Judgment : SOUMEN SEN, J. The present appeal is arising out of an order dated 4th November, 2008 passed by the learned Single Judge in a writ petition preferred by Shiva Glass Company Limited & Ors. (hereinafter referred to as the “said company”) primarily for quashing of two bills raised against the said company for supply of electricity for the months of October and November 1998. The learned Single Judge has quashed the said two bills inter alia holding that the delayed payment surcharge as claimed in the notice of disconnection for the said two periods are clearly barred and further held that the respondent cannot resort to the mode of recovery by threatening disconnection in terms of provisions of Section 56 of the Act for non-payment of delayed payment surcharge. However, the learned Single Judge records that the Court is not deciding the question as to whether the writ petitioners were at all required to pay the delayed payment surcharge or not as that would involve a further detailed enquiry on factual issues which would not be proper under Section 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the dues on the ground of delayed payment surcharge as reflected in the bill in June, 2006 would not be recoverable on the pain of disconnection in terms of Section 56 of the Act and the notice of disconnection dated 21st July, 2006 was quashed. The relative scope of Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’) and Section 172 of the said Act, thus, have come up for consideration. Interpretation of the said Sections have arisen in view of a notice of disconnection issued by the licensee appellant in June 2006 in purported exercise of its power under Section 56(1) of the said (Electricity) Act, 2003. CESC Limited being aggrieved by the said order preferred the instant appeal. The submissions on behalf of CESC are summarized below: The demand for delayed payment surcharge crystallizes only on the liquidation of the principal dues. The delayed payment surcharge related to undisputed bills at the material point of time for October, November and December 1998, January 1999 and February 2000. On an earlier occasion a writ petition was filed by the consumer challenging the said bills whereupon an interim order was passed on 22nd March, 2004 directing payment of a crystallized amount of Rs.3,36,568.19 in installments. On an earlier occasion a writ petition was filed by the consumer challenging the said bills whereupon an interim order was passed on 22nd March, 2004 directing payment of a crystallized amount of Rs.3,36,568.19 in installments. In obedience by such direction the said sum was paid by the consumer on different dates between 8th April, 2004 and 27th July, 2004. It was only on 27th July, 2004 that the principal dues of Rs.3,36,568.19 was fully paid and thereupon the demand for delayed payment surcharge crystallized only. The bill containing the said demand for delayed payment surcharge (hereinafter referred to as the ‘DPS’) issued on 10th July, 2006 that is within a period of two years from the DPS falling due since such demand for DPS crystallized and became due only on 27th July, 2004. In view thereof the provisions of Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 are not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The finding of the learned Single Judge that a period of more than two years had elapsed from the date when the delayed payment surcharge became due and since the same was not continuously shown during the said period of two years, no notice of disconnection in respect of such dues could be issued under Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 is factually incorrect and based on erroneous interpretation of the said Section. The learned counsel for the CESC Limited further argued that delayed payment surcharge conceptually is an interest payment to compensate for nonpayment of sum of money due from the consumer to the licensee. It goes on accruing at applicable rate on the unpaid amount till the unpaid principal amount is liquidated depending upon the length of time like the following:- 1. At the rate of 1.25 percent (delay less than three months); 2. At the rate of 1.50 percent (delay between three months and six months); 3. At the rate of 2 percent (delay above six months). It was further submitted that it was not possible to make a final quantification of the demand for DPS with exactitude before the unpaid principal amount to which it relates is finally paid and quantum of DPS is arrived at. At the rate of 2 percent (delay above six months). It was further submitted that it was not possible to make a final quantification of the demand for DPS with exactitude before the unpaid principal amount to which it relates is finally paid and quantum of DPS is arrived at. The consumer is periodically informed about the fact that the DPS is accruing on the unpaid amount at a specified rate and would go on accruing till the base amount is liquidated. In the instant case although the unpaid bills in question were directed to be paid by interim order dated 22nd March, 2004 in installments and such payments were completed on 27th July, 2004, prior thereto the consumer was notified by the notice of disconnection the dues for October 1998 and reminded subsequently by a communication dated 1st June 2003 and 13th June, 2004 about its liability towards payment of DPS till the date of payment. It was argued that the consumer was duly notified at all relevant point of time regarding the bills for October 1998, November 1998, December 2000 which remained unpaid was ultimately paid in full on 2nd March, 2004. The amounts paid, however, were kept in suspense account and adjusted against dues of the consumer. It is claimed that DPS have been computed only till respective date(s) of payment(s) that is up to 27th July, 2004 and the exact break up of the demand for DPS would appear from a schedule annexed to the stay petition. Our attention has been drawn to the communication made by the petitioner to the CESC Limited on 17th July, 2006 which referred to the bill dated 10th July, 2006 for the month of June 2006 which includes DPS between October 1998 and February 2000. The said letter is reproduced hereinbelow:- “To The Deputy Manager (Com. IIT) CESC Ltd. Kolkata – 700001 Dear Sir, Consumer Code No.01015002003 As per Hon’ble Justice Subhro Kamal Mukherjee order dt.22/03/2004 we are supposed tomake payment of current Electricity charges, which we are regularly making thereof. We have received your Bill dt. 10/07/2006 for June 2006 for Rs.498,829/-which includes Delayed Payment Surcharge as under:-Delayed Payment Surcharge for 10/98 18581.67 …………….do…………….. 11/98 71420.56 …………….do…………….. 12/98 64620.39 …………….do…………….. 01/99 …………….do…………….. 01/99 20687.12 …………….do…………….. 02/00 105933.33 …………….do…………….. We have received your Bill dt. 10/07/2006 for June 2006 for Rs.498,829/-which includes Delayed Payment Surcharge as under:-Delayed Payment Surcharge for 10/98 18581.67 …………….do…………….. 11/98 71420.56 …………….do…………….. 12/98 64620.39 …………….do…………….. 01/99 …………….do…………….. 01/99 20687.12 …………….do…………….. 02/00 105933.33 …………….do…………….. 02/00 89450.33 ______________ 388,883.09 ______________ It is not understood as to how you have combined your Delayed Payment Surcharge with current electricity charges. We have in this respect already written a letter to you on 14/7/2006 & our advocate also has written two letters to you. We are enclosing herewith our cheque No.503625 drawn on ABN-AMRO Bank dt. 15/07/2006 for Rs.109,946.00 (Rs.498,829.00 (-) Rs.388,883.09) towards current electricity charges after deducting amount of Rs.388,883.09 for Delayed Payment Surcharge. Please accept the payment & issue a fresh Bill for Current charges for Rs.109,945.91 & oblige. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, For Shiva Glass Works Co. Ltd. Director Encl. As above.” It appears that such communication was made without prejudice. It is argued that the DPS have been calculated before the 27th July, 2004 and the consumer was fully aware of the dues towards DPS and had objected to the same on the ground that because it was raised prior to the disposal of the writ petition, such demand is premature. The appellant relied on the communication dated 13th July, 2006 and 14th July, 2006. It was submitted on behalf of the CESC Limited that delayed payment surcharge as claimed in the notice dated 21st July, 2006 became due on 27th July, 2004 and was computed at payable rates. The said bill was issued in June 2006, that is, within a period of two years from the date on which it had fallen due. Accordingly, there is no question of bar under Section 56(2) of the 2003 Act operating in respect of the dues in question. By way of an alternative argument it was urged that the starting period of two years as mentioned in Section 56(2) of the said Act of 2003 is the date on which the demand is raised and so long as the money remains due and payable, within a period of two years from the making of the demand, it is open to the licensee to take recourse to Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 in respect of such demands within said period of two years. In this regard, reference was made to a Division Bench judgment of Bombay High Court in Awadesh S. Pandey Vs. Tata Power Company Ltd. reported in AIR 2007 Bombay 52 and reliance in particular was placed on Paragraph 7 which is reproduced hereinbelow:- “Relying on Sub-section (2) it was strenuously urged that Section 56(1) cannot be restored to after the period of two years from the date when such demand became first due. In our opinion, sub-section (2) only provides the limitation, that the recourse to recovery by cutting of electricity supply is limited for a period of two years from the date when such sum became due. As long a sum is due, which is within two years of the demand and can be recovered, the licensee of the generating company can exercise its power of coercive process of recovery by cutting of electricity supply. This is a special mechanism provided to enable the licensee or the generating company to recover its dues expeditiously….”. Reference was also made to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation Vs. Yatish Sharma & Ors. reported in AIR 2007 Bombay 73. In short, it was submitted that the date of making of payment being 10th July, 2006 recourse to Section 56 could be held by the appellant licensee at any point of time upto expiry of a period of two years thereafter that is 10th July, 2006. In this case, it was submitted that the notice of disconnection was issued on 21st July, 2006. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent consumer submits that the recourse to Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 was not available to the licensing authority after the expiry of the period as mentioned in Section 56(2) of the said Act. The said notice of disconnection was issued in colourable exercise of power and by this process the licensing authority was seeking to realize the amount which is not legally recoverable in view of the clear bar to Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003. The said notice of disconnection was issued in colourable exercise of power and by this process the licensing authority was seeking to realize the amount which is not legally recoverable in view of the clear bar to Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003. The consumer has also preferred a cross appeal in respect of a portion of the said judgment which negates the contention raised by the consumer that there is a novation of contract by reason of execution of a fresh agreement of 1st June, 2004 by which the parties thereto sought to extinguish rights and obligations of their original contract. The learned Judge held that there is no necessity to segregate the agreement into statutory and non-statutory parts, and assess their impact on the demand raised by the licensee. The learned Single Judge had also observed that it would be open for the respondents to institute proceeding for recovery of the said sum on account of delayed payment surcharge as raised in the impugned bill of June 2006 by way of filing of a suit or any other proceeding, if the same is otherwise permissible under the law and it would be open for the writ petitioners to contest such proceeding if instituted. The respondent writ petitioners would urge before us if there is a clear bar under Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 with regard to recovery of any such sum after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due, the learned Single Judge could not have given such liberty or made such observation after having held that no notice of disconnection could be given for realization of delayed payment surcharge for the periods mentioned in the said impugned bill of June, 2006. Prior to the 2003 Act, Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 was the Section empowering a licensee to discontinue supply of electricity to consumer including to pay charge. The said Section has undergone a sea-change and the present Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 is not a verbatim reproduction of the said old Section. One of the significant changes is the introduction of Subsection 2 which starts with an non-obstante clause. The said Section has undergone a sea-change and the present Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 is not a verbatim reproduction of the said old Section. One of the significant changes is the introduction of Subsection 2 which starts with an non-obstante clause. The said Section puts a restriction on the right of the licensee to realize and/or recover any sum due from any consumer after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due unless such sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied and the licensee was restrained from disconnecting supply of electricity. The Section starts with a non-obstante clause and the use of the word ‘shall’ in relation to disconnection of electricity is a complete bar to disconnect such supply if such demands are not recoverable in terms of Section 56(2) of the said Act. The sub-section (2) of Section 56 is a new provision which did not find place in Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. This is a provision of limitation for recovery of the dues by the licensee or the generating company. This provision has overriding effect and clearly prohibits a licensing authority to realize any amount after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due, unless such sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrears of charges for electricity supplied and the licensee ‘shall not’ disconnect the supply of electricity. The licensee can get rid of this limitation provided the said licensing company in the bills sent to the consumer has continuously shown the said arrears recoverable from him. If no such indication is there in the subsequent bills regarding the arrears recoverable from the consumer, then if two years’ period expires from the date when such sum became first due and would not be recoverable being barred by limitation. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge has noticed the following factual situation. There has been a suspension of work in the factory of petitioner from 26th September, 1998 and as a consequence whereof the factory of the petitioner had remained closed for a long time. The supply of electricity was disconnected on 5th January, 1999. Thereafter efforts were made to restart the factory and recommence the operation sometimes in the early part of 2003. The supply of electricity was disconnected on 5th January, 1999. Thereafter efforts were made to restart the factory and recommence the operation sometimes in the early part of 2003. For that purpose they approached to provide temporary connection for 440 volts which is some time in the last week of May, 2003. The licensee expressed their inability to provide such low tension supply on the ground that factory premises of the petitioner had already been provided with a high voltage bulk supply of electricity. Thereafter a memorandum was issued on 1st July, 2003, which is reproduced below: “2. Following disconnection your account was closed by way of adjustment of part of your outstanding dues against the Security Deposit (SD) that was lying with us (plus interest on SD less Income Tax thereon, as applicable). After such adjustment, a sum of Rs.3.36.568.19/- plus Delayed Payment Surcharge thereon is lying recoverable from you towards outstanding bills. 3. Delayed Payment Surcharge on the outstanding dues will have to be paid by you in terms of our Schedule of Rates duly approved. A sum of Rs.2,42,153.59 has already accrued as Delayed Payment Surcharge (upto 06.06.2003) on Rs.3,36,568.19 and will accrue further till the actual date of payment. 4. In addition to this, a sum of Rs.6,77,795.00 is required to be paid to us as Security Deposit). This SD has been assessed based on your past pattern of recorded consumption at the prevailing tariff. Kindly note that apart from the above commercial compliances and payment of reconnection charges, you are also required to comply with the technical formalities before restoration of the supply at above which will be informed to you by our Manager Mains (Power) having his office at Poddar Court, 18, Rabindra Sarani, Kolkata – 700001. If you require any further clarification in this regard you may kindly depute your representative to call on the undersigned on any full working day during normal working hours. Assuring you of our best attention at all times.” In the said proceeding when an interim application was moved being GA No.2379 in which the main challenge was to the bill for June, 2006 in which demand for delayed payment surcharge for different periods between October, 1998 and February, 2000 was clubbed together with current charges. Assuring you of our best attention at all times.” In the said proceeding when an interim application was moved being GA No.2379 in which the main challenge was to the bill for June, 2006 in which demand for delayed payment surcharge for different periods between October, 1998 and February, 2000 was clubbed together with current charges. Subsequently a notice of disconnection was issued on 21st July, 2006 for alleged non-payment of a sum of Rs.3,88,883/- in connection with the bill of June, 2006. The bill for the said amount was raised on account of delayed payment surcharge. After November, 1998 three bills were raised for the month of December 1998, January 1999 and February 2000 and the demand was raised for the outstanding dues as well as arrears of fuel surcharge. A public notice for recovery of provisional fuel surcharge was also issued on 14th July, 1998, 4th February, 1999 and 21st April, 1999, 8th October, 1999 and 13th March, 2000. It was alleged that the principal outstanding dues computed to be Rs.3,36,568.19 including a sum of Rs.1,86,065.10 which was incorporated in the bill of February, 2000. In the present case, none of the bills which are being relied upon before the Learned Single Judge would reflect when the amount which was now being demanded had fallen due. Bearing the bills for the month of October and November, 1998 the licensee would not establish service of any other bill. A specific case has been made out by the writ petitioners that except the bills after October and November, 1998, no further bill was raised by CESC for supply of electricity which was received by the petitioners. The bills excepting denying such statement did not disclose any particulars regarding alleged service of such further bill. It is settled law that when an allegation is made, the same has to be denied specifically and has to be conformed with the specific statements. (Shalimar Paints Limited & Ors. Vs. Andrew Francis & Ors. reported in 2005(1) SHN 129).It is a trite in law that in cases where there is no service of bill, the liability or obligation of the consumers to pay does not arise (Sailendra Nath Sen Vs. CESC Ltd. & Ors. reported in 2001 (1) CHN 410 ). (Shalimar Paints Limited & Ors. Vs. Andrew Francis & Ors. reported in 2005(1) SHN 129).It is a trite in law that in cases where there is no service of bill, the liability or obligation of the consumers to pay does not arise (Sailendra Nath Sen Vs. CESC Ltd. & Ors. reported in 2001 (1) CHN 410 ). Since the entire record relating to service of such bills are with the licensee, it is only reasonable that they ought to have produced such records since they are in possession of the best evidence. The learned Single Judge has taken note of the fact that when the writ petitioners originally moved challenge was thrown to bills for the month of October and November, 1998 and the memorandum of 1st July, 2003. This memorandum reflected the outstanding dues subsequent to the date of disconnection which was effected on 5th July, 1999. Thus, the dues for those two months were included in the total sum demanded as outstanding and this sum had been cleared in pursuance of the interim order passed by this Court on 22nd March, 2004. There was nothing on record to show that after the memorandum dated 1st July, 2003 any bill was raised for delayed payment surcharge till the issuance of bill of June, 2006. In the memorandum of 1st July, 2003 also there is no indication as to when delayed payment surcharge had fallen due for the first time. In the present case, if one takes 1st July, 2003 as a date on which such sum became due for the first time right to disconnecting cannot be exercised under sub-Section (1) of Section 56 in the month of June, 2006. Such right could have been exercised by the licensee in June 2006 provided these dues were continuously reflected as arrear charges in terms of Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003. We are of the opinion that the learned single Judge was justified relying on the aforesaid decisions with regard to non-service of the bills and thereafter proceeded to deal with the effect of non-service of such bills with the protection from disconnection as contemplated under Section 56(2) of the said Act. We are of the opinion that the learned single Judge was justified relying on the aforesaid decisions with regard to non-service of the bills and thereafter proceeded to deal with the effect of non-service of such bills with the protection from disconnection as contemplated under Section 56(2) of the said Act. As we have mentioned above, the said Sub-section (2) of Section 56 is a new provision which did not find place in Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and this is a provisions creating a restriction and/or limitation for recovery of any dues by the licensee or the generating company. This Subsection, in our view, was incorporated so that a generating company may not have the luxury of slapping a bill on delayed payment surcharge at their own sweet will and then to recover such amount on the pain of disconnection. We are in agreement with the interpretation given by the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge addressed the said issue in Paragraph 21 and 27 of His Lordship Judgment which is reproduced hereinbelow:- “21. The provisions of Section 56 of the Act confers on the licensee special power to recover dues from the consumer on the pain of disconnection. This power is supplemental to the right of the licensee to institute suit or other proceeding for recovery of such dues on account of electricity charge or any sum other than electricity charges payable to a licensee or the generating company in respect of supply, transmission, distribution or wheeling of electricity. However, such sum can be recovered applying this special power within two years from the date on which such sum became first due. In the event, however, such dues have been shown continuously shown as arrear of charges, the electricity company shall be empowered to apply this provision beyond the two year period.” “27. The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 56 of the 2003 curbs the power of the authority to use disconnection as a mode for recovery of dues after two years from the date from which the sum became first due. In the present case, if one takes 1st July 2003 as the date on which such sum fell first due, power under sub-section (1) of Section 56 cannot be exercised in the month of June, 2006. In the present case, if one takes 1st July 2003 as the date on which such sum fell first due, power under sub-section (1) of Section 56 cannot be exercised in the month of June, 2006. Such power could have been exercised by the licensee in June 2006 if these dues were continuously reflected as arrear charges since then. But no such case has been made out by the respondents. The arguments of the respondents that Section 56 of the 2003 Act does not have retrospective operation also does not justify the issuance of the notice of disconnection, as when the notice was issued in July 2006 then the 2003 Act had become operational.” However, the said bar under Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 cannot be stretched too far to deny the licensee from the realizing such amounts on account of delayed payment surcharge either by instituting a civil proceeding or by any other proceeding. If the same is otherwise permissible under the law and in such proceeding it is always open for the consumer to question initiation of such action on the grounds that may be available to them under the law. However, the dues on the ground of delayed payment surcharge as reflected in the bill for 2006 cannot be recovered on the pain of disconnection as contemplated in Section 56 of the Act and we agree with the reasoning of the learned single Judge on this point and uphold the order of the learned single Judge by which the notice of disconnection dated July, 2006 has been passed. We also did not find any reason to interfere with the other findings of the learned single Judge. However, we make it clear that in the event, any such proceeding is initiated for recovery of the amounts demanded under impugned bills it would be open for the respondents to raise all objections including the plea of limitation since we are not deciding the said issue in this proceeding and the same is kept open to be decided where appropriate court if any such proceeding is initiated by CESC Limited. In the cross-objection filed on behalf of the respondent in the appeal it was urged that the original agreement of the petitioners with the licensee stood substituted upon execution of an agreement dated 1st June, 2004 and it was contended on that basis that all the claims of the licensee under the original agreement stood extinguished. It has been further submitted that the learned Judge clearly erred in law and in not considering that nothing is payable under any agreement for supply of electricity entered into prior to 1st June, 2004 regardless of the fact whether such old agreement survives. It was further contended that the new agreement 1st June, 2004 completely and effectively rescinds the old contract and/or agreement and substitutes a new contract and it is a case of novation which attracts Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act. Since it is a case of novation, it is impossible that both the earlier contract and the new contract of 1st June, 2004 should be performed and/or required to be performed. The Electricity Act, 2003 does not require to enter into a new contract and, thus, the contract entered into by of an agreement dated 1st June, 2004 is not a statutory contract. There is an express new agreement by virtue of execution of the said agreement dated 1st June, 2004 replacing and/or substituting the old agreement without there being any requirement to do so and the principle of novation is to be applied in the instant case and for the aforesaid proposition, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the said respondents relied upon the said decisions: i) AIR 2000 SC 2573 (Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurein E. Kalathil) ii) AIR 2000 SC 1005 (India Thermal Power Ltd. v. State of M.P.) The appellant, in short, contended that under principle of novation, the original agreement of the petitioners with the licensee stood substituted upon execution of the agreement of 1st June, 2004, and all the claims of the licensee under the original agreement stood extinguished. This argument has been contested by the learned counsel for the licensee on two counts. Firstly, it has been submitted that the original agreement for supply of electricity was not substituted by the agreement of 1st June, 2004, but this was a new agreement as the original agreement had lapsed. This argument has been contested by the learned counsel for the licensee on two counts. Firstly, it has been submitted that the original agreement for supply of electricity was not substituted by the agreement of 1st June, 2004, but this was a new agreement as the original agreement had lapsed. It was also argued that this was a statutory contract to which principle of novation do not apply. To this submission, Mr. Banerjee’s rebuttal argument was that though there could be statutory element involved in the contract, the same also included certain non-statutory parts, and the claim of the licensee relate to such non-statutory parts. The basic principle behind the concept of novation is the substitution of a contract by a new one only through the consent of both the parties to the same. Such consent may be expressed as in written agreements or implied through their actions or conduct. If the rights under the old contract were kept alive even after the second agreement and rights under the first agreement had not been rescinded then there is no substitution of contracts and, hence, no novation as has been held in 2010 (12) SCC 458 (H.R. Basavaraj Vs. Canara Bank). Mere entering into a new agreement dated 1st June, 2004 by itself does not amount to novation. Furthermore, the stand of the respondent appears to be contradictory and self-destructive. Moreover, it cannot be said at this stage without further investigation that the rights under the old contract has been extinguished and the parties have agreed and/or consented to be guided by and bound by in terms of the agreement dated 1st June, 2004. In the factual context of the present case, we do not think there is any material from which inference can be drawn that by executing the agreement of 1st June, 2004, the parties thereto sought to extinguish their rights and obligations under the original contract. The ratio of the decisions cited on behalf of the petitioners are not applicable in the facts of the present case on this point. For this reason, we do not think it is necessary to segregate the agreement into statutory and non-statutory parts, and assess their impact on the demand raised by the licensee. On this score also we agree with the reasoning of the learned single Judge and dismiss the cross-appeal. For this reason, we do not think it is necessary to segregate the agreement into statutory and non-statutory parts, and assess their impact on the demand raised by the licensee. On this score also we agree with the reasoning of the learned single Judge and dismiss the cross-appeal. However, we make it clear that since the issue relating to novation can only be decided in a proper trial any observation made in this judgment with regard to the said issue should not be construed as conclusive and would not operate as a res judicata in any future proceeding between the parties relating to the said issue and arising out of the same subject-matter. The cross-objection also accordingly fails. Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties. I agree