Judgment :- M.N. GILANI, J. 1. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution has been filed by the petitioner seeking relief of declaration that the provisions of Articles 323A(2)(d) of the Constitution vis-à-vis provisions of Section 5(2), 5(4)(d), proviso 6(2)(b), (bb), (c), 6(3)(d), 6(3)(A), 17, 28, 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 are ultraviresthe constitution, to quash and set aside judgment dated 19.01.1994 passed by Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Nagpur Bench in O.A. No.977 of 1991 and also to quash the notice dated 25.05.1990 issued by respondent No.1 directing the petitioner’s premature retirement under the provisions of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 and further to reinstate the petitioner as Deputy Director of Health Services and allow her to continue in the said post till she retires on superannuation with all future benefits accruable to her including promotion to the higher post. 2. The petitioner entered into health services of the State of Maharashtra in the year 1968 as Medical Officer-Class-II. In the year 1974 she was promoted as Medical Officer-Class-I and further promoted as Deputy Director (Health Services) w.e.f. 18.11.1982. It is averred that the respondents denied her promotion to the post of Deputy Director and therefore, she was required to approach this Court by filing writ petition. The special leave petition filed by the respondents against the judgment of this court came to be dismissed and therefore, the respondents were bound to implement this decision with retrospective effect. It is her case that because of she approaching this Court, the respondents developed revengeful attitude against her and for one or other reason, they started harassing her. In her service record during the years 1983-84, 1985-86, 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90 deliberately adverse entries were made. After she resumed as Deputy Director on 3rd September, 1987, all these adverse entries were communicated to her. The representation submitted by her except for the year 1987-88 which was partly allowed, rest were rejected. Adverse entries made in her record were nothing but a camouflage to ensure her premature retirement. Against the order of the premature retirement she moved Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal (in short “Tribunal”). The petitioner, while canvassing her case that the decision rendered by the learned Tribunal is wrong, also proceeded to level allegations that the learned members of the Tribunal being biased and prejudiced against her. Against the order of the premature retirement she moved Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal (in short “Tribunal”). The petitioner, while canvassing her case that the decision rendered by the learned Tribunal is wrong, also proceeded to level allegations that the learned members of the Tribunal being biased and prejudiced against her. The reason cited is, the husband of the petitioner had filed Writ Petition No.3533/1993 in this Court challenging the appointments of all the members of the Tribunal including the learned members who delivered the impugned judgment against her. 3. As regards the right of the respondents to order her premature retirement it is submitted that the Special Review Committee, constituted to consider the cases of employees for their continuation in service, did not observe the principles of natural justice. The learned Tribunal did not rely upon the various decisions of the Apex Court cited by the petitioner to advance her case. The learned Tribunal was not just, fair and reasonable in deciding her application. The finding recorded by the Special Review Committee that the petitioner is liable to be retired prematurely in public interest is perverse, unwarranted and against the norms of service jurisprudence. In fact, major punishment is meted out to her without making any inquiry which is violative of Article 311 of the Constitution. 4. The petitioner has also challenged the provisions of Rule 10(4) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 (in short “Pension Rules”) on the ground that it is discriminatory and confers unfettered discretionary powers on the appointing authority. It allows one person to remain in service till he completes 30 years of qualifying service and at the same time it provides for retiring other person even at the age of 50 years. Therefore, the petitioner states that the provisions of the Pension Rules are violative of Articles 14, 16, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. 5. The petitioner attributes malafidesto the then Minister incharge of the Health Department on the ground that at her instance he was prosecuted and the matter was subjudice in the High Court when the impugned notice was issued. 6. As regards adverse entries in her confidential record it is pleaded that there were no advance communications of deficiencies before the entry of the same were taken in the service record. It is further stated that the adverse entries were communicated at a belated stage. 6. As regards adverse entries in her confidential record it is pleaded that there were no advance communications of deficiencies before the entry of the same were taken in the service record. It is further stated that the adverse entries were communicated at a belated stage. She also questions respondent’s rejecting her representation against the adverse entries. According to her, to justify these adverse entries, the relevant office record ought to have been produced before the Tribunal. It is her case that in view of the patent flaws pointed out above the learned Tribunal should not have relied upon the report of the Special Review Committee and ought to have quashed the impugned notice. 7. By way of additional pleadings the petitioner brought to the notice of this Court subsequent events in the matter of the decision rendered by the learned Tribunal on 15.04.2010 in T.A.No. 3872/1991 (W.P. No.214/1990) quashing her supersession and granting her promotion to the post of Joint Director of Health Services w.e.f. 23.01.1990. It may be noted that this decision has been challenged by the respondents before this Court in Writ Petition No. 5999 of 2010 and is being disposed of simultaneously with this petition. Based on the subsequent decision of the learned Tribunal, it is submitted that before she was given premature retirement she was deemed to be promoted w.e.f. 23.01.1990 to the post of Joint Director of Health Services. In that light of the matter, the impugned notice dated 25.05.1990 directing her premature retirement becomes void abinitio. 8. The respondents filed reply denying all the adverse allegations made in the petition. As regards adverse entries appearing in the confidential record of the petitioner the say of the respondents is as under : “.... It is submitted that, since the year 1983-84 to the year 1989-90 except the year 1986-87 the petitioner has earned adverse remarks in her Annual Confidential Report. It is submitted that, the Annual Confidential Report for the year 1983-84 and 1985-86 were communicated to her on 8th August, 1987. The adverse Confidential Report for the year 1987-88 were communicated to the petitioner. She had replied against the same on 28.11.1988. The another representation was made against the adverse Annual Reports for the year, 1988-89 on 4.11.1989. None of these adverse remarks were expunged. The petitioner had approached the Minister Incharge of the Public Health Department where there was no positive response. She had replied against the same on 28.11.1988. The another representation was made against the adverse Annual Reports for the year, 1988-89 on 4.11.1989. None of these adverse remarks were expunged. The petitioner had approached the Minister Incharge of the Public Health Department where there was no positive response. Thereafter, the petitioner has sent a representation to the Governor of State which was also not in her favour.” 9. It is the case of the respondents that under the Pension Rules, the Special Review Committee consisting of Senior Administrative Officer was constituted. After the notice was served upon the petitioner, there was round of litigation initiated by the petitioner by approaching the learned Tribunal and also this Court. After conclusion of this litigation she was retired w.e.f. 20.12.1991. The respondents justified their action on the ground of adverse entries appearing in the confidential records of the petitioner. The minutes of Special Review Committee, their recommendations to the high power establishment board, are produced by the respondents for the perusal of this Court. The allegations of bias and malafides attributed to the respondents as well as members of the Special Review Committee are vehemently denied. 10. The respondents while refuting the allegations put-forth the case that the performance of the petitioner as Deputy Director of Health Services was much below the average. The adverse entries in her confidential record is true reflection of her performance. Only because the adverse entries were made in her confidential record the allegations of bias, illwill and malice have been levelled by the petitioner. The respondents have also reproduced details of the adverse entries made in the service record right from the year 198788, 1989-90 to justify premature retirement of the petitioner in 'public interest'. According to the respondents, the Special Review Committee and thereafter the establishment board had taken conscious decision, as such, the order of premature retirement is in accordance with law. Lastly, it is submitted that the decision rendered by the learned Tribunal is not liable to be interfered with on any count. 11. According to the respondents, the Special Review Committee and thereafter the establishment board had taken conscious decision, as such, the order of premature retirement is in accordance with law. Lastly, it is submitted that the decision rendered by the learned Tribunal is not liable to be interfered with on any count. 11. The learned Tribunal, making following observations, proceeded to dismiss the application: “In the result after having throughly analysed the situation applicant stands in, on the strength of the relevant circumstances that surround her position in the present case and on a careful examination of the laws and rules applicable with due scrutiny for their validity and also utility in the matter of scanning the controversy confronting us in the present case, we are of the opinion that the action taken by the respondent State Government resulting in a premature compulsory retirement of the applicant by applying the provisions of Rule 10(4) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules 1982 is quite in accord with law, without any breach of the recognised and established principles evolved for the discipline and efficiency to be maintained in the government administration in harmony with the basic law of the land, that is, the Constitution of India, within whose frame work all the organis of the State are required to function. ….”. 12. Judicial and quasi judicial forums are the creatures of the statute to redress grievances of the aggrieved person. Litigant seeking relief by invoking jurisdiction of such forums need to have faith and belief in the working of the system. The litigant's faith and belief is foundation of justice delivery system. There are instances, of course, very few, when litigant at the inception is apprehensive about the justice which would be meted out to him at the hands of a particular forum. In such circumstances, he is not without remedy. We have a system which takes care of such situation giving liberty to the litigant to get his matter transferred to other court or other forum. Our experience shows that such situation arises very rarely. However, after submitting to the jurisdiction of the forum, levelling allegations and casting aspersions on the Presiding Officers particularly when the decision has gone against him, is reprehensible and such practice needs to be deprecated. 13. Our experience shows that such situation arises very rarely. However, after submitting to the jurisdiction of the forum, levelling allegations and casting aspersions on the Presiding Officers particularly when the decision has gone against him, is reprehensible and such practice needs to be deprecated. 13. We have made these observations as the petitioner in so many words and in different paras of his petition questioned impartiality and fairness of the learned members of the Tribunal. In paragraph 9 it is averred that “Members of the Tribunal have predetermined to dismiss the contempt petition then there was no point in advancing the argument only for the sake of arguments when they were already biased and prejudiced against the counsel for the petitioner as he had filed Writ Petition No.3533 of 1993 in the High Court challenging their own appointments as such being illegal.” Again similar allegations are repeated. It is stated that the learned members of the Tribunal heard the matter with bias mind and dismissed the original application. In paragraph 29 it is stated that “Possibility of personal bias cannot also be ruled out as the petitioner has to be a wife of her counsel. In view of this the petitioner reasonably apprehends that bias attributable to the Members of the Tribunal might have operated against her in the final decision i.e. Judgment Dt. 19.1.94.” Again in para 43 similar allegations have been repeated. 14. It is discernible from the order of the Tribunal that whatever documents relevant to the case and available with the respondents were sent for and inspection of the same was given to the counsel for the petitioner. What is expected of judicial or quasijudicial forum is to offer an opportunity of being heard to the litigant. It is not the case of the petitioner that she was not heard. The learned members of the Tribunal in their wisdom reached to the conclusion as stated above. We, therefore, find nothing on the record nor it has been demonstrated to point out that the learned members of the Tribunal bore personal grudge against the petitioner or her counsel and this weighed with them to arrive at the decision. The learned members of the Tribunal in their wisdom reached to the conclusion as stated above. We, therefore, find nothing on the record nor it has been demonstrated to point out that the learned members of the Tribunal bore personal grudge against the petitioner or her counsel and this weighed with them to arrive at the decision. Here, it is relevant to note that Writ Petition No.3533 of 1993 filed by the learned counsel for the petitioner and which is stated to be cause of discontent amongst learned members of the Tribunal, has been dismissed by this Court on 17th February, 1998 without any relief to the petitioner. 15. While impugning the order of the Tribunal, the petitioner has questioned the constitutionality of the various provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act. This appears to have been based on the ground that the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution has been taken away. Second ground of attack is the qualification prescribed for the post of Vice-Chairman (A). It is stated that for such post person having ten years standing at bar would be more suitable. While arguing the petition, these grounds were not agitated and therefore, there is no need to consider the same. Suffice it to say that in S.P. SampathKumar Vs. Union of India, reported in (1987)1 SCC 124 these challenges were dealt with and the Supreme Court suggested few amendments to rectify the defects appearing in the statute. Thereafter the decision in case of L.ChandraKumar Vs. Union of India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 has concluded the issue of constitutional validity of the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act. 16. In the petition one of the grounds is regarding constitutional validity of Rule 10(4) of the Pension Rules. This is on the ground that it is discriminatory and voilative of Article 14 of the Constitution in the sense that by applying Rule 10(4) an employee can be made to retire at the age of 50 years, however, other similarly situated gets full tenure and till one completes the age of 30 years. Although, this ground is incorporated in the petition, was not canvassed by the learned counsel while arguing the case. Suffice it, to say that this provision is on statute book since decades and is one of the service conditions which is binding on the employee. Although, this ground is incorporated in the petition, was not canvassed by the learned counsel while arguing the case. Suffice it, to say that this provision is on statute book since decades and is one of the service conditions which is binding on the employee. In the Central Service Rules and other service rules of the local bodies, government undertakings, it is seen that appointing authority / employer has retained with it right of review and power of retiring the employee at a particular age in “public interest”. We, therefore, find no merit in the ground incorporated in the petition. 17. In SwaranSingh Chand Vs. Punjab State Electricity Board and others, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 758 after relying upon the earlier decision in the case of State of Gujrat Vs. Umedbhai Patel (2001)3 SCC 314 the principles which are required to be followed in the matter of compulsory retirement were broadly summarised thus: “(i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest. (ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution. (iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer. (iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order. (v) Even un-communicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. (vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer. (viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure.” 18. Now, we proceed to examine whether the order of premature retirement is on the ground of non-application of mind, malafides or want of material particulars. We shall also examine whether it was passed as a shortcut to avoid departmental enquiry or in other words is it merely a camouflage, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Now, we proceed to examine whether the order of premature retirement is on the ground of non-application of mind, malafides or want of material particulars. We shall also examine whether it was passed as a shortcut to avoid departmental enquiry or in other words is it merely a camouflage, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In this context, it is necessary to reproduce the contents of the notice dated 25.05.1990. “NOTICE WHEREAS under Sub-Rule (4) Clause (a) (i)(ii) below Rule 10 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 an appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire any Gazetted Government servant: (i) if heentered Government service under any Government in India, before attaining the age of thirty five years after he has attained the age of fifty years. (ii) In any other case, after he has attained the age of fifty five years; by giving him notice of three months in writing, if such authority is of the opinion that it is in public interest so to do; AND WHEREAS, Dr. (Smt.) P.P. Gulhane, Deputy Director of Health Services (Family Welfare) Pune, a Gazetted Government servant, has now attained the age of 50 years; AND WHERAS the Government is of the opinion that it is in public interest to retire the said Dr. (Smt.) P.P. Gulhane. NOW THEREFORE, in pursuance of sub-rule (4) clause (a)(i) of Rule 10 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 the Government hereby gives notice to the said Dr. (Smt.) P.P. Gulhane that she shall stand retired from Government service on the 24th August, 1990 or the day immediately following the date of expiry of the period of three months commencing on the date of service of this notice on her, whichever is later. By order and in the name of Governor of Maharashtra.” 19. It is thus, obvious that the contents of the notice are totally innocuous. There is nothing in the said notice from which it can be inferred that it casts stigma or aspersion on the conduct of the petitioner. In case of SwaranSingh Chand (supra) there were disciplinary cases against the petitioner. In an inquiry the minor punishment was inflicted upon him. There is nothing in the said notice from which it can be inferred that it casts stigma or aspersion on the conduct of the petitioner. In case of SwaranSingh Chand (supra) there were disciplinary cases against the petitioner. In an inquiry the minor punishment was inflicted upon him. After considering this, the Supreme Court in paragraph 5 observed that, undisputedly, therefore, not only minor punishment inflicted on him had been taken into consideration while passing the impugned order, but it was also based, inter alia, on the premises that his integrity was doubtful. Further the Supreme Court observed that the directions contained in a circular dated 14.08.1981 (issued by Punjab Government) were not complied with and therefore, it amounts to malice in law. The facts of the present case stand on different footings. 20. The learned counsel for the petitioner took us through the reply filed on behalf of the respondent No.1. According to him, this reply suggests that the order of premature retirement was nothing but a punishment inflicted upon the petitioner on the ground of lack of integrity, efficiency, hard work, lack of coordination etc. In fact, this is not so. The Reply, which has been filed in the year 2009 merely reflects annual confidential reports which were considered by the Special Review Committee. In the matter of compulsory retirement one of the principles laid down is order has to be passed by the Government forming opinion that it is in the 'public interest' to retire a government servant compulsorily and has to be on the subjective satisfaction. This follows that the subjective satisfaction of the government has to be based on consideration of the service record of an employee. 21. In Posts and Telegraphs Board and others Vs. C.S.N. Murthy,reported in (1992) 2 SCC 317 , it was observed that “subjective satisfaction of the Review Committee is not open to the Courts interference in absence of malafides.” In that case the review was made by the High Power Committee. The respondents' earlier record was throughout good except two adverse remarks of latest years. It was held that such material was sufficient for arriving at the subjective satisfaction of the committee. In absence of any material showing malafides, perversity, arbitrariness or unreasonableness the order retiring an employee is not vulnerable to challenge. 22. The learned Tribunal extensively quoted adverse entries appearing in the service record of the petitioner. It was held that such material was sufficient for arriving at the subjective satisfaction of the committee. In absence of any material showing malafides, perversity, arbitrariness or unreasonableness the order retiring an employee is not vulnerable to challenge. 22. The learned Tribunal extensively quoted adverse entries appearing in the service record of the petitioner. The petitioner quoted all these adverse entries in para 5 of the petition. It is also pleaded by the petitioner that representation against all those adverse entries were made and except the adverse entry for the year 1987-88 which was partially expunged, rest of the representations were rejected. 23. Special Review Committee, which was constituted to consider the case of the petitioner, was consisted of: (i) Additional Chief Secretary, (ii) Principal Secretary (General Administration Department), (iii) Principal Secretary (Public Works Department), (iv) Two members of the Establishment Board of the rank of Additional Chief Secretary and Secretary. (v) Secretary (Health) was also present as special invitee. The minutes reveal that the annual confidential reports of the petitioner for the year 1984-85, 198586, 1987-88 and 1988-89 were considered. After undertaking onerous exercise the committee recommended to the government accordingly. 24. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that all the adverse entries have been belatedly made to block her promotion and to retire her compulsorily. There was delay in communication of the adverse remarks. Before adverse remarks were made in her service record she was not given any opportunity to amend or rectify her mistakes. We clarify that there is no practice or rule of issuing show cause notice to an employee before passing adverse remarks against her. In the hierarchy of the administrative setup the work of subordinate is supervised by his superior. It may happen that the superior may in writing or orally bring to the notice of his subordinate the flaws in his working noticed by his superior. However, if this is not done, the adverse entries made in the service record at the end of the particular year are not vitiated. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision in Dr. Mrs. Sumati P. Shere Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1431 .It was the case of termination of service of an ad hoc employee on the ground of unsuitability. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision in Dr. Mrs. Sumati P. Shere Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1431 .It was the case of termination of service of an ad hoc employee on the ground of unsuitability. The Supreme Court observed that: “If services of an ad hoc employee is to be discontinued on ground of unsuitability it is proper and necessary that he should be told in advance that his work and performance are not up to the mark.” Next decision relied upon is in case of AmarKant Vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1984 SC 531 .The Supreme Court suggested that the proper procedure in the matter of entry of adverse remarks in confidential roll would be to make remarks in the roll in presence of officer concerned, with right to make representation to higher authorities and second is to serve copy of such remarks on the officer before submission of the confidential roll. These were guidelines issued by the Supreme Court to be followed by the governments and the local bodies. In that case it was found that the adverse remarks were not communicated to the employee and subsequently it was expunged by the State Government. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the decision of the selection committee was vitiated. The facts of the present case are different. Whatever the adverse entries made in the confidential roll of the petitioner were communicated. Of course, same were communicated at a belated stage. However, the representations made against the adverse entries were ultimately turned down. 25. The learned counsel for the appellant empathetically argued that all the adverse entries have been made are without foundation and should not have been made against her. The prayer in this petition is divided into (i) to (viii) clauses. Nowhere it is averred that the adverse entries made in her confidential record be expunged or quashed. Even otherwise also, we find that all the adverse remarks were not passed by the single reporting officer. They are spread over to 5 to 6 years and must have been recorded by the different officers. The decision in the case of Dev Dutta Vs. Union of India, reported at 2008 SCW 3486relied upon by the petitioner does not help her case. They are spread over to 5 to 6 years and must have been recorded by the different officers. The decision in the case of Dev Dutta Vs. Union of India, reported at 2008 SCW 3486relied upon by the petitioner does not help her case. As has been stated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition the adverse entries were communicated to her and the representations which she had sent against these adverse entries were rejected. The learned counsel invited our attention to the entry made in the year 1985-86 to the effect that the petitioner had developed habit of approaching Court without permission of the Government. In the year 198788 and 1988-89 amongst other adverse things it was recorded that the petitioner goes to Court on silly grounds. Perusal of the minutes of the Committee Annexure R5 point out that overall performance of the petitioner was dispassionately reviewed. Entries like her attitude of approaching the Court etc. did not at all weigh with the Special Review Committee to arrive at the conclusion that she needs to be retired in “public interest”. 26. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned notice dated 25.05.1990 was issued before her representations pertaining to adverse entries for the years 198788 and 1988-89 was decided. According to him the representation dated 27.03.1991 was rejected on 25.03.1992. The fact remains that there were serious adverse entries in her confidential record for the years other than the years 1987-88 and 1988-89. Moreover, there were adverse entries against her in the year 1987-88 and 1988-89 made by the reporting officer and ultimately they were confirmed. 27. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that while the petitioner was entrusted with responsibility of conducting family planning operations (laparoscopy) not only she fulfilled the quota but her work was excellent and it was appreciated. 28. It is pertinent to note that this is a case where there are adverse entries in the successive years. Therefore, it does not appear probable that all the reporting officers bore grudge against the petitioner. We have already observed that in none of the prayer clauses the relief of expunging adverse entries has been sought. In that light of the matter, the adverse entries as were made in the service roll stand. 29. Therefore, it does not appear probable that all the reporting officers bore grudge against the petitioner. We have already observed that in none of the prayer clauses the relief of expunging adverse entries has been sought. In that light of the matter, the adverse entries as were made in the service roll stand. 29. Before the Tribunal the learned counsel placed reliance upon the affidavit sworn in by Dr. Gopal Panse retired Additional Director of Health Services. According to him, the performance of the petitioner who had an occasion to work under him was satisfactory. The learned Tribunal dealt with this aspect of the matter at page 12 of their judgment, and rightly so. The learned Tribunal also discarded the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was possibility of substituting reports of the reporting officer with the record produced before the Special Review Committee. The learned Tribunal was perfectly justified in observing that,: “..... wethus feel that the possibility of the State Government having substituted the reports of the reporting officers too with or without the connivance of the Director of the department of Health Services is too remote to believe.” On perusal of the minutes of the meeting of Special Review Committee it will have to be presumed that the members had seen the original record and were satisfied about its genuineness. If, at all, malafidesare to be attributed then it will have to be attributed to all six members of the review committee. By no stretch of imagination it can be believed that they all had a grudge against the petitioner and went to the extent of manipulating the record so as to pave way for her exit from the service. 30. In PyareMohan Lal Vs. State of Jharkhand, reported at (2010) 10 SCC 693 the Supreme Court took stock of the decisions right from the year 1994 to SurendraKumar's case [ (2010) 1 SCC 158 ] and explained the scope of judicial review by the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The ratio laid down is: “There is very limited scope of judicial review in case of compulsory retirement and is permissible only on grounds of non-application of mind, mala fides, or want of material particulars. The ratio laid down is: “There is very limited scope of judicial review in case of compulsory retirement and is permissible only on grounds of non-application of mind, mala fides, or want of material particulars. Power to retire compulsorily a government servant in terms of the service rules is absolute, provided the authority concerned forms bonafide opinion that compulsory retirement is in public interest.” 31. Having considered the entire material placed on record we are of the view that the decision of the learned Tribunal cannot be faulted with. Thus, the petition lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. 32. Before parting with the judgment, it is necessary to deal with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the event of the order of the Tribunal passed in T.A. No. 3872 of 1991 and which is subject matter of challenge before this Court in Writ Petition No.5999 of 2010, filed by the State of Maharashtra, is confirmed and consequently the petitioner is promoted, all adverse entries against her would be washed-off. According to him, this will have direct effect on the order of compulsory retirement, in the sense that the very foundation of the compulsory retirement i.e. adverse entries would be lost. Consequently, the order of premature retirement of the petitioner will become non-est. 33. There are catena of authorities and reference to some of them find place in this judgment laying down broad principles governing the issue of compulsory retirement under the Pension Rules. One of the principles is overall service record of an employee under consideration is to be considered. 34. In PyareMohan Lal Vs. State of Jharkhand [(2010)10 SCC](supra) it has been held that “washedoff theory does not have universal application”. Adverse entries in confidential rolls always remain part of record for overall consideration even when an employee has been subsequently promoted. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court, we find no force in the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Hence, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.