1. This age old habeas corpus petition concerns the disappearance of an young man aged 20 years by name Mushtaq Ahmad Dar S/O Ghulam Mohammad Dar R/O Tengpora, Srinagar on and after 13.04.1997 midnight. 2. As per the averments contained in the petition, the petitioner's son, namely, the detenu, was arrested by the 4th respondent at Boat Colony, Bemina on 13.04.1997 midnight, beaten in the presence of his family members, interrogated in one of the rooms of the house while the other family members were locked in another room, and thereafter he was frisked away by the personnel of the 4th respondent. The petitioner would contend that on the next day morning she approached the 4th respondent when they admitted the custody of the detenu with them and assured that he would be released shortly, and that after repeated approach and on subsequent days the detenu was not released. After passage of time, the petitioner was told that the detenu was not in their custody. In the above stated background the petitioner came forward with this Habeas Corpus Petition, stating that after exhausting her remedies with all other higher authorities including the Ministers, for securing the protection of the body of her son, having failed she approached this Court, which caused some delay in filing the Habeas Corpus Petition. The petitioner, therefore, prayed for a direction to the respondents to produce her son Mushtaq Ahmad Dar before this Court and to set him at liberty. The petitioner also sought for further directions for conducting a judicial enquiry and also payment of compensation of Rs.10 lacs. Petitioner also seek for a direction for prosecuting the officials of the 4th respondent for punishing them for unlawful arrest and disappearance of the detenu. 3. When the Habeas Corpus Petition came up for hearing, after admission and initial notice on 07.09.1999, respondents were directed to file their reply. After perusing the reply an order came to be passed on 02.05.2000 to the effect that since the respondents deny the alleged apprehension of the detenu, an enquiry was necessitated. The Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar was appointed as Enquiry Officer. The parties were directed to appear before the Enquiry Officer on 20.05.2000. The enquiry was directed to be completed within a period of four months from the date of appearance of the parties. The Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar was appointed as Enquiry Officer. The parties were directed to appear before the Enquiry Officer on 20.05.2000. The enquiry was directed to be completed within a period of four months from the date of appearance of the parties. The matter was directed to be listed after the receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer. 4. The Additional Sessions Judge, who is presently a sitting Judge of this Court, held the enquiry and submitted his report on 18.07.2000. The perusal of the report disclose that on 25.05.2000, none of the parties appeared before him, that the applicant appeared thereafter while the non applicants did not appear. The appli­cant was stated to have produced the witnesses whose statements were recorded by the learned Judge. The learned Judge extracted the substratum of the evidence, both the chief examination as well as the cross examination made by the non-appli­cants 1 & 2, namely, the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Director General of Police. The learned Judge has also recorded that while the counsel for the non-applicants 1 & 2 caused appearance on certain occasions, the non- applicants always remained absent and that therefore, no evidence was let in on behalf of the non-applicants. The learned Judge ultimately drew the following conclusions in his report. "Considered the submissions and also sifted the record. What emerges from the same is that son of the petitioner from the year 1997 is missing, whereabouts are not known till date. 20 Grenadiers army according to the witnesses had lifted Mushtaq Ahmad from his house on the intervening night of 13/14th of April, 1997. According to the witness Haji Ab. Rashid Dar, Mushtaq Ahmad was in the custody of 20 Grenediers Army. Accord­ing to him Commandant, S.K. Malik had assured released of said Mushtaq Ahmad Dar. But was not released. Thereafter army camp at Boatman Colony Bemina was contacted where Maj. Vishu Jeet Singh had assured that they will release Mushtaq Ahmad. But transfer of the said army camp disturbed that assurances. According to this witness some Nezar Mohamad, Naib Sobedar had demanded money. Concerned army was transferred to Pattan and then 20 Grenediers army camped at HMt were contacted where five boys were detained which included Mushtaq Ahmad Dar. Mushtaq Ahmad Dar was there but was not released. But transfer of the said army camp disturbed that assurances. According to this witness some Nezar Mohamad, Naib Sobedar had demanded money. Concerned army was transferred to Pattan and then 20 Grenediers army camped at HMt were contacted where five boys were detained which included Mushtaq Ahmad Dar. Mushtaq Ahmad Dar was there but was not released. The position of Mushtaq Ahmad Dar being in custody of 20 Grenediers army and having been lifted by them is clearly established by witnesses, namely, Ab. Rashid Dar, Ab. Rehim Bhat, Ab. Rehman Dar, Ali Mohd Dar and Mst. Azizi, applicant. Their statements as made mention of hereinabove are clear to the effect that Mushtaq Ahmad Dar was lifted by 20 Grenediers Army and thereafter was in their custody. But finally Mushtaq Ahmad could not be traced from anywhere and his whereabouts till date are not known. Specif­ically liability could not be fixed because it is not known as to which of the Army personnel had lifted Mushtaq Ahmad Dar, through 20 Grenediers is responsible for having lifted Mushtaq Ahmad Dar. Pursuant to enquiry it is safely concluded that Mushtaq Ahmad Dar was lifted by 20 Grenediers camped at Boatman Colony Bemina on 13.04.1997 and thereafter has dis­appeared. The report as such is submitted." 5. After the receipt of the report by order dated 29.10.2002, the parties were allowed to file their objections. The copy of the enquiry report was also directed to be made available to the parties. 6. It is pertinent to state that throughout, the respondents No. 1 & 2 were represented by the Deputy Advocate General/Additional Advocate General while the 3rd and 4th respondents were represented by Senior Central Government Standing Counsel. 7. On 15.07.2003 the opportunity to file the objections to the report was extended and thereafter on 19.08.2003 it was noted that while on behalf of respon­dents Nos. 3 & 4 objections were filed, respondents Nos. 1 & 2 were directed to file their objections within three weeks. Subsequently on 28.10.2003 this Court consid­ered the report of the learned Additional Sessions Judge Srinagar (Enquiry Officer) dated 18.07.2002 and has noted the findings of the enquiry report. It was also noted that in spite of opportunities extended to the respondents, the respondents did not file any objection or produce any witness. 8. The objections to the report filed by respondents Nos. It was also noted that in spite of opportunities extended to the respondents, the respondents did not file any objection or produce any witness. 8. The objections to the report filed by respondents Nos. 3 & 4 merely stated that no operation was conducted by any Army unit on 13.04.1997 in Boat Colony, Bemina and that the detenu was neither arrested nor lifted on that date. As far as respondents Nos. 1 & 2 were concerned, it was their stand that since the allegations were not against the State or the State police, they did not have any knowledge of the disappearance or arrest of the detenu by the 4th respondent. This Court, therefore, concluded that in the absence of any legally acceptable material placed before the Enquiry Officer or this Court, the evidence submitted by the petitioner had gone un-rebutted and was sufficient enough to reach the finding of the disappearance of the detenu Mushtaq Ahmad Dar after his arrest by the 4th respondent on 13/14.04.1997. It was also held that there was no reason to disagree with the report submitted by learned Additional Sessions Judge Srinagar, inasmuch as, in spite of several opportunities extended by the learned Judge, the respondents failed to avail the opportunity and let in any evidence to counter the evidence let in on behalf of the petitioner and, therefore, the report of the Enquiry Officer deserved to be accepted in toto. Therefore, a direction was given to the Police Station Primpora to register the case of disappearance after the arrest of the detenu Mushtaq Ahmad by the 4th respondent on 13.04.1997 and proceed to conduct the enquiry as per law. Regarding the prayer for compensation, the respondents were granted time to file their objections. 9. In spite of the order dated 28.10.2003 to register the FIR, the FIR was not registered by the Parim pora Police Station till 01.04.2009. Therefore, another order came to be passed on 01.04.2009 directing a separate Robkar to be framed against then Station House Officer, Police Station Parimpora and further direction was given to register the FIR as directed earlier, by the present Station House Officer of the said Police Station and report the same within one week from the date of the order. As regards the claim for compensation no objection was filed till 13.10.2009. 10. As regards the claim for compensation no objection was filed till 13.10.2009. 10. In the meantime FIR was stated to have been registered on 24.06.2009 in FIR No. 66/2009 under section 363 RFC in the Police Station Parimpora. 11. On behalf of the petitioner, a supplementary affidavit was filed on 08.10.2010, contending that the detenu was the only bread winner of the family, that he was working as Backman (Nan-wai) during the morning hours and that in the day time he used to ply auto rickshaw and from the earnings of such avocations he was supporting the family which consisted of his mother/the petitioner, two younger brothers, namely, Abdul Hamid Dar and Rafiq Ahmad Dar, who were minors at that time and that the whole family was dependent on him. The petitioner also stated therein that two of her elder sons were already married and were living separately and, therefore, she and her other minor sons were eking their livelihood with the meager earnings of the detenue. She also stated that her elder sons had deserted her and at present she is living with her handicapped son and finding it difficult to meet both ends meet. 12. To the supplementary affidavit a response was filed by the Station House Officer, Parimpora Police Station, stating that after the registration of FIR no. 66/2009 and the investigation was set in motion, it came to light that a complaint was already registered as FIR no.2/2001 under Section 364 RFC against the 4th respondent in the Batmaloo Police Station Srinagar on 14.04.1997, that the said FIR along with the file of the records/evidence was secured and the daily diaries of the Batmaloo Police Station was seized as a peace of evidence along with the seizure memo and recorded statement of MHC Police Station on 02.04.2009 with regard to the arrest of the detenue. It is also stated therein that in the course of further investigation, site plan of the place of occurrence was prepared and the statement of prosecution witnesses, by name, Mohd Altaf Dar S/O Gh. Mohd Dar, Haji Abdul Rashid Dar S/o Haji Mohammad Ramzan, Ghulam Mohammad Shiekh S/O Abdul Aziz and Mst. Azizi W/O late Gh. Mohammad Dar, were recorded and that the investigation process has been activated. Mohd Dar, Haji Abdul Rashid Dar S/o Haji Mohammad Ramzan, Ghulam Mohammad Shiekh S/O Abdul Aziz and Mst. Azizi W/O late Gh. Mohammad Dar, were recorded and that the investigation process has been activated. It is also stated that the 4th respondent was asked to intimate the full particulars of the party and also provide cooperation to the Parimpora Police Station through their letter dated 14.09.2009 so that the investigation can be brought to its logical conclusion. It is stated that in response to the said correspondence, by letter dated 02.12.2009, a copy of letter dated 17.11.2009 was received from one Rahul Jaswal, Major Adjutant of the 4th respondent wherein it was intimated that no operation was carried out by the said Army Unit during the intervening night of 13.04.1997 and no individual, by name, Mushtaq Ahmad Dar, was apprehended, that it was further reported that subject case was already dismissed by the High Court on 19.07.2005, and the Parimpora Police Station was intimated to stop further correspondence on the subject. The response of the Parimpora Police Station, however, states that no copy of the order dated 19.07.2005 was forwarded to them by the 4th respondent. The said response of the Parimpora Police Station also state that even to their subsequent communication dated 02.12.2009, there was no response from the 4th respondent and they were not cooperating with the investigating agency. It is lastly stated that the investigation process is going on and all earnestness and possible efforts are being made to trace out the alleged accused responsible for commission of the crime. 13. The above factors disclose that this Court has already concluded in the order dated 28.10.2003 that the 4th respondent was squarely responsible for the detention of Mushtaq Ahmad Dar, son of the petitioner. As per the directions of this Court made in the said order, since the Parimpora Police Station, acting under the directions of the 1st and 2nd respondent, have already registered FIR 66/2009 and the prosecution has been set in motion, they should leave no stone unturned for concluding the said prosecution proceedings and file the final report before the concerned jurisdiction Criminal Court expeditiously. 14. There is no point in saying that the 4th respondent is not co-operating with the Parimpora Police Station for proceeding in the prosecution. 14. There is no point in saying that the 4th respondent is not co-operating with the Parimpora Police Station for proceeding in the prosecution. It is for the police officials to invoke the appropriate provisions of the law under the criminal law jurisdiction for securing the ends of justice and for enforcement of the law. If the prosecuting agency be heard to state their helplessness, it can only be stated that such a pathetic plea, if made, would only result in deterioration of the status of the law enforcing agency, which would in effect reflect very badly on the 1st and 2nd respondents. Such a situation, when pleaded, would only make them also respon­sible for compensating the plight of the mother of the detenue who is crying for justice for the past more than a decade in this Court. I am convinced that this is a case where enough opportunities were extended to the respondents to place their case and the respondents merely come forward to state that they had played their role of lodging the prosecution by registering the FIR 66/2009 that too after passing of several orders of this Court. Their duty can be said to have been accomplished only after such launching of the prosecution is proceeded and taken to its logical conclusion by booking the culprits before the Court of law. Unless and until the prosecution is concluded in the said manner, known to law, the respondent nos. 1 and 2 cannot be absolved of their responsibility in regard to the disappearance of the son of the petitioner, now conclusively brought to light before this Court by the report of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar. Therefore, it cannot be stated that the responsibility of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 seize to exist by merely registering the FIR 66/2009 on the file of Parimpora Police Station. 15. Therefore, it cannot be stated that the responsibility of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 seize to exist by merely registering the FIR 66/2009 on the file of Parimpora Police Station. 15. Before proceeding further, this Court wish to be guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1983 SC, 1086, Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and anr, AIR 1984 SC 1026 , Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC, 746, Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa & Ors, AIR 1999 SC 3412 , Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa v. Smt. Sukamani Das and anr, AIR 2000 SC, 1603, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Sumathi and ors and AIR 2006 SC 1117 , Subc Singh v. State of Haryana, in order to consider the claim of the petitioner for compensation for the disappearance of her son, who was aged 20 years at the time of his disappearance. 16. In the decision reported in AIR 1983 SC, 1086, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has highlighted the right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and the remedy that can be granted in the event of violation of said right. Paragraph no. 10 of the said decision can be usefully referred to, which reads as under:- "..............Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court were limited to passing orders of release from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right cap reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured is to mullet its violaters in the payment of monetary compensation Administrative sclerosis leading to fragrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield. If civilization is not to perish in this country as it has perished in some others too well-known to suffer mention, it is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that respect for the rights of individuals is the true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioner's rights. If civilization is not to perish in this country as it has perished in some others too well-known to suffer mention, it is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that respect for the rights of individuals is the true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioner's rights. It may have recourse against those officers."(Emphasis added) 17. In AIR 1984 SC, 1026, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with a case of disappearance and awarded sum of Rs. 1 lac to the widows of the detenues whose disappearance was finally ascertained. The Supreme Court, while awarding such a payment by way of exemplary costs, held as under in paragraph nos. 5 and 7: - "5. The view of this Court as expressed in the main judgment clearly indicates that the assertion of respondents 1,2 and 4 that C. Daniel and C. Paul left Phungrei Camp where 21st Sikh Regiment were stationed is not correct and that to avoid responsibility flowing from the mysterious disap­pearance of C. Daniel and C. Paul an attempt was made to suggest that they had left alive in the company of their compatriots. On that conclusion one can say that there is a willful disobedience to the writ of habeas corpus by misleading the court by presenting a distorted version of facts not borne out by the record. It is thus established that the respondents 1,2 and 4 have committed civil contempt by their willful disobedience to the writ". 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, keeping in view the torture, the agony and the mental oppression through which Mrs. C. Thingkhuila, wife of Shri C. Daniel and Mrs. C. Vangamla, wife of Shri C. Paul had to pass and they being the proper applicants the formal application being by. Sebastion M. Hongray, the court considered it proper and directed that as a measure of exemplary costs as is permissible in such cases, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 shall pay Rs. 1 lac to each of the aforementioned two women within a period of four weeks from today" 18. In the decision reported in (1993)2 SCC, 746, a detailed consideration was made to the power of this Court under Article 226 for awarding compensation in proceedings for enforcement of fundamental rights as a remedy available in public law. 1 lac to each of the aforementioned two women within a period of four weeks from today" 18. In the decision reported in (1993)2 SCC, 746, a detailed consideration was made to the power of this Court under Article 226 for awarding compensation in proceedings for enforcement of fundamental rights as a remedy available in public law. The issue was dealt with in depth and the principles have been lucidly stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph nos. 10,22 and 23, as under- 10. In view of the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Another, [1983] 3 S.C.R.508, Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India and Others, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 904 and [1984] 3 S.C.R. 544, Bhim Singh v. State of J&K [1984]Supp. S.C.C. 504 and [1985] 4 S.C.C. 677, Saheli, A Women's Resources Centre and Others v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters and Others, [1990] 1 S.C.C. 422 and State of Maharashtra and Others v. Ravikant S.Patil, [1991]2 S.C.C. 373, the liability of the State of Orissa in the present case to pay the compensation not be doubted and as rightly not disputed by the learned Additional Solicitor General. It, would, however, be appropriate to spell out clearly the principle on which the liability of the State arises in such cases for payment of compensation and the distinction between this liability and the liability in Private law for payment of compensation in an action on tort. It may be mentioned straightaway that award of compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 by this court or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an action based on tort. This is a distinction between the two remedies to be borne in mind which also indicates the basis on which compensation is awarded in such proceedings. We shall now refer to the earlier decisions of this Court as well as some other decisions before further discussion of this principle. 22. The above discussion indicates the principles on which the Court's power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is exercised to award monetary compensation for contravention of a fundamental right. We shall now refer to the earlier decisions of this Court as well as some other decisions before further discussion of this principle. 22. The above discussion indicates the principles on which the Court's power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is exercised to award monetary compensation for contravention of a fundamental right. This was indicated in Rudul Sah and certain further observations therein adverted to earlier, which may tend to minimise the effect of the principle indicated therein, do not really detract from that principle. This is how the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah and others in that line have to be understood and Kasturilal distinguished there from. We have considered this question at some length in view of the doubt raised, at times, about the propriety of awarding compensation in such proceedings, instead of directing the claimant to resort to the ordinary process of recovery of damages by recourse to an action in tort. In the present case, on the finding reached, it is a clear case for award of compensation to the petitioner for the custodial death of her son. 23. The question now, is of the quantum of compensation. The deceased Suman Behera was aged about 22 years and had a monthly come between Rs.1200 to Rs.1500. This is the finding based on evidence recorded by the District Judge, and there is no reason to doubt its correctness. In our opinion, a total amount of Rs. 1,50,000 would be appropriate as compensation, to be awarded to the petitioner in the present case. We may, however, observe that the award of compensation in this proceeding would be taken into account for adjustment, in the event of any other proceeding taken by the petitioner for recovery of compensation on the same ground, so that the amount to this extent is not recovered by the petitioner twice over. Apart from the fact that such an order is just, it is also in consonance with the statutory recognition of this principle of adjustment provided in Section 357(5) Cr.P.C. and Section 141(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988."(Empha-sis added) 19. His lordship, Justice Anand (as he then was), while concurring with the judgment of His lordship Justice J.S. Verma, added certain principles in paragraph nos. His lordship, Justice Anand (as he then was), while concurring with the judgment of His lordship Justice J.S. Verma, added certain principles in paragraph nos. 31,33,34 and 35, which will have to be kept in mind by this Court while dealing with such claims for compensation, based on violation of Article 21 of the Consti­tution. The said paragraphs are usefully extracted for our purpose:- 31. "It is axiomatic that convicts, prisoners or under-trials are not denuded of their fundamental rights under Article 21 and it is only such restrictions, as are permitted by law, which can be imposed on the enjoyment of the fundamental right by such persons. It is an obligation of the State, to ensure that there is no infringement of the indefeasible rights of a citizen to life, except in accordance with law while the citizen is in its custody. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts, under trials or other prisoners in custody, except according to procedure established by law. There is a great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life. His liberty is in the very nature of things circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement and therefore his interest in the limited liberty left to him is rather precious. The duty of care on the part of the State is strict and admits of no exceptions. The wrongdoer is accountable and the State is responsible if the person in custody of the police is deprived of his life except according to the procedure established by law. I agree with Brother Verma, J. that the defence of "sovereign immunity" in such cases is not available to the State and in fairness to Mr. Altaf Ahmed it may be recorded that he raised no such defence either. 33. The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much as protector and guarantor of the indefeasible Fights of the citizens. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. 34...................Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting "com­pensation" in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making 'monetary amends' under the public law for the wrong done due to breach, of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of exemplary damages' awarded against the wrong doer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and persecute the offender under the penal law. 35..............................In doing so the courts take into account not only the interest of the applicant and the respondent but also the interests of the public as a whole with a view to ensure that public bodies or officials do not act. unlawfully and do perform their public duties properly particularly where the fundamental rights of a citizen under Article 21 is concerned. Law is in the process of development and the process necessitates develop­ing separate public law procedures as also public law principles. It maybe necessary to identify the situations to which separate proceedings and principles apply And the courts have to act firmly but with certain amount of circumspection and self restraint, lest proceedings under Article 32 or 226 are misused as a disguised substitute for civil action in private law. Some of those situations have been identified by this Court in the cases referred to by Brother Verma, J."(Emphasis added) 20. Some of those situations have been identified by this Court in the cases referred to by Brother Verma, J."(Emphasis added) 20. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon two other decisions reported in AIR 1999 SC 3412 , Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa v. Smt. Sukamani Das and anr, (2000) 10 SCC 649 , Haryana Urban Development Author­ity v. Anupama Patnaik, AIR 2000 SC, 1603, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Sumathi and ors and AIR 2006 SC 1117 , Sube Singh v. State of Haryana. 21. In the decisions reported in AIR 1999 SC 3412 and (2000) 10 SCC 649 , the issue related to the death of a deceased by causes other than illegal detention or violation of Article 21 of the Constitution but were of some other causes, such as death of a deceased due to electrocution etc. Dealing with such cases where- the claim was made for compensation under Article 226, the Hon'ble Supreme Court took the view that where such claims for compensation were made based on the alleged negligence on the part of the State or other public bodies and when such allegations are denied by contending that irrespective of due care or caution, due to circumstances beyond their control, such mishap has taken place, it will not be appropriate for the High Court, exercising its power under Article 226, to award any compensation, inasmuch as, there were many disputed questions of fact. This Court is convinced that such cases stand apart as against the cases where violation of fundamental right to life and liberty based on Article 21 of the Constitution, is made, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court having laid down well settled principles to be applied and by applying such a principle to the case on hand it can be safely held that the award of compensation is warranted in the facts and circumstances of this case. 22. In a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 2006 SC 1117 the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering all its earlier decisions including the decision reported in (1993) 2 SCC, 746, has issued broad guidelines before awarding compensation as a public law remedy. Paragraph no. 21 of the said decision can be usefully referred to which reads as under: - "21. Paragraph no. 21 of the said decision can be usefully referred to which reads as under: - "21. In cases where custodial death or custodial torture or other violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21 is established, courts may award compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 or 226. However, before awarding compensation, the court will have to pose to itself the following question (a) Whether the violation of Article 21 is patent and incontrovert­ible, (b) Whether the violation is gross and of a magnitude to shock the conscience of the Court, (c) Whether the custodial torture alleged has resulted in death or whether custodial torture is supported by medical report or visible marks or scars or disability. Where there is no evidence of custodial torture of a person except his own statement, and where such allegation is not supported by any medical report or other corroboration evidence, or where there are clear indications that the allegations are false or exaggerated fully or in part, courts may not award compensation as a public law remedy under Article 32 or 226, but relegate the aggrieved party to the traditional remedies by way of appropriate civil/criminal action." 23. Keeping the above principles in mind and the guidelines set out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the recent decision, I find that having regard to the categoric findings of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar, in the report dated 18.07.2000, which has been examined and confirmed by this Court in the order dated 28.10.2003, it will have to be held that in the case on hand, violation of Article 21 was patent and incontrovertible. It is not as if the disappeared detenue had any criminal background or was wanted in any serious criminal case in which he was alleged to have been involved. Therefore, when there were uncontroverted materi­als available on record to say with certainty that he was taken into custody by the 4th respondent on 13.04.1997, the 4th respondent, except making a simple denial never came forward to dislodge the said conclusion. On the other hand, it came forward with an incorrect and untrue statement that the case of the detenue was dealt with by this Court earlier and was closed, for which there was no material forthcoming from the 4th respondent. On the other hand, it came forward with an incorrect and untrue statement that the case of the detenue was dealt with by this Court earlier and was closed, for which there was no material forthcoming from the 4th respondent. Though the learned Additional Sessions Judge Srinagar gave ample opportunities to the 4th respondent, he did not bother to avail the opportunity effectively by placing any material, either oral or documen­tary, to support its stand of mere denial regarding the disappearance of the detenue. 24. The above factors, as compared to the plight of the petitioner, a gullible women, who had no other dependable person to fall back upon for her source of livelihood, it will have to be held that this was a case which would fall within the parameters of violation of the right under Article 21 of the Constitution, which was gross and was of such grave magnitude which shocked the conscience of this Court. 25. Inasmuch as, this is a case of total disappearance of the detenue who was taken into custody by the personnel of the 4th respondent, this Court is of the view that this is a fit case where award of compensation as a public law remedy under Article 226 to the aggrieved person, namely the petitioner, is fit and appropriate as well as in the interest of justice, and it will not be proper to relegate the petitioner to go to a Civil Court for the redressal of her grievance. 26. Be that as it may, when based on the concluded statement that the detenue has disappeared after his custody was taken by the personnel of the 4th respondent on 13.04.1997, apart from the prosecution proceedings being initiated against the culprits in the FIR registered by the Parimpora Police Station in FIR 66/2009, they are legally and morally responsible to answer the plight of the gullible lady, namely, the petitioner, who has been fighting for her rights in regard to the disappearance of her son, the detenue. In other words, the 3rd respondent, being the authority under whom the 4th respondent is functioning and as such the 3rd and 4th respondent are fully responsible along with 1st and 2nd respondent as well, to off set whatever loss and mental agony suffered by the petitioner due to the disappear­ance of her son, who was supporting her as well as her two other minor sons, one of whom is stated to be a handicapped person. 27. Going by the details furnished in the supporting affidavit, it transpires that the detenue was undertaking different avocations, such as a Bakeman, Auto Rick­shaw driver etc. for a king out the livelihood for himself as well as for the sustenance of his mother, namely, the petitioner and two minor brothers. There is no contra statement made either by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 or by the 3rd and 4th respondent as regards the said statement except mere denial in the response filed by respondent nos. 3 and 4. 28. It is not as if the petitioner was claiming that the detenue was doing any lucrative business/working in very high salaried employment. However, it can be safely concluded that by carrying on such avocations stated above, the detenue would have earned not less than Rs. 400/- per day in Srinagar. Therefore, keeping the same as the base, if it is calculated, the detenue would have earned not less than Rs. 10,000/- per month on an average. By providing at least1/4th of the said a mount, which he would have spent for himself, the detenue would have contrib­uted not less than Rs. 7500/- to the family of the petitioner. 29. Based on the above calculations and noting the age of the detenue at the time of his detention, namely, 13.04.1997, when he was stated to be of 20 years old, he would have definitely supported the petitioner for another 40 years. On that basis, though the sum total would come to several lacs, it can reasonably be held that a compensation of Rs. 10 Lacs, to be payable by the respondents, would meet the ends of justice. Inasmuch as, the respondents are legally and morally responsible for the disappearance of the dentenue and such a disappearance is in violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, the respondents are bound to make good the loss at least by payment of compensation of Rs. Inasmuch as, the respondents are legally and morally responsible for the disappearance of the dentenue and such a disappearance is in violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, the respondents are bound to make good the loss at least by payment of compensation of Rs. 10 Lacs to the petitioner. 30. Since the various factors placed before this Court reveal that the respondent nos. 3 and 4 were mainly responsible for the disappearance of the detenue, I am convinced that the payment of the said sum of Rs. 10 Lacs can be directed to be made by the 3rd respondent in the first instance with liberty to recover the same from the other respondents. 31. For all the above stated reasons, it is directed as under- (a) The 1st and 2nd respondent shall proceed with the prosecution of the case registered in FIR no. 66/2009 on the file of Parimpora Police Station expeditiously and file the final report preferably within three months from the date of production of a copy of this order before the concerned jurisdiction Court. (b) The respondent nos. 1 to 4 are held liable for payment of compensation of Rs. 10 Lacs to the petitioner for disappearance of the detenue, namely, Mushtaq Ahmad Dar S/O Gh. Mohammad Dar, who was taken into custody by the 4th respondent on 13.04.1997 and whose body was not produced till this date. (c) The 3rd respondent is directed to pay the compensation of Rs. 10 Lacs, determined in this order, by depositing the same in the J&K Bank, High Court Branch, Srinagar in Fixed Deposit, in the name of the petitioner, for a period of two years within eight (8) weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order, failing which the said amount shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of this order till the date of making the deposit. The interest payable from such deposit shall be paid to the petitioner quarterly during the period of deposit. (d) The 3rd respondent is at liberty to recover the said compensation amount of Rs. 10 Lacs, payable to the petitioner, from the other respondents. (e) After the Fixed Deposit gets matured after the initial period of two years, it is for the petitioner to either renew the deposit for further period or its encashment depending upon her needs and desire. 10 Lacs, payable to the petitioner, from the other respondents. (e) After the Fixed Deposit gets matured after the initial period of two years, it is for the petitioner to either renew the deposit for further period or its encashment depending upon her needs and desire. 32. The habeas corpus petition stands disposed of with the above directions.