Judgment :- 1. This second appeal is focussed by the original defendant, animadverting upon the judgement and decree dated 03.11.2009 passed in A.S.No.620 of 2008 by the learned II Addl. Judge, City Civil Court at Chennai, confirming the judgment and decree of the I Assistant Judge, City Civil Court at Chennai in O.S.No.667 of 2007. The parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 2. Compendiously and concisely, the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this Second Appeal would run thus: The plaintiff filed the suit seeking the following reliefs: (a) For ejectment directing the defendant to quit and deliver vacant possession of the said portion more fully described in the schedule here under to the plaintiff; (b) For the said sum of Rs.43,000/- being the arrears of rent; (c) Damages for wrongful use and occupation of the said property at the rate of Rs.900/-from the date of plaint till the date of realisation." (extracted as such) 3. The defendant filed the written statement. 4. Whereupon issues were framed. On the side of the plaintiff,, Mr.K.Salam was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 to A5 were marked. The defendant/Mr.E.Sivanesan examined himself as D.W.1 and Exs.B1 and B2 were marked. 5. Ultimately the trial court decreed the suit. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, the appeal was filed for nothing but to be dismissed by the appellate court, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 6. Challenging and impugning the judgments of both the Courts below, the Second Appeal has been filed on various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether the respondent is a Public Religious Charitable Trust to file O.S.No.667 of 2007 on the file of City Civil Court, Chennai? 2. Without proving that the Respondent is a Public religious Charitable Trust as per G.O.Ms.No.2000 Home 16.08.1976, whether the suit filed by the respondent in the City Civil Court is maintainable?" (extracted as such) 7. Heard both sides to find out as to whether any substantial question of law in involved. On hearing both sides, I am of the view that the following substantial question of law could be framed. Heard both sides to find out as to whether any substantial question of law in involved. On hearing both sides, I am of the view that the following substantial question of law could be framed. "Whether the plaintiff is a Public Religious Trust, exempted under Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and the Notification No.II (2)/HO/4520/76 passed thereunder? 8. The aforesaid substantial question of law has been framed by me even though there was no issue framed by the trial Court, despite in the written statement there was a plea to that effect. Before the appellate Court also the matter was argued centering on that point. Since this is a pure question of law based on the available facts, I have been of the view that such a substantial question of law could be framed at the second appeal stage and accordingly framed as set out supra. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant would submit that simply because his client earlier filed a suit in O.S.No.667 of 2007 in the First Additional City Civil Court, Chennai, and consequently an appeal in A.S.No.620 of 2008 for being dismissed by both the courts, yet there is no estoppel operating as against the appellant/defendant herein to raise the issue that the plaintiff Salam had no right to institute the present suit. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant also would proceed to argue thus: a] Even as per the Settlement Deed exhibited as Ex.B2, there are as many as five Trustees. b] The said Salam who projected himself as the sole Trustee was not the competent person to file the suit. c] There is nothing to indicate that the said Trust is a Public Religious Trust and d] Hence the provisions of the Rent Control Act should have been invoked for evicting the defendant. 11. b] The said Salam who projected himself as the sole Trustee was not the competent person to file the suit. c] There is nothing to indicate that the said Trust is a Public Religious Trust and d] Hence the provisions of the Rent Control Act should have been invoked for evicting the defendant. 11. Whereas, by way of torpedoing and pulverising the arguments and contentions as put forth and set forth on the side of the appellant/defendant, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would advance his arguments, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus: (a) The appellant/defendant while filing the earlier suit candidly and categorically set out that he entered into possession of the suit property as a tenant only under the said Salam's father S.K.Mohideen and in such a case, it would not lie in the mouth of the appellant/defendant now to have a mercurial attitude and a volte face and turn turtle and contend unacceptably and unconvincingly that Salam alone was not competent to file the suit in the absence of having added other trustees. (b) The trial Court as well as the appellate Court in the earlier proceedings initiated by the tenant, gave a categorical finding that the said Salam had the right to receive rent and in such a case, the filing of the suit by the Salam projecting himself as the sole trustee cannot be found fault with by the tenant, who is the appellant/defendant herein. (c) The clauses in the Settlement Deed, Ex.B2 would amply make the point clear that it is a Public Religious Trust exempted from the operation of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 by virtue of the Notification No.II(2)/HO/4520/76 passed under Section 29 of the Act. Accordingly the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would pray for the dismissal of the Second Appeal. 12. At this juncture it is just and necessary to extract the relevant portions of Ex.B2, the Settlement Deed: "To and in favour of The Mohammedan Mosque at Sathyavedu Village, Ponneri Taluk, Chingleput District represented by its present Honorary Trustees Honorary Trustees (1) S.K.Mohamed Mohideen Sahib, Founder and Life Trustee and the Muthavalli. ........................... (1) The Committee shall constitute of only five members. ........................... (1) The Committee shall constitute of only five members. (2) The Income from the said properties shall be collected and used for: a) For paying the salary of the paishimam who conducts the prayer and gives religious instruction in the school connected with the mosque. b) paying the salary of the Movazan (crier) c) paying the salaries of the other servants employed for the purposed of property conducting the prayers etc., in the mosque and shall not be utilized for any other purpose." 13. A mere perusal of those excerpts and also the reading of the entire deed would display and demonstrate that there is nothing to indicate and connote that the property referred to in the Settlement Deed was intended to benefit the family members of the founders, but it was intended that the property and its income should be utilised only for religious public purpose and whereby it is sufficient to hold that the said dedication is for religious public purpose and it could rightly be taken as a Public Religious Trust having been created by the founders. No doubt five Trustees are contemplated. 14. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably, the tenant entered into possession of the suit property only under one of the Trustees, namely the deceased S.K.Mohideen and the said Salam happened to be his son. He would claim that only under the Will of his father he stepped into the shoes of his father and in that capacity as Trustee he prayed for eviction. The said Salam not in his individual capacity filed the suit for the purpose of getting possession of it. 15. The learned counsel for the tenant also inviting the attention of this Court to the evidentiary portion of the records would try to focus the search light on the fact that there is nothing to indicate that the income derived from the properties covered under the Settlement Deed were spent for Satharia Ahle Sunnath Jamath Mosque and that no accounts were produced etc. I am of the considered view that it is not for the tenant to question all those facts. It is for the appropriate authorities to supervise the functioning of the Trust as well as the Mosque properties to take suitable action. 16. I would also incidentally refer to Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act and it is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: "16. It is for the appropriate authorities to supervise the functioning of the Trust as well as the Mosque properties to take suitable action. 16. I would also incidentally refer to Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act and it is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: "16. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in possession – No tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given." 17. A tenant cannot question the title of his landlord. No doubt, I am fully aware of the fact that in this case, the plea of the tenant is that the suit filed by the Salam was not in proper order and he ought to have approached the Rent Controller for eviction. To the risk of repetition and pleonasm but without being tautologous, I would like to point out that once the Settlement Deed portrays and projects, details and delineates that the properties are dedicated for Public Religious Trust, then it is not for the tenant to question any of the facts concerning the alleged malfunctioning or mismanagement of the trust. 18. Regarding the locus standi of Salam to file the suit, it is pellucidly and palpably clear that in the earlier suit both the Courts below rendered the findings as against the tenant, to the effect that instead of paying the rent to Salam, the tenant approached the civil Court for depositing the rent which was not tenable. Those proceedings attained finality and in such a case, to that much extent the tenant cannot once again rack up the matter in this Second Appeal by contending unsuccessfully and wrongly that the absence of other Trustees in the party array is fatal. 19. The learned counsel for the tenant cited the decision of this Court reported in 2009 (1) CTC 779 [Dhanasekaran v. The ARC School Board, rep. By its Secretary, V.Balu, 26, Saiva Muthiah Mudali Street, Muthialpet, Chennai 600 001, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "10. 19. The learned counsel for the tenant cited the decision of this Court reported in 2009 (1) CTC 779 [Dhanasekaran v. The ARC School Board, rep. By its Secretary, V.Balu, 26, Saiva Muthiah Mudali Street, Muthialpet, Chennai 600 001, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "10. On a cumulative reading of the provisions of the statute and the Government Order, it could be seen that the Act per se applies to residential and non-residential buildings owned by religious, charitable, educational or other public institutions. After making the Act per se applicable, the Act confers powers under Section 29, upon the Government, to exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of the Act. In contra distinction to Section 29, the exemption under Section 30 is a statutory exemption. The exemption provided under Section 29 is actually a power conferred upon the Government to grant exemption to certain types of buildings to which the applicability of the Act, is not in question. In other words, there is a distinction between the exemption under Section 29 and the exemption under Section 30. 11. Keeping this distinction in mind, if we look at the Government Order issued, the Government Order extracted above, exempts only buildings belonging to two types of Trusts, namely (i) Public Charitable Trusts and (ii) Religious Public Trusts of Hindu, Christian and Muslim faiths. It is not the case of the petitioner/tenant that the building in question is exempt from the very application of the Act under Section 30. The contention of the petitioner is that the building falls within the exempted category by virtue of the Government Order issued under Section 29. Therefore, in order to bring the building in question, within the purview of the exemption provided under the Government Order extracted above, it must be established that the landlord, invoking the provisions of the Act, is either a public charitable Trust or a Religious Public Trust of Hindu, Christian or Muslim Faiths. A reading of Section 10(3) (b) shows that the provision applies to religious, charitable, educational or other public institutions. Section 10(3) (b) does not deal with religious public trusts or public charitable trusts of the kind indicated in the Notification issued by the Government under Section 29. A reading of Section 10(3) (b) shows that the provision applies to religious, charitable, educational or other public institutions. Section 10(3) (b) does not deal with religious public trusts or public charitable trusts of the kind indicated in the Notification issued by the Government under Section 29. Therefore, if a Trust takes recourse to the Act for evicting a tenant, it should be established by the pleadings and by evidence that such a landlord is either a public charitable trust or a religious public trust within the meaning of the Government Order issued under Section 29. In this case, the petition for eviction as well as the counter filed by the tenant, does not disclose that the respondent/landlord would fall under either of the two categories, namely, public charitable trust or religious public trust. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the exemption under G.O.Ms.No.2000, is patently exhibited on the basis of the pleading, so as to enable the petitioner/tenant to raise it as a point for the first time at the stage of revision. In the decision relied upon by the learned counsel, a copy of the trust deed was marked as exhibit and there was overwhelming oral evidence to show that it was a public charitable trust. But in this case, there is absolutely no pleadings or evidence to show that it is a public charitable or public religious trust and hence the plea cannot be allowed to be raised at the stage of Revision. Hence the first contention is rejected." 20. Absolutely there is no quarrel over the proposition as found enunciated in the cited decision, as it emerged relating to a set of facts where one ARC School Board, represented by Secretary instituted the proceedings and in that connection the learned Court gave the said verdict. 21. Accordingly, the substantial question of law is decided to the effect that the Trust created under the Settlement Deed is a Public Religious Trust and in such a case, the tenant cannot insist that it should initiate proceedings under the Rent Control Act. 22. At this juncture, I recollect the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court: (i) (2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 545 – HERO VINOTH (MINOR) VS. SESHAMMAL, (ii) 2008(4) SCALE 300 – KASHMIR SINGH VS. HARNAM SINGH AND ANOTHER. 22. At this juncture, I recollect the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court: (i) (2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 545 – HERO VINOTH (MINOR) VS. SESHAMMAL, (ii) 2008(4) SCALE 300 – KASHMIR SINGH VS. HARNAM SINGH AND ANOTHER. A mere perusal of those judgments would reveal that the High Court in the Second Appeal would not interfere with the findings of fact rendered by both the Courts below unless there is any perversity or illegality in their findings or any substantial question of law is involved. Here I could see no perversity or illegality in the judgments of both the Courts below. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 23. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant made an extempore submission that sufficient time might be given for the tenant to vacate the premises. I am of the considered view that in the interest of justice, nine months' time could be granted for handing over vacant possession of the suit property to the said Salam, subject to the condition that the defendant should pay amounts equal to that of the monthly rent including arrears, if any, regularly without any default. Even if there is any one default, the plaintiff/respondent is at liberty to file E.P. for obtaining delivery. The affidavit of the appellant/defendant shall be filed within a week to that effect.