Virender Singh, J. 1. Above captioned three appeals involve three different incident causing two deaths and injuring one. In this regard three different writ petitions were filed before the learned Writ Court for compensation, which have now been dismissed vide three different orders, but solely on the ground that they involve disputed questions of fact and such cannot be adjudicated upon in writ jurisdiction in the light of the judgment handed down by Hon'ble Apex Court in case 'S.D.O. Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. and others v. Timudu Oram' reported in 2005 AIR SCW 3715 (for short hereinafter to be referred as 'SDO Grid Corporation'). Therefore, all these three appeals have been clubbed together for disposal. 2. Even for deciding the main issue with regard to the mainta: " ability of the writ petitions, we have to look at the facts of each individual case, which, in brief, are thus: Hereinafter the appellants shall be referred to as writ petitioner(s) only. LPAOW No. 34/2007 arising out of OWP No. 647/2002 3. In this case, there is an amputation of right arm of injured- writ petitioner Joginder Singh. His permanent disability is assessed as 60%. On the date of accident, he was working as a Conductor in private matador and his age was 25 years. 4. It is pleaded that on 11.04.2002, he was passing through land of one Dharam Singh S/o Sh. Kanshi Ram, where an electric pole was installed by the State Electricity Department (respondent), in which electric current was passing. He incidentally touched that pole and got electrocuted, as a result thereof, received severe burn injuries, which ultimately resulted into amputation of his right hand from elbow. He has claimed Rs.12 lacs as compensation. along with the main petition, he has attached certain documents with regard to his medical treatment etc. 5. Refuting the case of the petitioner, the stand taken by the official respondents is that he received injuries because of his own fault as he was climbing the electric pole to snap the conductor in order to misuse the electricity. The incident was reported by the Lineman of the department and ultimately the matter was investi­gated, in which, the statements of some locals were also recorded. The incident was reported by the Lineman of the department and ultimately the matter was investi­gated, in which, the statements of some locals were also recorded. On these pleas, the preliminary objection raised by the official respondents for dismissal of the writ petition was that all the facts involved in the petition were disputed one, which could not be adjudicated upon in writ jurisdiction. LPAOW No. 58/2008 arising out of OWP No. 994/2003 6. This is a case of death, in which wife of the appellant-Tara Chand (writ petitioner) died due to electric shock. It is pleaded that on 02.08.2003, she came in contact with live electric wire attached with the electric pole installed by the State Electricity Department and was hanging loose in the maize field for the last 8-10 days on account of heavy rains. In this connection, F.I.R. under Section 304-A RFC was also got lodged in Police Station, Ramnagar. It is further pleaded that despite the fact of electric wire being loose brought to the notice of one Lineman, no attempt was made by the department to correct the defect and, therefore, this occurrence. 7. The deceased is stated to be of the age of 26 years at the time of occurrence and a sum of Rs.5 lacs is asked for as compensation in this regard. The writ petitioner has attached certain documents including the report prepared by the police, the post mortem report etc. 8. The stand taken by the official respondents in their defence as borne out from the reply filed by them to the main petition is, that the incident has occurred because of snapping of the conductor resulting into falling of the wire and therefore, it was purely an act of God and not on account of negligence on the part of the department. It was further averred that due to heavy rains, there might have been the collision of the conductor resulting into its snapping. LPAOW No. 60/2008 arising out of OWP No. 892/2003 9. This case also relates to death of one Sanjay Kumar Sharma, an unmarried boy. His parents and two brothers have filed the writ petition for compensation. At the time of death, Sanjay Kumar was running his own shop of a photo-grapher. His age was 27 years. 10. LPAOW No. 60/2008 arising out of OWP No. 892/2003 9. This case also relates to death of one Sanjay Kumar Sharma, an unmarried boy. His parents and two brothers have filed the writ petition for compensation. At the time of death, Sanjay Kumar was running his own shop of a photo-grapher. His age was 27 years. 10. It is averred that on the fateful day i.e. 18.12.2001 when the deceased was going to a shop, he had passed through a place known as Jhiri, where the employees of Power Development Department were removing the temporary electric poles installed for Jhiri festival which was over. One of the electric poles fell on the head of the deceased, which ultimately proved fatal. In this connection a criminal case was registered under Section 304-A RFC against the officials of the Electricity Department. A sum of Rs.7.5 lacs has been claimed as compensation. along with the petition, the copy of the post mortem, F.I.R. and other documents are attached by the petitioners. 11. In the objections, factum of death of Sanjay Kumar Sharma coining under the electric pole has been admitted, but the fault is shown of the deceased himself stating that when the electric poles were being removed, he in a rash manner made an attempt to cross under the electric pole in order to catch the matador standing across and one of the roles incidentally fell on his head, resulting into death. 12. This is all, in brief, with regard to the facts of each individual case. 13. We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and gone through the record minutely. Submissions by appellants' counsel:- 14. It is contended by the respective learned counsel of each individual case that instead appreciating the each writ petition on the doctrine of 'strict liability', they are rejected simply on the analogy that the disputed questions of facts are attracted in it, which cannot be gone into by the Writ Court, which approach adopted by the learned Writ Court is not sustainable. 15. It is further submitted that in all the cases, the factum of occurrence is admitted and in two cases, even the challans have been filed against the employees of FDD. This fact by itself proves the negligence. 15. It is further submitted that in all the cases, the factum of occurrence is admitted and in two cases, even the challans have been filed against the employees of FDD. This fact by itself proves the negligence. The learned counsel flirter submit that if the present three cases are appreciated applying the test of doctrine of 'strict liability' then 'negligence' or 'no negligence' would pale into insignificance. 16. It is then contended that the judgment handed down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in SDO Grid Corporation's case (supra) referred to by the learned Writ Court for dismissing the writ petitions, is, otherwise, not applicable to the facts of any of the cases at hand, as such, the impugned order(s) deserves to be set aside. Submissions by respondents' counsel:- 17. Per contra, Mr. Thakur although admits the occurrence, yet does not admit the negligence submitting that all the three writ petitions involve disputed ques­tions of fact, which could not be gone into by the Writ Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, therefore, the writ petitions have been rightly rejected. He prays for dismissal of the present three appeals also on the same rationale. Our Discussion:- 18. In the first instance, we would enter into detailed discussion with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition(s), primarily for which purpose, we have clubbed all the present three appeals. 19. In normal course, it can be said that the exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, though discretionary, has to follow certain well recognized norms and should not be used in each and every case where action complained of is not related to a fundamental right. This power is also not to be exercised where the petitioner has alternate remedy under ordinary law of land. It can also be said that extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised when civil rights of the parties are involved and the facts are disputed. However, all these well recognized norms would not be attracted in a case of 'strict liability'. 20. We would refer to para 6 of the judgment rendered in 'SDO Grid Corporation's case (supra), in which, their Lordships, while relying upon another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in case 'Chairman, Grid Corpora­tion of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) and another' reported in (1997) 7 SCC 298, observed as under:- "6. 20. We would refer to para 6 of the judgment rendered in 'SDO Grid Corporation's case (supra), in which, their Lordships, while relying upon another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in case 'Chairman, Grid Corpora­tion of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) and another' reported in (1997) 7 SCC 298, observed as under:- "6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellants, that "admittedly/prima facie amounted to negligence on the part of the appellants." The High Court failed to appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and negligence was required to be established firstly by the claimants. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to appel­lant 1 had snapped and the deceased had come in contact with it and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the appellants and under which circumstances the deceased had come in contact with the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases they deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorized intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not and could not have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the Civil Court as it was done in OJC No.5229 of 1995." 21. The High Court has not and could not have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the Civil Court as it was done in OJC No.5229 of 1995." 21. In 'SDO Grid Corporation's case (supra), the decision of the Apex Court rendered in 'M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari and others' reported in 2002 (2) SCC 162 was also considered and distinguished observing that in the said case finding of negligence was already recorded by the trial Court against the Electricity Board. 22. In so far as application of 'Strict Liability' is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 'M.P. Electricity Board's case (supra) has observed in paras 8 & 9 as under: - "8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under lave of torts to compensate for the injury suffered any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as "strict liability". It differ from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions." "9. The doctrine of 'strict liability' has its origin in English common law which it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 HL 330. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions." "9. The doctrine of 'strict liability' has its origin in English common law which it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 HL 330. Blackburn, ]., the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision: (All ER p.7E-F) "[T]he true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."(emphasis supplied) 23. In the aforesaid judgment, there is a reference to the Constitution Bench judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in case 'M.C. Mehta v. Union of India' 1987(1) SCC 395 , in which the Apex Court has gone even beyond the rule of 'Strict Liability' by holding in para 12 of the judgment as under:- "Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 HL 330." 24. In 'SDO Grid Corporation's case (supra), there is a reference to another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in case 'H.S.E.B. and others v. Ram Nath and others' (2004) 5 SCC 793 , which is also distinguished on its own facts. In this case, an appeal was filed in the Supreme Court by Haryana Electricity Board against the compensation awarded by Punjab & Haryana High Court to the claim­ants on account of death of a child by taking the plea that since disputed questions of fact had arisen in the said case, the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition. Their Lordships of the Apex Court while dismissing the appeal of H.S.E.B. observed in paras 2 to 6 as under:- "2. Reliance is placed upon the case of Chairman, Grid Corpn. Their Lordships of the Apex Court while dismissing the appeal of H.S.E.B. observed in paras 2 to 6 as under:- "2. Reliance is placed upon the case of Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) v. Sukamani Das wherein a person walking along the road came in contact with a live wire which was lying on the road after having got snapped from the overhead electric line. The writ petition was filed claiming compensation. The High Court directed payment of compensation. However, this Court held that disputed questions of fact arose and that a writ petition was not a proper remedy. On the basis of this authority, it is urged that even in this case disputed questions of fact arose and that, therefore, the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition. 3. In order to consider this submission, one has to look at the averments made in the petition and the reply to those averments. 25. In para (2) of the petition it is stated as follows:- "(2) That the petitioners are residing in their house in Sakti Nagar Colony near Kabri Railway Crossing for over 15 years and a HT line is passing over the house of the petitioners at a much lower height than that prescribed under the Rules. The said line has become quite loose and drooping and touching the roof of the house of the petitioners for the last about two years. The petitioners as well as other inhabitants of the aforesaid colony have been requesting Respondents 3 and 4 to tighten the said HT line for the last about two years repeatedly in writing and verbally by calling on them in their respective offices but they did not bother for the same" 4. In the written statement there is no denial to these averments. All that is claimed is that the entire colony was an unauthorized colony and that unauthorizedly the height of the houses had been raised. It is claimed that the wires were at the prescribed height of 20 feet from the ground level and that the height of the wire was as per the standard prescribed under the Rules. 5. It is submitted that these averments would show that there was a disputed question of fact as to whether or not the wires were touching the roof. We are unable to accept this submission. 5. It is submitted that these averments would show that there was a disputed question of fact as to whether or not the wires were touching the roof. We are unable to accept this submission. To the categoric averments set out hereinabove that the wires had become loose and were drooping and touching the roof of the houses, there is no denial. To the categoric averments that complaints had been made, both in writing and orally, requesting that the wires had to be tightened, there is no denial. A mere vague statement to the effect that the height was as per the prescribed limit does not detract from the fact that there is a deemed admission that the wires were drooping and touching the roofs. 6. The appellants are carrying on a business which is inherently dangerous. If a person were to come into contact with a high-tension wire, he is bound to receive serious injury and/or die. As they are carrying on a business which is inherently dangerous, the appellants would have to ensure that no injury results from their activities. If they find that unauthorized con­structions have been put up close to their wires it is their duty to ensure that that construction is got demolished by moving the appropriate author­ities and if necessary, by moving a court of law. Otherwise, they would take the consequences of their inaction. If there are complaints that these wires are drooping and almost touching houses, they have to ensure that the required distance is kept between the houses and the wires, even though the houses be unauthorized. In this case we do not find any disputed question of fact." 26. After referring to all the judgments, in our considered view, the ratio of the judgment handed down by the Apex Court in SDO Grid Corporation's case (supra) relied upon by Mr. Thakur and also made the basis for rejection of all the three writ petitions filed by the appellants, does not whittle down the law laid down by the Apex Court in 'M.P. Electricity Board's case as in SDO Grid Corporation's case (supra), the Apex Court considered the earlier decision rendered in M.P. Electricity Board's case and without affecting the principle of 'strict liability' distinguished the said judgment on the ground that the question of negligence was determined by Civil Court. Therefore, it can be reasonably understood that M.P. Electricity Board's case has been distinguished on its own facts and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not taken any contrary view from the one already taken with regard to the doctrine of 'strict liability' as discussed in extenso in the judgment of Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in M. C. Mehta's case (supra). 27. Their Lordships in a recent judgment rendered in case 'Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and others' reported in (2008) 9 SCC 527 in a case of railway accident, while dealing with the doctrine of 'strict liability', observed as under:- "47. However, apart from the principle of strict liability in Section 124-A of the Railways Act and other statutes, we can and should develop the law of strict liability dehors statutory provisions in view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in M.C. Mehta case. In our opinion, we have to develop new principles for fixing liability in cases like the present one." 28. Viewed thus, it can be comfortably said that simply on raising preliminary objection on the point of maintainability in a particular case taking the plea of disputed questions of fact, it shall not call for its dismissal out rightly on the strength of SDO Grid Corporation's case (supra). Therefore, each individual case in this regard has to be tested on the touchstone of doctrine of 'strict liability' on its own facts, but taking into consideration the averments made in the petition coupled with the documentary evidence, if any, and the reply submitted thereto by the opposite side. 29. Having said so, let us now examine the facts of the case of Joginder Singh (LPAOW No. 34/2007 arising out of OWP No. 647/2002), facts thereof, in brief, have already been depicted hereinabove. His case is that when he was passing through the field of one Dharam Singh S/o Sh. Kanshi Ram, he came in contact with the electric pole in which electric current was passing, as a result of which, he received burn injuries which ultimately resulted into amputation of his right arm above the elbow. While admitting the incident, the respondents/PDD Department has shifted the liability upon the injured only stating that he wanted to fiddle with the power supply system by climbing on the pole. While admitting the incident, the respondents/PDD Department has shifted the liability upon the injured only stating that he wanted to fiddle with the power supply system by climbing on the pole. The other ground taken is that the matter was investigated by the Executive Engineer and other senior officers of the department, in which statement of certain locals were also recorded and ultimately the matter was reported to the police. We do not find any document on the file attached with the reply so as to indicate that some inquiry was ever conducted by any senior officer/official of the department or any mater was reported with the police. In the absence of any evidence to strengthen the plea of the respondents, even prima facie so as to presume any over act attributable to the injured/writ petitioner resulting into electrocution, and while testing the present case on the doctrine of 'strict liability', we can comfortably hold that the State and its functionaries were negligent. Therefore, rejecting the case of the writ petitioner by the learned Writ Court on the basis of the judgment rendered in SDO Grid Corporation's case (supra) is not sustainable, as in our view, the said judgment is distinguishable on facts of the present case. 30. Let us now advert to other two cases in which there is one death in each case. 31. In Tara Chand's case (LPAOW No. 58/2008 arising out of OWP No.994/2003), wife of the writ petitioner has died on account of electrocution. The case set up by him is that she came in contact with a live wire hanging loose from the pole in the fields which remained unattended by the officials of the respondent-department for a long period. The incident is admitted by the respondent-depart­ment, but the negligence is not admitted on the plea that it was purely an act of God as on account of heavy rains, there was snapping of the conductor. 32. In our considered view, the plea taken by the respondents does not absolve them of their liability. It was the duty of the Electricity Department to take all the precautions. The liability cast on the State in law, would fall within the ambit of 'strict liability'. The basis of 'strict liability' is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of the activity. It was the duty of the Electricity Department to take all the precautions. The liability cast on the State in law, would fall within the ambit of 'strict liability'. The basis of 'strict liability' is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of the activity. The doctrine of 'strict liability' as discussed in extenso in 'M. C. Mehta's case (supra) is straightway attracted in the present case. The State and its functionaries, who were engaged in supplying electric energy in a particular area knew it very well that the live electric wire has dangerous dimensions. Therefore, it was their added responsibility to take all precautionary/safely mea­sures to prevent snapping of the wire. 33. While dismissing the writ petition of writ petitioner-Tara Chand, the learned Writ Court referring to the facts of the case observed thus:- "In the present case disputed question of fact arise. The petitioner alleges negligence on the part of department, but the respondents have denied the same. In this circumstance, the court can not proceed on the basis that death has taken place because of electrocution, which has resulted due to the negligence on the part of respondent. The mere fact that electric wire snapped and fell on the deceased was not by itself sufficient to establish negligence on the part of the respondents. It is required to be examined whether the wire has snapped as a result of any negligence of the respon­dents and that under which circumstances the deceased has come in contact with the wire." 34. If the present case is tested on the doctrine of 'strict liability' the observa­tions made by the learned Writ Court will not be sustainable and, as such, deserves to be disturbed. 35. Let us now advert to the death of Sanjay Kumar Sharma (LPAOW No. 60/2008 arising out of OWP No. 892/2003). He has not been died because of electrocution. The case set up by the writ petitioners is that Electricity Department had installed certain electric poles at a particular place (Jhiri) with regard to some Mela organized in that village. After that was over, the employees of the department were removing the poles and one of the poles fell on the head of the deceased, which ultimately proved fatal. In this regard, a case under Section 304-A RFC was also registered against the employees of the department. 36. After that was over, the employees of the department were removing the poles and one of the poles fell on the head of the deceased, which ultimately proved fatal. In this regard, a case under Section 304-A RFC was also registered against the employees of the department. 36. While controverting the averments made by the writ petitioners, the main stand taken by the respondents is that the deceased wanted to catch the matador and in a hurry he went towards the side where electric poles were being removed and incidentally one pole fell on the head of the deceased, resulting into his death. 37. Virtually, the incident is admitted but the entire fault is shifted to the deceased himself. The learned Writ Court taking it to be a case of disputed question of facts, observed as under:- "In the present case also disputed questions of fact have been raised. The petitioner alleges negligence on the part of department, respondents have denied the same. In this circumstance, the court can not proceed on the basis that death has taken place due to the negligence of the employees of the respondent department. The mere fact that the pole fell on the deceased was not by itself sufficient. It is required to be examined whether the pole has fallen as a result of any negligence of the respondents." 38. Following the judgment rendered in SDO Grid Corporation's case (supra), ultimately the writ petition was dismissed. 39. We are not in agreement with the view taken by the learned Writ Court on a simple rationale that the exercise being carried out by the employees of the respondent department could result in risky exposure to the human life. Therefore, they were supposed to take all the precautions at the time of removing the poles so that nobody could enter that particular area. Admittedly, that is not the case of the respondents. So appreciating it from that very angle and testing the case on the doctrine of 'strict liability' it cannot be said to be a case of disputed questions of fact as held by the learned Writ Court. 40. Admittedly, that is not the case of the respondents. So appreciating it from that very angle and testing the case on the doctrine of 'strict liability' it cannot be said to be a case of disputed questions of fact as held by the learned Writ Court. 40. For the sake of repetition, we may observe here that the doctrine of 'strict liability' is to be appreciated on the rationale of a celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 HL 330, referred hereinabove, in which it is observed that: "[T]he true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." 41. Although there are exceptions to the above rule of 'strict liability', yet what has come to be accepted by Courts in India including Supreme Court of India, may be stated as follows:- Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on any one on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (refer to M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, reported as (1987) 1 SCC 395 ) ( AIR 1987 SC 1086 ). 42. In view of the above settled legal position and after appreciating all the three cases at hand in the light of the aforesaid discussion, where facts of each individual case have been taken into account, we hold that the negligence in these cases is writ large, which makes the respondents liable to compensate the writ petitioner(s) for deaths/injury. 43. Resultantly, the impugned orders passed in each of the three cases on different dates dismissing the writ petitions are liable to be set aside. Ordered accordingly. Discussion on quantum of compensation:- 44. The next question arises for our consideration is that, what should be the quantum of compensation to be awarded in each case. 43. Resultantly, the impugned orders passed in each of the three cases on different dates dismissing the writ petitions are liable to be set aside. Ordered accordingly. Discussion on quantum of compensation:- 44. The next question arises for our consideration is that, what should be the quantum of compensation to be awarded in each case. We could remand all the three cases to the learned Writ Court for assessment of compensation, once we have held the respondents being negligent, but remanding for determination of compen­sation, at this stage, will further delay the matter. Therefore, to shorten the litigation and to do complete justice between the parties, we embark upon the exercise ourselves to assess the compensation in each individual case. 45. For the purpose of assessing compensation, we would apply the same analogy, which the legislature in its wisdom and as a social security measure has provided to the victim of the motor vehicle accident enacting 163-A of the Motor Vehicle Act sanctioning payment of compensation on the basis of the structured formula prescribed in Second Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (for short to be referred to as Act only). Finding in:- LPAOW No. 34/2007 arising out of OWP No. 647/2002 46. Let us take the case of Joginder Singh-injured/writ petitioner. The medical evidence on record indicates that it is a case of amputation of right hand. The certificate of disability issued by the Government Medical College & Hospital, Jammu reflects permanent disability to the extent of 60%. His age in the medical record is shown as 25 years. He asserts in his petition that besides engaging himself in agricultural pursuits, sometimes he used to work as conductor also with the matador. May be there is no evidence with regard to this aspect, still one fact, which this Court cannot lose sight of is that at the time of incident, appellant-Joginder Singh was of the age of 25 years and, therefore, even if we consider his earning capacity at the level of a daily wager, his income should be minimum Rs.3,000/-per month. Permanent disability in his case is to the extent of 60%. He is, therefore, entitled to compensation for future loss of earning. 47. In a very recent judgment handed down by I hon'ble Supreme Court in case 'Yadava Kumar v. The Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Permanent disability in his case is to the extent of 60%. He is, therefore, entitled to compensation for future loss of earning. 47. In a very recent judgment handed down by I hon'ble Supreme Court in case 'Yadava Kumar v. The Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. & another' 2010 (5) Recent Apex Judgments 116, while drawing the distinction between 'compensation' and 'damage' their Lordships have observed in para 20 as under:- "20. The High Court and the Tribunal must realize that there is a distinction between compensation and damage. The expression compensation may include a claim for damage but compensation is more comprehensive. Normally damages are given for an injury which is suffered, whereas compensation stands on a slightly higher footing. It is given for the atone­ment of injury caused and the intention behind grant of compensation is to put back the injured party as far as possible in the same position, as if the injury has not taken place, by way of grant of pecuniary relief. Thus, in the matter of computation of compensation, the approach will be slightly more broad based than what is done in the matter of assessment of damages. At the same time it is true that there cannot be any rigid or mathematical precision in the matter of determination of compensation." 48. In the aforesaid case, the permanent disability received by the injured was assessed as 20% and the income was assessed as Rs.36,000/- per annum. While taking into account Second Schedule under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which gives a structured formula for calculating compensation in accident cases, considering the age of the injured, multiplier of 17 was adopted and for assessing loss of future income, by applying the multiplier on the actual income vis-a-vis the disability, loss of future earning was assessed as Rs. 1,22,400/-. 49. For reference, clause 5 of the Schedule deals with disability in non fatal accidents, which reads as follows:- "5. Disability in non-fatal accidents: The following compensation shall be payable in case of disability to the victim arising out of non-fatal accidents: Loss of income, if any, for actual period of disablement not exceeding fifty two weeks. 1,22,400/-. 49. For reference, clause 5 of the Schedule deals with disability in non fatal accidents, which reads as follows:- "5. Disability in non-fatal accidents: The following compensation shall be payable in case of disability to the victim arising out of non-fatal accidents: Loss of income, if any, for actual period of disablement not exceeding fifty two weeks. PLUS either of the following:- (a) In case of permanent total disablement the amount payment shall be arrived at by multiplying the annual loss of income by the Multiplier applicable to the age on the date of determining the compensation, or (b) In case of permanent partial disablement such percentage of compen­sation which would have been payable in the case of permanent total disablement as specified under item (a) above. Injuries deemed to result in Permanent Total Disablement/Permanent Partial Disablement and percentage of loss of earning capacity shall be as per Schedule I under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923." 50. Let us apply the ratio of the aforesaid judgment on the case of injured-Joginder Singh also. His income has been assessed by us as Rs. 3,000/- p.m. It comes to Rs.36,000/- p.a. At the time of accident, his age was 25 years. Even if we apply the multiplier of 17, it come to Rs.6,12,000/-. Percentage of disablement is 60%. The loss of future earning would be thus Rs.3,67,200/-. We round it to Rs.3,70,000/-. 51. Mr. Chandel has relied upon a judgment of Delhi High Court rendered in case of a labourer suffering from permanent disability of 60% has been granted compensation to the tune of Rs.9 lacs. In the said case, Tribunal had taken the income at minimum wages of Rs.2,783/- p.m. and considering the rise in cost of living and future prospects, assessed average income at Rs.4,175/- p.m., adopted the multi­plier of 18 and after assessing functional disability at 75%, awarded Rs.6,76,350/-for loss of earning capacity. Besides this, Rs.1,00,000/- for pain and suffering, Rs.2,00,000/-for permanent disability/loss of amenities, Rs.26,000/- for medical expenses, Rs.75,00/- for conveyance/attendant charges and Rs.25,000/- for loss of marriage prospects was granted. The total awarded amount was Rs.10,34,850/-. By Appellate Court, amount for loss of earning was reduced to Rs.5,41,080/- and ultimately the injured claimant was granted about Rs.9 lacs. 52. Besides this, Rs.1,00,000/- for pain and suffering, Rs.2,00,000/-for permanent disability/loss of amenities, Rs.26,000/- for medical expenses, Rs.75,00/- for conveyance/attendant charges and Rs.25,000/- for loss of marriage prospects was granted. The total awarded amount was Rs.10,34,850/-. By Appellate Court, amount for loss of earning was reduced to Rs.5,41,080/- and ultimately the injured claimant was granted about Rs.9 lacs. 52. We, after considering the case of Joginder Singh-injured on all aspects, grant a sum of Rs.6,40,000/- as per following break up under different heads:- Rs.3,70,000/- for loss of future earning. Rs.1,00,000/- for pain and suffering. Rs.70,000/- for medical expenses. Rs.25,000/- for conveyance and attendant charges Rs.75,000/- towards loss of amenities. 53. We would like to mention here that in the memo of appeal, Joginder Singh-appellant in the relief clause has prayed for compensation to the tune of Rs.3 lacs, but we ignore that fact and go, to the original writ petition wherein a sum of Rs.12 lacs is asked for. Finding in:- LPAOW No. 58/2008 arising out of OWP No. 994/2003 54. Let us now take the case of Tara Chand, in which his wife-Lakshmi has died. He has prayed for Rs.5 lacs as compensation. At the time of death, the deceased was of 26 years. She is said to be house-wife. In the petition, Tara Chand has not said a word about any child born out of their wedlock. Therefore, we will presume that appellant-Tara Chand is the only legal heir of the deceased. 55. Mr. Thakur, learned counsel for respondents, argued before us that since Lakshmi was a house wife, she cannot be said to be an earning member and, therefore, not entitled to any compensation. 56. We do not agree with the submissions advanced by Mr. Thakur. 57. In a very recent judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court handed down in case 'Arun Kumar Agrawal and another v. National Insurance Company and others' 2010 (4) R.A.J. 262, their lordships while dealing with the compensation part on account of death of a house wife in a motor accident held that service .rendered by a house wife cannot be compared with that of house-keeper or servant. It was observed in para 23 as under:- "23. In India the Courts have recognized that the Contribution made by the wife to the house is invaluable and cannot be computed in terms of money. It was observed in para 23 as under:- "23. In India the Courts have recognized that the Contribution made by the wife to the house is invaluable and cannot be computed in terms of money. The gratuitous services rendered by wife with the love and affection to the children and her husband and managing the household affairs cannot be equated with the services rendered by others. A wife/mother does not work by the clock. She is in the constant attendance of the family through­out the day and night unless she is employed and is required to attend the employer's work for particular hours. She takes care of all the requirements of husband and children including cooking of food, washing of clothes, etc. She teaches small children and provides invaluable guidance to them for their future life. A housekeeper or maidservant can do the household work,, such as cooking food, washing clothes and tonsils, keeping the house clean etc., but she can never be a substitute for a wife/mother who renders selfless service to her husband and children." 58. It was further held that in absence of any definite criteria for determining the compensation payable to the dependents of a non-earning house wife/mother, it would be reasonable to rely upon the criteria specified in clause (6) of the Second Schedule and then apply appropriate multiplier. In para 32 of the aforesaid judg­ment, it was observed as under:- "32. In our view, it is highly unfair, unjust and inappropriate to compute the compensation payable to the dependents of a deceased wife/mother, who does not have regular income, by comparing her services with that of a housekeeper or a servant or an employee, who works for a fixed period. The gratuitous services rendered by wife/mother to the husband and children cannot be equated with the services of an employee and no evidence or data can possibly be produced for estimating the value of such services. It is virtually impossible to measure in terms of money, the loss of personal care and attention suffered by the husband and children on the demise of the housewife. In its wisdom, the legislature had, as early as in 1994, fixed the notional income of a non-earning person at Rs.15,000/- per annum and in case of a spouse, 1/3rd income of the earning/surviving spouse for the purpose of computing the compensation. In its wisdom, the legislature had, as early as in 1994, fixed the notional income of a non-earning person at Rs.15,000/- per annum and in case of a spouse, 1/3rd income of the earning/surviving spouse for the purpose of computing the compensation. Though, Section 163A does not, in terms apply to the cases in which claim for compensation is filed under Section 166 of the Act, in the absence of any other definite criteria for determination of compensation payable to the dependents of a non-earning housewife/mother, it would be reasonable to rely upon the criteria specified in clause(6) of the Second Schedule and then apply appro­priate multiplier keeping in view the judgments of this Court in General Manager Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and others (supra), U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Trilok Chandra (supra), Sarla Vcrma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another (supra) and also take guidance from the judgment in Lata Wadhwa's case. The approach adopted by different Benches of Delhi High Court to com­pute the compensation by relying upon the minimum wages payable to a skilled worker does not commend out approval because it is most unreal­istic to compare the gratuitous services of the housewife/mother with work of a skilled worker." 59. As to how to assess the loss of dependency in the event of death of a house wife, it would be apt to reproduce para 10 of the judgment handed down by Apex Court in 'Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar7 reported in AIR 2001 SC 3218 , which reads thus:- "10. So far as the deceased housewives are concerned, in the absence of any data and as the housewives were not earning any income, attempt has been made to determine the compensation, on the basis of services rendered by them to the house. On the basis of the age ground of the housewives, appropriate multiplier has been applied but the estimation of the value of services rendered the house by the housewives, which has been arrived at Rs.12,000/- per annum in cases of some and Rs.10,000/- for others, appears to us to be grossly low. It is true that the claimants, who ought to have given dates for determination of compensation, did not assist in any manner by providing the datas for estimating the value of services rendered by such housewives. It is true that the claimants, who ought to have given dates for determination of compensation, did not assist in any manner by providing the datas for estimating the value of services rendered by such housewives. But even in the absence of such datas and taking into consideration the multifarious services rendered by the housewives for managing the entire family, even on a modest estimation, should be Rs.3000/- per month and Rs.36,000/- per annum. This would apply to all those housewives between the age group of 34 to 59 and as such who were active in life. The compensation awarded, therefore, should be re-calcu­lated, taking the value of services rendered per annum to be Rs.36,000/-and thereafter applying the multiplier, as has been applied already, and so far as the conventional amount is concerned, the same should be Rs.50,000/- instead of Rs.25,000/- given under the report. So far as the elderly ladies are concerned, in the age group of 62 to 72, the value of services rendered has been taken at Rs.10,000/- per annum and multiplier applied is eight. Though, the multiplier applied is correct, but the value of services rendered at Rs.10,000/- per annum, cannot be held to be just and, we, therefore, enhance the same to Rs.20,000/- per annum. In their case, therefore, the total amount of compensation should be re-determined, taking the value of services rendered at Rs.20,000/- per annum and then after applying the multiplier, as already applied and thereafter adding Rs.50,000/- towards the conventional figure." 60. Viewed, thus, we do not even deduct any amount in consideration of the expenses, which the victim could incur towards maintaining herself in this partic­ular case and hold that the claimant/writ petitioner has lost the contribu­tion/source of dependency on account of death of his wife to the tune of Rs.3,000/- per month, thus Rs.36,000/- per annum and by applying the multiplier of 17 considering the age of the deceased, it comes to Rs.6,12,000/- (Rs.36,000 x 17). A sum of Rs.20,000/- for loss of consortium and Rs.10,000/- for funeral expenses etc. is also added to it. The total amount of compensation to which the appellant/writ petitioner now becomes entitled is Rs.6,42,000/-. However, we restrict his claim to Rs.5 lacs only as in his basic writ petition, writ petitioner-Tara Chand is claiming the said amount. Finding in:-LPAOW No. 60/2008 arising out of OWP No. 892/2003 61. is also added to it. The total amount of compensation to which the appellant/writ petitioner now becomes entitled is Rs.6,42,000/-. However, we restrict his claim to Rs.5 lacs only as in his basic writ petition, writ petitioner-Tara Chand is claiming the said amount. Finding in:-LPAOW No. 60/2008 arising out of OWP No. 892/2003 61. Let us now take the case of death of Sanjay Kumar Sharma, in which his parents (petitioner Nos.1 & 2) and two real brothers are praying for grant of compensation. Mr. Gandotra at the very outset submits that petitioner Nos. 3 & 4 (real brothers of the deceased) were not dependent upon the earning of the deceased and as such he would confine his case with regard to the compensation part qua petitioner No.1 & 2 only being the parents of the deceased. 62. Deceased, at the time of accident, was of the age of 27 years. His earning has been shown as Rs.4,000/- p.m. However, no documentary evidence has been placed on record with regard to the earning part. A sum of Rs.7,50,000/- as compensation has been asked for. 63. Since no conclusive proof of income of the deceased has brought on record, we by our guess work and for assessing just compensation, fix the income of the deceased as Rs.3,000/- p.m. Out of monthly income,1/3rd is to be deducted towards the personal expenditure of the deceased, thus, leaving behind a sum of Rs.2,QOO/- per month. It come to Rs.24,000/- per annum. For applying suitable multiplier, we would apply the same test as observed by their Lordships in case tilled 'Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another' ACJ 2009, page 1298, wherein it is observed thus:- "19. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie, 2005 ACJ 1131 (SO, thus court noticed that in respect of claims under section 166 of the M.V Act, the highest multiplier applicable was 18 and that the said multiplier should be applied to the age group of 21 to 25 years (commencement of normal productive years) and the lowest multiplier would be in respect of persons in the age group of 60 to 70 years (normal retiring age). This was reiterated in Tamil Nadu State Road Trans. Corpn. This was reiterated in Tamil Nadu State Road Trans. Corpn. Ltd. v. S. Rajapriya, 2005, 2005 ACJ 1441 (Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie (for claims under section 166 of MV Act) is given below in juxtaposition with the multiplier mentioned in the Second Schedule for claims under section 163-A of M.V. Act (with appropriate declaration after 50 years): Age of the Deceased Multiplier scale as envisaged in Susamma Thomas Multiplier scale scale as adopted in Trilok, Chandra Multiplier scale scale in Trilok Chandra as clarified in Charlie Multiplier specified in Second column in the Table in Second Schedule to MVAct Multiplier actually used in second Schedule to MV Act (as seen from the quantum of compen­sation. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Up to 15 years _ 15 20 15 to 20 years 16 18 18 16 19 21 to 25 years 15 17 18 17 18 26 to 30 years 14 16 17 18 17 31 to 35 years 13 15 16 17 16 36 to 40 years 12 14 15 16 15 41 to 45 years 11 13 14 15 14 46 to 50 years 10 12 13 13 12 51 to 55 years 9 11 11 11 10 56 to 60 years 8 10 9 8 8 61 to 65 years 6 8 7 5 6 Above 65 years 5 5 5 5 5 20. Tribunals/courts adopted and apply different operative multipliers. Some follow the multiplier with reference to Susamma Thomas (set out in column 2 of the Table above); some follow the multiplier with reference to Trilok Chandra (set out in column 3 of the Table above); some follow the multiplier with reference to Charlie (set out in column 4 of the Table above); many follow the multiplier given in the second column of the Table in the Second Schedule to MV Act (extracted in column 5 of the Table above); and some follow the multiplier actually adopted in the Second Schedule while calculating the quantum of compensation (set out in column 6 of the Table above). For example, if the deceased is aged 38 years, the multiplier would be 12 as per Susamma Thomas, 14 as per Trilok Chandra, 15 as per Charlie, or 16 as per the multiplier given in column 2 of the Second Schedule to the MV Act or 15 as per the multiplier actually adopted in the Second Schedule to MV Act. Some Tribunals, as in this case, apply the multiplier of 22 by taking the balance years of service with reference to the retiring age. It is necessary to avoid this kind of inconsistency. We are concerned with cases falling under section 166 and not under 163-A of M.V. Act. In cases falling under section 166 of the M.V. Act, Devies Method is applicable. 21. We, therefore, hold that the multiplier to be used should be as men­tioned in column 4 of the Table above (prepared by applying Susamma if Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years, reduced by one unit for every five years, that is, M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years." 64. Since the age of the deceased at the time of occurrence was 27 years as pleaded in the writ petition and clear from the post mortem report also, in our considered view, multiplier of 17 will be attracted. Adopting the same, the depen­dency of the petitioners is assessed as 24000 X17= Rs.4,08,000/-. Beside this amount, a sum of Rs.50,000/- is being granted for love and affection and another sum of Rs.10,000/- for funeral expenses. The total amount, thus, comes to Rs.4,68,000/-. We round it to Rs.4,70,000/-. Granted accordingly. 65. Before parting with the judgment, we would like to mention here that the appellants/writ petitioners have not prayed for interest on compensation either in the main petition(s) or in the memo of appeal(s), therefore, we do not grant any interest on the amount of compensation awarded by us in each individual case. We round it to Rs.4,70,000/-. Granted accordingly. 65. Before parting with the judgment, we would like to mention here that the appellants/writ petitioners have not prayed for interest on compensation either in the main petition(s) or in the memo of appeal(s), therefore, we do not grant any interest on the amount of compensation awarded by us in each individual case. However, we direct the respondents to release actual amount of compensation to the appellants/writ petitioners within three months from the date of passing of the judgment, failing which they shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of the judgment till its realization. 66. All the appeals, thus, stand allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms.