JUDGMENT ( 1. ) The unsuccessful tenants (defendants) having lost from two Courts below have filed this second appeal assailing the judgment and decree of eviction passed against them by learned two Courts below. ( 2. ) Looking to the substantial questions of law which are framed, the facts necessary for disposal of this second appeal lie in a narrow compass. Suffice it to say that the plaintiff-respondent Rameshchand filed a suit for eviction in respect to a shop, the description whereof has been mentioned in the plaint and which is disputed in the suit on the ground envisaged under section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short "Act"). The suit has been filed arraying "M/s Kanhaiya Readymade Stores" a Partnership Firm as first defendant while partners of said firm namely Bhojraj, Kanhaiyalal and Chhata Ram have been arrayed as defendants No.2 to 4 respectively. The defendants obtained suit shop from the father of the plaintiff and thereafter his second shop was also obtained by them on tenancy basis. There was a wall in between the two shops which defendants removed by dismantling it. The defendants were carrying on business in the name and style "Asha Cut-piece" in the suit shop and now they are carrying on business in the name and style "Kanhaiya Readymade Stores". The plaintiffs father Dagdulal had already died and before his death, the said Dagdulal during his life time executed a Will in which the entire building consisting of suit shop and some other properties mentioned in it have been bequeathed to plaintiff, his brother Suresh and mother Maganbai. Lateron an oral partition took place among Maganbai, plaintiff and his brother Suresh alias Surendra and in the partition, the movable property fell in the share of mother of plaintiff, while the suit shop fell in the share of plaintiff. The shop situated on the southern portion fell in the share of plaintiffs brother Suresh. A memorandum of this oral partition was also reduced in writing. Thus, according to plaintiff, in this manner he has become the owner of the suit shop which is on the northern side and defendants are tenants @Rs.225/- per month. ( 3. The shop situated on the southern portion fell in the share of plaintiffs brother Suresh. A memorandum of this oral partition was also reduced in writing. Thus, according to plaintiff, in this manner he has become the owner of the suit shop which is on the northern side and defendants are tenants @Rs.225/- per month. ( 3. ) Further it has been pleaded by the plaintiff that defendants have not paid the rent w.e.f. 1-4-1988; the suit shop is bona fide required by the plaintiff to start the business of Electrical Binding Works and for this purpose he is not having any suitable vacant non-residential accommodation of his own in the township of Burhanpur. The plaintiff before filing the suit also sent a notice to evict the suit shop and to pay arrears of rent but defendants have neither paid the rent nor vacated the suit shop and therefore present suit has been filed. ( 4. ) The defendants denied the plaint averments by filing written statement and pleaded that plaintiff alone is not the owner of the suit shop. They had also denied the execution of Will executed by plaintiffs father, although the factum of death of plaintiffs father Dagdulal (who was owner and landlord of defendants) in the year 1974 has been admitted. According to defendants Late Dagdulal died leaving behind four sons and five daughters and all of them are the owners of suit shop. One son of Dagdulal has also died and his heirs are also owner of the suit shop. THE factum of carrying on business "Asha Cut-piece" earlier in the suit shop and at present the business is being carried in the name "Kanhaiya Readymade Stores" has been admitted by the defendants. According to them, the rate of rent is Rs.450/- of two shops. The factum of oral partition took place between sons and mother as well as execution of memorandum of oral partition has been denied and it has also been pleaded that the said memorandum is not legal. According to them, the rate of rent is Rs.450/- of two shops. The factum of oral partition took place between sons and mother as well as execution of memorandum of oral partition has been denied and it has also been pleaded that the said memorandum is not legal. So far as the payment of rent is concerned, according to defendants the rent was being paid to plaintiffs mother Maganbai and further pleaded that in the month of April, 1988 said Maganbai obtained Rs.100/- on credit from them and because she did not repay the same, the defendants deducted the said amount in two installments of Rs.50/- each from the rent payable for the month of April and May, 1988 and hence, paid the amount of rent @Rs.400/- for these two months. The plaintiff is not entitled to receive rent @Rs.225/- per month. Further it has been pleaded by the defendants that rent of month June, 1988 was sent by money-order which has been returned back to them. The plaintiff never disclosed about the execution of Will as well as factum of oral partition which took place in the family. The averments of plaintiff in respect to the bona fide requirement has also been emphatically denied. The factum of giving notice by plaintiff has been admitted but according to defendants necessary reply was sent by them through their Counsel. The defendants were paying rent to plaintiffs mother Maganbai and still they are ready to pay the rent. The plaintiff has no right to file the suit. ( 5. ) The further stand of defendants in the written statement is that two shops (including the suit shop) were obtained @Rs.300/- per month and after the death of original landlord Dagdulal the rate of rent was enhanced to Rs.360/- and widow of Dagdulal was receiving the rent at this rate. ( 6. ) Further it has been pleaded by defendants in their written statement that demonstrating herself to be the owner of the entire ground floor where the suit shop is situated, the mother of plaintiff Maganbai filed a suit against second defendant Bhojraj for eviction on 9-12-1982. ( 6. ) Further it has been pleaded by defendants in their written statement that demonstrating herself to be the owner of the entire ground floor where the suit shop is situated, the mother of plaintiff Maganbai filed a suit against second defendant Bhojraj for eviction on 9-12-1982. In that suit the ground envisaged under section 12(1)(f) of the Act for the bona fide need of present plaintiff was shown, but, the real intention was to enhance the rent and when the rate of rent was enhanced to Rs.450/- per month, on 5-8-1987 the said suit was got dismissed in default. No application was filed by her to restore the suit. Hence, the plaintiff is not having any right to file the present suit. On the basis of these pleadings it has been prayed by the defendants/appellants to dismiss the suit. The learned trial Court on the basis of averments made in the plaint and denial in the written statement framed necessary issues and after recording the evidence of the parties, decreed the suit holding both the ground under section 12(1)(f) of the Act to be proved by further holding that the rent of the month of April and May, 1988 has not been paid and eventually passed a decree of eviction and also arrears of rent. ( 7. ) The first appeal which was filed by the defendants /appellants has been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. ( 8. ) In this manner this second appeal has been filed by the appellants before this Court, which was admitted on 22-2-2000 on the following substantial questions of law :- "1. Whether, in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Habibunnisa Begum and others vs. G. Doraikannu Chettiar (deceased by L.Rs.) and others, reported in AH? 2000 SC 152, the respondent was entitled to evict the appellants from half of the property let out to the appellants? 2. Whether, the appellants were entitled to say that the respondent was not entitled to evict the appellants on the basis of Will, Ex.P-1 as well as the memorandum of partition Ex.P-2 and Ex. P-3 even though he was not a party to the deed of partition? 3. Whether, the aforesaid documents Ex.P-2 and Ex.P-3 were admissible in evidence for want of registration? P-3 even though he was not a party to the deed of partition? 3. Whether, the aforesaid documents Ex.P-2 and Ex.P-3 were admissible in evidence for want of registration? Thereafter following one more substantial question of law was framed by this Court on 8-11-2011 :- 4. Whether, the documents Ex.P/2 and P/3 were admissible in evidence for being insufficiently stamped? ( 9. ) The contention of Shri Ravish Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel is that looking to the pleadings of the parties, it is clear that the defendants were inducted in suit shop on the ground floor in the yearl968 by plaintiff's father Dagdulal. Soon thereafter they were inducted in the adjoining shop by said Dagdulal by removing the dividing wall existing between the two shops and the two shops were converted into one shop having a single individual tenancy and the defendants were paying monthly rent Rs.300/- per month to said Dagdulal of these two shops. My attention has been drawn to Ex.D/18, D/11, D/19 and D/20 to show that rate of rent Rs.300/- was being paid for these two shops. After the death of Dagdulal the defendant continued to pay the rent to mother of plaintiff Smt. Maganbai @ Rs. 300/- of two shops and in this regard my attention has been drawn to Ex.D/21, D/22, D/12 and D/23. THE rent was enhanced in the year 1978 to Rs.360/- per month of two shops and the mother of plaintiff Maganbai was realizing the rent and in this regard my attention has been drawn to Ex.D/13, D/25 and D/24. THE rent of two shops was also sent @ Rs. 360/- per month by money order and in this regard my attention has been drawn to money order receipts Ex.D/3, D/6, D/7 and rent receipts Ex.D/1, D/2, D/5 and D/4 and it has also been submitted that said rent remitted to plaintiff's mother Maganbai was received by plaintiff Rameshchand for and on behalf of her mother. ( 10. 360/- per month by money order and in this regard my attention has been drawn to money order receipts Ex.D/3, D/6, D/7 and rent receipts Ex.D/1, D/2, D/5 and D/4 and it has also been submitted that said rent remitted to plaintiff's mother Maganbai was received by plaintiff Rameshchand for and on behalf of her mother. ( 10. ) It is also submitted that on or about 9-12-1982 plaintiff's mother Maganbai instituted a suit (Civil Suit No.74-A/1994) against defendant Bhojraj for eviction under section 12(1 )(f) of the Act and same was dismissed in default on 5-8-1987 (Ex.D/37) and indeed it was got dismissed in default because the rent was enhanced from Rs.360/- to Rs.450/- per month and in this regard my attention has been drawn to Ex.D/14, D/15, D/27, D/17 which are the rent receipts showing the rate of rent to be Rs.450/- of two shops. Hence, it has been put-forth by learned counsel for appellants that two shops were given to defendants by original owner/landlord Dagdulal and therefore filing eviction suit of one shop by the plaintiff amounts to splitting of tenancy which is not permissible in law and in this regard learned Senior Counsel has placed heavy reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Habibunnisa Begum and others vs. G. Doraikannu Chettiar (deceased by L.Rs.) and others, AIR 2000 SC 152 . By addressing other substantial questions of law it has been put-forth by learned Senior Counsel that the Will executed by original landlord/owner Dagdulal in favour of his wife Maganbai, plaintiff Rameshchand and his brother Suresh alias Surendra was never disclosed to defendants-appellants and further it was also not disclosed that any oral partition took place between the plaintiff, his brother Suresh and mother Maganbai. It was also not disclosed to defendants/appellants that acknowledging the earlier oral partition whether any memorandum was reduced in writing, although under section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (in short "Act of 1882"), the plaintiff was obliged to discharge this statutory duty. In this regard, learned Senior Counsel has placed heavy reliance on Sk. Sattar Sk. Mohd. Choudhari vs. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate, (1996)6 SCC 373 . Learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Kajodimal Vijaylal vs. Darbarilal Devilal, 1960 MPLJ 172 . In this regard, learned Senior Counsel has placed heavy reliance on Sk. Sattar Sk. Mohd. Choudhari vs. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate, (1996)6 SCC 373 . Learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Kajodimal Vijaylal vs. Darbarilal Devilal, 1960 MPLJ 172 . By inviting my attention to notice Ex.P/4, which is a quit notice sent by the plaintiff to defendant it has been submitted that in the said notice nothing has been said that when the Will was executed and on which date the oral partition took place and thereafter when the memorandum of oral partition was reduced in writing. According to learned Senior Counsel the landlord should have notified the transaction acceptable to a prudent man and in this regard learned Senior Counsel has invited my attention to sections 2(d), 5, 37 and 38 of the Act of 1882. ( 11. ) By inviting my attention to Ex.P/2 and P/3 it has been contended that the memorandum of oral partition written on these two documents is insufficiently stamped and unless and until they are sufficiently stamped under section 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as amended by the State of M. P. vide notification dated 9-5-1975 published in M.P. Rajpatra (Aasadharan) 1975 which came into force on 15-5-1975, the same are not admissible in evidence and in this context learned Senior Counsel has placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court Avinash Kumar Chauhan vs. Vijay Krishna Mishra, 2009(3) MPLJ (S.C.) 289 = (2009) 2 SCC 532 , Ram Rattan vs. Parma Nand, AIR 1946 PC 51 and M/s. Sms Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/o. Chandmar Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2011 (7) Scale 747. Learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on the Single Bench decision of this Court Smt. Mamta Awasthy and others vs. Ajay Kumar Shrivastava, 2011(3) MPLJ 588 = AIR 2011 M.P. 166 . Learned Senior Counsel has also invited my attention to section 34 of the Act of 1882 and has submitted that the documents Ex.P/2 and P/3 are inadmissible in evidence. On the basis of these submissions, it has been put-forth by learned Senior Counsel that this appeal be allowed and suit of the plaintiff be dismissed. ( 12. Learned Senior Counsel has also invited my attention to section 34 of the Act of 1882 and has submitted that the documents Ex.P/2 and P/3 are inadmissible in evidence. On the basis of these submissions, it has been put-forth by learned Senior Counsel that this appeal be allowed and suit of the plaintiff be dismissed. ( 12. ) On the other hand Shri Praveen Dubey, learned counsel for respondent argued in support of the impugned judgment and submitted that a pure finding of fact has been arrived at by two Courts below on the basis of admission made by defendant Bhojraj himself that the suit shop was given earlier by the-then landlord/owner Dagdulal to him in the year 1968 and lateron another shop was given and therefore merely because one time rent of two shops was being paid, it would not mean that there was one tenancy of two shops and therefore if eviction suit has been filed by the plaintiff in respect to suit shop, it would not amount to splitting of tenancy. By replying the submission of learned Senior Counsel for appellants it has been put-forth by learned counsel for respondent that a pure finding of fact has been arrived at by learned two Courts below that Dagdulal bequeathed his certain immovable property in favour of his wife Maganbai, plaintiff and his brother Suresh and this was known to defendant Bhojraj which he has also admitted in his evidence and if that would be the position, since, the plaintiff jointly became the owner of the suit property inter alia with other properties even if for the sake of argument if it is hereby held that oral partition did not take place and consequently memorandum Ex.P/2 and P/3 accepting the earlier oral partition are not taken into account being insufficiently stamped, since plaintiff Rameshchand is the joint co- owner/co-landlord of the suit property, he alone could file suit for eviction specially when other co-owners have not objected and in this regard learned counsel has placed reliance on Kanta Goel vs. B. P. Pathak and others, (1977) 2 SCC 814 , FGP Limited vs. Saleh Hooseini Doctor and another, (2009)10 SCC 223 and Santosh Kumar Jain vs. Sambhulal Krishna Kumar Suhane, 1993 MPLJ 260 . Learned counsel has also placed reliance on the Single Bench decision of this Court Moolchand Agrawal vs. Babulal Agrawal and others, 2005(3) MPLJ 217 and has submitted that the memorandum acknowledging the oral old partition is not required to be registered and a stranger is not open to challenge that oral partition or even the execution of the said document. ( 13. ) By inviting my attention to Single Bench decision of this Court Laxman Swaroop Sadaiya vs. Bal Kishan Babulal Garg, 1985 MPLJ 588 it has been put-forth by Shri Dubey learned Counsel for respondent that by interpreting sections 2(15), 36 and 37 of the Act of 1882 it has been held by this Court that there is nothing in the Stamp Act that if the instrument has not been stamped it is inadmissible in evidence and at the most after depositing the duty penalty the same can be made admissible in evidence and this has also been so held by the Supreme Court in M/s. Sms Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. (supra) which has been relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for appellants. ( 14. ) Learned Counsel further submits that at the time of putting exhibit mark on Ex.P/2 and P/3 no objection was taken by the defendants and therefore such an objection cannot be taken in this second appeal and in this regard learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court Javer Chand and others vs. Pukhraj Surana, AIR 1961 SC 1655 . LEARNED counsel has also placed reliance on another decision of Supreme Court Himalaya House Co. Ltd. vs. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and another, AIR 1972 SC 899 (Para 10). By replying the arguments of learned Senior Counsel for appellants who placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court Avinash Kumar Chauhan (supra), it has been put-forth by learned counsel for respondent that the said case was not of landlord and tenant and was virtually for repayment of advance given at the time of execution of the document of agreement of sale and therefore in this context it was rightly so held that until and unless the agreement to sale is not sufficiently stamped, it is not admissible in evidence. Hence it has been prayed by learned counsel that this appeal is devoid of any substance and same be dismissed. ( 15. Hence it has been prayed by learned counsel that this appeal is devoid of any substance and same be dismissed. ( 15. ) Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed. Regarding substantial question of law No. 1: ( 16. ) There is no quarrel to the proposition that the tenancy cannot be split. The Supreme Court in Habibunnisa Begum (supra) has also held that there cannot be a partial ejectment of the tenanted premises. Hence, it is to be seen whether the present suit filed by the plaintiff Rameshchand has been filed in respect of partial ejectment of entire tenanted premises (two shops). If it is held that by the instant suit a decree of partial ejectment of tenanted premises has been sought, plaintiff would stand nowhere and his suit is liable to be dismissed. However, if it is held that tenancy of two shops is quite distinct to each other, certainly the submission of learned Senior Counsel for appellants in respect of first substantial question of law cannot be accepted. On bare perusal of the plaint para 1 this Court finds that the plaintiff has pleaded the description of the suit shop given in Schedule 'A' of the plaint. On going through the Schedule 'A' attached to the plaint, it is found that plaintiff pleaded the entire description of whole building and it has been specifically mentioned that suit shop is situated on the northern side 23.6 feet towards east to west and 11.8 feet towards south to north (total area 267 sq.feet on the main road). Thus, after describing the situation of entire triple storied-building, specific description of tenanted premises situated in the said building has been pleaded. In reply to this para of the plaint, it has been pleaded by defendants that plaintiff alone is not the owner of the property mentioned in the Schedule 'A' but there are other co-owners also. Hence the stand of defendants is that plaintiff is also a co-owner/co-landlord. ( 17. ) On behalf of defendants, Bhojraj (second defendant) was examined as DW1. In para 8 of his cross-examination specifically it has been admitted by him that he is tenant of Dagdulal (father of plaintiff) since 1968. Hence the stand of defendants is that plaintiff is also a co-owner/co-landlord. ( 17. ) On behalf of defendants, Bhojraj (second defendant) was examined as DW1. In para 8 of his cross-examination specifically it has been admitted by him that he is tenant of Dagdulal (father of plaintiff) since 1968. In very specific words he has further admitted that at that juncture he was having only one shop on tenancy basis in which he was carrying on business in the name and style "Asha Cut-piece" (suit shop) lateron its name has been changed to "Kanhaiya Readymade Stores". Thus, it is clear that initially the suit shop was obtained by the tenant and lateron he also took adjoining shop. In the same para further it has been admitted by defendant Bhojraj that when he obtained the suit shop in which he was carrying on business of "Asha Cut-piece" there was a wall between the two shops. Further he has admitted that when after lapse of some period, second shop was given to him by father of plaintiff, he removed the wall existing between the two shops. Hence, according to me, merely because later on the second shop adjoining to suit shop was given by Dagdulal to defendants and second defendant Bhojraj removed the wall existing between two shops it would not mean that there was a single tenancy of two shops. Merely because one time rent of two shops or we may say single rent of two shops was being obtained it would not mean that the tenancy of two shops was joint. Since the landlord (Dagdulal) was same, therefore, if he was receiving rent of two shops at one point of time singally it would not mean that tenancy of the two shops became a single tenancy. ( 18. ) Looking to the admission made by the defendant Bhojraj in his testimony para 8 that earlier the suit shop was given to him on tenancy basis and lateron after lapse of considerable long period another adjoining shop was given and to carry on business smoothly if he had removed the wall existing between two shops still the tenancy of the two shops will be separate. Apart from this, in para 14 of his cross-examination the said defendant has further admitted that he came to know that partition has been taken place between the present plaintiff Rameshchand and his brother Suresh and suit shop fell in the share of plaintiff and this he came to know by virtue of notice Ex.P/4 sent to him. Hence again here the defendant has admitted that plaintiff became the owner of the suit shop by virtue of partition. ( 19. ) Learned two Courts below have categorically held that in the present case there is splitting of tenancy this has not been proved rather pure finding of fact has been arrived at that defendants are the tenant in the suit shop and their tenancy of suit shop is quite distinct and separate from another shop. Although a pure finding of fact has been arrived at by learned two Courts below that defendant Bhojraj himself removed the wall existing between two shops so as to convert two shops into one shop and much has been argued by learned Senior Counsel, for appellants in this regard but this Court is not entering into those niceties because it has been proved that tenancy of defendants of suit shop is quite distinct and separate from another shop. It is well settled in law that finding of fact, how so far erroneous it may be, cannot be interfered in second appeal. Hence I am of the view that in the present case there is no splitting of tenancy and therefore respondent is entitled to evict the appellants from the suit property. ( 20. ) The substantial question of law No.1 is thus answered that the decision of Supreme Court Habibunnisa Begum (supra) is not applicable in the present case because there is no splitting of tenancy in the instant case. Regarding substantial questions of law Nos. 2, 3 and 4: At the cost of repetition in order to answer the aforesaid substantial question of law it would be relevant to go through para 14 and 15 of admission of defendant Bhojraj. In these two paragraphs it has been admitted that partition has been taken place between plaintiff and his brother Suresh. This fact came into the knowledge of defendant through notice. In para 14 he has also admitted that after the death of Dagdulal apart from his wife Maganbai, his children also became his landlord. In these two paragraphs it has been admitted that partition has been taken place between plaintiff and his brother Suresh. This fact came into the knowledge of defendant through notice. In para 14 he has also admitted that after the death of Dagdulal apart from his wife Maganbai, his children also became his landlord. Hence, the defendant himself is admitting that the plaintiff is the co- landlord/co-owner of the suit property and if that would be the position according to me any co-landlord/co-owner can file suit against tenant for eviction and particularly when in the present case no objection has been filed by any of the co- owner/co-landlord and therefore even if it is hereby held that the documents (Ex.P/2 and P/3) are not sufficiently stamped and inadmissible in evidence since defendant himself has admitted the plaintiff to be the co-owner/co-landlord of the suit shop, therefore, suit filed by him for eviction is maintainable. Apart from this oral evidence was always be adduced to prove oral partition. ( 21. ) Looking to the admission of defendant, the decisions placed reliance by learned Senior Counsel for appellants are not applicable in the present factual scenario. The substantial questions of law No. 2 to 4 are thus answered accordingly for the reasons stated hereinabove. ( 22. ) Resultantly, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. During the course of arguments it was submitted by Shri Abhishek Singh submitted that if this Court comes to the conclusion that appeal is to be dismissed, one year time to evict the suit premises be granted to the defendants. Though this prayer has been vigorously opposed by learned counsel for respondent but on going through the record of the learned trial Court this Court finds that appellants are carrying on the business for last several years in the suit premises, therefore, time to vacate the suit premises is granted. ( 23. Though this prayer has been vigorously opposed by learned counsel for respondent but on going through the record of the learned trial Court this Court finds that appellants are carrying on the business for last several years in the suit premises, therefore, time to vacate the suit premises is granted. ( 23. ) The appellants shall vacate the suit premises on or before 31-12-2012 on the following terms and conditions:- "(i.) The appellants shall deposit the entire amount of rent, if any due, in the trial Court on or before 23-12-2011; (ii) the cost of learned two Courts below and that of this Court be also deposited on or before 23-12-2011; (iii) the appellants shall continue to deposit the monthly rent in terms of section 13 of the Act; (iv) the appellants shall not create any third party interest in the suit premises; and (v) a usual undertaking of aforesaid conditions be submitted in the trial Court/Executing Court on or before 23-12-2011. However, it is made clear that if any of the conditions which are mentioned hereinabove is violated by the appellants, the respondent shall be free to execute the decree even prior to 31-12-2012. ( 24. ) Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 4000/- if pre-certified. Appeal dismissed.