JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. The present appeal filed u/s 483 of the Companies Act, 1956 is directed against order passed by the learned Company Judge in Company Application No.377 of 2008 in Company Petition No.226 of 2007. 2. The present appeal arises in the backdrop of the following factual background. 3. Late Shri Mafatlal Gordhandas Patel was an employee of a company running in the name of Cellulose Products of India Limited (now under liquidation). In the year 1993 he was dismissed from service. The order of dismissal was challenged before the Labour Court and the Labour Court quashed and set aside the order of dismissal and directed the company to pay back wages from the date of dismissal up to the date of superannuation i.e. from 1993 to 2001. It appears from the record of the case that the company challenged the said award by way of filing Special Civil Application No.9028 of 2000 before this Court. The matter was admitted and the order of payment of back wages was stayed. During the pendency of Special Civil Application No.9028 of 2000 the company was ordered to be wound up and the Official Liquidator was appointed for managing the affairs of the company vide order dated 16th May 2008. Special Civil Application No.9028 of 2000, which was preferred by the company and which was pending for final disposal was taken up for hearing on 16th May 2008 and the learned Single Judge passed the following order: 1. The petitioner company, namely Cellulose Products of India Limited has filed this petition for quashing and setting aside the impugned award dated 16th September 1999 passed by the Presiding officer, Labour Court, Ahmedabad in Reference No. LCA No. 1462 of 1993. This Court has admitted the said petition and granted interim relief against the payment of backwages. During the pendency of the said petition, Civil Application No. 4420 of 2007 was filed by Shri Mafatlal G. Patel, the Respondent in the said Special Civil Application No. 9028 of 2008. In the said Civil Application the Court has directed the Registrar to present the Civil Application along with the Company Petition No. 226 of 2007 before the learned Company Judge. Accordingly these two applications are heard along with Company Petition No. 226 of 2007. In the said Civil Application the Court has directed the Registrar to present the Civil Application along with the Company Petition No. 226 of 2007 before the learned Company Judge. Accordingly these two applications are heard along with Company Petition No. 226 of 2007. This Court has passed an order today in Company Petition No. 226 of 2007 directing the company to be wound up u/s 433(a) of the Companies Act, 1956. In view of the said winding up order and in view of the observations made therein, the present Special Civil Application as well as Civil Application no longer survive. The Official Liquidator is in charge of the Affairs of the company and he will adjudicate the claim of the concerned workman, namely, Shri Mafatlal G. Patel and distribute the amount in his favour, out of the amount which is to be received from Registrar of Gujarat High Court with whom the IIBI has deposited a sum of Rs 64.05 lacs. If necessary the concerned workman may also lodge his claim with the Official Liquidator and the Official Liquidator will decide the said claim in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act 1956. If the claim of the concerned workman is not satisfied, it is open for him to move an appropriate application for redressing the grievance. 2. Subject to the aforesaid directions and observations the above Special Civil Application as well as Civil applications are accordingly disposed of. 4. It is evident from the order passed by the learned Company Judge that the Appellant was given liberty to lodge his claim with the Official Liquidator and the Official Liquidator would decide the claim in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act. The learned Company Judge also observed that if the claim of the Appellant is not satisfied, it would be open for him to move an appropriate application to redress his grievance. 5. The manufacturing activities of the company got stopped from 1998 and because of this the Appellant could not claim back wages for the period from 1998 up to 2001. 5. The manufacturing activities of the company got stopped from 1998 and because of this the Appellant could not claim back wages for the period from 1998 up to 2001. Ultimately, a settlement took place between the company and the workers and under the settlement all the workers gave a resignation and in return of that they got the benefit of gratuity, retrenchment compensation, ex-gratia payment of 15 days salary per each year as well as 12 days per year, total 42 days per year of their total rendered services in the said company. 6. As per the order of the learned Single Judge, the Appellant put forward his calculation of back-wages before the Official Liquidator, who, in turn, forwarded the same for the verification of the claim of the Appellant. The Official Liquidator filed its report on 8th May 2009 stating that the Appellant was entitled to receive the amount of back wages to the tune of Rs.2,31,223. 7. The Appellant, thereafter, preferred Company Application No.377 of 2008 through his legal heirs for directing the Official Liquidator to make the payment of back wages as were available to deceased Shri Mafatbhai Patel as per the award of the labour court. Before the learned Company Judge it was contended that in addition to Rs.2,31,223/- the Appellants were also entitled to ex-gratia payment as made to the other workers by the management who were in service as per the settlement arrived at between the management and the workers' union before the Industrial Tribunal. It was submitted that such ex-gratia payment would be Rs.1,57,500, which was ordered to be paid by the High Court as per the interim order dated October 20, 2009 and the same shall be in addition to the back-wages and the said amount, which is paid as per the interim order may not be adjusted or deducted. Lastly, it was contended that the Appellant would have continued in service up to October 2001 and as per the report of the Chartered Accountant, if the services are considered until October 2001, he would have been entitled for the amount of Rs.3,57,122/- and such amount may be ordered to be paid to the Appellant if ex-gratia payment is to be excluded or the interim payment made is to be adjusted or set off. 8. 8. The learned Company Judge rejected the entire plea of the Appellants taking the view that the reinstatement would not continue beyond closure of the manufacturing activity, which is in 1998 and the Appellant was not a party to the settlement and therefore the back wages, at the most, could be claimed by the worker until the manufacturing activity of the company was in operation i.e. November 1998. Ultimately, the learned Company Judge directed the Official Liquidator to make the balance payment of Rs.2,31,323 minus the amount of Rs.1,57,500, which is already paid as per order dated 20th October 2008. 9. The legal heirs of the Appellant, feeling aggrieved by the said order passed by the learned Company Judge filed the present appeal. 10. We have noticed and are of the view that the order of the learned Company Judge is little harsh and unreasonable to a certain extent. It deserves to be noted that there was already an award passed by the Labour Court ordering reinstatement of the Appellant with back wages from 1993-2001. Unfortunately, in the year 1998 the unit got closed. If the unit would not have been closed, probably, the Appellant would have received the entire amount of back wages till the time of his superannuation in the year 2001. We feel that it is too harsh to say that on the one hand he is not entitled to the entire amount of back wages from 1993 till 2001 because of closure of the unit in the year 1998 and that he is not entitled to the ex gratia payment to the tune of Rs.1,57,500/-. The Appellant is not responsible for the closure of the unit. Even otherwise, he was entitled to receive back wages from 1993 to 2001. Assuming for a moment that he is not entitled now to claim back wages up to 2001 and he is entitled to claim the same for the period from 1993 to 1998, under no circumstances can he be denied the ex-gratia payment and retrenchment compensation payment of Rs.1,53,000/-, which were were already ordered to be paid by way of an interim order. On the one hand he has lost back wages of 3 years viz. for the period from 1998 to 2001 because of closure of the unit and on the other hand the ex-gratia payment and retrenchment compensation is also sought to be withdrawn. 11. On the one hand he has lost back wages of 3 years viz. for the period from 1998 to 2001 because of closure of the unit and on the other hand the ex-gratia payment and retrenchment compensation is also sought to be withdrawn. 11. We take notice of the fact that late Mafatlal Gordhandas Patel was an ordinary worker of the company hailing from a lower strata of society. For a fortuitous circumstance, he cannot be asked to pay a heavy price. Firstly, it deserves to be noted that he did not even live long to derive some monetary benefit out of the orders which were passed by the Labour Court. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the only way to do complete justice was to pay him ex-gratia payment or monetary compensation, which was already ordered to be paid. We also take notice of the fact that as per the recent trend of the judgments of the Ape Court in a large number of decisions the Apex Court has assigned that payment of adequate compensation in place of direction to reinstatement in service would subserve the ends of justice. Reference is made of the following judgments: Jaipur Development Authority Vs. Ram Sahai and Another, (2006) 11 SCC 684 Madhya Pradesh Administration Vs. Tribhuban, (2007) 9 SCC 748 Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation Vs. M.C. Joshi, (2007) 9 SCC 353 12. Secondly, in the recent judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the matter of Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, AIR 2010 SC 1116 the Honourable Supreme Court laid much emphasis on interpreting the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and other similar legislative instruments, which are social welfare legislations keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution of India and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39, 39(a) to (e), 43, 43A in particular, much mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. In paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 23 the Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under: 17. In paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 23 the Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under: 17. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J, opined that "the concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State" - The State of Mysore Vs. The Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 923 . 18. In Y.A. Mamarde and Nine Ors. and Ghanshyam and Others Vs. Authority under the Minimum Wages Act (Small Causes Court) Nagpur and Another, AIR 1972 SC 1721 this Court, while interpreting the provisions of Minimum Wages Act, 1948, observed: The anxiety on the part of the society for improving the general economic condition of some of its less favoured members appears to be in supersession of the old principle of absolute freedom of contract and the doctrine of laissez faire and in recognition of the new principles of social welfare and common good. Prior to our Constitution this principle was advocated by the movement for liberal employment in civilised countries and the Act which is a pre-constitution measure was the offspring of that movement. Under our present Constitution the State is now expressly directed to endeavour to secure to all workers (whether agricultural, industrial or otherwise) not only bare physical subsistence but a living wage and conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure. Under our present Constitution the State is now expressly directed to endeavour to secure to all workers (whether agricultural, industrial or otherwise) not only bare physical subsistence but a living wage and conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure. This Directive Principle of State Policy being conducive to the general interest of the nation as a whole, merely lays down the foundation for appropriate social structure in which the labour will find its place of dignity, legitimately due to it in lieu of its contribution to the progress of national economic prosperity. 19. The preamble and various Articles contained in Part IV of the Constitution promote social justice so that life of every individual becomes meaningful and he is able to live with human dignity. The concept of social justice engrafted in the Constitution consists of diverse principles essentially for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. Social justice is thus an integral part of justice in the generic sense. Justice is the genus, of which social justice is one of its species. Social justice is a dynamic devise to mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, dalits, tribals and deprived sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. In other words, the aim of social justice is to attain substantial degree of social, economic and political equality, which is the legitimate expectation of every section of the society. In a developing society like ours which is full of unbridgeable and ever widening gaps of inequality in status and of opportunity, law is a catalyst to reach the ladder of justice. The philosophy of welfare State and social justice is amply reflected in large number of judgments of this Court, various High Courts, National and State Industrial Tribunals involving interpretation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, Indian Factories Act, Payment of Wages Act, Minimum Wages Act, Payment of Bonus Act, Workmen's Compensation Act, the Employees Insurance Act, the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act and the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act enacted by different States. 21. In 70s, 80s and early 90s, the courts repeatedly negated the doctrine of laissez faire and the theory of hire and fire. 21. In 70s, 80s and early 90s, the courts repeatedly negated the doctrine of laissez faire and the theory of hire and fire. In his treaties: Democracy, Equality and Freedom, Justice Mathew wrote: The original concept of employment was that of master and servant. It was therefore held that a court will not specifically enforce a contract of employment. The law has adhered to the age-old rule that an employer may dismiss the employee at will. Certainly, an employee can never expect to be completely free to do what he likes to do. He must face the prospect of discharge for failing or refusing to do his work in accordance with his employer's directions. Such control by the employer over the employee is fundamental to the employment relationship. But there are innumerable facets of the employee's life that have little or no relevance to the employment relationship and over which the employer should not be allowed to exercise control. It is no doubt difficult to draw a line between reasonable demands of an employer and those which are unreasonable as having no relation to the employment itself. The rule that an employer can arbitrarily discharge an employee with or without regard to the actuating motive is a rule settled beyond doubt. But the rule became settled at a time when the words `master' and `servant' were taken more literally than they are now and when, as in early Roman Law, the rights of the servant, like the rights of any other member of the household, were not his own, but those of his pater familias. The overtones of this ancient doctrine are discernible in the judicial opinion which rationalised the employer's absolute right to discharge the employee. Such a philosophy of the employer's dominion over his employee may have been in tune with the rustic simplicity of bygone days. But that philosophy is incompatible with these days of large, impersonal, corporate employers. The conditions have now vastly hanged and it is difficult to regard the contract of employment with large scale industries and government enterprises conducted by bodies which are created under special statutes as mere contract of personal service. But that philosophy is incompatible with these days of large, impersonal, corporate employers. The conditions have now vastly hanged and it is difficult to regard the contract of employment with large scale industries and government enterprises conducted by bodies which are created under special statutes as mere contract of personal service. Where large number of people are unemployed and it is extremely difficult to find employment, an employee who is discharged from service might have to remain without means of subsistence for a considerably long time and damages in the shape of wages for a certain period may not be an adequate compensation to the employee for non-employment. In other words, damages would be a poor substitute for reinstatement. The traditional rule has survived because of the sustenance it received from the law of contracts. From the contractual principle of mutuality of obligation, it was reasoned that if the employee can quit his job at will, then so too must the employer have the right to terminate the relationship for any or no reason. And there are a number of cases in which even contracts for permanent employment, i.e. for indefinite terms, have been held unenforceable on the ground that they lack mutuality of obligation. But these case demonstrate that mutuality is a high-sounding phrase of little use as an analytical tool and it would seem clear that mutuality of obligation is not an inexorable requirement and that lack of mutuality is simply, as many courts have come to recognize, an imperfect way of referring to the real obstacle to enforcing any kind of contractual limitation on the employer's right of discharge, i.e. lack of consideration. If there is anything in contract law which seems likely to advance the present inquiry, it is the growing tendency to protect individuals from contracts of adhesion from over-reaching terms often found in standard forms of contract used by large commercial establishments. Judicial disfavour of contracts of adhesion has been said to reflect the assumed need to protect the weaker contracting part against the harshness of the common law and the abuses of freedom of contract. The same philosophy seems to provide an appropriate answer to the argument, which still seems to have some vitality, that "the servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered to him. (emphasis added) 13. The same philosophy seems to provide an appropriate answer to the argument, which still seems to have some vitality, that "the servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered to him. (emphasis added) 13. In view of what we have observed in the judgment, we deem it fit and proper to disturb the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge to the extent that the Official Liquidator to make the balance payment i.e. Rs.2,31,323 minus the amount of Rs.1,57,500, which is already paid as per order dated 20th October 2008. We modify the order to the extent that the Official Liquidator shall now pay Rs.2,31,323 determined towards back wages for the period from 1993 to 1998 without deducting the amount of Rs.1,57,500 paid to the Appellant towards ex-gratia payment or monetary compensation as per the settlement arrived at between the Government and other identically situated workers like the Appellant. We deem it fit to observe that though the Appellant was not a party to the settlement which was arrived at between other identically situated workman, but that would hardly make any difference in view of the what we have observed in the judgment. We direct the Official Liquidator to handover the account payee cheques of the amount of Rs.2,31,322/- within 15 days from the date of receipt of order of this Court. Appeal stand allowed accordingly.