JUDGMENT As common questions of law andfacts are involved in all these three petitions and other connected cases,which were heard together, are being decided by this common order. 2. For the sake of convenience,the documents and material available in the record of W.P. No. 10000/2010 isbeing referred to in this order. 3. Petitioners in all these casesare either individual persons, working as Sainiks/Sepoys in the Home Guards'Organization or are Association of Employees workingin the same Organization in similar capacity. The relief claimed for in thesewrit petitions are, that the petitioners be declared as holders of "civilpost" and treating them to be so, all consequential benefits be granted tothem as is being granted to regular employees of the State Government,particularly in the Police Department. That apart, further direction sought foris to issue a 'mandamus' to the respondents directing them to frame rules andregulations governing conditions of service for the persons working in the HomeGuards Organization, particularly with reference to pay Scale, allowances,increments, pensionary benefits and other service conditions. Further payermade is to grant the benefit of pay and allowances as is paid to otheremployees of the Police Department and treat the petitioners as regularemployees in the department and finally it is claimed that after soregularising and absorbing them in the regular establishment, the system ofcalling off duty, which is followed be done away with. 4. In the year 1947, the MadhyaPradesh Home Guards Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 1947') was enacted.This Act was created to establish a body of volunteers to supplement the policeforce and to assist the regular police force in case of emergency and as ageneral measure for public welfare in the State of Madhya Pradesh . Section 2 (a) of the Act defines a HomeGuard to be a person, who is appointed under Section 6. Thereafter, variousprovisions are contained in this Act, which deal with appointment, duties andtraining, calling of Home Guards, the Competent Authorities and the protectionavailable to them. A copy of the Act is filed as Annexure P-1, and it containsvarious procedure for regulating the activities ofHome Guard. Even though, there is no specific mention in the Act that theorganization is a voluntary organization, but the State Government has comewith a case that the Organization is a voluntary organization and, therefore,the persons engaged as Home Guard are volunteers. A copy of the Act is filed as Annexure P-1, and it containsvarious procedure for regulating the activities ofHome Guard. Even though, there is no specific mention in the Act that theorganization is a voluntary organization, but the State Government has comewith a case that the Organization is a voluntary organization and, therefore,the persons engaged as Home Guard are volunteers. It is also seen from therecords that after due selection in accordance to the provisions contained inthe Act of 1947, the Home Guards appointed are designated as Naik, Lance Naik,Constable, Sepoys etc. The persons so employed are deployed to work mainlyunder the operational control of the M.P. Police, but the overall control isexercised by respondent No. 2-the Director General, Home Guards and CivilDefence with Headquarters at Jabalpur. 5. The duties of a Home Guard arethose, which are assigned to them in the Act of 1947 itself. Thereafter, aprovision for calling of duty is contained. Section 10 of the Act of 1947,stipulates the duty of a Home Guard, the same reads as under:- "10. Duties.- Subject to anygeneral or special order of the District Magistrate, the Nagar-Sainiks (HomeGuards) called out under sub-rule (1) of Rule 9 may be required to perform allor any of the following duties :- (a) the prevention of commission of offences; (b) the protection of life and property; (c) collection and communication to the Superior Officer of information; (d) the regulation of traffic; (e) the suppression of disorder; (f) to report the currency of false rumours and check it; (g) to control and regulation of fairs and large assemblies; (h) to assist the regular fire-fighting services in fighting fires resulting fromrioting or sabotage; (i) to render first-aid and to help in the removal of casualties under escort tohospital; (j) to combat subversive activities; and, (k) generally to assist the police in discharge of their lawful duties; *[(1) to perform such duties asmay, in the event of strike or general disorder, be assigned to a Nagar-Sainik(Home Guard) for the purposes of maintaining supplies and services which, inthe opinion of the Provincial Government, are essential to the life of thecommunity.] * Added vide Police DepartmentNotification No. 922-946-IV, dated 23rd January, 1949 ." 6. It is the case of thepetitioners, in all these cases, that the aforesaid duties being performed bythe Home Guards are nothing but regular duties, which are performed bythe-persons employed in the regular police establishment in the State of MadhyaPradesh and in spite of the fact that the Home Guards are performing all theseduties, they are neither classified as "civil post" holders nor isthe benefit of regular pay and other conditions of service applicable to anemployee of the Police Department granted. It is the case of the petitionersthat even though various statutory rules have been framed like the MadhyaPradesh Home Guards (Gazetted) Service Rules, 1973; the Madhya Pradesh HomeGuards (Class III Ministerial) Service Recruitment Rules, 1973 and variousother statutory rules providing for creating a substantively definedorganization is enacted, but nothing has been done, neither posts are creatednor are the pay scale prescribed under various statutory provisions granted tothe employees. By referring to the Madhya Pradesh Home Guards Class III (Executive)Service Recruitment Rules, 1973, filed as Annexure P-4, it is stated that eventhough posts and pay scale are created by the said Rules, but the same is notbeing implemented. It is stated that for the last more than 50 years, the HomeGuards are discharging duties like the police personnel and by treating them tobe a voluntary organization, benefits available to a regular employee byenforcing the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution is not beinggiven. Instead, a pick and choose policy is adopted and in case of some personseven though the benefits are given, but in case of the petitioners, who arebefore this Court neither the regular pay scale is given nor any servicebenefit granted. They are only paid an honorarium of Rs. 120-125/- per dayalong with certain additional benefits like washing allowance etc. Vide orders- Annexures P-7 and P-8, certain reservation to the extent of 5% forrecruitment on the post of Security Guard in the M.P. State Electricity Board,and to the extent of 15% in the regular appointment to the Police Department,is granted, but no other service benefit or regular pay scale are granted. 7. Vide orders- Annexures P-7 and P-8, certain reservation to the extent of 5% forrecruitment on the post of Security Guard in the M.P. State Electricity Board,and to the extent of 15% in the regular appointment to the Police Department,is granted, but no other service benefit or regular pay scale are granted. 7. Accordingly, in sum andsubstance, grievance of all the petitioners in these cases are that theOrganization is functioning for the last more than 50 years, liven though itwas initially started as a voluntary organization, but with the passage of timeit lost its voluntary characteristics, instead has become a regularestablishment assisting the regular police force of the State and even thoughpersons like the petitioners are required to perform regular duties, they areneither paid regular salary or pay scale and other service benefits. Inter aliacontending that no statutory rules or regulations have been framed and in anarbitrary manner the respondents are treating the petitioners to be volunteersand denying them their statutory benefit, these petitions are filed. 8. Inter alia contending that thevoluntary nature of the organization, which existed initially 50 years back, nomore survives Shri Mrigendra Singh, Shri A.K. Jain, Shri Gopal Singh and otherCounsel appearing for the petitioners, took me through the provisions of theAct of 1947, the rules framed hereunder and various judgments to emphasize thatthe petitioners are entitled to the benefit as claimed for Placing reliance ona judgment of the Supreme Court, in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. PanthaChattarjee, AIR 2003 SC 3569, and the observations made by the Supreme Courttherein to the effect that the Home Guards Organization is no more a voluntaryorganization, learned Counsel emphasized that petitioners are entitled to bebenefit as claimed for. That apart, inviting my attention to the followingjudgments :- Union of India Vs. Tarit Ranjan Das, AIR 2004 SC 852; State ofKarnataka Vs. M.L Kesari, AIR 2010 SC 2587 ; Government of India Vs. CourtLiquidator Employees Association, (1999) 8 SCC 560 ; and Union of India Vs. PamlDevnath, (2009) 14 SCC 173 ; Jaspal Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (1988) 3 SCC354, it was argued that in view of the provisions of Articles 14, 16 and 23 ofthe Constitution and the law laid down by the Supreme Court, in theaforementioned case, on the principle of 'equal work for equal wages', thepetitioners are entitled to the relief as claimed for. 9. State of Haryana, (1988) 3 SCC354, it was argued that in view of the provisions of Articles 14, 16 and 23 ofthe Constitution and the law laid down by the Supreme Court, in theaforementioned case, on the principle of 'equal work for equal wages', thepetitioners are entitled to the relief as claimed for. 9. Finally, inviting attention toa report submitted by the M.P. State Human Rights Commission, filed as I.A. No.11324/2011, in the record of Writ Petition No. 10000/2010, referring to thisdetailed report submitted by the Commission on 23-6-2011, during the pendencyof this writ petition, learned Counsel for the petitioners argued that theHuman Rights Commission has found that the engagement of the petitioners in themanner done by paying them a meagre honorarium of Rs. 120-125/- with certainwashing allowance and following the system of calling off and grantingemployment only for a period of 8 months in a year, is an arbitrary, illegaland unconstitutional decision violating the provisions of Articles 14, 21 and23 of the Constitution, so also amounts to breach of their human rights, therecommendations of the Commission are to the effect that the petitioners shouldbe brought into the regular establishment and regular benefit granted byframing appropriate rules and regulations. 10. Accordingly, contending thatnow in the light of the recommendations made by the State Human RightsCommission, respondents cannot deny benefits to the petitioners, exploitationof the Home Guards should be done away with, relief is sought for. 11. Finally, by placing relianceon a judgment of the Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Sher SinghMalhan Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1955 Nagpur 175, it is emphasized thatin this case, the Division Bench has held that Home Guard is a civil postholder and, therefore, 'mandamus' and declaration as sought for be granted.Accordingly, in sum and substance, it is the case of the petitioners that thevoluntary nature of the organization has ceased to exist with the passage oftime, the Home Guards are performing regular duties as are performed by membersof the regular police staff in the State and, therefore, treating thepetitioners to be regular employees, applying the principle of 'equal work forequal wages' and by declaring the action of the State Government in not doingso to be an arbitrary and an illegal decision, contrary to the mandate ofArticles 14, 21 and 23 of the Constitution, the relief be granted. 12. 12. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General appearing for the State, refuted the aforesaidcontentions and submitted that the recommendations made by the Human RightsCommission are not legal. The recommendations made by the Human RightsCommission are beyond the powers conferred on the Commission under law and theCommission has no authority to recommend or direct the State Government toframe rules and regulations for laying down the service conditions of the HomeGuards. The Home Guards organization is a voluntary organization and until andunless the Statutory Act of 1947 is not declared as 'ultra vires' and so longas the said Act is in existence, engagement of the volunteers as Home Guardsunder the said Act is permissible, the Human Rights Commission has no authorityto make any recommendation as has been done in the present circumstances.Contending that the Human Rights Commission has travelled beyond itsjurisdiction in making the recommendation and the recommendations made by theCommission to formulate the rules and regulations cannot be enforced by thisCourt, Shri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, sought for rejecting the claim of the petitioners. 13. Placing reliance on a judgmentof the Supreme Court, in the case of Mallikarjuna Rao and others Vs. State ofAndhra Pradesh and others, (1990) 2 SCC 707 , and referring to Paragraphs 9 to13 thereof, Shri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, argued that therecommendations made and the directions given by the Human Rights Commissioncannot be enforced by this Court. Thereafter, placing reliance on the judgmentof the Supreme Court, in the case of MC Dhoundial Vs. Union of India andothers, AIR 2004 SC 1272 , learned Advocate General argued that the Home Guardsare not 'civil post' holders, they are only volunteers and as they are notcivil post holders, it is stated that no relief can be granted to them. 14. Emphasizing that the judgmentrendered by the Nagpur High Court, in Sher Singh Malhan (supra), was based onthe benefit to be granted and the protection available under Article 311 of theConstitution, it is without referring to the statutory provisions of the Act,the same is no more good law in view of the subsequent judgments rendered bythis Court, particularly in the case of Kedar Prasad Mishra Vs. State of M.P.and others, Writ Petition No. 3668/2000, decided on 14-7-2000; and PunpratapSingh and another Vs. State of M.P. and others, 2000(4) M.P.H.T. 398 , learnedAdvocate General submits that the contention of the petitioners that they arecivil post holders cannot be accepted. State of M.P.and others, Writ Petition No. 3668/2000, decided on 14-7-2000; and PunpratapSingh and another Vs. State of M.P. and others, 2000(4) M.P.H.T. 398 , learnedAdvocate General submits that the contention of the petitioners that they arecivil post holders cannot be accepted. 15. Inviting my attention tovarious judgments Shri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, submitted that theprinciple of 'equal work for equal wage' will not apply in the case under thepresent set up, for the simple reason that the method of recruitment, thenature of work, the Control and power exercised by the Home Guards are entirelydifferent from those exercised by the employees of the regular policeestablishment and, therefore, it is stated that the principle of 'equal workfor equal wage' will not apply. Placing reliance on various judgments as is indicatedhereinabove, Shri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, argued that quantity andquality of work done by the Home Guards, the capacity of the work to beperformed by them, the method of recruitment and all other factors aredifferent and, therefore, the principle of 'equal work for equal wage' will notapply. The judgments relied upon are :- Punpratap Singh (supra); State ofHaryana and others Vs. Charanjit Singh and others, (2006) 9 SCC 321 ; State ofMadhya Pradesh and another Vs. Pramod Bhartiya and others, (1993) 1 SCC 539 ;Sita Devi and others Vs. State of Haryana and others, (1996) 10 SCC 1 ; Union ofIndia and another Vs. S. K. Sareen, (1998) 1 SCC 177 ; State of Orissa andothers Vs. Balaram Sahu and others, AIR 2003 SC 33 ; State of Haryana and anotherVs. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, (2002) 6 SCC 72 ;Raghunath Rai Bareja and another Vs. Punjab National Bank and others, (2007) 2SCC 230; State of West Bengal Vs. Kinkar Karmakar, 2008 Cal.LT (2) 315; DelhiHome Guards Welfare Association (Delhi Pradesh) Vs. Lieutenant Governor, Delhi,2003 ILR DLH (11) 272; Manibhushan Kumar Rao Vs. State of Bihar, 2005 PLJ (3)355; Prakash Balwantrao Dethe Vs. Collector, Yavatmal, 2007 AIR Bom.R (1) 441;Narayan S. Bhat Vs. State of Karnataka, 2008 KCCR (2) 818. 16. Kinkar Karmakar, 2008 Cal.LT (2) 315; DelhiHome Guards Welfare Association (Delhi Pradesh) Vs. Lieutenant Governor, Delhi,2003 ILR DLH (11) 272; Manibhushan Kumar Rao Vs. State of Bihar, 2005 PLJ (3)355; Prakash Balwantrao Dethe Vs. Collector, Yavatmal, 2007 AIR Bom.R (1) 441;Narayan S. Bhat Vs. State of Karnataka, 2008 KCCR (2) 818. 16. Shri R.D. Jain, learnedAdvocate General, taking me through the organizational set up of the HomeGuards, the work being done by the regular police personnel, submitted thatexcept for certain duties which regard to public safety, none of the workperformed by the Home Guards fall in the category of a work, which is performedby the regular police personnel and, therefore, the same benefit of 'equal workfor equal wage' cannot be granted. Distinguishing the principle laid down bythe Supreme Court in the case of Pantha Chattarjee (supra), and contending thatthe said case has been subsequently explained by the Calcutta High Court in thecase of Kinkar Karmakar (supra), Shri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, arguedthat the benefit cannot be granted to the petitioners. 17. Thereafter, inviting myattention to certain judgments of the High Court of Patna, High Court ofBombay, High Court of Karnataka, particulars of which are given herein above, ShriR.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, argued that the Home Guards set upthroughout the country is in the nature of a voluntary organization and thework done by the Home Guards is entirely different from that of a regularpolice personnel and, therefore, the Home Guards and the petitioners hereinhave no right to claim any benefit. Accordingly, contending that therecommendations of the Human Rights Commission cannot be enforced by thisCourt; the Commission is not empowered to issue the recommendations ordirections as contained in its report dated 23-6-2011, and further submittingthat the Home Guards are not civil post holders nor does the principle for'equal work for equal wage' applies, learned Advocate General resists the claimmade by the respondents. 18. Finally, it was also submittedby Shri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, that if the prayer made by thepetitioners are to be considered and accepted, the financial implication of thesame will create burden on the State Government, which the State Government isunable to bear and, therefore, no 'mandamus' can be issued which would have theeffect of upsetting the entire economic and financial set up of the StateGovernment. Accordingly, contending that the petitioners and the Home Guardschose to come into the organization, which is voluntary in nature, governed bythe Act of 1947 and having accepted the same, they cannot now claim any furtherbenefit. Accordingly, on the aforesaid contentions, Shri R.D. Jain, learnedAdvocate General, prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 19. Having heard learned Counselfor the parties at length and after taking note of the various contentionsadvanced at the time of hearing and further on a close scrutiny of the reportsubmitted by the State Human Rights Commission, the matter is being decided. 20. As far as the claim made bythe petitioners for treating them as "civil post" holders and furtherissuing a direction for treating them as regular employees of the departmentare concerned, the same is to be considered in the light of submissions made byShri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, particularly with reference to therights and power of the Human Rights Commission. 21. In the light of the principleslaid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Mallikarjuna Rao (supra), reliedupon by Shri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, this Court cannot issue a'mandamus' for implementing the recommendations of the State Human RightsCommission. To that effect, the relief claimed for by the petitioners cannot beaccepted. 22. Similarly, as the method ofrecruitment of the petitioners and the employees appointed in the regularestablishment of the Police Department and even in the manner of dischargingthe duty and exercise of powers, there is no exact similarity. As such, theprinciple of 'equal work for equal wages' cannot be enforced in its totality inthe facts and circumstances of the present case. Particularly, in the light ofthe law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases relied upon by learnedAdvocate General. To that effect Shri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, maybe right in contending that the relief claimed for by the petitioners cannot begranted. 23. However, this Court can verywell take note of the findings recorded by the State Human Rights Commissionand consider as to under the facts and circumstances that have come on record,whether the relief of directing for their continuation in. 23. However, this Court can verywell take note of the findings recorded by the State Human Rights Commissionand consider as to under the facts and circumstances that have come on record,whether the relief of directing for their continuation in. service withoutcalling off and the relief of paying them a reasonable salary can be granted.To that affect, I am of the considered view that the report of the Human RightsCommission can very well be examined and after taking note of the manner, inwhich the Home Guards establishment is functioning in the State of Madhya Pradesh , during the long period of 50 years, adecision can be taken. 24. Even though initially when theAct of 1947 was enacted, the same was enforced for establishing a voluntaryorganization and the organization that came into force was also a voluntaryorganization, but the voluntary nature of the organization lost its identity,with the passage of time and the nature of work, which the organization startedperforming also underwent substantial change in due course of time, it attainedthe status of a regular establishment. Even the employees, like thepetitioners, who are working have continued to work for more than 10-20 yearsand it is, therefore, correct on the part of the petitioners in contending thatwith the passage of time and with the manner in which the organization hadprogressed, the voluntary nature of the organization had ceased to exist. Thisaspect of the matter is considered by the Supreme Court in the case of PanthaChattarjee (supra), and after taking note of the continued deployment of HomeGuards for a period of more than 10 years, in that particular case, it has beenheld by the Supreme Court that the voluntary nature of the organization haslost its identity and it has become more or less a regular establishment. It isheld by the Supreme Court that in the prevailing situation, it is unfair on thepart of the Competent Authorities to contend that it is a voluntaryorganization and no relationship of master and servant exists. It has been heldthat the scheme, which was originally initiated as a voluntary organization,has lost its characteristic and now it is nothing but a regular establishment,catering to the needs of the State in various matters. 25. It has been heldthat the scheme, which was originally initiated as a voluntary organization,has lost its characteristic and now it is nothing but a regular establishment,catering to the needs of the State in various matters. 25. Even though, under the Act of1947, the Home Guards organization is termed to be a voluntary organization,the nature of duties of the Home Guards as is specified in Section 10 clearlyindicates that the Home Guards have to perform various duties. The dutiesperformed by the Home Guards and the findings recorded by the Human RightsCommission in this regard would be referred to after some point of time. Forthe present, it may be taken note of that the State Government itself feelingthat the Home Guards organization is no more a voluntary organization,temporary in nature, has enacted various rules exercising powers under Article309 of the Constitution and if these rules are taken note of, it would be seenthat, the State Government had been harping upon an idea of creating apermanent organization with a permanent set up, regular substantive posts wereto be created with a particular pay scale. The statutory rules framed in thisregard namely the Madhya Pradesh Home Guards (Gazetted) Service Rules, 1973;the Madhya Pradesh Home Guards (Class III Ministerial) Service RecruitmentRules, 1973; The Madhya Pradesh Home Guards Class III (Executive) RecruitmentRules, 2000; The Home Guards Class III (Executive) Recruitment Rules and thePension Rules are all examples of various enactment made by the StateGovernment for giving a permanent characteristic to the Home Guardsorganization. 26. At this stage, it would berelevant to take note of certain findings recorded by the State Human RightsCommission, in its report, which is available on record. The report of theHuman Rights Commission indicates that various complaints were received by theCommission in the year 2008-09 from various quarters, including registeredorganizations, pointing out the miserable conditions, under which the HomeGuards are performing the duties and the prayer made in these complaints werethat an enquiry be conducted into their working conditions and properrecommendations be made for betterment of the same. The report furtherindicates that between 24-3-2009 to 8-4-2009 , variouscomplaints were received and even though notices were issued to the StateGovernment and the Director General (Home Guards) to give their response to theCommission. The report furtherindicates that between 24-3-2009 to 8-4-2009 , variouscomplaints were received and even though notices were issued to the StateGovernment and the Director General (Home Guards) to give their response to theCommission. The State Government and the Home Guards organization did notrespond to the notices issued by the Human Rights Commission and, therefore,steps were taken for summoning the Director General and it was only on 25-5-2009 , that the Director General(Home Guards) gave his written reply to the State Human Rights Commission. Thereply was sent to various authorities, including the Chief Secretary, and theircomments on the same were called for. It is revealed from the report that on20-7-2009, the Director General of Home Guards -Shri Hemant Sareen, appearedbefore the State Human Rights Commission and it was stated by him before theCommission that a Home Guard Sainik except for conducting investigations intoan offence and participating in anti-dacoity operations are discharging all theduties, which is discharged by a normal police personnel. In Paragraph 6 of thereport submitted by the Human Rights Commission, the following statements are made : - xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Emphasis supplied) which clearly goes to show that the Home Guards are discharging all the duties, whichare being performed by a regular police personnel except actual investigationinto a crime and anti-dacoity operations and this is the admission of theDirector General before the Commission. 27. It is also seen from thisreport that keeping in view the increasing demand of the Home Guards and due tonon-grant of adequate financial assistance from the State Government, the systemof calling off duty was introduced, in his statement the Director General hasadmitted this position. It is, therefore, clear fromthe statements of the Director General (Home Guards) that the calling of dutywas necessitated due to economic and financial constraints in spite ofrequirement for the work. Thereafter, if the report is scrutinised, it would beseen that on the basis of material that was collected, the Commission thoughtit appropriate to constitute a Committee to conduct a detailed enquiry andstudy into the working of the Home Guards. Accordingly, a High Level Committeeconsisting of Shri D.P. Khanna -Director General of Police (Retired), HomeGuards, Bhopal; Shri Prakash Singh Rajput, Divisional Commandant (Retired),Home Guards, Jabalpur; and, Shri Pradeep Roonwal, Director General of Police,Human Rights Commission, Bhopal was constituted. After transfer of Shri PradeepRoonwal, Shri H.K. Sareen replaced him as a Member in the Committee. Accordingly, a High Level Committeeconsisting of Shri D.P. Khanna -Director General of Police (Retired), HomeGuards, Bhopal; Shri Prakash Singh Rajput, Divisional Commandant (Retired),Home Guards, Jabalpur; and, Shri Pradeep Roonwal, Director General of Police,Human Rights Commission, Bhopal was constituted. After transfer of Shri PradeepRoonwal, Shri H.K. Sareen replaced him as a Member in the Committee. Shri D.P.Khanna was nominated as Chairman of the Committee and Shri H.K. Sareen was theConvener of the Committee. The points for determination, which was referred tothe Committee, was as under : - "(1) Whether the presentworking condition of Home Guards conform to the Human Rights declared andaccept by India being a Member Country of the United Nations in the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, 1948, and particularly the provisions in Articles23, 24 and 25 therein ? (2) Whether the Central Provinceand Berar Home Guards Act, 1948 being a Pre-Constitutional Law (saved andapplicable to the State of Madhya Pradesh) is in consonance with thefundamental human rights guaranteed to every citizen under Articles 19 and 23of the Constitution and the Directive Principles of State Policy contained inArticles 38, 39, 41 and 42 of the Constitution ? (3) What recommendations deserveto be made to the Executive and Legislature of the State for providing 'humaneworking conditions' to the Home Guards. " (Emphasissupplied) 28. After conducting a detailedstudy on the basis of enquiry conducted, the Committee gave its detailed reportand the recommendations on the basis of the report recorded by the Human RightsCommission indicates that even though initially the Home Guards establishmentwas created for the purpose of meeting the emergency need and subsequently inthe year 1962, they were used for protecting the country against the Chineseaggression, but with the passage of time and the change which took place, thework of the organization also changed from time to time and the Governmentstarted taking assistance of the organization in various day-to-day activitiesconcerning maintenance of law and order, as a result the organization lost itsoriginal characteristic and started performing various activities, which arenormally performed by the regular police organization. In Paragraph 19 of thereport, more than eight duties, which are performed by the Home Guards are detailed. In Paragraph 19 of thereport, more than eight duties, which are performed by the Home Guards are detailed. Finally, in Paragraph 20, it isreported by the Commission that for the present, in the State of Madhya Pradesh , the Home Guards organization is continuingand carrying out all the duties, which is carried out by a regular police forceexcept the duties pertaining to investigation of a criminal offence andparticipating in anti-dacoity operation. The findings in this regard arerecorded in Paragraph 20 of the report of the Human Rights Commission,indicates that in Madhya Pradesh the strength of Home Guards consist of 16005Sainiks, who are continuously working for about 8 months every year. TheCommission has also found adverse affect in the call off duty procedure beingfollowed and has reported that the same has affected, adversely not only on theforce, but also on the physical and mental health of the Sainiks, working inthe Home Guard. 29. Thereafter, in Paragraph 21 ofthe report, it is stated that the factual position as on date is that the HomeGuard is not a voluntary or temporary organization, a Home Guard Sainik isperforming the regular duties like the Police Jawan, he is enrolled in the nameof a volunteer at the age of 19 years and from the date of appointment hecontinues upto the age of 60 years in the same manner and is discharged after theage of 60 years without granting him any benefits. He is only paid anhonorarium/daily wage and some washing allowance. Apart from the same no otherbenefit is granted to him. After meticulously analyzing each and every aspectof the matter, the allowance being paid to a Home Guard Sainik and the workbeing performed by them and after evaluating the totality of the facts andcircumstances, in its 43 page report, the State Human Rights Commission hasindicated that the manner, in which the Home Guards are treated in the State ofMadhya Pradesh amounts to violation of the provisions of Articles 14,21 and 23of the Constitution, is contrary to the norms laid down in the Universaldeclaration of Human Rights, to which India is a party, and the recommendationsmade are to the effect that there should be rules and regulations governingtheir service conditions; the principle of 'equal work for equal wage' shouldbe made applicable and various other recommendations are made on the groundthat the nature of the work performed by the Home Guards is the regular workperformed by a regular. Government Department and, therefore, they should betreated as a regular employee of the State Government. These recommendationsare to be acted upon by the State Government and it is for the State Governmentto consider these recommendations and take a decision with regard toformulating a scheme or a provision, statutory in nature, for laying down theservice conditions of the Home Guards. In this regard no 'mandamus' can be issuedby this Court except a direction to consider the recommendations and proceed inaccordance with law. 30. However, the report doesindicate the following factors : - (a) The Home Guards are requiredto work continuously once they are empanelled at the age of 19 years and mostof them continue to work upto the age of 60 years. (b) For the work done by themduring this period except for granting them daily wage, or honorarium and somewashing allowance etc., alongwith some medical facility, no benefit availableto a regular employee of the State Government or a regular employee of thePolice Department is granted. (c) The action of the StateGovernment in so treating the employees is nothing, but, an arbitrary andunjustified action of the State Government, which amounts to violating theHuman Rights of the Home Guards. (d) Finally, it is found that theHome Guards are entitled to work continuously without the rotation or callingoff duty procedure being implemented. It is under the back drop of thesefindings and certain reporters submitted by Shri K.F. Rustom Ji, the then Chiefof M.P. Police in the year 1960, wherein it was indicated that the Home Guardsare receiving salary, which is very meagre and cannot be enough to even sustainthem for their day-to-day living, that this Court is now required to consideras to what directions can be issued and what relief can be granted to thepetitioners. 31. On a close scrutiny of thereport of the Human Rights Commission and the principle laid down by theSupreme Court, in the case of Pantha Chattarjee (supra), this Court isconstrained to take note of certain observations made by the Supreme Court inthe case of Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights Vs. Union of India, (1982) 3SCC 235. 32. 31. On a close scrutiny of thereport of the Human Rights Commission and the principle laid down by theSupreme Court, in the case of Pantha Chattarjee (supra), this Court isconstrained to take note of certain observations made by the Supreme Court inthe case of Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights Vs. Union of India, (1982) 3SCC 235. 32. In the aforesaid case, Hon'bleSupreme Court was considering the question of paying wages to employees engagedfor construction activity under the Asian Games Organization, in the year 1982,and after taking note of the provisions of Article 23 of the Constitution, inParagraphs 12, 13 and 14, the observations made read as under :- "12. Article 23 enacts a veryimportant fundamental right in the following terms : - "Art. 23. Prohibition oftraffic in human beings and forced labour.- (1) Traffic in human beings andbegar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and anycontravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordancewith law. (2) Nothing in this Article shallprevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public purposes, and inimposing such service the State shall not make any discrimination on groundsonly of religion, race, caste or class or any of them. Now many of the fundamental rightsenacted in Part III operate as limitations on the power of the State and imposenegative obligations on the State not to encroach on individual liberty andthey are enforceable only against the State. But there are certain fundamentalrights conferred by the Constitution, which are enforceable against the wholeworld and they are to be found inter alia in Articles 17, 23 and 24. We havealready discussed the true scope and ambit of Article 24 in an earlier portionof this judgment and hence we do not propose to say anything more about it. Soalso we need not expatiate on the proper meaning and effect of the fundamentalright enshrined in Article 17, since we are not concerned with that Article inthe present writ petition. It is Article 23 with which we are concerned andthat Article is clearly designed to protect the individual not only against theState, but also against other private citizens. Article 23 is not limited inits application against the State, but it prohibits "traffic in humanbeings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour'' practiced by anyoneelse. It is Article 23 with which we are concerned andthat Article is clearly designed to protect the individual not only against theState, but also against other private citizens. Article 23 is not limited inits application against the State, but it prohibits "traffic in humanbeings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour'' practiced by anyoneelse. The sweep of Article 23 is wide and unlimited and it strikes ht trafficin human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour whereverthey are found. The reason for enacting this provision in the chapter onfundamental rights is to be found in the socio-economic condition of the peopleat the time when the Constitution came to be enacted. The Constitution makers,when they set out to frame the Constitution, found that they had the enormoustask before them of changing the socio-economic structure of the country andbringing about socio-economic regeneration with a view to reaching social andeconomic justice to the common man. Large masses of people, bled white bywell-nigh two centuries of foreign rule, were living in abject poverty and destitutionwith ignorance and illiteracy accentuating their helplessness and despair. Thesociety had regenerated into a status-oriented hierarchical society with littlerespect for the dignity of individual who was in the lower rungs of the socialladder or in an economically impoverished condition. The political revolutionwas completed and it had succeeded in bringing freedom to the country butfreedom was not an end in itself, it was only a means to an end, the end beingthe raising of the people to higher levels of achievement and bringing abouttheir total advancement and welfare. Political freedom had no meaning unless itwas accompanied by social and economic freedom and it was therefore, necessaryto carry forward the social and economic revolution with a view to creatingsocial economic conditions in which every one would be able to enjoy basichuman rights and participate in the fruits of freedom and liberty in anegalitarian social and economic framework. It was with this end in view thatthe constitution makers enacted the Directive Principles of State Policy inPart IV of the Constitution setting out the constitutional goal of a newsocio-economic order. Now there was one feature of our national life, which wasugly and shameful and which cried for urgent attention and that was theexistence of bonded or forced labour in large parts of the country. Now there was one feature of our national life, which wasugly and shameful and which cried for urgent attention and that was theexistence of bonded or forced labour in large parts of the country. This evilwas the relic of feudal exploitative society and it was totally incompatiblewith the new egalitarian socio-economic order which, "We the people of India "were determined to build and constituted a gross and most revolting denial ofbasic human dignity. It was, therefore, necessary to eradicate this perniciouspractice and wipe it out altogether from the national scene and this had to bedone immediately because with the advent of freedom, such practice could not beallowed to continue to blight the national life any longer. Obviously, it wouldnot have been enough merely to include abolition of forced labour in theDirective Principles of State Policy, because then the outlaying of thispractice would not have been legally enforceable and it would have continued toplague our natural life in violation of the basic constitutional norms andvalues until some appropriate Legislation could be brought by the Legislatureforbidding such practice. The Constitution makers, therefore, decided to giveteeth to their resolve to obliterate and wipe out this evil practice byenacting constitutional prohibition against it in the chapter on fundamentalrights, so that the abolition of such practice may become enforceable andeffective as soon as the Constitution came into force. This is the reason whythe provision enacted in Article 23 was included in the chapter on fundamentalrights. The prohibition against "traffic in human beings and begar andother similar forms of forced labour" is clearly intended to be a generalprohibition, total in its effect and all pervasive in its range and it isenforceable not only against the State but also against any other personindulging in any such practice. 13. The question then is as towhat is the true scope and meaning of the expression "traffic in humanbeings and beggar and other similar forms of forced labour" in Article 23 ? What are the forms of'forced labour' prohibited by thatArticle and what kind of labour provided by a person can be regarded as 'forcedlabour' so as to fall within this prohibition ? What are the forms of'forced labour' prohibited by thatArticle and what kind of labour provided by a person can be regarded as 'forcedlabour' so as to fall within this prohibition ? Whenthe Constitution makers enacted Article 23, they had before them Article of theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights, but they deliberately departed from itslanguage and employed words, which would make the reach and content of Article23 much wider than that of Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of HumanRights. They banned 'traffic in human beings, which is an expression of muchlarger amplitude than "slave trade" and they also interdicted 'begar and other similar forms of forced labour'. The question iswhat is the scope and ambit of the expression 'begar and other similar forms offorced labour' ? In this expression, wide enough toinclude every conceivable form of forced labour and what is the true scope andmeaning of the words "forced labour " ? Theword 'begar' in this Article is not a word of common use in English language.It is a word of Indian origin, which like many other words has found its way inthe English vocabulary. It is very difficult to formulate a precise definitionof the word 'begar', but there can be no doubt that it is a form of forcedlabour under which a person is compelled to work without receiving anyremuneration. Molesworth describes 'begar' as "labour or service exactedby a Government or person in power without giving remuneration for it". Wilson 'sglossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms gives the following meaning of the word'begar':- "a forced labourer, one pressed to carry burthens forindividuals or the public. Under the old system, when pressed for publicservice, no pay was given. The Begari, though still liable to be pressed forpublic objects, now receives pay : Forced labour forprivate service is prohibited." "Begar" may therefore, beloosely described as labour or service which a person is forced to give withoutreceiving any remuneration for it. That was the meaning of the word 'begar'accepted by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in S. Vasudevan Vs . S.D. Mital AIR 1962 Bom 53 . 'Begar' is thus clearly afilm of forced labour. Now, it is not merely 'begar', which isunconstitutionally prohibited by Article 23, but also all other similar forms offorced labour. That was the meaning of the word 'begar'accepted by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in S. Vasudevan Vs . S.D. Mital AIR 1962 Bom 53 . 'Begar' is thus clearly afilm of forced labour. Now, it is not merely 'begar', which isunconstitutionally prohibited by Article 23, but also all other similar forms offorced labour. This Article strikes at forced labour in whatever form it maymanifest itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is contrary tobasic human values. The practice of forced labour is condemned in almost everyInternational instrument dealing with human rights. It is interesting to findthat as far back as 1930 long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rightscame into being, International Labour Organization adopted Convention No. 29laying down that every member of the International Labour Organization, whichratifies this convention shall "suppress the use of forced or compulsorylabour in all its forms" and this prohibition was elaborated in ConventionNo. 105 adopted by the International Labour Organization in 1957. The words "forced or compulsory labour" in Convention No.29. had of course a limited meaning, but thatwas so on account of the restricted definition of these words given in Article2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights andArticle 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights alsoprohibit forced or compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the same strain and itenacts a prohibition against forced labour in whatever form it may be found.The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent laid some emphasis onthe word 'similar' and contended that it is not very form of forced labour,which is prohibited by Article 23 but only such form of forced labour as issimilar to 'begar' and since 'begar' means labour or service, which person isforced to give without receiving any remuneration for it, the interdict ofArticle 23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour, where labour orservice is exacted from a person without paying any remuneration at all and if someremuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would not fall within thewords 'other similar forms of forced labour'. This contention seeks to undulyrestrict the amplitude of the prohibition against forced labour enacted inArticle 23 and is in our opinion not well founded. It does not accord with theprinciple enunciated by this Court in Maneka Gandhi Vs. This contention seeks to undulyrestrict the amplitude of the prohibition against forced labour enacted inArticle 23 and is in our opinion not well founded. It does not accord with theprinciple enunciated by this Court in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India, (1978)1 SCC 248, that when interpreting the provisions of the Constitution conferringfundamental rights, the attempt of the Court should be to expand the reach andambit of the fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their meaning andcontent. It is difficult to imagine that the Constitution makers should haveintended to strike only at certain forms of forced labour leaving it open tothe socially or economically powerful sections of the community to exploit thepoor and weaker sections by resorting to other forms of forced labour. Couldthere be any logic or reason in enacting that if a person is forced to givelabour or service to another without receiving any remuneration at all itshould be regarded as a pernicious practice sufficient to attract thecondemnation of Article 23, but if some remuneration is paid for it, then itshould be outside the inhibition of that Article ? Ifthis were the true interpretation, Article 23 would be reduced to a mere ropeof sand, for it would then be the easiest thing in an exploitative society fora person belonging to a socially or economically dominant class to exact labouror service from a person belonging to the deprived and vulnerable section ofthe community by paying a negligible amount of remuneration and thus escape therigour of Article 23. We do not think it would be right to place on thelanguage of Article 23 an interpretation, which would emasculate its beneficentprovisions and defeat the very purpose of enacting them. We are clear of theview that Article 23 is intended to abolish every form of forced labour. Thewords "other similar forms of forced labour are used in Article 23 notwith a view to importing the particular characteristic of 'begar' thatlabour'or service should be exacted without payment of any remuneration, butwith a view to bringing within the scope and ambit of that Article all otherforms of forced labour and since 'be gar' is one form of forced labour, theConstitution makers used the words "other similar forms of forcedlabour". If the requirement that labour pr work should be exacted withoutany remuneration were imported in other forms of forced labour, they wouldstraightaway come within the meaning of the word 'begar' and in that eventthere would be no need to have the additional words "other similar formsof forced labour". These words would be rendered futile and meaninglessand it is a well recognized rule of interpretation that the Court should avoida construction, which as the effect of rendering any words used by theLegislature superfluous or redundant. The object of adding these words wasclearly to expand the reach and content of Article 23 by including, in additionto 'begar', other forms of forced labour within the prohibition of thatArticle. Every form of forced labour 'begar' or otherwise, is within theinhibition of Article 23 and it makes no difference whether the person who isforced to give his labour or service to another is remunerated or not. Even if,remuneration is paid, labour supplied by a person would be hit by this Articleif it is forced labour, that is, labour supplied not willingly but as a resultof force or compulsion. Take for example a case where a person has entered intoa contract of service with another for a period of three years and he wishes todiscontinue serving such other person before the expiration of the period ofthree years. If a law were to provide that in such a case the contract shall bespecifically enforced and he shall be compelled to serve for the full period ofthree years, it would clearly amount to forced labour and such a law would bevoid as offending Article 23. That is why specific performance of a contract ofservice cannot be enforced against an employee and the employee cannot beforced by compulsion of law to continue to serve the employer. Of course, ifthere is a breach of the contract of service, the employee would be liable topay damages to the employer but he cannot be forced to continue to serve theemployer without breaching the injunction of Article 23. This was precisely theview taken by the Supreme Court of United States in Baily Vs .Alabama, 291 US 219, while dealing with a similar provision in the Thirteenth Amendment........ This was precisely theview taken by the Supreme Court of United States in Baily Vs .Alabama, 291 US 219, while dealing with a similar provision in the Thirteenth Amendment........ It is, therefore, clear that evenif a person has contracted with another to perform service and there isconsideration for such service in the shape of liquidation of debt or evenremuneration, he cannot be forced by compulsion of law or otherwise to continueto perform such service, as that would be forced labour within the inhibitionof Article 23. This Article strikes at every form of forced labour even if, ithas its origin in a contract voluntarily entered into by the person obligatedto provide labour or service vide Pollock Vs. Williams, 322 US 1 = 88 L.Ed1095. The reason is that it offends against human dignity to compel a person toprovide labour or service to another if he does not wish to do so, even thoughit be in breach of the contract entered into by him.There should be no serfdom oranvoluntary servitude in a free democratic India ,which respects the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person.Moreover, in a country like India, where there is so much poverty andunemployment and there is no equality of bargaining power, a contract ofservice may appear on its face voluntarily, but it may, in reality, beinvoluntary, because while entering into the contract, may have been faced withHobson's choice, either to starve or to submit to the exploitative termsdictated by the powerful employer. It would be a travesty of justice to holdthe employee in such a case to the terms of the contract and to compel him toserve employer even though he may not wish to do so. That would aggravate theinequality and injustice from which the employee evenotherwise suffers on account of his economically disadvantaged position andlend the authority of law to the exploitation of the poor helpless employee bythe economically powerful employer. Article 23, therefore, says that no oneshall be forced to provide labour or service against his will, even though it be under a contract of service. 14. Now, the next question thatarises for consideration is, whether there is any breach of Article 23, when aperson provides labour or service to the State or to any other person and ispaid less than the minimum wage for it. 14. Now, the next question thatarises for consideration is, whether there is any breach of Article 23, when aperson provides labour or service to the State or to any other person and ispaid less than the minimum wage for it. It is obvious that ordinary no onewould willingly supply labour or service to another for less than the minimumwager, when he knows that under the law, he is entitled to get minimum wagesfor the labour or service provided by him. It may therefore, be legitimatelypresumed that when a person provides labour or service to another againstreceipt of remuneration, which is less than the minimum wage, he is actingunder the force of some compulsion, which drives him to work though he is paidless than what he is entitled under law to receive. What Article 23 prohibitsis 'forced labour' that is labour or service, which a person is forced toprovide and 'force', which would make such labour or service 'forced labour'may arise in several ways. It may be physical force, which may compel a personto provide labour or service to another or it may be force exerted through alegal provision such as a provision for imprisonment or fine in case theemployee fails to provide labour or service or it may even be compulsionarising from hunger and poverty, want and destitution. Any factor whichdeprives a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt oneparticular course of action may properly be regarded as 'force' and if labouror service is compelled as a result of such 'force', it would we 'forcedlabour'. Where a person is suffering from hunger or starvation, when he has noresources at all to fight disease or feed his wife and children or even to hidetheir nakedness, where utter grinding poverty has broken his back and reducedhim to a state of helplessness and despair and where no other employment isavailable to alleviate the rigour of his poverty, he would have no choice butto accept any work that comes his way, even if the remuneration offered to himis less than the minimum wage. He would be in no position to bargain with theemployer; he would have to accept what is offered to him. And in doing so, hewould be acting not as a free agent with a choice between alternatives butunder the compulsion of economic circumstances and the labour or serviceprovided by him would be clearly 'forced labour'. He would be in no position to bargain with theemployer; he would have to accept what is offered to him. And in doing so, hewould be acting not as a free agent with a choice between alternatives butunder the compulsion of economic circumstances and the labour or serviceprovided by him would be clearly 'forced labour'. There is no reason, why theword 'forced' should be read in a narrow and restricted manner so as to beconfined only to physical or legal 'force' particularly, when the nationalcharter, its fundamental document has promised to build a new socialistrepublic where there will be socio-economic justice for all and every one shallhave the right to work, to education and to adequate means of livelihood. TheConstitution makers have given us one of the most remarkable documents inhistory for ushering in a new socio-economic order and the Constitution, whichthey have forged for us has a social purpose and an economic mission andtherefore, every word or phrase in the Constitution must be interpreted in amanner, which would advance the socio-economic objective of the Constitution. Itis not un often that in capitalist society economiccircumstance exert much greater pressure on an individual in driving him to aparticular course of action than physical compulsion or force of Legislativeprovision. The word 'force' must therefore, be constructed to include not onlyphysical or legal force but also force arising from the compulsion of economiccircumstance, which leaves no choice of alternatives to a person in want andcompels him to provide labour or service even though the remuneration receivedfor it is less than the minimum wage. Of course, if a person provides labour orservice to another against receipt of the minimum wage, it would not bepossible to say that the labour or service provided by him is 'forged labour'because he gets what he is entitled under law to receive. No inference canreasonably be drawn in such a case that he is forced to provide labour orservice for the simple reason that he would be providing labour or serviceagainst receipt of what is not under the force of any compulsion. We are,therefore, of the view that where a person provides labour or service toanother for remuneration, which is less than the minimum wage, the labour orservice provided by him clearly falls within the scope and ambit of the words 'forcedlabour' under Article 23. We are,therefore, of the view that where a person provides labour or service toanother for remuneration, which is less than the minimum wage, the labour orservice provided by him clearly falls within the scope and ambit of the words 'forcedlabour' under Article 23. Such a person would be entitled to come to the Courtfor enforcement of his fundamental right under Article 23 by asking the Courtto direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the labour or serviceprovided by him ceases to be 'forced labour' and the breach of Article 23 isremedied. It is, therefore, clear that when the petitioners alleged thatminimum wage was not paid to the workmen employed by the contractors, thecomplaint was really in effect and substance a complaint against violation ofthe fundamental right of the workmen under Article 23" (Emphasis supplied) It has been further held that, ifthe wages paid to the labourers are less than the minimum wages, the sameamounts to 'begar'. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the said casethat, if Sugar Barons and the Liquor Kings of the country have fundamentalright to carry on their business and fatten their purses by exploiting theconsuming public, can the down-trodden persons belonging to the lower strata ofsociety be denied their fundamental rights even to earn an honest livingthrough sweat and toil. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the onlycivil and political rights meaningful to this larger section of the societywould be to remake the material conditions and restructure the social andeconomic order, so that these persons may be able to realize the economic,social and cultural rights. 33. If the aforesaid judgment ofthe Supreme Court is scanned in its totality and the principles scrutinized, itwould be seen that the Supreme Court has laid stress to the fact about paymentof at least the minimum wages to an employee for working in the establishmentas a fundamental right of the employee and anything done to deprive an employeeof this right, would be nothing but an act amounting to 'begar'. It is truethat in the set up, in the organization of the Home Guards, no pay scale isprescribed, but in the Statutory Rules proposed to be framed by the State Governmentand as indicated hereinabove, certain posts and pay scales have beenprescribed. It is truethat in the set up, in the organization of the Home Guards, no pay scale isprescribed, but in the Statutory Rules proposed to be framed by the State Governmentand as indicated hereinabove, certain posts and pay scales have beenprescribed. It is for the State Government and the Expert Authorities todeliberate on these issues and prescribe an appropriate pay scale or conditionsof service, which can be termed as the reasonable conditions for these persons.However, the fact remains that as on date nothing is prescribed and the HomeGuards are made to work on a payment of an amount of Rs. 120-140/- paid to themevery day, which is much less than even the Basic Pay prescribed to a Constablein the Police Department. 34. During the course of hearing,it was stated that now they are being paid a sum of about Rs. 160/- per day. Ifthey are paid salary of Rs. 160/- per day, compared to the salary, which isreceived by a Constable in the Police Department, there is a great disparity.According to the indications made in Paragraph 26, of the Report of theCommission, it is seen that the Commission has referred to a note of one ShriP.V. Rajagopal, Director General of Home Guards, and it is indicated that onexamining the duties being performed by Home Guards Personnel, one would findthat they are in the same lines as that prescribed for a police personnel underthe M.P. Police Regulations. It is, thereafter observed that in the fitness ofthings, the Sainiks should be given daily allowance, which would work out to beequivalent to the average daily income of a Police Constable, in the State of Madhya Pradesh . Thereafter, a detailed chart is indicated,which shows that when a Home Guard Sainik received about Rs. 3,000/- per month,a Police Constable was receiving about Rs. 10,233/- per month. It is reportedthat as on date, a Police Constable is receiving near about Rs. 11,000/- to12,000/- per month. While considering the question of payment of salary andemoluments to daily wage employees and while taking note of the claim made bythe daily wage employee for payment of salary on the principle of 'equal payfor equal work', the Supreme Court in the case of Dharwad District PWD LiterateDaily Wage Employees Association and others Vs. 11,000/- to12,000/- per month. While considering the question of payment of salary andemoluments to daily wage employees and while taking note of the claim made bythe daily wage employee for payment of salary on the principle of 'equal payfor equal work', the Supreme Court in the case of Dharwad District PWD LiterateDaily Wage Employees Association and others Vs. State of Karnataka and others, (1990) 2 SCC 396 , has taken note of various Constitutional provisions and hasheld that even though the Court is not entitled to issue a direction toregularize and make payment of salary to the employees in a particular payscale of pay and thereby burdening the State Exchequer unduly, but the meaningof the word 'socialist' as appearing in the Preamble of the Constitution andthe Socialistic Philosophy adopted by the Constitution should be implemented inits letter and spirit. Therefore, a scheme should be formulated in such amanner that daily wage employees are not exploited to such an extent that theirConstitutional rights are infringed. 35. While considering the samequestion in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Devinder Singh, (1998) 9 SCC 595 ,and taking note of the applicability of the principle of parity of employmentand 'equal pay for equal work' in the case of daily wage ledger keepers, it washeld by the Supreme Court that, even if, daily wage employees are not entitledto the regular pay scale and other benefits according to a post against, whichthey are working, they are at least entitled to the minimum of the pay scaleprescribed for the post (i.e. ledger keepers in this case). 36. Similar view is again laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Land Development Corporation Vs. H. Anwar, : AIR 2010 SC 2587 . If the aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme Court and the concept of payment of minimum wages or a fair living wage to the employees discharging duties for the State Government are taken note and if the working conditions of the Home Guards are evaluated in the back drop of the findings recorded by the Human Rights Commission, it is clear that the Home Guards in the State of Madhya Pradesh are not being paid emoluments and other service benefits in accordance to the service performed by them and in the light of the recommendations made by the Human Rights Commission, the entire matter has to be reconsidered and reviewed. But, at the same time as the aforesaid process would take some time, the Home Guards cannot be permitted to suffer, having already suffered for the last more than 50 years. They are to be given some benefit so that the emoluments or salary earned by them for the work done can atleast be termed as a living wage sufficient enough to sustain them and their family. This is the requirement of the constitutional mandate and this Court cannot lose sight of this mandate of the Constitution. The Constitution further mandates the State Government to ensure that conditions of working are atleast such that the employee working for the State or its instrumentalities are paid salary, which is sufficient enough for sustaining them and their family i.e.... they get atleast a living wage. 37. As already indicated hereinabove, this Court cannot issue any 'mandamus' to the State Government for implementing the recommendations of the Human Rights Commission in its totality nor can the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' be enforced. Similarly, the declaration sought by the petitioners for declaring them as civil post holders and, therefore, to regularize treating them to be "civil post" holders can also be not granted in view of the judgments rendered by this Court in the case of Kedar Prasad (supra) and again in the case of Pun Pratap Singh (supra), wherein it has been held by Division Bench of this Court that as the Home Guards are not civil post holders and they did not enjoy 'equal pay for equal work' in the absence of rules being framed and made applicable to them by the State Government. To that effect, the objections raised by Shri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, has to be upheld. 38. But, at the same time taking note of the fact that the petitioners, who are Home Guards, and are required to work continuously year after year and are not even getting the bare minimum salary as is given to their counterparts in the Police Department, the amount paid presently is not sufficient enough to sustain them and their family, relief has to be granted to them so that they can earn living wage by working as Home Guards and at the same time the system of calling of, which is not at all justified in any manner, should be done away with. 39. 39. During the course of hearing of this petition Shri R.D. Jain, the learned Advocate General, except for contending that the recommendations made by the State Human Rights Commission cannot be enforced, did not point out even a single error or illegality or perversity in the findings of fact recorded by the State Human Rights Commission, with regard to the manner in which the Home Guards are treated in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Not a single ground was canvassed during the time of hearing to show as to why the findings recorded in this Report be not taken to be correct. If the facts that have come out in the Report are correct, then it clearly shows that the constitutional and fundamental rights of the Home Guards are being violated and the State Government is not even following the mandate of the Constitution for protecting the rights of the Home Guards. 40. This Court had passed an interim order directing for payment of certain minimum salary and doing away with the system of calling of. Even though the order was passed more than three months back on 22.9.2011, the order has not been given affect to and the State Government by filing an application for recall has not given any reason as to why the said directions cannot be implemented. Except for contending that the financial and economic condition of the State Government prevents the State Government from implementing the said directions, no justifiable reason is given as to why the decision cannot be implemented. Financial constraints of the State Government cannot be an excuse for denying the constitutional rights of an employee discharging duties for the State Government. The Home Guards are performing duty by protecting the life and liberty of the citizens of the State and safeguarding the properties and assets of the State Government and whey they are doing so, the bare minimum of paying them some living wage, enough to sustain them has to be granted and mere financial constraints cannot be an excuse for denying the said benefit to the petitioners. 41. In a welfare State and particularly when the State has to act as a model employer, the State is required to set an example by giving wages and salary sufficient enough to sustain an employee and his family. 41. In a welfare State and particularly when the State has to act as a model employer, the State is required to set an example by giving wages and salary sufficient enough to sustain an employee and his family. The State cannot be permitted to act like a private employer and exploit the working class or the labour force doing duties for the State and citizens. The State has to act as a model employer and in the absence of any cogent justification from the Government for not doing so, the excuse of financial constraints cannot be accepted. 42. The emphasis on behalf of the State Government by Shri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, for denying the benefits to the petitioners are mainly two folded. His first contention is that the recommendations made by the State Human Rights Commission are not enforceable and the Human Rights Commission has no authority under the Human Rights Act to issue any such direction, much less the direction to frame statutory rules and regulations or legislation. It was also emphasized by him that due to various factors as indicated hereinabove, the principle of 'equal wage for equal work' does not apply. Except for contending so, nothing is brought to the notice of this Court to show as to why the findings recorded by the State Human Rights Commission in its report dated 25.6.2011, with regard to the manner in which the Home Guards are treated, be not accepted as a correct projection of the entire picture. 43. The Human Rights Commission is a fact finding body and the report submitted by the Commission on the basis of enquiry can be taken cognizance of. Infact, in the case of Paramjit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab, 1999 Cri. L.J 456, the Supreme Court ruled that the Human Rights Commission is a fact finding commission and just like any fact finding body, even the Supreme Court can direct the Commission to conduct enquiry and collect information. Infact, in the case of Paramjit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab, 1999 Cri. L.J 456, the Supreme Court ruled that the Human Rights Commission is a fact finding commission and just like any fact finding body, even the Supreme Court can direct the Commission to conduct enquiry and collect information. The information collected by the State Human Rights Commission and the report submitted by the said Commission, available on record, in my view, has some value and in the absence of the findings recorded in the report being shown to be perverse or opposed to some principle of law or facts, which is shown to be incorrect, the report has to be given due credence, particularly in the present case when the report is based on an enquiry conducted by a High Level Committee, which consisted of Senior Police Officers of the Rank of Director General of Police etc. 44. It is pertinent to note that during his entire submissions Shri R.D. Jain, learned Advocate General, did not make any allegation to the effect that any of the findings recorded by the State Human Rights Commission in its report or the facts mentioned on the basis of enquiry conducted is not correct. Except for taking the legal plea that the recommendations cannot be accepted, based on the law laid down in the case of Mallikarjuna Rao (supra), he did not give any reasons as to why the findings recorded by the Commission cannot be taken cognizance of by this Court for dispensing justice to the petitioners herein. 45. The findings recorded by the State Human Rights Commission and the violation of the Human Rights, the provisions of Articles 14 & 23 of the Constitution as indicated therein, have to be taken note of and even if the recommendations have no binding or statutory force, which can be enforced by this Court, but if the report show violation of not only the human rights of the petitioners before this Court, but also their constitutional rights, the question is can this Court be a mute spectator and leave it to the Government to take a decision on the report, without any direction for safeguarding the rights and interests of the petitioners exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 46. 46. India alongwith various States is a party to various covenants and International Charter, proclaimed by the United Nations, which have been issued after due deliberations in accordance to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One such covenant is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. India is a signatory to this Covenant and has also ratified the same. The preamble to this Covenant indicates that the United Nations and the States parties to the said Covenant recognizes the need for inherent dignity, equal and inalienable right of all members of the human family, this is stated to be the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. The Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights is proclaimed realizing the effect that every individual living human being has a right to enjoy certain economic, social and cultural rights and in furtherance thereof, various provisions are made in this Covenant. Part III, Article 7 of this Covenant contemplates that the States parties to the present Covenant recognizes the right of everyone for the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure that the remuneration provided to all workers are atleast the minimum with regard to fair wages that can fetch them a decent living for themselves and their family, provide for safe and healthy working conditions and various other aspects concerned with the rights of a working individual. Even though Article 7 of this Covenant contemplates various benefits to be extended, including remuneration, public holidays, time for leisure, health and safety. One of the basic conditions is that remuneration provided should be the minimum fair wages, which can enable an individual to have a decent living and this right under the Covenant is nothing but a Human Right. That apart, under Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is provided as under: Article 23. 1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. 3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. 4. 2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. 3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. 4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. (Emphasis supplied) 47. While evaluating the facts with regard to working conditions of the Home Guards, the State Human Rights Commission has found that in the matter of prescribing working conditions of the petitioners and in the matter of granting them various facilities, the basic human rights requirement are not complied with and it is violative of Articles 14 , 21 and 23 of the Constitution. If that be so and if the basic human rights and constitutional rights are found to be violated, this Court cannot simply close its eyes and leave it to the Government to take a decision at its own sweet will. For more than 50 years, nothing has been done and it is not known as to for how many more years, the petitioners and Home Guards will have to suffer this violation of their basic human rights in the matter of giving them a fair wage and other working and service conditions, decent enough to maintain themselves and their family. 48. Under such circumstances, even though this Court deems it appropriate to leave it to the State Government to take a final decision into the matter, but with a view to do immediate justice to some extent to the petitioners, the interest of not only justice, but the constitutional mandate requires that till a final decision is not taken by the State Government, as a measure of interim relief or interim benefit, some relief should be granted to the petitioners so that their grievance are mitigated to some extent and the violation of their human and constitutional rights are to some extent remedied and it was taking note of all these factors that an interim order was passed by this Court on 22.9.2011, directing the respondents atleast to give to each of the petitioners the minimum of the pay, payable to a Constable in the Police Department and in doing away with the principle of calling of or rotation of duty. 49. 49. In view of the aforesaid and in the facts and circumstances of the case, for the grounds and reasons indicated hereinabove, these petitions are allowed in part. Even though this Court does not deem it appropriate to issue any 'mandamus' with regard to the prayer made by the petitioners for declaring them as civil post holders or for granting them regular service alongwith regular benefits available to a personnel in the police department, the following directions are issued in the facts of the present case: (a) On receipt of a certified copy of this order, the State Government shall take note of the recommendations made by the State Human Rights Commission and if required after constituting a High Level Committee or Commission to go into the questions and recommendations made by the Human Rights Commission and after studying the organization, working set up and other factors in the establishment of the Home Guards, make endeavour to lay down schemes, rules or regulations for regulating the working of the Home Guards establishment and if required, may formulate statutory rules and regulations in this regard, for prescribing their service conditions. (b) Till the aforesaid exercise is not completed, all the employees working in the Home Guards department and who are petitioners before this Court, so also other similarly situated persons, who may have not filed writ petitions, be granted salary at the minimum/basic of the pay prescribed for the lowest post i.e.... constable in the police department, without any running pay scale, allowances etc. (c) All the employees would be entitled to the minimum of the pay scale i.e.... the basic of the pay, as is payable to a constable in the police department, and the said benefit shall be extended to the employees with effect from 1.1.2011. (d) The employees would be paid the aforesaid amount with revision of basic pay, if any, in the corresponding police department from time to time hereafter, till a final scheme or regular rules and regulations are not formulated for working in the Home Guards organization. (e) Apart from the aforesaid, the system of calling of duty shall be done away with and the employees shall be employed throughout the year subject to their being physically fit or otherwise entitled to work in accordance to law. 50. (e) Apart from the aforesaid, the system of calling of duty shall be done away with and the employees shall be employed throughout the year subject to their being physically fit or otherwise entitled to work in accordance to law. 50. If this Court does not grant even this bare minimum relief to the petitioners, this Court would be failing in its duty of protecting the constitutional rights of the petitioners and having been prima facie satisfied that the action of the State Government is unjustified and amounts to violation of the constitutional and human rights, cannot sit back and look without issuing any directions. It is under these compelling circumstances that this Court is constrained to pass this order so that till the State Government takes a final decision into the matter, the petitioners are granted some interim benefit. 51. With the aforesaid directions, all these petitions stand allowed and disposed of.