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2011 DIGILAW 1383 (RAJ)

Kanchan v. State of Rajasthan

2011-07-14

NARENDRA KUMAR JAIN

body2011
JUDGMENT 1. - Complainant-petitioner has preferred this revision petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. against the impugned order dated 4.9.2003 passed by the Civil Judge(Jr. Division) and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Shree Mahaveerji, whereby accused-respondent Nos. 2 to 6 have been acquitted of the offence under Sections 147, 148, 323/149, 324/149 and 326/149 I.P.C. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 9.11.1995, a report Ex.P-2 was lodged at Police Station Shree Mahaveerji by complainant Kanchan about injuries inflicted on his person by accused Amrit Lal by 'Gandasa' and other injuries by other accused persons by 'Lathi' i.e. blunt object. After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against accused-respondent Nos. 2 to 6. The trial Court framed charges against accused-respondents, who denied the same and claimed trial. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined PW-1 to PW-10 and produced documentary evidence Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-8. Thereafter, statements of accused persons were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In defence, statements of DW-1 and DW-2 were recorded. 3. Learned trial Court, after hearing the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and examining the record, acquitted the accused-respondents of the charges. 4. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that from the statements of PW-2 Kanchan, PW-6 Chhuttan, PW-3 Dr. Hari Singh Meena and PW-10 Dr. M.D. Qureshi, charges framed against accused persons were fully proved and the learned trial Court committed serious illegality in giving benefit of doubt and acquitting the accused-respondents, therefore, this is a fit case wherein this Court should interfere in the order of acquittal and punish the accused-respondents. 5. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for petitioner in the light of reasons assigned by the trial Court for acquittal of the accused-respondents. 6. 5. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for petitioner in the light of reasons assigned by the trial Court for acquittal of the accused-respondents. 6. The trial Court has considered the prosecution evidence in detail and has observed that incident took place in the morning at about 9'0 Clock, whereas F.I.R. was lodged in the evening at about 8.45 p.m., there is no reasonable explanation for delay in lodging the F.I.R., eye-witness PW-4 Gyarsya was declared hostile and another eye-witness PW-6 Chhuttan was examined but his name was not mentioned in the F.I.R., there is contradiction in respect of weapon used in the incident as in F.I.R. it was alleged that accused Amrit Lal inflicted injury by 'Gandasa', whereas during trial it was alleged that he inflicted injury by 'Farsa', Investigating Agency did not recover any weapon alleged to have been used in the incident. Learned trial Court was also of the view that statement of PW-2 Kanchan has not been corroborated by any other independent witness, whereas incident took place in the main market and in the day light, therefore, prosecution failed to prove charges against accused-respondents beyond all reasonable doubts. 7. I have examined the statements of PW-2, PW-4 and PW-6 and I am satisfied that the trial Court has correctly come to a conclusion that delay in lodging F.I.R. has not been explained satisfactorily. It is also correct that PW-4 Gyarsya, who was examined as eye-witness, was declared hostile in the case, another eye-witness PW-6 Chhuttan was not named in the F.I.R., incident took place in the morning and in the day light, but no independent witness has corroborated the prosecution story, no weapon was recovered at the instance of any of the accused persons during investigation of the case. 8. In these circumstances, I am of the view that reasons assigned by the trial Court for giving benefit of doubt to the accused persons appear to be absolutely legal and justified and the same do not call for any interference by this Court. 9. 8. In these circumstances, I am of the view that reasons assigned by the trial Court for giving benefit of doubt to the accused persons appear to be absolutely legal and justified and the same do not call for any interference by this Court. 9. Apart from above, Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bacchudas alias Balaram & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1236 observed that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that the order of acquittal should not be interfered with unless there are some compelling and substantial reason or circumstances for doing so. Para 9 of the judgment (supra) is reproduced as under: "9. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two view are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of injustice which may arise from acquittal of the guilt is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offences or not. The principle to be followed by the appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there is compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. The principle to be followed by the appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there is compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 ; Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 ; Jaswant v. State of Haryana, (2000) 4 SCC 484 ; Rajkishore Jha v. State of Bihar, (2003) 11 SCC 519 ; State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, (2003) 11 SCC 271 ; State of Punjab v. Phola Singh, (2003) 11 SCC 58 ; Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal, (2003) 11 SCC 527 and Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410 ." 10. in view of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, an order of acquittal should not and cannot be interfered with unless there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. It is also a settled law that if two view are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. 11. In view of above discussions, I do not find any compelling or substantial reason for interfering in the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. 12. In view of above, I do not find any merit in this revision petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******