ORDER P.K. Musahary, J. 1. Heard Mr. R.P. Sarmah, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. M.R. Adhikari, learned Counsel, for the review Petitioner. Also heard Dr. Y.K. Phukan, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mrs. S. Bora, learned Counsel, for the Respondents. 2. This application has been filed for review/modification of judgment and order dated 29-01-2008 passed in RSA No. 65/2000 whereby this Court, without going into the merit of the case, disposed of the said appeal on the basis of submission made by the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant/present Petitioner to the effect that the Appellant would have no grievance against the impugned judgment and decree dated 19-1-2000 signed on 25-1 -2000 by the lower Appellate Court in Title Appeal No. 02/1999 except the order for - (i) recovery of Rs. 6,750/- as loss incurred by the Plaintiff for not being able to possess the land during the year of alleged dispossession and, (ii) compensation (usufruct) at the rate of Rs. 4000/-per year from 12-11-1996 till recovery of the suit land subject to payment of requisite court-fees. 3. The learned Counsel for the Appellant/Petitioner, at the time of hearing the above appeal, made a submission that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court be modified exempting the Appellant from payment of aforesaid recovery of Rs. 6,750/- and compensation (usufruct) at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per year. Responding to the aforesaid submission, Dr. Phukan, learned senior counsel, who appeared for the Respondents in the said appeal, submitted that he would not claim the compensation of Rs. 4,000/- per year from 12-11-1996 but he would insist upon payment of recovery of Rs. 6,750/-. Consequently, this Court modified the impugned judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court exempting the Appellant/Petitioner from payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per year. 4. Mr. Sarmah, learned senior counsel, submits that the aforesaid concession was made by the counsel engaged by the Appellant/Petitioner at the time of hearing without obtaining any instruction from the Appellant and it would cause great prejudice and hardship to the Petitioner as he is still in possession/occupation of the suit land and as a cultivator, he is solely dependent on the said suit land for maintenance of himself and his family. Moreover, the value of the said suit land is much more than Rs. Moreover, the value of the said suit land is much more than Rs. 6,750/- as directed to be exempted and also the compensation (usufruct) at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per year from 12-11-1996 till recovery of the suit land. According to him, the concession alleged to have been made by the learned Counsel for the Appellant at the time of hearing of the second appeal is beyond anybody's comprehension in view of the present market value of the suit land which is still in his physical possession. Even assuming, but not admitting, that the alleged concession was made by the learned Counsel as per instruction of the Appellant/present Petitioner at the time of hearing, it is simply unbelievable and for the ends of justice, the aforesaid order needs to be recalled/modified and/or reviewed and the matter may be heard again on merit. 5. Countering the submissions of Mr. Sarmah, Dr. Phukan, learned senior counsel submits that the Appellant/Petitioner was represented by a senior counsel who made the above concession on instruction received from the Appellant and it cannot be doubted that a senior counsel would make such wrong submission before the Court without any instruction. If the aforesaid concession was made by the engaged senior counsel, without instruction, he should be made a party Respondent in the present review petition for the purpose of clarifications/explanations from the aforesaid senior counsel but the same has not been done so. In absence of the aforesaid senior counsel, nor order against him could be passed nor could any opinion or conclusion be made. Moreover, according to Dr. Phukan, there is no legally acceptable ground for review of the aforesaid order on the basis of an afterthought allegation brought against the senior counsel engaged by the Appellant/present Petitioner in the said appeal. 6. The grounds for review in civil proceeding are provided in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. For better appreciation, let me reproduce the aforesaid provision of the Code, hereunder: 1. Application for review of judgment. 6. The grounds for review in civil proceeding are provided in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. For better appreciation, let me reproduce the aforesaid provision of the Code, hereunder: 1. Application for review of judgment. (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved - (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the Applicant and the Appellant, or when, being Respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. 7. In the present case, no plea has been taken for discovery of new and important matter or evidence or some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. What could be understood from the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that there was no instruction from the Appellant to make certain concession and the concession so made by the senior counsel engaged by the Appellant was to the detriment of the interests of the Appellant. It should be examined by the Court whether the alleged concession so made by the senior counsel comes under the fold of "sufficient reason". No doubt, the phrase "sufficient reason" in Order 47, Rule 1of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, can be applied to various cases depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. It should be examined by the Court whether the alleged concession so made by the senior counsel comes under the fold of "sufficient reason". No doubt, the phrase "sufficient reason" in Order 47, Rule 1of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, can be applied to various cases depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In several cases including Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club, AIR 2005 SC 592 it has been held that the phrase "sufficient reasons" in Order 47, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure is wide enough to include a misconception of fact and law by a Court or even by an Advocate and an application of review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus quriae neminem gravabit" which means an act of Court shall prejudice no man. the reason behind this law is that law has to bend before justice. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 1650 , the Apex Court observed that if the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice, nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error. No plea has been taken in the present review petition that there is a misconception of fact or law committed by this Court and by the advocate representing the Appellant/present Petitioner. The order was passed on the submission/concession made by the party concerned and there cannot be any scope for importing the ground of misconception of fact or law by the Court or the advocate. 8. The next question may arise as to whether there is any misconduct on the part of the counsel in making the concession or submission, allegedly without instruction, and such misconduct can be construed as "sufficient reason" within the meaning of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. For construing the alleged misconduct of a counsel or acting against the interests of the party concerned, there must be a finding to that effect and such finding could be possible only when the advocate concerned against whom such allegation has been levelled, is made a party and given an opportunity of hearing. For construing the alleged misconduct of a counsel or acting against the interests of the party concerned, there must be a finding to that effect and such finding could be possible only when the advocate concerned against whom such allegation has been levelled, is made a party and given an opportunity of hearing. On a query made by this Court as to why the advocate concerned was not made a party, it was stated by Mr. Sharma, learned senior counsel for the Appellant that the said counsel has retired from practice due to old age and it would not be proper to drag such retired counsel to Court. If it is so, I am afraid that a conclusion could be drawn against the said senior counsel for taking a view that he made the concession aforesaid without instruction from the Appellant/Petitioner. 9. There is another aspect which should be taken note of by this Court. The order in question was passed on 29-1-2008 and it came to the notice of the Appellant on 15-2-2008 but he applied for a certified copy only on 23-4-2008. The Appellant got the certified copy of the order on 16-5-2008 and filed the present review petition on 20-6-2008 with an application for condonation of delay of 111 days. The said delay was condoned by this Court vide order dated 21-12-2008 passed in MC No. 2511/2008. In the meantime, principal Defendant Haladhar Saikia, husband of Respondent No. 1, had died on 8-4-2008. The sole intention of the Appellant in filing the present review petition is to reopen the matter for a fresh hearing in the garb of alleged misconduct in making the concession by the engaged senior counsel without instruction; who is no longer in practice, without making him a party. The accepted law is that review is not an appeal in disguise. In the present review petition, the Petitioner is intending to indulge in rehearing of the entire second appeal on merit which is not permissible under the law. The Petitioner is pursuing the Court to review its earlier order purely on sympathetic ground that he is completely dependent on the said suit land for his maintenance and irreparable loss would be caused to him if the order of this Court against which review has been sought for, is executed. The Petitioner is pursuing the Court to review its earlier order purely on sympathetic ground that he is completely dependent on the said suit land for his maintenance and irreparable loss would be caused to him if the order of this Court against which review has been sought for, is executed. There is no question of review of the Court's order out of sympathy or emotion unless it could be shown that there was apparent mistake of fact or law committed by the Court and the advocate representing the party or mischief has been committed with mala fide intention on the part of the counsel representing the party for some vested interests. Review of a judgment or an order cannot be ordered as a measure of routine procedure. It is a creation of statute under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in civil proceedings. The power of review is not an inherent power as held in Patel Narshi Takershi v. P. Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1273 ) and Lily Thomas (supra). In this regard, I may also refer to the case of Promoters and Builders Association of Pune v. Pune Municipal Corporation, (2007) 6 SCC 143 : AIR 2007 SC 1956 , wherein it has been held that review of an earlier order is not a routine procedure. A review of an earlier order is not permissible unless the Court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. It has also been held that a review of judgment in a case is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. It is because, as held therein, that the stage of review is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which is the normal feature of finality. It is because of such position it was rightly said by Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. as His Lordship was then, that asking for review is like asking for the moon. 10. I am far from being persuaded by the learned senior counsel for the Appellant that valid ground(s) do really exist in the present case for review of the earlier order. 10. I am far from being persuaded by the learned senior counsel for the Appellant that valid ground(s) do really exist in the present case for review of the earlier order. The law so far established and followed in the matter of review does not support the Petitioner's case. In view of such finding, I have no other alternative but to hold that no ground for review of the earlier order could be established. This review petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed accordingly. 11. Parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed