JUDGMENT 1. THE concerned learned District Judge was urged by the petitioners, being the appellants in Misc. Appeal No. 58 of 2009, to condone the delay of 2110 (two thousand one hundred ten) days in presenting an appeal under Section 9, Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereafter the Act). By order dated 30.04.2011, the learned District Judge declined the prayer of the petitioners and consequently dismissed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This order is challenged in this revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. THE Calcutta Port Trust had leased out one of its properties to the first petitioner, the third opposite party and one Amiya Bag (since deceased) (hereafter Amiya). Having failed and/or neglected to pay lease rent that was payable, they were served with a notice dated 24.10.2002 issued by the Estate Officer. He called upon them to show-cause on or before 03.12.2002 why an order shall not be passed requiring them to pay Rs.15,59,409.88 p together with simple interest @ 12% per annum on the said sum with effect from 04.12.1993 till final payment for occupation of the said property, being public premises within the meaning of the Act. Since no objection had been raised in response to such notice, an order was passed on 19.03.2003 by the Estate Officer holding that the first petitioner, the third opposite party and Amiya were liable to pay the said sum. A further notice dated 20.03.2003 was issued by the Estate Officer requiring them to pay the said sum by 30.04.2003. This notice was issued in terms of provisions contained in Section 7 of the Act. The order dated 19.03.2003 was sought to be challenged by the three petitioners herein (the brother, widow and son of Amiya respectively), being the appellants in the misc. appeal referred to above. In support of their plea that the delay in presentation of the appeal ought to be condoned, the petitioners pleaded that Amiya was looking after the interest of the petitioners and the third opposite party all throughout. He, however, died on 02.01.2008 at the relatively young age of 43 (forty-three) years. Prior to his death, he was continuously suffering from various ailments almost from 2002 and was under the treatment of doctors. He was bed ridden from the middle of 2004 and thereafter admitted in hospital. He, however, died on 02.01.2008 at the relatively young age of 43 (forty-three) years. Prior to his death, he was continuously suffering from various ailments almost from 2002 and was under the treatment of doctors. He was bed ridden from the middle of 2004 and thereafter admitted in hospital. Being the eldest son of the family, other members thereof depended on him blindly since it was he who used to make tadbir so far as the said public premises is concerned either with the Port Trust or with other statutory bodies. It was about six months after Amiya passed away that the petitioners came to learn of the order dated 19.03.2003 of the Estate Officer, when they received a notice on 28.06.2008 from the concerned Certificate Officer claiming Rs.28,89,536.25p including interest. On receipt of such notice, the first petitioner contacted a learned advocate and it took about 9 (nine) months to collect all the documents and 15 (fifteen) days more time to prepare the memorandum of appeal whereafter, only on 04.03.2009, the appeal under Section 9 could be presented. Claiming complete ignorance of the order dated 19.03.2003, the prayer for condonation of delay was made. 3. THE Port Trust did not contest the application for condonation of delay by filing any written objection. 4. THE learned District Judge was of the opinion that sufficient cause as mentioned in Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be stretched that far so as to condone the delay in presentation of the appeal based on the explanation furnished by the petitioners. According to him, medical documents were not produced by the petitioners to support their contention that Amiya had been admitted in a hospital in the year 2004 or that Amiya was not in a position to move. THE learned Judge was also of the view that there was nothing on record to prove that Amiya failed to make tadbir in filing the appeal due to his prolonged illness. THE delay not having been properly explained, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act stood rejected. Referring to the contents of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate for the petitioners contended that the learned Judge exercised discretion erroneously. According to him, a hyper-technical approach was adopted without bestowing careful attention to the plea advanced for condonation of delay. Referring to the contents of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate for the petitioners contended that the learned Judge exercised discretion erroneously. According to him, a hyper-technical approach was adopted without bestowing careful attention to the plea advanced for condonation of delay. Failure of the Port Trust to controvert the application and to cross-examine the witness on behalf of the petitioners, he contended, was sufficient to clinch the issue that proper explanation was furnished by the petitioners for the belated presentation of the appeal justifying condonation of delay. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 : Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantanag v. Mst. Katiji and ors., he made a fervent prayer to allow the prayer for condonation of delay and to extend opportunity to the petitioners to highlight the infirmities in the order dated 19.03.2003 passed by the Estate Officer. 5. MR. Kar, learned advocate for the Port Trust, did not leave any stone unturned to impress the Court that the revisional application is devoid of any merit and consequently merits outright dismissal. According to MR. Kar, the learned Judge disbelieved the plea set up by the petitioners and, therefore, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction this Court ought not to substitute its view for the view taken in the order under challenge, since it is a plausible view. Referring to the order dated 19.03.2003, he endeavoured to highlight that Amiya had appeared before the Estate Officer at one point of time but did not appear thereafter for undisclosed reasons. He further contended that if Amiya was seriously ill right from 2002, as claimed by the petitioners, there is no valid reason as to why they did not take steps to protect their interest before the Estate Officer. It was also contended that the petitioners have not been paying any rent for nearly 2 (two) decades and, therefore, are not entitled to any relief in equity. 6. IN support of his submission that there has been a shift in approach of the Supreme Court while considering prayers for condonation of delay, he placed reliance on the decision reported in (2010) 5 SCC 459 : Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and anr., and submitted that this Court ought to refuse the prayer for condonation of delay. I have heard learned advocates for the parties and considered the materials on record. 7. I propose to consider first the decision cited by Mr. Kar in Oriental Aroma (supra) for ascertaining whether, in fact, there has been a shift in approach or not, as argued by him. Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in condoning more than four years' delay in filing of appeal by the respondents was the question that arose for determination there. Paragraph 8 of the decision records that the Division Bench of the High Court referred to various judgments of the Supreme Court, noted therein, and condoned the delay by making a cryptic observation that the cause shown by the respondents is sufficient. The Supreme Court was of the view that the High Court, in condoning the delay, had ignored the judicially accepted parameters for exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and set aside the order of the High Court on the grounds that it erroneously assumed that the delay was of 1067 (one thousand sixty seven days) days whereas the delay was more than 4 (four) years, that despite the appellants having filed a reply objecting to the prayer for condonation of delay, the High Court proceeded on the basis that there was no reply, and that the respondents had approached the High Court with unclean hands in that they had made false statements to cover up the delay. 8. I find no change or shift in approach. To enable the Court to exercise discretionary relief, it is the cardinal principle that the party approaching the Court must come with his hands clean. Distorting or even twisting facts to suit ones convenience with a view to mislead the Court to make it believe that sufficient cause exists does more harm than good. Once the Court is apprised and it is satisfied that the approach is not bonafide, no Court would come to the aid of such a dishonest litigant. That has been the approach since yesteryears and has been the approach of the Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma (supra) too. There is nothing much to be impressed about Mr. Kars contention. At this stage, it would be profitable to notice the decision reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 : N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy. This decision was noticed in Oriental Aroma (supra) along with other decisions. There is nothing much to be impressed about Mr. Kars contention. At this stage, it would be profitable to notice the decision reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 : N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy. This decision was noticed in Oriental Aroma (supra) along with other decisions. One finds an enlightening discussion on the policy behind imposing a time-frame for the Courts to be approached by aggrieved litigants and the factors that ought to weigh in the mind of the Court if a prayer for condonation of delay is made. The same reads : 9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest republican up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. (italics in original and underlining for emphasis by me) 9. THE principles that emerge are that discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is available to be exercised if the Court is satisfied that the party approaching it beyond the time statutorily stipulated was prevented due to a genuine disability, that sufficient cause ought to receive a liberal construction if the conduct of the defaulting party does not smack of malafides or the belated approach is not the result of any evil design, that length of the delay is not material and it is the credibility of the explanation offered that ought to exercise the consideration of the Court, and that in the event of the subordinate Court declining the prayer for condonation, it would be open to the higher Court to satisfy itself in respect of acceptability of the cause shown for the delay to reach its own finding irrespective of the conclusion reached in the order impugned. 10. THE portion of the decision in N. Balakrishnan (supra) underlined by me for emphasis takes care of Mr. Kars contention that the revisional Court would not interfere where two views are possible. 10. THE portion of the decision in N. Balakrishnan (supra) underlined by me for emphasis takes care of Mr. Kars contention that the revisional Court would not interfere where two views are possible. On the authority of the said decision, it is open to the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction to independently examine whether on the facts presented before the Court the delay ought to be condoned or not. I am further inclined to take the view that in a case where two views are possible on a given set of facts as to whether cause shown by the defaulting party is sufficient or not warranting condonation, the Court ought to lean towards condoning the delay rather than rejecting the prayer, for, that would really advance the cause of justice. Now, to the facts of the case for determining whether the prayer for condonation of delay ought to be allowed or not. 11. THE application under Section 5 of the Act filed by the petitioners was not controverter by the Port Trust. So far as the Port Trust was concerned, by applying the doctrine of non-traverse, the statements on the factual aspects regarding the illness of Amiya are deemed to have been admitted. This approach does not find reflection in the impugned order. 12. IN its decision reported in (2007) 6 SCC 401 : M. Venkatramana Hebbar v. M. Rajagopal Hebbar, the Supreme Court considered the effect of non-denial of averments in the plaint by filing written statement. It was observed that the Court was entitled to draw an inference that the same had been admitted and that facts admitted need not be proved. IN a previous decision reported in AIR 1992 SC 700 : Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, the Supreme Court while accepting it as true that a distinction must be made between pleading and proof, observed that if the allegations of facts made in support of a plea are denied then alone the question of their proof in an appropriate case arises. If those allegations of facts are admitted, there is no need to prove what is admitted or must be deemed to be admitted, since there can be admissions by non-traverse. But there might also be cases in which, having regard to the nature of the circumstances, the Court may insist upon proof independently of such admission by non-traverse. If those allegations of facts are admitted, there is no need to prove what is admitted or must be deemed to be admitted, since there can be admissions by non-traverse. But there might also be cases in which, having regard to the nature of the circumstances, the Court may insist upon proof independently of such admission by non-traverse. I am to consider, on the admitted facts, whether the plea set up is acceptable or not founded on the materials produced as proof and not challenged. The petitioners did, in fact, produce certain medical documents to support their claim that Amiya was critically ill and, therefore, could not appear before the Estate Officer to answer the charge in course of the proceedings initiated under the Act. These are all questions of fact and were supported by the examination-in-chief on affidavit filed by the first petitioner. It has been ascertained that the Port Trust did not even call upon the first petitioner to face cross-examination. In such circumstances, the plea of the petitioners cannot be discarded as untrustworthy only on the ground that further documents were required to be produced in support of illness of Amiya. As has been observed in Katiji (supra), the expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. There is also no material to doubt the bonafides of the petitioners or to rule that the belated approach is a deliberate attempt on their part to deflect the course of justice. True it is that the learned District Judge recorded his satisfaction that the petitioners had failed to produce adequate documents to prove the illness of Amiya but as has rightly been contended by Mr. Mukherjee, a hyper-technical approach was adopted which resulted in technicalities overriding substantial justice. Mere fact that the appeal was presented more than 5 (five) years beyond the period of limitation would, therefore, be hardly relevant in deciding as to whether the delay ought to be condoned or not. 13. IN normal circumstances, the High Court exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution would not interfere with findings of fact recorded by the subordinate Court but if the decision suffers from perversity, there is no reason as to why the High Court should refrain from interfering. The learned Judge has not exercised discretion judiciously. 13. IN normal circumstances, the High Court exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution would not interfere with findings of fact recorded by the subordinate Court but if the decision suffers from perversity, there is no reason as to why the High Court should refrain from interfering. The learned Judge has not exercised discretion judiciously. I am of the view that for promoting justice, the prayer for condonation of delay ought to have been allowed. 14. HAVING regard to the pleadings and the evidence on record, I do not consider that the law reiterated in Oriental Aroma (supra) would stand in the way of granting the prayer for condonation of delay. The order impugned stands set aside. The learned District Judge is requested to register the appeal, if it is otherwise in form, and to proceed for disposal thereof in accordance with law. 15. THE revisional application stands allowed, without order for costs. Photostat certified copy of this judgment and order may be furnished to the applicant at an early date.