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2011 DIGILAW 133 (KAR)

P. A. Hanumanthaiah v. Tahsildar Tumkur Taluk

2011-02-02

RAM MOHAN REDDY

body2011
ORDER RAM MOHAN REDDY, J.—The rejection of petitioners I.A. Nos. l to 3 under Order 22, Rule 4 CPC; Section 5 of the Limitation Act; under Order 22, Rule 9 CPC to bring on record the legal representatives of deceased Narasahanumaiah, the 1st respondent by condoning the delay and setting aside the abatement, by order dated 31.5.2004 of the II Addl. District Judge, Tumkur, in Miscellaneous Petition 60/2000 is called in question in this petition. 2. Petitioner instituted Miscellaneous Petition 60 of 2000 under Order 9, Rule 9 CPC to set aside the order dated 28.8.2000 and restore M.A. (VOA) 38/1993 to file. Notice when issued on 10.10.2000, the petition was listed on 14.12.2000, whence a memo was filed by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent reporting the death of Narasahanumaiah, s/o Lenkappa on 26.11.2000, and the proceeding adjourned to 31.1.2001. Petitioner filed LA. Nos. l to III on 4.9.2001, 7.11.2001 and 29.11.2003 to bring on record the legal representatives of deceased Narasahanumaiah by condoning the delay and setting aside the abatement. In the affidavit accompanying the applications, the deponent stated that he recently came to know of the death of Narasahanumaiah without specifying the date of knowledge or material particulars constituting sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed time. The Court below, having noticed absence of acceptable/satisfactory explanation to condone the delay, coupled with the fact that the death of Narashanumaiah was reported to the Court in the memo dated 26.11.2000, declined to accept the explanation and accordingly, by the order impugned, rejected the applications. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that petitioner an ignorant villager having no knowledge of the death of Narasahanumaiah, the application to condone the delay was required to be considered liberally and that the petition is more in the form of a mercy petition. 4. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is a resident of Pandithanahalli where Narasahanumaiah, since deceased, also did reside. If that is so, then the petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the death of a co-resident of the very same village, since the village is not shown to have a large population. Yet again, since the fact of death of Narasahanumaiah was reported by the learned counsel in the memo filed on 14.12.2000, the least, that the petitioner could have done is to file the applications within 90 days therefrom. Yet again, since the fact of death of Narasahanumaiah was reported by the learned counsel in the memo filed on 14.12.2000, the least, that the petitioner could have done is to file the applications within 90 days therefrom. In the affidavit accompanying the applications filed on 4.9.2001, 7.11.2001 and 29.11.2003, except for saying that the deponent came to know of the death of Narasahanumaiah “recently” material particulars and dates are wanting. 5. In the fact situation, it is useful to refer to the observation of the Apex Court in Balwant Singh (Dead) vs. Jagdish Singh and others, 2010 AIR SCW 4848. The Apex Court held that even if the term ‘sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party since the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of reasonableness as it is understood in its general connotation. In addition, it is held that the law of limitation being a substantive law having definite consequences on the rights and obligations of the parties, the principles to be adhered to and applied appropriately must depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case and once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it would be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Further that ends of justice can be achieved only when justice is done to both the parties equally. If the petitioner has been negligent in implementing his rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the respondents of the valuable right that has accrued to him in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ is held to imply the presence of legal and adequate reasons as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended embracing no more than that which provides a plentitude which when done, suffices to accomplish the existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ is held to imply the presence of legal and adequate reasons as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended embracing no more than that which provides a plentitude which when done, suffices to accomplish the existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. Sufficient cause, it is said should be such as it would persuade the Court in exercise of its judicial discretion to treat the delay as an excusable one. The discretion is to apply the law in a meaningful manner while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. 6. Applying the aforesaid law to the facts of this case, apparently, petitioner a resident of the very same village where Narasahanumaiah resided and died cannot be heard to state that he was not aware of the death. So also, the conduct of the petitioner in not stating material facts and date on which he became aware of the death of Narasahanumaiah is yet another factor that would go against the petitioner. Even otherwise, the petitioner was well informed of the death of Narasahanumaiah in the memo filed on 14.12.2000 and, therefore, it is too far-fetched for the petitioner to contend in the affidavit accompanying the applications that he came to know of the death ‘recently’. 7. In my considered opinion, the order rejecting I.As. 1 to 3 cannot be faulted with. The reasons, findings and conclusions arrived at by the Court below are well-merited and do not call for interference. 8. Petition being without merit, is rejected.