Judgment U.C. Maheshwari, J.:- The applicant/plaintiff/decree holder has directed this revision under Section 115 of CPC being aggrieved by the order dated 15.5.2007 passed by the District Judge, Jabalpur in Misc. Appeal No. 15/2007 whereby allowing the appeal of the respondent and reversing the order dated 23.4:2007 passed by 3rd Civil Judge Class- II, Jabalpur in M. J. C. No.57/06 dismissing the respondents application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC for setting aside the ex-parte judgment and decree dated 12.9.2006 passed in Civil Original Suit No.44-A/03 holding the same to be barred by limitation, the case has been remitted back to the trial Court with a direction to decide the aforesaid application of Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC on merits. 2. The facts given rise to this revision in short are that the applicant herein filed the eviction suit against the respondent/defendant in respect of nonresidential accommodation described in the plaint situated at Plot No.12/1 and 12/2 Block No.83, Jaiprakash Nagar (East) Marhatal, Civic Centre, Jabalpur. The summons of aforesaid civil suit was duly served on the respondent pursuant to that he appeared through counsel and also filed his written statement. As the rent of accommodation was neither paid nor deposited by the applicant for a longer period, on which an application under Section 13 (6) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1963 ("In short the Act") was filed on behalf of the applicant. On consideration in presence of both the parties vide order dated 14.10.2005 the defence of the respondent was struck of. Thereafter, the case was posted for recording the evidence, pursuant to that on 2.3.2006 the applicant had filed the in-chief of his witness under the provision of Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC instead to cross examine such witness an adjournment was sought by the respondents counsel in this regard, on which in presence of the respondents counsel the case was posted on 8.4.2006 for cross-examination of said witness. But on such date no one was appeared on behalf of the respondent to defend the suit. On which the case was proceeded ex-party against the respondent. The applicant has closed his evidence and case was posted for final argument. In pendency of the suit for final argument an application under Order 9 Rule 7 of CPC was filed on behalf of the respondent on 18.5.2006. On which the case was proceeded ex-party against the respondent. The applicant has closed his evidence and case was posted for final argument. In pendency of the suit for final argument an application under Order 9 Rule 7 of CPC was filed on behalf of the respondent on 18.5.2006. On consideration the same was dismissed on merits vide order dated 26.8.2006 and aforesaid suit of the applicant was-decreed ex-parte vide judgment dated 12.9.2006. Subsequent to such decree, beyond the period of limitation i.e. 30 days on behalf of the respondent, the impugned application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC for setting aside the ex-parte judgment and decree, was filed. The same was seriously opposed by the applicant on the ground of limitation, as the same was filed beyond the limitation of 30 days prescribed under Article 123 of Limitation Act 1963 without filing any application under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the same. Considering such objection of the applicant the aforesaid application of the respondent filed for setting aside the ex-parte decree was dismissed by the trial Court holding the same is filed barred by the prescribed limitation. It is noted that as per case of the respondent he spent some period in obtaining the certified copies of the aforesaid ex-party judgment and decree and as per provision of Section 12 of Limitation Act, such period spent in obtaining the aforesaid certified copies deserves to be excluded from the period of limitation in filing such application. While such case of the respondent was opposed by the applicant on the ground that as per provision of Section 12 (1) of Limitation Act the period spent in obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and decree could not be excluded as certified copy of the judgment and decree was not required to file the aforesaid application and as per Article 123 of Limitation Act period of 30 days from the date of ex-parte judgment and decree was available to the respondent to file the aforesaid application and not beyond that because the copy of the original suit was duly served on him and in such premises the period of limitation could not be counted from the date of knowledge of aforesaid ex-parte decree. 3. 3. After dismissal of such application by the trial Court, the respondent had approached the subordinate appellate Court where on consideration by holding the period spent by the respondent in obtaining the certified copy of ex-parte judgment and decree deserves to be excluded and pursuant to that by allowing the appeal the application of the respondent filed under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC was held within time and by setting aside the order of the trial Court the case was remitted back to such Court with a direction to decide the same on merits. On which the applicant has come to this Court in this revision with a prayer to restore the order of the trial Court by setting aside the impugned order of the appellate Court. 4. On earlier occasion after hearing the parties instead to decide the case on merits vide order dated 26.3.2010 the Coordinate Bench of this Court (which is not available now at Jabalpur), in view of some earlier conflicting decisions of this Court formulated the following question under Rule 3, Chapter IV of Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules, 2008: "Whether the view of the learned Single Bench of this Court in the matter of Mohan @ Munna Pachari Vs. Jagdish Chandra Dubey passed in W. P. No.15147 of 2006, that the period spent for obtaining the certified copy of ex-parte decree cannot be excluded for calculating the limitation under Article 123 of the Limitation Act is the correct view or the earlier contrary view of the Single Bench of this Court in the matter of Shakuntala Singh Vs. Basant Kumar Thakur & others reported in (2003 (3) MPLJ 414) is correct?" After framing aforesaid question the concerning Bench directed the office to place this matter before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring the matter to the Larger Bench for settling the aforesaid controversy, on which 120 Jagat Guru vs. Siddhu Engineering Works 2012 (II) the case was referred to the Hon'ble Division Bench. After hearing the parties Hon'ble Division Bench vide order dated 13.8.2010 has answered the aforesaid question in the following verdict: 18. After hearing the parties Hon'ble Division Bench vide order dated 13.8.2010 has answered the aforesaid question in the following verdict: 18. In view of the aforesaid discussion our answer to the question referred is that the view expressed in Mohan @ Munna Pachauri (supra) that the period spend for obtaining certified copy of the ex parte decree cannot be excluded for calculating the limitation under Article 123 of Limitation Act is correct view. In case summons were served limitation to file applicable under Order 9 Rule 13 is 30 days from the date of decree. In our opinion, in Shakuntala Singh (supra) also this Court has correctly opined that certified copy is not necessary to be filed along with application under Order 9 Rule 13. The decision with respect to condonation of delay depends upon the facts of each case. In Shakuntala Singh (supra) very service of summon was disputed, decision has to be read in that context. In our opinion, period spent for obtaining certified copy of the ex-parte decree cannot be excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act for the purpose of filing application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC. Section 12 of the Limitation Act has no application to the proceedings under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC. 19. In view of the aforesaid answer to the question, let matter be placed before the Single Bench for deciding the case in accordance with law. 5. In view of aforesaid direction of the Hon'ble Division Bench this case was placed before this Bench to adjudicate the same on merits. 6. Learned counsel of the applicant Ku. Neelam Goel, after taking me through the pleading of the parties, the order of the trial Court as well as the impugned order of the appellate Court, ex-parte judgment and decree and the proceedings of Civil Original Suit along with the aforesaid order of the Division Bench argued that in the provision of Article 123 of Limitation Act on examining the matter, it is apparent that the impugned application of Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC was not filed on behalf of the respondent within thirty days from the date of passing the impugned ex-parte decree. It is also apparent that no application for condoning the delay in filing the aforesaid proceeding has been filed, therefore, firstly in the lack of any application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, the trial Court has rightly dismissed the application of the respondent and in view of aforesaid answer of the Division Bench the impugned order of the appellate Court deserves to be set aside by restoring the order of the Trial Court. She further said that in any case, for the sake of agreement if the version of the respondent is taken into consideration for condoning the delay in filing the impugned application of Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC without any separate application under Section 5 of Limitation Act even then there is no sufficient factual matrix pleaded in the application showing the sufficient cause for condoning such delay and in such premises the impugned order of the subordinate appellate Court deserves to be set aside. It was also agreed that while considering the present matter the Court has to consider the conduct of the respondent, according to which on service of summons the suit respondent had given his appearance and filed the written statement in the original suit, on which the issues were framed by the trial court and parties were directed to adduce the evidence. Pursuant to it the applicant placed the in-chief of his witnesses on affidavit as per provision of Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC on such date, the respondents counsel took the adjournment for cross examination of such witnesses, on which the case was posted for next date on such very next date the respondent and his counsel became absent and in such premises the case was proceeded ex-parte against him. Even on filing the application under Order 9 Rule 7 of CPC in pendency of suit the same was dismissed. In such premises, inspite having the knowledge of the date of ex-parte decree the application was not filed within limitation. Besides this from the date of service of summons of the original suit within thirty days as per requirement of Section 13 (1) of the Act the outstanding rent and the recurring regular rent of the disputed accommodation was neither paid nor deposited in the Court, pursuant to that the defence of the respondent was also struck down in the original suit vide order dated 14.10.2005. In all these circumstances, it could not be deemed that the respondent had any sufficient cause for filing the appeal at belated stage and by placing her reliance on some reported decisions prayed for setting aside the impugned order of the appellate Court and restoring the order of the trial Court by allowing this revision. 7. On the other hand responding aforesaid argument Shri R. K. Verma, learned counsel of the respondent by justifying the impugned order of the appellate Court said that in the available factual matrix of the case such order being in-consonance with the existing legal provision and its interpretations, does not require any interference at this stage. In continuation he argued that even after answering the aforesaid question by Hon'ble Division Bench this Court has to consider the matter by adopting some lenient view to condone the delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC even in the absence of any application on his behalf under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condoning the alleged delay. He also said that on the basis of the averments of application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC the sufficient cause for condoning the alleged delay is very well made out. He also said that in the trial Court before passing the ex-parte judgment in the original suit on behalf of the respondent an application under Order 9 Rule 7 of CPC was also filed which was dismissed on merits, it shows the bonafide of the respondent to contest the matter. Subsequent to dismissal of such application on passing the impugned ex-parte judgment in the original suit, the respondent has filed an application for obtaining the certified copy of such judgment and bonafidely spent some time in it, therefore such cause should be deemed to be the sufficient cause for condoning the alleged delay. In response of some query of the Court he fairly conceded that on behalf of the respondent no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed at any point of time in the proceeding of Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC and in this regard on filing the appeal against the order of the trial Court no specific ground or objection was taken or stated in the appeal memo. With these submission by placing his reliance of some reported decisions of the Apex Court as well as of different High Courts he prayed for dismissing this revision. 8. Having heard the counsel at length, keeping in view their arguments, I have carefully gone through the entire record of the impugned case of Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC and its appeal, also the record of the impugned suit along with the impugned order and aforesaid ex-party judgment and decree of eviction. 9. Before proceeding further to consider the arguments of the counsel on merits, I would like to reproduce para 17 of the aforesaid order of Hon'ble Division Bench passed in the instant matter on dated 13.8.2010, the same is read as under: 17. Coming to the question as to so called conflict in aforesaid decision in Shakuntala Singh (s pra) and Mohan @ Munna Pachauri (supra) whether delay can be condoned or not; in case certified copy has been applied for, in our opinion, various aspects have to be considered including the effect of non filing of the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. Overall conduct of the applicant has to be considered during the trial, circumstances in which he was proceeded ex-parte. Mere filing of certified copy is not enough to condone the delay. These aspects on merits have to be considered by the Single Bench. 10. In view of the aforesaid order this Court has to consider the overall conduct of the respondent during trial of the suit in which the case was proceeded ex-parte against him? 11. It is undisputed fact on record that the impugned application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC was filed by the respondent without filing any application under Section 5 of Limitation Act beyond the period of limitation of 30 days provided under Article 123 of Limitation Act. Inspite of aforesaid keeping in view the argument of the respondent's counsel that even in the absence of any application under Section 5 of Limitation Act on the averments of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC by holding the sufficient cause the alleged delay should be condoned. Inspite of aforesaid keeping in view the argument of the respondent's counsel that even in the absence of any application under Section 5 of Limitation Act on the averments of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC by holding the sufficient cause the alleged delay should be condoned. I have carefully gone through the said application of Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC to find out the averments of sufficient cause for condoning the alleged delay but except the aforesaid ground that on exclusion of period spend by the respondent in obtaining certified copy of the ex-parte judgment and decree the application has been filed in limitation no other grounds with factual matrix explaining the alleged delay in filing such application was found. In the light of the aforesaid order of the Division Bench, in the available factual matrix of the case the aforesaid ground as found in the application could not be held to be sufficient cause for condoning the alleged delay and except this no other explanation or ground are stated in the application. Thus, in the lack of any pleading of sufficient cause supported by affidavit, mere on some oral submission the impugned order could not be sustained. Law is almost settled that in the lack of the pleadings supported by affidavit mere on the basis of the oral arguments of the counsel no question could be decided in favour of such party in the matter. 12. The argument of the respondent's counsel based on the decision of this Court in the matter of Suresh Kumar and others Vs. 12. The argument of the respondent's counsel based on the decision of this Court in the matter of Suresh Kumar and others Vs. Kurban Hussain Taiyab Ali reported in 1996 MPLJ 330 holding that if any proceeding is filed barred by limitation without filing any application under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condoning the delay, then a formal application would not be required, if the facts presented before the Court satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court that the applicant before it was prevented for sufficient cause in brining the proceeding well within limitation and if the Court is of the opinion that in absence of formal application the delay could not be condoned then it is always the duty of the Court to give an opportunity to the applicant before deciding the same to move an application explaining the cause for delay and seek condonation under Section 5 of Limitation Act, so the applicant may get an opportunity to file appropriate application is concerned, in view of the discussion in forgoing paras such argument in the available factual matrix of the case has not appealed me. So for the principle laid down in the aforesaid cited case is concerned, this Court did not have any dispute but such case being distinguishable on facts is not helping to the respondent in the present scenario of the case at hand. It is apparent from para 9 of such cited case that the same was decided on the basis of an affidavit of counsel stating that he came to know for the first time regarding ex-parte judgment and decree dated 30.10.1993 on 7.1.1994. It is apparent in the case at hand that no such affidavit of the respondent or his counsel has been filed. Even otherwise as per discussion in forgoing paras no circumstances or ground was found in existence to condone the delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC, which could be considered as sufficient cause even on filing the formal application or in the absence of such application. 13. The identical question involved in the present revision on arising the occasion was answered by this Court in the matter of Ramdas Vs. 13. The identical question involved in the present revision on arising the occasion was answered by this Court in the matter of Ramdas Vs. Smt. Amrita & Ors reported in 2006 (I) MPJR 410 , in which it was held as under: "So far as the second contention of the parties that the limitation for filing an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC was thirty days from the date of decree as the summons were served in the matter. In this case, it is not in dispute the respondent was duly served and she was represented by a counsel. She filed written statement in the case and when the case was fixed for recording the evidence of the respondent, counsel for respondent took several adjournments for a considerable long period of near about two years and three months. This shows that the respondent remained negligent in attending the case. In this case, the counsel who was appearing on behalf of respondent was not examined by the respondent in the trial Court who was in a position to explain the circumstances in which the applicant could not be informed, but in absence of this evidence, it will be presumed that the respondent was having knowledge about the proceedings of the case and the counsel appearing on her behalf was having instructions from respondent to seek adjournments for the evidence. The counsel sought various adjournments on the instruction of the respondent and case remained pending for a considerable long period of near about twenty - seven months for recording evidence on behalf oi respondent. In these circumstances, the limitation for filing application shall be thirty days from the date of ex-parte judgment and decree. If the respondent was having sufficient cause for not filing the application within a period of thirty days, the respond ought to have filed an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act for explaining the delay for non-filing of the application within the prescribed period of limitation. In the case admittedly no such application was filed by the respondent. The application was apparently barred by time and without condonation of delay such application ought to not have been entertained by the trial Court." 14. In the case admittedly no such application was filed by the respondent. The application was apparently barred by time and without condonation of delay such application ought to not have been entertained by the trial Court." 14. Even otherwise in view of the aforesaid direction/observation of the Division Bench and also in the light of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of "Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao" reported in AIR 2002 S.C. 1201 on examining the stack of dispute involved in the present case for adopting the lenient view to condone the alleged delay in filing the impugned proceeding, then it is apparent from the record that inspite the service of summons of the original suit filed for eviction on the grounds available under the provision of the Act, within thirty days in compliance of Section 13 (1) of the Act entire arrears of the rent was neither paid nor deposited by the respondent, even in compliance of such provision the recurring rent of the alleged accommodation was also neither paid nor deposited by the respondent. It is needless to say that the same has also not been deposited till today. It is also apparent on the record that due to aforesaid violation of Section 13 (1) of the Act, the defence of the respondent was also struck down by the trial Court vide order dated 14.10.2005. Subsequent to that no step was taken by the respondent for condoning such delay in depositing the arrears of rent. 15. In such premises for a moment if by condoning the alleged delay in the absence of any sufficient cause by allowing the application of Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC the impugned ex-parte decree is set aside even then in the light of the decision of the Apex court in the matter of "Jamnalal Vs. Radheshyam" reported in (2000) 4 SCC 380 holding that on committing default by tenant in depositing the arrears and regular rent of the disputed accommodation the tenant is liable to be evicted, the respondent cannot be benefited. As such in the light of the aforesaid case of "Jamnalal" (supra) the respondent is bound to face the decree of eviction. 16. Radheshyam" reported in (2000) 4 SCC 380 holding that on committing default by tenant in depositing the arrears and regular rent of the disputed accommodation the tenant is liable to be evicted, the respondent cannot be benefited. As such in the light of the aforesaid case of "Jamnalal" (supra) the respondent is bound to face the decree of eviction. 16. It is also apparent from the record of the original suit that initially the written statement was not filed within ninety days from the date of service of summons and when such opportunity was closed by the trial Court then after obtaining the order from the superior Court for its condonation such written statement was filed by the respondent beyond the period of ninety days. Again after framing the issues on filing the in chief of the witnesses on behalf of the applicant/plaintiff on affidavit as per provision of Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC on dated 2.3.2006, instead to cross-examine such witnesses on such date the respondents counsel sought an adjournment and thereafter on next date respondent and his counsel both became absent while such date was fixed in presence of the respondent counsel, then only the case was proceeded ex-parte. Thereafter, an application under Order 9 Rule 7 of CPC was filed, the same was considered and dismissed on merits by speaking order and such dismissal does not appear to be contrary to the law in the present scenario of the case. Subsequent to it inspite having the knowledge of aforesaid ex-parte judgment and decree the impugned application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC was not filed within the prescribed period of thirty days, the same was filed beyond such period of limitation without filing any application under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condoning the alleged delay in filing the same. Accordingly, the conduct of the respondent is very apparent that at every stage of the original suit he had tried to prolong and delay the trial of the suit and still by way of present proceeding the respondent is trying to prolong the litigation. Accordingly, the conduct of the respondent is very apparent that at every stage of the original suit he had tried to prolong and delay the trial of the suit and still by way of present proceeding the respondent is trying to prolong the litigation. So in the light of the observation made by the Division Bench in para 17 of above mentioned order the conduct of the respondent discussed above does not make him entitled to grant the relief for condonation of delay in filing the impugned application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC even without filing the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. In these circumstances also I am of the considered view that even on extending the opportunity to the respondent to file the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act no fruitful purpose would be served in the matter. 17. So far other case law cited on behalf of the respondent are concerned in the present scenario, the some of them being either distinguishable on facts with the present matter are not helping to the applicant and some of them have already been taken into consideration by the Division Bench while passing the aforesaid order dated 13.8.2010. 18. The case law cited on behalf of the respondent in the matter of Jijibhoy N. Surty Vs. T.S. Chettyar reported in AIR 1928 P.C. 103 and of Additional Collector of Customs Vs. M/s Best and Co. reported in AIR 1966 SC 1713 have already been taken into consideration while passing the aforesaid order dated 13.8.2010 by the Division Bench in the matter, so it does not require any further consideration. 19. So far the case law cited on behalf of the respondent in the matter of Jagat Dhish Bhargava Vs. Jawahar Lal Bhargava reported in AIR 1961 SC 832 is concerned, the same was decided in appeal and not in the application or proceeding of Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC and on such very fact the same being distinguishable from the present matters not giving any support to the case of the respondent. 20. So far the case law cited on behalf of the respondent in the matter of Bhagwan Swarup Vs. 20. So far the case law cited on behalf of the respondent in the matter of Bhagwan Swarup Vs. Municipal Board reported in AIR 1970 Allahabad 652 is concerned, in such case it is held that if the delay in filing the aforesaid proceeding is caused due to bonafide then such ground could be treated to be the sufficient cause for condoning the alleged delay, which is not the situation in the case at hand as per aforesaid discussion no such bonafide on the part of the respondent has been found to be proved by this Court. So this citation is also not helping to the respondent. 21. So far the case law cited on behalf of the respondent in the matter of Mosmat Ram Kali Kuer Vs. Indradeo reported in AIR 1985 PATNA 148, holding that if the appeal is filed beyond the period of limitation in explainable circumstances without any application for condoning such delay, then the Court should may afford the opportunity to the appellant to file such application is concerned, in the forgoing paras it has already been held that even from the application of Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC no sufficient cause is made out in the present matter in favour of the respondent to condone the alleged delay and even on extending the opportunity to file such application no fruitful purpose may be served as discussed above. In such premises, this citation is also not helping to the applicant. 22. So far the case law cited on behalf of the respondent in the matter of Smt. Shakuntala Devi Vs. Banwari Lal reported in AIR 1977 All 551 is concerned, the same was decided considering the application under Order 22 Rule 9 of CPC filed for setting aside the abatement holding that separate formal application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is not necessary, if the Court think it proper to condone the delay on the facts stated in the affidavit in support of such application filed under Order 22 Rule 9 CPC, which is also not the situation here. It is apparent fact that in the case at hand that no such affidavit explaining the delay has been placed on behalf of the respondent. Therefore, this case is also not helping to the respondent. 23. So far the case law cited on behalf of the respondent in the matter of Shakuntala Singh Vs. It is apparent fact that in the case at hand that no such affidavit explaining the delay has been placed on behalf of the respondent. Therefore, this case is also not helping to the respondent. 23. So far the case law cited on behalf of the respondent in the matter of Shakuntala Singh Vs. Basant Kumar Thakur reported in 2003 (3) MPLJ 414 is concerned, the same was decided taken into consideration the circumstance that summons of the suit was not served on the concerned defendant and service of the notice was not proved by placing any affidavit or recording the statement of process server and in such premises for setting aside the ex-parte decree the limitation for filing the aforesaid proceeding was held to be counted from the date of knowledge of the alleged ex-parte decree, which is not the situation in the case at hand. On the contrary undisputedly the summons of the impugned suit was duly served on the respondent. Thus aforesaid case being distinguishable on facts is not helping to the respondent. 24. So far the case law cited on behalf of the respondent in the matter of Bhagmal Vs. Kunwar Lal reported in AIR 2010 S.C. 2291 is concerned, such case was decided on the factual matrix i.e. as alleged some settlement took place out of the Court between the parties, on which the defendant did not appear in the Court and ex-parte decree was passed. In such background it was held that the period of limitation should be counted from the date of the knowledge or of receiving the notice of such decree in execution proceeding, which is also not the situation in the case at hand, therefore, this’ citation is also not helping to the respondent. 25. Apart the above it is also apparent from the record and specifically from the appeal memo filed by the respondent in the appellate Court that the alleged question for condoning the delay in filing the proceeding under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC even in the absence of the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act inspite the order of the trial Court was neither stated nor raised the before the appellate Court and no such application was moved before the appellate Court. Therefore, the respondent could not be permitted to raise any new question for the first time in this revision of extending the opportunity to file the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act because as per aforesaid discussion in the light of the case of "Jamnalal" (supra) no fruitful purpose would be served on filing such application. 26. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that the appellate Court has committed grave error, perversity, infirmity and illegality in setting aside the order of the trial Court by allowing the appeal of the respondent and remitting back the case to the trial Court with a direction to decide the same on merits. Therefore, by allowing this revision, the impugned order of the appellate Court is hereby set aside. Pursuant to it, the order of the trial Court dismissing the respondent's application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC is hereby restored. 27. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. 28. The revision is allowed as indicated above.