Research › Search › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 1286 (BOM)

Geeta Ramesh Agrawal v. State of Maharashtra

2011-10-13

ANOOP V.MOHTA, D.K.DESHMUKH

body2011
Judgment :- D.K. DESHMUKH, J. 1. By this Petition, the Petitioner, who is a legal representative of a judicial officer, challenges the order dated 28 October 2003 by which the original Petitioner Mrs. Geeta Agrawal was compulsorily retired from the judicial service. At the time when that order was made, she was holding the post of Metropolitan Magistrate. She was compulsorily retired by giving her three months pay. There are three challenges raised to the order of compulsory retirement : (i) That as per the service rules the appointing authority of the Petitioner being a promotee Metropolitan Magistrate is High Court and, therefore, the order of compulsory retirement could not have been issued by the Governor of Maharashtra; (ii) That payment of three months salary was not tendered to the Petitioner along with the notice of compulsory retirement but that payment was made subsequently and (iii) There was no material before the Authority for compulsorily retiring the Petitioner on completion of 50 years of age. 2. So far as the first submission is concerned, according to the Petitioner, an order of compulsory retirement can be made by the Appropriate Authority. The term “Appropriate Authority” has been defined to mean the Authority which has power to make substantive appointment to the post or service. As per the Bombay Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1956, so far as the post of Metropolitan Magistrate is concerned, persons who are appointed to the post of Metropolitan Magistrate by promotion, their appointing Authority is the High Court. According to the Petitioner, therefore, the order of compulsory retirement could have been made only by the High Court. As per the Bombay Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1956, so far as the post of Metropolitan Magistrate is concerned, persons who are appointed to the post of Metropolitan Magistrate by promotion, their appointing Authority is the High Court. According to the Petitioner, therefore, the order of compulsory retirement could have been made only by the High Court. The Respondents, on the other hand, relied on Article 234 of the Constitution of India and two judgments of the Supreme Court, one in the case of Registrar, High Court of Madras vs. R. Rajiah (1988) 3 SCC 211 and the other of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Registrar (Admn), High Court of Orissa, Cuttack vs. Sisir Kanta Satapathy (Dead) by lrs & anr., (1999) 7 SCC 725 , to contend that notwithstanding what is contained in the service Rules in view of the provisions of Article 234 of the Constitution of India the appointing Authority of a person who is holding the post of Metropolitan Magistrate is the Governor of State and, therefore, the order of compulsory retirement issued by the Governor is issued by the Competent Authority. 3. It is true that as per the Bombay Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1956, power to make appointment by promotion to the post of Metropolitan Magistrate is vested in the High Court. Article 234 of the Constitution of India reads as under: Appointments of persons other than district judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State.” 4. Thus, according to the aforesaid Article, the appointing Authority of all judicial officers other than the District Judges is the Governor of the State. In the case before the Supreme Court in the case of Registrar, High Court of Madras vs. R. Rajiah (supra),the judicial officer was compulsorily retired by an order made by the High Court. The contention of the judicial officer was that it is only the Governor of the State who is competent to issue order of compulsory retirement in view of the provisions of Articles 234 and 235 of the Constitution. That contention has been upheld by the Supreme Court. The contention of the judicial officer was that it is only the Governor of the State who is competent to issue order of compulsory retirement in view of the provisions of Articles 234 and 235 of the Constitution. That contention has been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has held that though the decision to retire a judicial officer compulsorily has to be taken by the High Court in view of the provisions of Article 235 in term of the provisions of Article 234 formal order of compulsory retirement is to be issued by the Governor. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Registrar (Admn), High Court of Orissa, Cuttack vs. Sisir Kanta Satapathy (Dead) by lrs & anr(supra),was considering a similar case where the order of compulsory retirement of a judicial officer was issued by the High Court and the contention of the judicial officer was that the order should have been issued by the Governor of the State. The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 17 and 18 of that judgment are relevant. They read as under: “17 In the instant case, the decision of the Orissa High Court dated 421987 (on the administrative side) was required to be forwarded to the Governor for passing an order of compulsory retirement. That was not done. It was wrong for the High Court to have passed the order of compulsory retirement itself. The judicial side of the High Court rightly decided the writ petition in favour of the judicial officers and held the order dated 521987 to be bad. In the words of the Division Bench of the High Court: “There is a stronger constitutional objection to accept the submission of Shri Nayak for regarding the High Court as the appointing authority of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on the basis of what has been provided in Rule 10 of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963, inasmuch as it has been laid down in Article 234 of the Constitution that appointments of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with the rules made by him in that behalf. The aforesaid rules are one set of such rules. The aforesaid rules are one set of such rules. So, no provision in the rules could have altered the constitutional position that the Governor of the State is the appointing authority of persons other than District Judges also. Conferment of this power on the High Court by virtue of what is stated in Rule 10 of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules would have clashed with the constitutional mandate. We would, therefore, not accept because of what is stated in Rule 10 that the High Court is the appointing authority of a Chief Judicial Magistrate. In view of all that is stated above, we would hold that the High Court is not the appointing authority of Chief Judicial Magistrates to clothe it with the power of compulsory retirement conferred by the first proviso to Rule 71(a) of the Orissa Service Code. In this connection, may we also point out that it would be really incongruous where, though the High Court cannot retire a Munsiff, or for that matter a District Judge, as fairly conceded by; Shri Nayak it would be in a position to retire a Chief Judicial Magistrate. We do not think if the concerned provisions permit us to take this view. Before closing this aspect of the discussion, we may say that we are conscious of the legal position that passing of an order of compulsory retirement by the Governor is a formal matter as stated in Rajiahcase because, according to this decision, the Governor in such cases merely acts on the recommendation of the High Court by signing an order in that regard; but the procedure of the Governor formally passing an order of retirement has to be complied with. So long as there is no formal order of the Governor, the compulsory retirement as directed by the High Court cannot take effect, as opined in Rajiahcase itself. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, it is not necessary to deal with the second submission of Shri Ray that there were no materials in the present case to order for the compulsory retirement of the petitioner.....” 18 The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is strictly in accord with the catena of judgments referred to above and in particular with the judgment in Rajiahcase. We, therefore, see no error in the orders under appeal.” 5. We, therefore, see no error in the orders under appeal.” 5. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the Service Rules have to be read in consonance with the provisions of Article 234 of the Constitution. Therefore, notwithstanding anything said in the Rules, in view of the provisions of Article 234, the appointing Authority of every judicial officer in a State other than the District Judge is the Governor of the State. Therefore, in terms of the provisions of the civil Service Rules, the authority competent to make the order of compulsory retirement would be the Governor of the State. In the present case, the order of compulsory retirement has been issued by the Governor of the State. Therefore, in our opinion, there is no substance in the contention of the Petitioner that it is the High Court which should have issued order of compulsory retirement. 6. So far as the second submission is concerned, it is true that the payment in lieu of three months salary was not tendered along with the notice of compulsory retirement, but it was subsequently tendered. But it is clear from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa vs. Balkrushna Sathpathy AIR 1994 SC 1127 specially what is contained in para 8 of the judgment that it is not the requirement of the Rule that the payment of three months salary should be simultaneous with the service of the notice. In our opinion, what is observed by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 8 and 9 of that judgment is relevant. They read as under: “8 The Rule requires three months prior notice to be given or payment of three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. In other words, the alternative mode prescribed of payment of the amount in lieu of three months notice, when adopted, entitles the Government servant to get that amount, but the validity of the order of compulsory retirement does not depend on its prior full payment as a prerequisite. The only right of the Government servant under such an order is to get the amount of three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice and no more. The only right of the Government servant under such an order is to get the amount of three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice and no more. This is the manner in which similar provisions have been construed in RajKumar v. Union of India, (1975) 3 SCR 963 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1116 ) and Union of India v. Arun Kumar Roy, (1986) 1 SCR 136 : ( AIR 1986 SC 737 ). 9. Assuming, deduction of the income-tax at source could not be made, the only right of the respondent is to get the deficit amount, but the order of compulsory retirement is not invalidated for that reason. Since the appellant has offered to pay the deficit amount, deducted as tax, from the amount paid to the respondent, it is unnecessary in the present case to decide the question whether the deduction was rightly made.” 7. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, the second submission has no substance. 8. So far as the last contention is concerned, the Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of NawalSingh vs. State of U.P. (2003) 8 SCC 117 has considered the question of the material to be considered while making an order of compulsory retirement of a judicial officer. What is said by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 6 and 13 of that judgment is relevant. It reads as under: “6 Further, it is to be reiterated that the object of compulsory retirement is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain a high standard of efficiency and honesty to keep the judicial service unpolluted. It empowers the authority to retire officers of doubtful integrity which depends upon an overall impression gathered by the higher officers as it is impossible to prove by positive evidence that a particular officer is dishonest. This aspect is dealt with in Union of India v. M.E. Reddy (1980) 2 SCC 15 wherein the Court (in para 17) held thus: “17 Mr. Krishnamurty Iyer appearing for Reddy submitted that the order impugned is passed on materials which are nonexistent inasmuch as there are no adverse remarks against Reddy who had a spotless career throughout and if such remarks would have been made in his confidential reports they should have been communicated to him under the rules. Krishnamurty Iyer appearing for Reddy submitted that the order impugned is passed on materials which are nonexistent inasmuch as there are no adverse remarks against Reddy who had a spotless career throughout and if such remarks would have been made in his confidential reports they should have been communicated to him under the rules. This argument, in our opinion, appears to be based on a serious misconception. In the first place, under the various rules on the subject it is not every adverse entry or remark that has to be communicated to the officer concerned. The superior officer may make certain remarks while assessing the work and conduct of the subordinate officer based on his personal supervision or contact. Some of these remarks maybe purely innocuous, or may be connected with general reputation of honesty or integrity that a particular officer enjoys. It will indeed be difficult if not impossible to prove by positive evidence that a particular officer is dishonest but those who have had the opportunity to watch the performance of the said officer from close quarters are in a position to know the nature and character not only of his performance but also of the reputation that he enjoys. 13. It is to be reiterated that for keeping the stream of justice unpolluted, repeated scrutiny of service records of judicial officers after a specified age/completion of specified years of service provided under the Rules is a must by each and every High Court as the lower judiciary is the foundation of the judicial system. We hope that the High Courts would take appropriate steps regularly for weeding out the dead wood or the persons polluting the justice delivery system.” 9. It is thus clear that the object of compulsory retirement of a judicial officer on attaining the age of 50 years is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain high standard of efficiency and honesty in judicial service. In so far as the record of the Petitioner is concerned, the proceedings of the Review Committee show that in the Annual Confidential Reports of the judicial officer for the year 1991-92, 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000 the judicial officer was rated “average”. Her disposal for the year 2002 was grossly inadequate. In so far as the record of the Petitioner is concerned, the proceedings of the Review Committee show that in the Annual Confidential Reports of the judicial officer for the year 1991-92, 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000 the judicial officer was rated “average”. Her disposal for the year 2002 was grossly inadequate. The SID record was perused by the Review Committee and it was found that once she was advised to exercise proper and effective control over the files and she was advised to maintain the record properly. She was issued a caution and was advised in another case “to avoid passing contradictory orders of simultaneous police custody and bail in non-bailable matters”. Considering overall record, the Review Committee which consists of Chief Justice and three Judges of the High Court decided to compulsorily retire the Petitioner. Therefore, the decision of the High Court to compulsorily retire the Petitioner cannot be stated to be not based on relevant material. 10. We thus find that there is no substance in any of the contentions urged on behalf of the Petitioner. The Petition therefore fails and is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No costs.