contentions being advanced .on behalf of the appellant. The contention has been dealt with hereinabove while dealing with the provisions of section 6(2) of the Act. We have found that the applicant is not required to give reasons for seeking information. Once it is so held, the issue whether or not the alleged bungling was in his mind becomes wholly irrelevant, and completely obviated by the strident approach of section 6(2) of the Act. The contention is rejected. 8. We have found that the applicant is not required to give reasons for seeking information. Once it is so held, the issue whether or not the alleged bungling was in his mind becomes wholly irrelevant, and completely obviated by the strident approach of section 6(2) of the Act. The contention is rejected. 8. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has submitted that it has devised a fool-proof system to provide to or to withhold, informations from, the applicant. It is submitted that it is a time- tested system and inspiration and guidance is derived from the three reported judgments of the Supreme Court. The contention completely overlooks the non-obstante clause of the Act. The judgment relied on by learned counsel for respondent No. 2 is Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Sheth, ( AIR 1984 SC 1543 ) (supra), and was rendered much before the Act was enforced and, therefore, is not relevant for the purpose of disposal of the present appeal. In so far as the remaining two cases are concerned, namely, H.P. Public Service Commission v. Mukesh Thakur, ( AIR 2010 SC 2620 : 2010 AIR SCW 3636) (supra), and Khanapuram Gandaiah v. Administrative Officer, ( AIR 2010 SC 615 : 2010 AIR SCW 363) (supra), the same raised different issues and rest on their own facts. All offices in the public domain in this country will now have to rise to the stringent provisions of the Act and have to bring transparency in their functioning, and shall provide all informations sought for under the Act subject to the prohibitions/restrictions engrafted in section 8 of the Act. Disclosure is the rule, withholding information is an exception for which the authority will have to make out a case. 9. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has next submitted that the appellant has sought informations which are in the private domain and, therefore, may not be supplied in view of the provisions of section 2(n), read with section 8(l)(j), and section 11, of the Act. Section 2(n) defines "third party", and means a person other than the citizen making a request for information and includes a public authority. Section 8 contains exceptions to right of information provided under section 3 of R.T.I. Act. The provision enumerates the various conditions in which informations sought may not be disclosed. Section 2(n) defines "third party", and means a person other than the citizen making a request for information and includes a public authority. Section 8 contains exceptions to right of information provided under section 3 of R.T.I. Act. The provision enumerates the various conditions in which informations sought may not be disclosed. In the case in hand, we are concerned mainly with exemption from disclosure of information provided in section 8(l)(j) which is reproduced hereinbelow: "8. Exemption from disclosure of information- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen- xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information: Provided that the information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person. 10. Section 11 deals with third-party informations and set out hereinbelow as the appellant is also aggrieved with non-furnishing of address/details of other participating candidates: "11. 10. Section 11 deals with third-party informations and set out hereinbelow as the appellant is also aggrieved with non-furnishing of address/details of other participating candidates: "11. Third party information- (1) Where a Central Public Information Officer or a State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, intends to disclose any information or record, or part thereof on a request made under this Act, which relates to or has been supplied by a third party and has been treated as confidential by that third party, the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall within five days from the receipt of the request, give a written notice to such third party of the request and of the fact that the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, intends to disclose the information or record, or part thereof, and invite the third party to make a submission in writing or orally, regarding whether the information should be disclosed, and such submission of the third party shall be kept in view while taking a decision about disclosure of information: Provided that except in the case of trade or commercial secrets protected by law, disclosure may be allowed if the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance any possible harm or injury to the interests of such third party. (2) Where a notice is served by the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under sub-section (1) to a third party in respect of any information or record or part thereof, the third party shall, within ten days from the date of receipt of such notice, be given the opportunity to make representation against the proposed disclosure. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7, the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall, within forty days after receipt of the request under Section 6, if the third party has been given an opportunity to make representation under sub-section (2), make a decision as to whether or not to disclose the information or record or part thereof and give in writing the notice of his decision to the third party. (4) A notice given under sub-section (3) shall include a statement that the third party to whom the notice is given is entitled to prefer an appeal under Section 19 against the decision. 11. It appears that there are certain restrictions with respect to supply of informations touching third party. Third party has been defined to mean that a person other than the citizen or public authority of this country. In other words, the information may be denied if it touches third party, i.e. a person who is not a citizen or authority of this country, and the information sought with respect to such persons is either not in public domain or is an invasion of privacy of such third party. It appears to us that the provisions of section 8 (1) (j) of the Act has been viewed incorrectly by the respondents. The bar to provide information in terms of Section 8(1) (j) regarding supply of informations with respect to the affairs which has no relationship with any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual, notwithstanding which the concerned authority may be obliged to divulge the information provided it would be in larger public interest. To illustrate this by a hypothetical example, the love affair between the Managing Director of a government company or the Secretary of a department of the government with a girl may not be directed to be disclosed unless larger public interest suggests that such love affair has adversely affected governmental functioning as we usually hear about defence contracts and the like. In such a situation, a case will have to be made out that it is in larger public interest to direct supply of information which, in view of its subterranean currents, may have a bearing on the issues in the public domain. Larger public interest may in such cases demand that information has got to be disclosed even though seemingly not in public domain, and may be invasion of the privacy of the individual. On the other hand, in the present case, the interviewers have been discharging the duties in the public domain and there is no question of invasion of their privacy. The contention is rejected. 12. On the other hand, in the present case, the interviewers have been discharging the duties in the public domain and there is no question of invasion of their privacy. The contention is rejected. 12. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has laid considerable emphasis on the provisions of section 8(1) (j) of the Act which has been reproduced in foregoing paragraphs. We fail to appreciate its applicability to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Section 8(1) (j) is applicable to a situation with respect to law-enforcement agency and for security purposes. No such consideration arises with respect to the affairs of respondent No. 2. The contention is rejected. 13. We now come to the factual aspect of the present matter. The appellant raised eight queries as would appeal in his communication dated 16.12.2008. Some of the informations have been supplied to the appellant and he is satisfied. The substance of the queries which have evoked no response are to the effect that he wants the names of the interviewers along with their addresses and photocopy of the signatures of the interview statement. We must make it clear that we would not allow divulgence of information if it will adversely affect the selection process, or may cause leakage of the questions. In the present case, the names of the interviewers cannot be denied for various reasons. The interviewers are visible to the candidates while the interview is being held. They have public egress and ingress to the venue of the interview. It is a possible situation that the applicant may have reasons for suspicion that a particular interviewer was on the interview board and his close relation was appearing. Such determination cannot be made unless the names of the interviewer and the candidate who appeared are disclosed. If he denies this information, it would be defeating the aims and objects, the preamble, and the legislative intent of the Act. We cannot countenance such an obstruction to such laudable Act which is intended to bring about transparency in governance, and root out corruption, in this country. If he denies this information, it would be defeating the aims and objects, the preamble, and the legislative intent of the Act. We cannot countenance such an obstruction to such laudable Act which is intended to bring about transparency in governance, and root out corruption, in this country. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1970 S.C. 150 ) is an appropriate example to show that one of the members of the Board was himself a candidate for promotion from the State cadre to the Central cadre of Indian Forest Service. If we prohibit the information which the applicant is seeking to obtain, the misdeed as had taken place in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (supra), may not be set at naught. 14. To make a comparison with the court/judicial proceedings, vis-a-vis an interview; Court proceeding is open and the names of the Judges who are hearing the matter are well-known to the parties. When court proceedings can be held in broad day-light and the names of Judges are known to all the parties, why not the names of interviewers be disclosed to the applicant. We must, however, strike the requisite note of caution that the applicant on account of over-enthusiasm or inexperience, has, sought irrelevant informations by seeking photo copies of the signatures of the interviewers and has equally over-done by seeking their residential addresses, which will serve no public purpose. Respondent No. 2, therefore, is justified in declining informations to that extent because the same would not be in public interest, and will not in the least serve the applicants purpose. 15. It is equally true that merely because the information relates to a public official, it cannot be assumed in all circumstances that it would have a public interest element. Informations sought to serve a personal feud in private litigations may not be maintained in the name of public interest. In case of Vijay Prakash v. Union of India & Ors, reported in AIR 2010 Delhi 7, the Delhi High Court observed that disclosure of service record of public servant sought by her husband, so as to establish his case in matrimonial suit is impermissible, as such disclosure does not involve public interest. In case of Vijay Prakash v. Union of India & Ors, reported in AIR 2010 Delhi 7, the Delhi High Court observed that disclosure of service record of public servant sought by her husband, so as to establish his case in matrimonial suit is impermissible, as such disclosure does not involve public interest. The husband, Vijay Prakash, had sought information regarding the service records of his wife for the purposes of using the same in a divorce proceeding. Disallowing the prayer of the petitioner and affirming the order of the Information Commissions, the learned single Judge observed that information sought for was not in public interest and has rightly been refused by the Information Commissions. " ", 16. This takes us on to the last issue canvassed on behalf of the appellant. He submits that, in view of the provisions of the Act, his appeal ought to have been heard by all the members sitting together. In view of the scheme of the Act, we find it difficult to accede to the submission for the reason that section 15 of the Act is headed "Constitution of State Information Commission", and sub-section (4) of the said section which provides as follows: "15.Constitution of State Information Commission. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (4) The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs of the State Information Commission shall vest in the State Chief Information Commissioner who shall be assisted by the State Information Commissioners and may exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things which may be exercised or done by the State Information Commission autonomously without being subjected to directions by any other authority under this Act." In other words, the Chief Information Commissioner, assisted by the State Information Commissioner, has been vested with the general powers of superintendence. 17. In view of the powers conferred by section 28 of the Act which are rule-making powers, the Bihar State Information Commission (Management) Regulation 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulation"), has been framed. Regulation 6 of the Regulation is reproduced hereinbelow: "6. 17. In view of the powers conferred by section 28 of the Act which are rule-making powers, the Bihar State Information Commission (Management) Regulation 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulation"), has been framed. Regulation 6 of the Regulation is reproduced hereinbelow: "6. Posting of appeal or complaint before the Commission: (i) An appeal or a complaint, or a class or categories of appeals or complaints, shall be heard either by a single State Information Commissioner or a Division Bench of two State Information Commissioners, or a Full Bench of three or more State Information Commissioners, as decided by the State Chief Information Commissioner by a special or general order issued for this purpose from time to time. (ii) Where in the course of the hearing of an appeal or complaint or other proceeding before a single State Information Commissioner, the Commissioner considers that the matter should be dealt with by a Division of Full Bench, he shall refer the matter to the State Chief Information Commissioner by a reasoned order who may thereupon constitute such a Bench for the hearing and disposal of the matter. (iii) Similarly, where during the course of the hearing of a matter before a Division Bench the Bench considers that the matter should be dealt with by a Full Bench, or where a full Bench considers that a matter should be dealt with by a larger Bench, it shall refer the matter to the State Chief Information Commissioner by a reasoned order who may thereupon constitute such a Bench for the hearing and disposal of the matter". It is thus evident that the State Chief Information Commissioner by special or general order can issue orders for hearing of appeals from time to time. We are informed by learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 3 that the current practice is to assign all matters to single-member Benches, who have the requisite, statutory power under section 6(ii) of the Regulation to refer matters to larger Benches. In such a situation, if all matters are initially placed before a single-member Bench, then there cannot be any objection to the same, but this practice must be consistently followed. We may, however, point out for the guidance of respondent No. 3 that it is possible to classify different kinds of matters coming up before it in accordance with the nature and the importance of such matters. We may, however, point out for the guidance of respondent No. 3 that it is possible to classify different kinds of matters coming up before it in accordance with the nature and the importance of such matters. For example, it may be open to respondent No. 3 to create one category of cases which concern the life or liberty of a person because the information has to be provided within 48 hours on receipt of the request in terms of proviso to section 7(1) of the Act. It may also be possible, for example, all cases covered by section 8(1) (j) or 8(1) (f) of the Act, in one category. The strength of the Bench may be determined according to the nature and the importance of such matters, if the Commission in future decides to categorise the matters coming up before it. 18. In the result, we disagree with the order of the learned single Judge in so far as it relates to exemption of names of the interviewers from being disclosed. The appeal and the writ petition are allowed. Respondent No. 2 is directed to communicate the information to the appellant in the manner indicated hereinabove forthwith. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.