JUDGMENT 1. - Being aggrieved by the order dated 9.3.2009 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Sri Ganganagar whereby the learned Judge has allowed the revision petition filed by respondent No. 1 and has set aside the judgment dated 25.11.2005 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sadulsahar whereby the learned Magistrate had framed charges against the respondent No. 1 for an offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, the petitioner has approached this Court. 2. The brief facts of the case are that Rampratap, respondent No. 1, had borrowed Rs. 1,00,000/- from the petitioner @ 2% interest per month. In order to repay the loan, Rampratap had issued a cheque, cheque No. MDS 361663 dated 30.6.2007 (?). In order to encash the said cheque, the petitioner presented the said cheque on 8.7.2002. However, the bank refused to honour the cheque. The petitioner was informed on 8.7.2002 about the fact that the cheque has bounced. However, the petitioner did not send a notice within the stipulated period of fifteen days; the notice was sent on the sixteenth day, i.e. 24.7.2002. Subsequently, on 4.9.2002 petitioner deposited the same cheque for encashment. However, even on the second occasion, the cheque was dishonoured. Therefore, on 9.9.2002 the petitioner sent a notice to Rampratap. Despite the service of notice on Rampratap, he did not pay the amount to the petitioner. Therefore, on 30.9.2002 the petitioner filed a complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. Eventually, vide order dated 25.11.1995 the learned Trial Court framed charges for offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act against Rampratap. Aggrieved by the said order, Rampratap filed a revision petition before the learned Judge. Vide order dated 9.3.2009 learned Judge quashed the charge order. Hence, this petition before this Court. 3. Mr. Rakesh Matoria, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that since the first notice was not sent within the stipulated period of fifteen days and was in fact sent on sixteenth day, the cause of action did not arise. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, cause of action arose only after the cheque was dishonoured the second time and the notice was sent within the stipulated period of limitation of fifteen days. Therefore, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Judge has erred in quashing and setting aside the charge framed by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Judge has erred in quashing and setting aside the charge framed by the learned Trial Court. 4. On the other hand Mr. M.K. Garg, the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, has contended that according to the case of Premchand Vjaykumar vs. Yashpal Singh & Ors., 2005 CrLR (SC) 476 = 2006 (1) NIJ 121 (SC) the period of limitation does not get revived by the mere fact that the cheque was submitted for the second time and it had bounced. In fact, the period of limitation begins to run from very first time that the cheque had bounced. Moreover, the period of limitation cannot be extended by the complainant by redepositing the cheque for encashment for the second time. Lastly, the petitioner should have been vigilant to send the required notice within the stipulated period of fifteen days. By sending such a notice on the sixteenth day, he cannot be permitted to take the benefit of his own fault. Therefore, he has supported the impugned judgment. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment. 6. It is, indeed, settled position of law that the period of limitation begins to run from the date that the cheque bounces. The said period of limitation cannot be extended by a litigant by resubmitting the cheque for encashment for the second time. Therefore, in the present case the period of limitation commenced on 8.7.2002. Since the notice was not sent within fifteen days, therefore, obviously, the petitioner had missed the bus. Since the limitation period of prescribed by the law, a litigant cannot extend it by redepositing the cheque for re-encashment. Therefore, the argument that the period of limitation should be counted from the date when the cheque was returned the second time, such an argument is unacceptable. 7. Moreover, a litigant cannot be permitted to take the benefit of his own fault. In case he fails to send the required notice within the stipulated period of fifteen days, he cannot claim that the period of limitation has not commenced. Such an argument would permit a litigant to take the benefit of his own fault. Such an argument would also permit a litigant to defeat the very purpose of law. Hence, such a stand cannot be accepted either in law or in equity. 8. Such an argument would permit a litigant to take the benefit of his own fault. Such an argument would also permit a litigant to defeat the very purpose of law. Hence, such a stand cannot be accepted either in law or in equity. 8. Thus, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in judgment dated 9.3.2009. Hence, the revision petition is devoid of any merit, it is, hereby, dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******