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2011 DIGILAW 134 (PAT)

Ratnesh Mani Tripathi Son Of Late Pandit Siddhanath Mani Tripathi v. State Of Bihar Through The District Magistrate And collector, East Champaran At Motihari

2011-01-21

S.K.KATRIAR, SAMARENDRA PRATAP SINGH

body2011
JUDGEMENT 1. This appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Patna has been preferred against the order dated 18.12.2009 passed by a learned Single Judge of this court in C.W.J.C. No. 7715 of 2009 whereby he imposed a cost of Rs. 50,000/- on the appellant holding that he filed a frivolous complaint before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Motihari against Respondent No, 5 Dr. Ashutosh Sharan. 2. It would appear from the pleadings of the parties that way back in the year 1930 about 19 Kathas 4 Dhurs of land was transferred by Motihari Concerned Limited to one Khem Chand Lai by registered sale deed. In 1943, 19 Kathas 4 Dhurs of land was sold by the said Khem Chand Lal to one Narsingh Das Kejaria. The family of Narsingh Das Kejaria established Shiv Temple on a part of the said land and formed a family trust for the management of the temple. In course of time, the original trustees died and time to time new trust was drawn up. Only the members of Kejaria family were trustees of the Shiv temple trust. In 1991 the family realized that it was getting difficult to maintain Shiv temple and for upkeep of the same and running of the trust, it was necessary to dispose of part of the land. In September, 1991 trustees sold 45 Dhurs of land to Respondent no. 5 by registered sale deed. Soon thereafter the Bihar Religious Trust Board issued notice to respondent No. 5 claiming the trust to be public trust. The respondent no. 5 challenged the notice before this court by way of writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 1961 of 1991. In course of proceeding the Religious Trust Board finally submitted to the court that on enquiry it was found that the trust in question was not a Public Trust and accordingly de-notified the same as being not a public trust. In view of the stand of the Religious Trust Board, the writ petition was withdrawn on 28.8.2004. However, the problem of respondent no. 5 did not end there. The appellant filed a complaint before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Motihari, East Champaran stating therein. that public land is unauthorisedly being sold by the trustee to the respondent no. 5 and the latter has started construction without sanction of law. The Sub-Divisional Officer issued notice to respondent no. However, the problem of respondent no. 5 did not end there. The appellant filed a complaint before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Motihari, East Champaran stating therein. that public land is unauthorisedly being sold by the trustee to the respondent no. 5 and the latter has started construction without sanction of law. The Sub-Divisional Officer issued notice to respondent no. 5 who contested the claim of the appellant. 3. The stand of the purchaser (Respondent No. 5) was that land in question would not be a public land in view of Section 2(3) of the Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956, which runs as under: "2(3) "public land" means any land vested in the Union of India or the State of Bihar, or in any local authority (public undertaking), educational institution recognized by the Government or by any University established under any law for the time being in force, railway company or Gram Panchayat established under Section 3 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (Bihar Act VII of 1948), and includes any land over which the public or the community has got a right of user such as right of way, burials, cremation, pasturage or irrigation." 4. The stand of respondent no. 5 was that only the land which vested in Government and over which public has a right of usage would amount public land. He submits that he had purchased the land in question from the original raiyat and since then he continued to be the owner of the land as the raiyat. Thus, he contended that the land in question was not a Government land nor the public has a right of usage. However, the stand taken by respondent no. 5 did not find favour with S.D.O., Motihari Who stopped the construction. This led to filing of instant writ bearing C.W.J.C. No. 7715 of 2009. In the writ application, the appellant was arrayed as respondent no. 4. After hearing the parties, this court found that the land in question was not a public land within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Public Land Encroachment Act. The learned Single Judge observed that if the land in question pertained to religious activities, then in such circumstances only the Religious Trust would be the competent authority to interfere. However, the Religious Trust Board on the contrary found the trust in question to be a private trust and not a public trust. The learned Single Judge observed that if the land in question pertained to religious activities, then in such circumstances only the Religious Trust would be the competent authority to interfere. However, the Religious Trust Board on the contrary found the trust in question to be a private trust and not a public trust. Learned Single Judge found that the writ petitioner was unnecessarily harassed by the complainant. 5. Heard counsel for the parties. 6. The Honbie Apex Court in the case reported in A.I.R. 1961 SC 1570; Wazir Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in 1955-1 SCR 408: A.I.R. 1954 SC 415 and Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi vs. State of Bihar reported in 1953 SCR 1129: AIR 1953 SC 215 have repeatedly deprecated such harassment of an individual which found invasion in the enjoyment of his personal property and made him to fight unnecessary litigations. In such circumstances the learned Single Judge imposed a cost of Rs. 50,000/- on the appellant as he dragged respondent no. 5 in unnecessary litigation and caused undue harassment for a period over 18 years. 7. The appellant states that the cost imposed is excessive. 8. We find that the learned Single Judge has rightly imposed cost of Rs. 50,000/- on the appellant as the respondent no. 5 was dragged into litigation for 18 long years. Thus, we reject the contention of appellant that the cost is excessive. The appellant would pay the cost to Respondent No. 5 within a period of four months failing which it shall be treated to be a violation of the orders of this court. 9. In the result, this appeal is dismissed.