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2011 DIGILAW 131 (KAR)

Muniyappa @ Murali v. State of Karnataka

2011-02-01

K.N.KESHAVANARAYANA, MANJULA CHELLUR

body2011
JUDGMENT MANJULA CHELLUR, J.—The appellant arraigned as accused No. 1, alongwith his mother and younger brother arraigned as accused Nos. 2 and 3, took their trial before the Principal Sessions Judge, Kolar in S.C. No. 81/2005 for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 504 and 114 IPC inter alia on the allegation that at about 11.00 a.m. on 22.5.2004, all the three accused persons intentionally insulted the deceased Krishna @ Kanda and his mother Smt. Indiramma near their house in Hanumanthanagar, Bethamangala, Bangarpet Taluk and at that time, at the instigation of accused Nos. 2 and 3, accused No. 1 stabbed first Krishna @ Kanda with knife and when his mother Indiramma questioned accused No. 1 about, his act of assault, on her son Krishna @ Kanda, accused No. 1 stabbed her also indiscriminately with knife and thereby caused serious injuries to both Krishna @ Kanda and Indiramma. to which both of them succumbed. 2. According to the ease of the prosecution, the two deceased persons being the neighbourer of accused persons, were putting up construction of bathroom and toilet by the side of the house of the appellant-accused in Hanumanthanagar, Bethamangala, Bangarpet Taluk. In respect of said construction, there was some dispute between the accused and the deceased persons. It is in that background, the accused committed the murder of both the deceased persons by stabbing them with knife. According to the case of the prosecution, immediately, after the incident, the accused went to Bethamangala Police Station alongwith blood-stained knife and blood-stained clothes. Thereafter, P.W. 14-Venkateshappa who was working as a Mason at the site of construction and who witnessed the incident of assault on the two deceased persons by the accused, lodged a written complaint about the incident as per Ex. P7, based on which P.W. 21-Eraj, PSI and SHO registered the case in Crime No. 54/2004. Thereafter P.W. 21 handed over the investigation to P.W. 18-Sathyanarayana, Circle Inspector. During investigation, the Investigating Officer conducted inquest over the two dead bodies, seized the blood-stained knife and blood-stained clothes found on the person of the accused in the Police Station under mahazar Ex. P9 and subjected the dead bodies to post-mortem examination. P.W. 7-Dr. K. Siddalingaiah conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of Indiramma while P.W. 8-Dr. M. Shivakumar conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of Krishna @ Kanda and submitted a report as per Exs. P9 and subjected the dead bodies to post-mortem examination. P.W. 7-Dr. K. Siddalingaiah conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of Indiramma while P.W. 8-Dr. M. Shivakumar conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of Krishna @ Kanda and submitted a report as per Exs. P4 and P6, respectively. Both of them opined that the death of the two deceased was due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of injuries to vital organ, namely, the heart. The Investigating Officer during investigation, recorded the statement of witnesses, subjected seized articles to forensic examination and after collecting necessary documents, submitted charge-sheet against all the three accused persons. Upon their appearance before the learned Sessions Judge on the case being committed, the accused persons pleaded not guilty for the charges levelled against them and claimed to be tried. The prosecution in order to bring home the guilt of the accused persons examined 21 witnesses, relied on 13 documents and 18 material objects. 3. The defence of the accused was one of total denial and that of false implication. The accused persons did not. choose to lead any defence evidence. After hearing both sides and on assessment, of oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned Sessions Judge by the judgment under appeal, held that the prosecution has proved that the death of the two deceased persons was homicidal and that the evidence placed by the prosecution clearly establishes that the accused No. 1 was responsible for the homicidal death of two deceased persons. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge convicted accused No. 1 for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. However, the learned Sessions Judge held that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against accused Nos. 2 and 3 and consequently, they were acquitted. Accused No. 1. was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay fine, Aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence, accused No. 1 has presented this appeal. 4. We have heard Sri D. Venugopal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-accused No. 1 and Sri N.S. Sampangiramaiah, learned High Court. Government Pleader appearing for respondent-State. 5. was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay fine, Aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence, accused No. 1 has presented this appeal. 4. We have heard Sri D. Venugopal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-accused No. 1 and Sri N.S. Sampangiramaiah, learned High Court. Government Pleader appearing for respondent-State. 5. It is the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the judgment under appeal suffers from perversity and illegality as the learned Sessions Judge has failed to notice that the evidence of P.W. 14 who was stated to be the sole eye-witness is not convincing and that it is highly unsafe to place reliance on the sole testimony of the said witness to base conviction as such judgment under appeal is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. 6. On the other hand, Sri Sampangiramaiah, sought to justify the judgment under appeal and contended, that the judgment under appeal does not suffer from any perversity or illegality, therefore, there are no grounds interfere with the reasoned judgment of the Court below. Therefore, he sought for dismissal of the appeal. 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the points that arise for our consideration are: 1. Whether the learned Sessions Judge is justified in holding the appellant/accused No. 1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and in convicting him for the said offence? 2. Whether the judgment under appeal suffers from any perversity or illegality calling for interference by this Court? 8. We have bestowed our anxious considerations to the submissions made on both sides. We have perused the records, closely scrutinized the oral and documentary evidence and carefully read the judgment under appeal. 9. With regard to the nature of death of the two deceased persons, there appears to be no dispute by the accused also. The evidence of P.Ws. 7 and 8, the two Doctors who conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead bodies of the two deceased persons clearly establish that the death of the deceased persons was homicidal. Their evidence clearly indicates the presence of fatal injury on the vital part, namely, the heart. Both the doctors have opined that the death was due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of injury to vital organ, namely, heart. None of these witnesses have been cross-examined by the defence. Their evidence clearly indicates the presence of fatal injury on the vital part, namely, the heart. Both the doctors have opined that the death was due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of injury to vital organ, namely, heart. None of these witnesses have been cross-examined by the defence. Thus the evidence of P.Ws. 7 and 8 has not been controverted nor challenged. It is pertinent to note that during the cross-examination of P.W. 14 it is suggested on behalf of the accused that some persons assaulted the deceased as a result they died. Thus even from the suggestions put to P.W. 14 in the cross-examination, it is clear that the death of the two deceased persons was homicidal. Under these circumstances, in our opinion, the Court below is justified in holding that the death of the two deceased persons was homicidal. 10. The next aspect, required to be considered is as to whether the appellant accused No. 1 was responsible for the homicidal death of two deceased persons. 11. As noticed supra, according to the case of the prosecution, P.W. 14 was the sole eye-witness to the incident of assault. As could be seen from the judgment under appeal, the learned Sessions Judge after referring to the oral evidence of P.W. 14 has opined that the evidence of P.W. 14 is consistent with the contents of complaint, lodged by him at the earliest point of time; that his evidence inspires confidence of the Court; that his presence at the scene of occurrence is quite natural and acceptable, therefore, there is no reason to discard his testimony. According to the learned Sessions Judge, the evidence of P.W. 14 with regard to complicity of the accused is further corroborated from the fact of accused himself going to the Police Station immediately after the incident, presenting himself before the Station House Officer with blood-stained knife and the seizure of blood-stained knife as well as blood-stained clothes of the accused. Under these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge held that the appellant-accused No. 1 was responsible for the homicidal death of two deceased persons. 12. Under these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge held that the appellant-accused No. 1 was responsible for the homicidal death of two deceased persons. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant-accused No. 1 after taking us through the entire evidence of P.W. 14, submitted that in the cross-examination lot of inconsistencies and discrepancies have been brought out which have rendered his testimony highly unreliable, therefore, the Court below ought, not to have placed any reliance on the testimony of P.W. 14. After going through the evidence of P.W. 14, we find no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. According to P.W. 14, he is a mason by profession and on the date of the incident he had come near the house of the deceased for construction of bathroom and latrine. In the cross-examination, this part of the evidence of P.W. 14 has not been challenged nor controverted. No doubt it is elicited in the cross-examination of P.W. 14 that he came near the house of deceased at about 8.30 a.m. on that day and since there were no bricks for proceeding with the construction he went to a nearby brick factory, which was at a distance of about 1 furlong and he came back to the site of construction with 2000 bricks. According to him while he was proceeding with the construction work, accused No. 1 came there at about 11.00 a.m. and questioned him as to why a stone slab belonging to him has been used while constructing. According to P.W. 14, he told accused No. 1 that as the said stone slab has already been used in the construction without knowing that the said stone slab belonged to him (accused No. 1) and if that stone slab belongs to him, the owner, namely, Indiramma would give another stone slab to him. It is the further say of P.W. 14 that on hearing this, accused No. 1 went back and after some time he came back and told him that he wants the very stone slab, at that juncture, deceased Krishna @ Kanda told accused No. 1 that he would not give any stone slab to him (accused No. 1) and he can do whatever he wants. At that moment, accused No. 1 annoyed by that answer of Krishna @ Kanda took out a knife from his pocket and stabbed Krishna @ Kanda on the chest or abdomen. It is his further say that on seeing this incident, when Indirarnma, mother of Krishna @ Kanda questioned accused No. 1 as to why he is assaulting her son, immediately, accused No. 1 with the same knife stabbed Indiramma also on the chest as a result of which she fell down, thereafter also, accused No. 1 stabbed her on her abdomen and other parts and ran away from the place. In the cross-examination, suggestions have been put to him that accused No. 1 was not present in the house and he did not commit any act of assault on the deceased. However, the witness has denied those suggestions. Though P.W. 14 has been subjected to a lengthy cross-examination, we find nothing in the cross-examination to discredit his evidence. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant brought to our attention the evidence of P.W. 14 that accused No. 1 stabbed Krishna @ Kanda on the chest or abdomen and in the light of said evidence, contended that the witness was not definite as to the site of the assault, therefore, it is highly probable that he did not witness the incident. We find no substance in this contention also. Chest and abdomen are portion of trunk below the neck and above the waist. Therefore, while accused No. 1 was assaulting the deceased, the witness might have confused as to whether it was on the chest or abdomen. In fact, the medical evidence supports the evidence of P.W. 14 with regard to the site of injury. That evidence of P.W. 14 does not in our opinion, take away the effect of his evidence with regard to the complicity of the accused in inflicting fatal injury to the two deceased persons. Close scrutiny of the evidence of P.W. 14 indicates that he was also a co-worker alongwith appellant-accused No. 1. There were no ill-will or animosity between them. Therefore, there were no reasons for P.W. 14 to depose falsehood against appellant-accused No. 1. The evidence of P.W. 1-Balakrishna, P.W. 9-Rafeeq and P.W. 10-Chalapathi indicates that on hearing the galata they came near the scene of occurrence and saw the two deceased persons lying in pool of blood. There were no ill-will or animosity between them. Therefore, there were no reasons for P.W. 14 to depose falsehood against appellant-accused No. 1. The evidence of P.W. 1-Balakrishna, P.W. 9-Rafeeq and P.W. 10-Chalapathi indicates that on hearing the galata they came near the scene of occurrence and saw the two deceased persons lying in pool of blood. According to them, they shifted the two injured persons to the hospital in Auto rikshaw where the doctors, on examination, declared both of them brought dead. It is also in their evidence that they were fold that the appellant-accused No. 1 stabbed both the deceased persons with knife. Therefore, their evidence would establish the immediate conduct on the part of P.W. 14 in disclosing the incident to others. 14. It is now well settled law that conviction can be based on the testimony of sole eye-witness provided, the testimony of such witness is convincing and inspires confidence of the Court. P.W. 14 after witnessing the incident lodged the complaint about the incident as per Ex. P7. P.W. 21-Eeraj, PS1 and SHO has stated in his evidence that on 22.5.2004, P.W. 14 came to the Police Station and lodged the complaint as per Ex. P7 based on which he registered the case. The evidence of P.W. 14 is consistent with the contents of complaint Ex. P7. The defence has not been able to bring out any inconsistency or discrepancy in his evidence from the contents of Ex. P7. Therefore, in our opinion, the learned Sessions Judge is justified in placing reliance of testimony of P.W. 14. The evidence of P.W. 14 being consistent and cogent inspires the confidence of the Court. We find no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that in the absence of any corroboration, the Court below ought not to have based the conviction on the sole testimony of P.W. 14. It is not the law that testimony of a witness is always to be corroborated. Insistence for corroboration is not as a rule of law but only as a rule of prudence. In the case on hand, we find no reason to look for any corroboration for the testimony of P.W. 14. It is not the law that testimony of a witness is always to be corroborated. Insistence for corroboration is not as a rule of law but only as a rule of prudence. In the case on hand, we find no reason to look for any corroboration for the testimony of P.W. 14. Even if it is felt that some amount: of assurance is required for the evidence of P.W. 14, in our opinion, the immediate conduct on the part of the appellant-accused No. 1 in going to the Police Station, presenting himself before the SHO alongwith blood-stained knife and blood-stained clothes and its seizure thereafter would provide the necessary assurances to the testimony of P.W. 14. 15. No doubt, two independent witnesses for seizure of blood-stained knife and blood-stained clothes of accused No. I have not supported the case of the prosecution. However, the evidence of P.W. 18-Satyanarayana, Circle Inspector of Police and P.W. 21-Eeraj, PSI coupled with the entries made by P.W. 21 in the Station House Diary about the appearance of accused No. 1 in the Police Station alongwith blood-stained knife and blood-stained clothes, satisfactorily proves the conduct of accused No. 1 and also seizure of material objects, namely, blood-stained knife and blood-stained clothes on the person of accused No. 1. This conduct on the part of accused No. 1 is admissible, as held by the learned Sessions Judge, under Section 8 of Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, we find no error committed by the learned Sessions Judge in holding that the testimony of P.W. 4 coupled with the conduct of accused No. 1 would prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant-accused No. 1 for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge are sound and reasonable having regard to the evidence placed on record. Therefore, we find no ground to interfere with the reasoned judgment of the learned Sessions Judge. Having regard to nature of the offence for which the appellant has been found guilty and the punishment provided under Section 302 IPC, question of showing any leniency to the appellant with regard to the sentence does not arise. The learned Sessions Judge himself has shown the leniency to the appellant by sentencing the appellant to undergo imprisonment for life, though the offence under Section 302 IPC prescribes the maximum punishment of death sentence. The learned Sessions Judge himself has shown the leniency to the appellant by sentencing the appellant to undergo imprisonment for life, though the offence under Section 302 IPC prescribes the maximum punishment of death sentence. Therefore, we find no merit in this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.