JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner-complainant is aggrieved by the order dated 18.7.2008 passed by the Sessions Judge, Churu, whereby the learned Judge has quashed and set aside the cognizance order dated 16.3.1989 passed by the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sardarsahar, Churu. Vide order dated 16.3.1989, the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance for offence under Sections 417, 419, 420, 465, 468 read with Section 120-B I.P.C. against the accused-respondents. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 21.2.1986, the petitioner had submitted a criminal complaint wherein he had claimed that he was, employed with Rajasthan Premkrishna Transport Company as an agent. While he was working at the company, Deepchand, respondent No. 2, used to visit his office. During these visits, he told the petitioner that there is no point in working in a small company. He also used to promise the petitioner that he would make him an agent of big company. He also got the complainant to sign forms at two different places. Believing the promise, the petitioner signed the forms. Till May 1980, the petitioner continued working at Sardarsahar. Subsequently, he shifted to Delhi, where he worked at Duwaras Transport Company Ltd., Azad Market, Delhi. Having worked thereabout one and a half years, he went to work for different transport companies. 3. Meanwhile, both Deepchand and Rajkumar, respondent Nos. 2 and 3, had big business in South India. Taking the benefit of the signed papers, they created a big company, Bhagwati Agency, wherein they claimed that the petitioner was the owner of the said agency. In their bogus claim, they projected respondent No. 2, Rajkumar, as the manager. He further contended that both these persons pretended that they were the elder brother of his. Creating a false impression, they got the agency registered with the branch at Sardarsahar. He further claimed that he had never stayed at Jaipur at Haldion Ka Rasta. Therefore, the entire fraud was made by the respondents-accused. However, when he received a notice from the Commercial Taxes Department that his name had been used by the petitioner, he discovered. the fraud. The complaint was sent for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., However, after investigating the case, the police submitted a negative FR. A notice was issued to the complainant-petitioner. However, when he received a notice from the Commercial Taxes Department that his name had been used by the petitioner, he discovered. the fraud. The complaint was sent for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., However, after investigating the case, the police submitted a negative FR. A notice was issued to the complainant-petitioner. After hearing the complainant-petitioner and after going through the negative FR, vide order dated 16.3.1989, the learned trial Court took cognizance, as aforementioned. Since the respondent-accused were aggrieved by the said order, they filed a revision petition before the learned Judge. The learned Judge, vide order dated 18.1.2008, quashed and set aside the order dated 16.3.1989. Hence, this petition before this Court. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the scope and ambit of taking cognizance is an extremely limited one. At the time of taking the cognizance, the learned trial Court is not permitted to meticulously examine the evidence. In fact, if a prima facie case is made out about the commission of offence, then the cognizance should be taken. After all, the cognizance is that of the offence, and not of the offender. If the documents were submitted, the learned trial Court was convicted that the offence under Sections 417, 418, 420, 465, 468 and 120B I.P.C. were committed. However, the learned Judge has meticulously examined the evidence and has weighed the evidence to the extent that the learned Judge has passed the acquittal order. Thus, the learned Judge has overstepped his jurisdiction. Therefore, the order dated 18.1.2008 ought to be interfered with. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the accused-respondent has strenuously contended that the learned Judge has not meticulously examined the evidence. It has merely noticed the finding of the police. Moreover, relying upon the case of Kewal Krishan v. Surajbhan & Anr., AIR 1980 SC 1780 , he has contended that even if there were appreciation of evidence, it merely amounts to an irregularity and not an illegality. Therefore, this Court should not interfere with the impugned order. 6. The learned Public Prosecutor has echoed the same arguments. 7. It is, indeed, well-settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender. Therefore, this Court should not interfere with the impugned order. 6. The learned Public Prosecutor has echoed the same arguments. 7. It is, indeed, well-settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender. At the time of taking the cognizance, the Court is merely concerned with seeing whether a prima facie case exists if the complaint were taken to be true on its face value? If the ingredient of offence are. made out on the basis of the statement made by the complainant, or through the evidence collected by the Investigating Agency, then the learned trial Court is duty bound to take cognizance of the offence. At the time of taking cognizance, the learned trial Court cannot go into a meticulous examination of the evidence. If it were to do so, obviously it would overstep its jurisdiction. Moreover, when a cognizance order is challenged before the revisional Court, then the revisional Court is concerned with the issue whether the learned trial Court has overstepped its jurisdiction or not? 8. In the present case, the learned Judge has failed to consider this issue. Instead, the learned Judge has gone into a meticulous discussion of the evidence. A bare perusal of the reasoning given by the learned Judge clearly reveals that he has concluded that even if the statement of the complainant were taken to be true, it cannot be said that "there was any fraudulent intention on the part of the respondent-accused." It is rather surprising that a judicial finding has been given without permitting the complainant to lead his evidence during the course of trial. Obviously, the said finding cannot be given at the very first step of the beginning of criminal trial. Whether there was any fraudulent intention or not, whether the signatures were forged or not as claimed by the complainant, these are matters to be decided by the learned trial Court after going through the evidence produced by the prosecution and rebutted by the defence. 9. Surprisingly, the learned Judge has also, observed that in case the complainant was of the opinion that his signatures were forged, he was required to get a certificate from an hand-writing expert. This observation is also rather surprising. 9. Surprisingly, the learned Judge has also, observed that in case the complainant was of the opinion that his signatures were forged, he was required to get a certificate from an hand-writing expert. This observation is also rather surprising. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Judge has clearly, overstepped his jurisdiction and has passed the order which amounts to acquitting the respondent-accused. 10. Although, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Kezval Krishan (supra), yet the case is distinguishable on the factual matrix. The case dealt with the Magistrate who had appreciated the evidence while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 203 Cr.P.C. However, in the present case, it is not the Magistrate who exercised its power while appreciating the evidence. Moreover, the case does not deal with the cognizance order. 11. Hence, this Court quashes and sets aside the order dated 18.1.2008 and confirms the order dated 16.3.1989.Revision allowed. *******