By The Court—We have heard Col. Ashok Kumar assisted by Sri Rohit Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Sri R.B. Singhal, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India assisted by Sri S.K. Rai, learned counsel for the respondents and Sri S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Manish Goel, as Amicus Curae. 2. By this intra court appeal the appellant has sought to challenge the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 12.8.2002 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32319 of 2002 filed by the petitioner seeking a direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Chief of the Army Staff, New Delhi to examine the grievance of the petitioner brought out in the statutory complaint made by the petitioner therein and dispose of the same by a reasoned order within a time frame. 3. The learned Single Judge while considering the said prayer of the writ petitioner, declined to grant any indulgence on the ground that the relief claimed by the petitioner has already been adjudicated upon by the Gujarat High Court in a writ petition filed by the petitioner himself being Special Civil Application No. 4236 of 1996 before that High Court, and thus, dismissed the writ petition. 4. Hence the Special Appeal. 5. When the matter came up before us for consideration, without inviting us to the merits of the case, learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court dated 2.11.2010 in Special Appeal (Defective) No. 445 of 2005 (Union of India & others v. Ram Baran), which is also reported in 2011 (I) AWC 571 . By the said judgment it has been held that after the establishment of the Armed Forces Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), with effect from 15.6.2008 under the Arms Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), all matters pending before the High Court with regard to disputes emanating from the cause of action which are triable by the Tribunal will be transferred to the Tribunal for adjudication. For ready reference, paragraraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted herein-below: “16. The Armed Forces Tribunal under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, has been constituted as independent adjudicatory forum for the defence personnel for which the recommendations were made by the Supreme Court in Prithvi Pal Singh Bedi Vs. For ready reference, paragraraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted herein-below: “16. The Armed Forces Tribunal under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, has been constituted as independent adjudicatory forum for the defence personnel for which the recommendations were made by the Supreme Court in Prithvi Pal Singh Bedi Vs. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1413 . The new legislation contemplates adjudication of complaints and disputes regarding service matters and appeals arising out of the verdict of the Court Martial of the members of the three services, and to provide for quicker and less expensive justice to the members of the Armed Forces of the Union. The Legislature wanted to establish independent Armed Forces Tribunal to fortify the trust and confidence amongst the members of the three services in the system of dispensation of justice, in relation to their service matters. The bill provided for a judicial appeal on points of law and facts against the verdict of the Court Martial. Section 14 not only provides for jurisdiction, powers and authority in service matters exercisable immediately before the appointed day by courts except the Supreme Court or the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in relation to all service matters. Section 15 provided for jurisdiction, powers and authority in the matters of appeal against Court Martial. The Tribunal has also been given powers available to the courts established by law to punish for contempt. These powers provide for a stricter punishment of three years as compared to the powers under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, providing for a maximum period of only two months. The appeal against the order of the Tribunal lies to Supreme Court under Section 30 of the Act, subject to provisions of Section 31, which provides for leave by the Tribunal. Section 33 excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to the service matters covered under the Act. 17. In the aforesaid context, we are of the opinion that the words ‘other proceeding’ in Section 34 (1), will include intra court special appeals provided under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, in respect of the matters, which fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 14 of the Act. 17. In the aforesaid context, we are of the opinion that the words ‘other proceeding’ in Section 34 (1), will include intra court special appeals provided under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, in respect of the matters, which fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 14 of the Act. If the Tribunal can decide the pending writ petitions, which are transferred to it, the powers to decide the specdial appeal arising out of the judgments of one Judge of the High Court, has to be included in it. 18. The office is directed to transfer the records of this special appeal to the Armed Forces Tribunal, Lucknow, to be decided by it in accordance with the jurisdiction and powers conferred upon it by the Act of 2007.” 6. Learned counsel for the appellant placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment, submitted that the present Special Appeal be also transferred to the Tribunal for adjudication. He further contended that many Special Appeals by various other Division Benches have been directed to be transferred to the Tribunal. One such order is of a Division Bench of this Court dated 19.1.2011 passed in Special Appeal (Defective) No. 885 of 2008. He also submitted that many pending writ petitions have also been transferred to the Tribunal and, therefore, there is no reason for us to take a different view and the present Special Appeal should also be transferred to the Tribunal. 7. On the other hand, Sri S.K. Rai, learned counsel representing the respondents, submitted that the Division Bench in directing the transfer of Special Appeal filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court to the Tribunal, placed reliance on Section 34 (1) of the Act, as well as the judgment of this Court rendered by a learned Single Judge in the case of Devi Saran Mishra v. Union of India & others, reported in 2010 (2) ESC 1475 (Alld.). He contends that while Section 34 of the Act provides for transfer of suits or other proceedings pending before any Court or even before the High Court, would not include Special Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. He contends that while Section 34 of the Act provides for transfer of suits or other proceedings pending before any Court or even before the High Court, would not include Special Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. He furtrher submits that it is more so because of the fact that the High Court had adjudicated upon the issue and as such it would be beyond the scope and jurisdiction of the Tribunal to either disagree or reverse the judgment of the High Court if the Tribunal comes to the conclusion otherwise. 8. The Armed Forces Tribunal was constituted under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007. Under the said Act the Tribunal is meant to be an independent adjudicatory forum which has been created upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court as recommended in the case of Prithvi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India & others, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1413 , to cater to the needs of the defence personnel with regard to the speedy redressal of their service disputes and also to exercise appellate jurisdiction in the matter arising of or connected with the Court Martial. The Tribunal came into being with effect from 15th June, 2008, which is the appointed day. 9. The Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 is a comprehensive piece of legislation which provides for establishment of the Tribunal and extent of its power, authority and jurisdiction. It also provides for a detailed procedure for institution and adjudication of disputes. 10. Now as to the question whether the Special Appeal filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court can be transferred to the Tribunal as has been opined by the Division Bench of this Court, certain provisions of the Act are necessarily to be looked into. 11. Section 14 of the Act provides for an exclusive jurisdiction with the Tribunal which was earlier exercisable by all Courts prior to the establishment of the Tribunal except the one exercised by the Supreme Court or the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with regard to all service related disputes of the Armed Forces. Section 14 of the Act provides for an exclusive jurisdiction with the Tribunal which was earlier exercisable by all Courts prior to the establishment of the Tribunal except the one exercised by the Supreme Court or the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with regard to all service related disputes of the Armed Forces. Section 15 of the Act provides for jurisdiction, power and authority of the Tribunal in the matter of appeal filed against the Court Martial. 12. While Section 14 of the Act provides for jurisdiction of the Tribunal, Section 33 provides for exclusion from jurisdiction of all other authorities and Courts of disputes relating to service matters of the personnel of Armed Forces of the Union. 13. Section 34 of the Act is with regard to the transfer (emphasis supplied) of cases which are in the nature of suit or other proceeding and are pending before any Court or Authority including the High Court to the Tribunal. Finally Section 35 of the Act provides for institution of certain appeals against any decree or order passed by any Court or Authority except from the orders passed by the High Court before the Tribunal within the time stipulated in the Section. For ready reference, the aforesaid provisions are quoted herein-below: “Sec.14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority in service matters:- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority, exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court or a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to all service matters. (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by an order pertaining to any service matter may make an application to the Tribunal in such form and accompanied by such documents or other evidence and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed. (3) On receipt of an application relating to service matters, the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after due enquiry, as it may deem necessary, that it is fit for adjudication by it, admit such application; but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may dismiss the application after recording its reasons in writing. (3) On receipt of an application relating to service matters, the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after due enquiry, as it may deem necessary, that it is fit for adjudication by it, admit such application; but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may dismiss the application after recording its reasons in writing. (4) For the purpose of adjudicating an application, the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) subject to the provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), requisitioning any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any office; (e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; (f) reviewing the decisions; (g) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex-parte; (h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte; and (i)any other matter which may be prescribed by the Central Government. (5) The Tribunal shall decide both questions of law and facts that may be raised before it. Sec.15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority in matters of appeal against court martial.- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable under this Act in relation to appeal against any order, decision, finding or sentence passed by a court martial or any matter connected therewith or incidental thereto. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order, decision, finding or sentence passed by a court martial may prefer an appeal in such form, manner and within such time as may be prescribed. ..................................................................... ....................................................................... Sec. 34. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order, decision, finding or sentence passed by a court martial may prefer an appeal in such form, manner and within such time as may be prescribed. ..................................................................... ....................................................................... Sec. 34. Transfer of pending cases:- (1) Every suit, or other proceeding pending before any court including a High Court or other authority immediately before the date of establishment of the Tribunal under this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based, is such that it would have been within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, if it had arisen after such establishment within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal. (2) Where any suit, or other proceeding stands transferred from any court including a High Court or other authority to the Tribunal under sub-section (1),- (a) the court or other authority shall, as soon as may be, after such transfer, forward the records of such suit, or other proceeding to the Tribunal; (b) the Tribunal may, on receipt of such records, proceed to deal with such suit, or other proceeding, so far as may be, in the same manner as in the case of an application made under sub- section (2) of Section 14 from the stage which was reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage or de novo as the Tribunal may deem fit. Sec.35. Provision for filing of certain appeals:- Where any decree or order has been made or passed by any court (other than a High Court) or any other authority in any suit or proceeding before the establishment of the Tribunal, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based, is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment,within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and no appeal has been preferred against such decree or order before such establishment or if preferred, the same is pending for disposal before any court including High Court and the time for preferring such appeal under any law for the time being in force had not expired before such establishment, such appeal shall lie to the Tribunal, within ninety days from the date on which the Tribunal is established, or within ninety days from the date of receipt of the copy of such decree or order, whichever is later.” 14. Considering the aforesaid provisions and after a careful reading of the same and also considering the law on the subject as laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 , some doubts have occurred in our mind regarding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain Special Appeals filed against the judgment of learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. The decision of this Court in the case of Ram Baran (Supra) is by a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction and the judicial discipline requires that the other Benches would follow the same. But in the present case, after careful examination of Sections 14, 34 and 35 we were inclined to arrive at a different conclusion. Therefore, we thought it proper to seek legal expertise of the competent lawyers of this Court and hence we requested Sri S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate and Sri Manish Goel, learned Advocate of this Court to be the friends of the Court and assist the Court in the matter. Before proceeding further, we must express our deep appreciation for Sri S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate who immediately consented to offer his assistance to the Court and so did Sri Manish Goel, learned Advocate. 16. The Amicus Curae Sri S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Manish Goel while drawing our attention to various provisions of the Constitution, placed heavy reliance upon the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (Supra), and submitted that a final judgment of the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even if passed by the learned Single Judge, cannot be judicially reviewed by the Tribunal. 17. To press the aforesaid proposition and to further emphasise the constituitional status that of the High Court, vis-a-vis, the Tribunal created under Article 323-A of the Constitution, Sri Gupta has drawn our attention to various paragraraphs of L. Chandra Kumar’s case most importantly paragraraphs no. 78, 79, 90, 91, 93 and 99, which are quoted herein-below. “78. ................ An analysis of the manner in which the Framers of our Constitution incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were very grately concerned with securing the independence of the judiciary. 78, 79, 90, 91, 93 and 99, which are quoted herein-below. “78. ................ An analysis of the manner in which the Framers of our Constitution incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were very grately concerned with securing the independence of the judiciary. (#) These attempts were directed at ensuring that the judiciary would be capable of effectively discharging its wide powers of judicial review. While the Constitution confers the power to strike down laws upon the High Courts and the Supreme Court, it also contains elaborate provisions dealing with the tenure, salaries, allowances, retirement age of Judges as well as the mechanism for selecting Judges to the superior Courts. The inclusion of such daborate provisions appear to have been occasioned by the belief that, armed by such provisions, the superior Courts would be insulated from any executive or legislative attempts to interfere with the making of their decisions. The Judges of the superior Courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional limitations. It is equally their duty to oversee that the judicial decisions rendered by those who man the subordinate Courts and tribunals do not fall foul of strict standards of legal correctness and judicial independence. The constitutional safeguards which ensure the independence of the Judges of the superior judiciary are not available to the Judges of the subordinate judiciary or to those who man Tribunals created by ordinary legislations. Consequently, Judges of the latter category can never be considered full and effective substitutes for the superior judiciary in discharging the function of constitutional interpretation. We, therefore, hold that the power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. 79. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. 79. We also hold that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This is because a situation where the High Courts are divested of all other judicial functions apart from that of constitutional interpretation, is equally to be avoided. 90. We may first address the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High Courts . We have already held that in respect of the power of judicial review, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 cannot be excluded.It has been contended before us that the Tribunals should not be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislations is questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to handling matters where constitutional issues are not raised. We cannot bring ourselves to agree to this proposition as that may result in splitting up proceedings and may cause avoidable delay. If such a view were to be adopted, it would be open for litigants to raise constitutional issues, many of which may be quite frivolous, to directly approach the High Court and thus subvert the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. Moreover, even in these special branches of law, some areas do involve the consideration of constitutional questions on a regular basis; for instance, in service law matters, a large majority of cases involve an interpretation of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. To hold that the Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. On the other hand, to hold that all such decisions will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls will serve two purposes. While saving the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the constitution, it will ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunals. While saving the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the constitution, it will ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunals. The High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter. 91. ...................We have already emphasised the necessity for ensuring that the High Courts are able to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of Tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution. In R. K. Jain’s case, (1993 AIR SCW 1899), after taking note of these facts, it was suggested that the possibility of an appeal from the Tribunals on questions of law to a Division Bench of a High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, be pursued. It appears that no follow-up action has been taken pursuant to the suggestion. Such a measure would have improved matters considerably. Having regard to both the afore-stated contentions, we hold that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls. 93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions of the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional setup, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Court. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. 99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323A and Clause 3 (d) of Article 323B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Article 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred uipon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislation (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged)by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. Section 5(6)of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.” 18. In L. Chandra Kumar’s case, while considering the validity of the provisions contained in Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Apex Court in so far as it excludes the jurisdiction of High Court, declared sub-clause 2 (d) of Article 323-A of the Constitution as ultra vires and held that the jurisdiction and power of the High Court of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution being the essential feature of the Constitution, cannot in any manner, be abrogated or taken away. 19. Therefore, apparently the provision of Section 14 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act have suitably been conditioned to save the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and that of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in view of the law laid down in L.Chandra Kumar (Supra), 20. He further submits that the Tribunal can not be a substitute for the High Court. Therefore, according to him, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. Ram Baran (Supra), was in error to include the Special Appeals within the meaning of ‘other proceedings’ pending before this Court while interpreting Section 34 of the Act. The ‘other proceedings’ mentioned in Section 34 of the Act is in relation to suit and it should have been read ‘ejusdem generis’ with the expression ‘suit’, which would then mean proceedings of original nature. The expression ‘other proceedings’ in Section 34 of the Act is preceded by the word ‘suit’ which discloses the ‘genus’, i.e., category. The ‘other proceedings’ mentioned in Section 34 of the Act is in relation to suit and it should have been read ‘ejusdem generis’ with the expression ‘suit’, which would then mean proceedings of original nature. The expression ‘other proceedings’ in Section 34 of the Act is preceded by the word ‘suit’ which discloses the ‘genus’, i.e., category. To substantiate the aforesaid proposition the learned Senior Advocate has relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of M/S Jupiter Chit Fund (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh Dayal & others, reported in AIR 1979 Alld. 218 (Para 34). He then drew our attention to Section 35 of the Act which provides for institution of certain appeals before the Tribunal and expressly excludes the decree or order passed by the High Court. 21. We find ourselves in agreement with the submissions made by the learned Senior Advocate. However, we may clarify that from a careful perusal of Section 35 which has already been extracted above, the following ingredients can be deduced: (a) The provision specifically deals with the filing of appeals only, against a decree or order passed by any court or authority, but does not deal with transfer of appeals. (b) The order or decree passed by the High Court has been expressly excluded for the purposes of filing appeal before the Tribunal. (c) The expression “proceeding” cannot be construed as an order or decree passed by the High Court prior to the establishment of the Tribunal for the simple reason that an appeal against an order or decree of the High Court has been expressly excluded. (d) If no appeal has been preferred against the decree or order prior to establishment of the Tribunal, such an order or decree passed by any civil court or any authority, appeal shall lie only before the Tribunal after its establishment. (e) The only exception to the above is in case an appeal has been filed before the High Court and such an appeal has been filed within the period of limitation prescribed under the law or as mentioned in Section 35 itself, such an appeal even if filed before the High Court, ought to be filed before the Tribunal. (f) Even such an appeal also shall be considered as arising out of a decree or order passed by the civil court or any other authority other than the High Court. (f) Even such an appeal also shall be considered as arising out of a decree or order passed by the civil court or any other authority other than the High Court. In other words, even if any order or decree passed by the High Court and if any right of appeal is available before the High Court, the said jurisdiction of the High Court available under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India cannot be taken away. On the other hand, by necessary implication an appeal that is pending before the High Court against an order or decree of the civil court or any other authority, shall remain with the High Court only and cannot be transferred. To put it in a different way, an appeal pending as on the date of establishment of the Tribunal shall continue with the High Court only, subject to the exception mentioned therein. (g) An order under appeal shall include an order passed by the learned Single Judge against which right of Special Appeal is available under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court and shall lie before the appellate forum of the High Court only. 22. Apart from the above, in other words, the purport of Section 35 of the Act is not of transfer of an appeal pending before the Courts but is with regard to the institution of appeals against the decree or order made or passed by any Court or authority. Here such appeal would not include appeals from any order passed by the High Court. It further provides that against any other such decree or order if no appeal has been filed and the period prescribed for filing of such appeal under the relevant law has not yet expired at the time when the Tribunal came into being, that is to say, 15th June, 2008, then such appeal could be filed before the Tribunal within a further period of ninety days from the date of the receipt of copy of such decree or order. The Section further provides that in case where such appeal against the decree or order of any authority or Court has already been filed and is pending but the limitation for filing such appeal under the relevant law has not yet expired, the same can be filed before the Tribunal notwithstanding pendency of such appeal before any Court or authority including the High Court. 23. As such, upon a conjoint reading of Sections 14, 33, 34 and 35 of the Act would necessarily show that Section 34 does not include within its fold Special Appeal arising from the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Similarly, under Section 35 of the Act no appeal can be instituted before or transferred to the Tribunal against any order that may be passed by the High Court. 24. Learned Senior Counsel Sri R.B. Singhal, Assistant Solicitor General of India assisted by Sri S.K. Rai, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has adopted the arguments advanced by Sri S.P. Gupta, Senior Advocate and has submitted that the Tribunal is an inferior court and by no stretch of imagination it can be said to be a substitute of the High Court. The High Court has been held to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all courts including the Tribunal within their respective jurisdiction, which is also the basic structure of the Constitution. For the aforesaid proposition reliance may be placed upon para 79 of the judgment in L.Chandra Kumar’s Case (Supra). 25. Sri Singhal has further contended and drew our attention to the provisions of Section 24 (1-A) and (1-B) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Explanation attached to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure to explain that ‘other proceedings’ would not and cannot include the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, Special Appeal being an intra court appeal, is in fact, a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution and as such, the expression ‘other proceedings’ used in Section 34 of the Act cannot include Special Appeal. Sri Singhal has also relied upon a decision in the case of M/S Jupiter Chit Fund (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh Dayal & others, (Supra), for the aforesaid purpose. 26. Sri Singhal has also relied upon a decision in the case of M/S Jupiter Chit Fund (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh Dayal & others, (Supra), for the aforesaid purpose. 26. Sri Singhal then placed before us a judgment passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Writ Appeals No. 156/2009 (Ganga Dutt v. Union of India & others), 900/2006, (Chandra Bhan Urmila v. Union of India & others), 417/2007 (Sahadev Paul v. Union of India & others) and 9/2007 (Prabhakar Pandey v. Union of India & others), decided together by a Division Bench of that Court vide order dated 9.9.2009, wherein the Division Bench while interpreting Sections 34 and 35 of the Act, in paras 10 & 11 of the judgment, held as under: “10. The basic facet as is perceived is that an order passed by the High Court cannot be made the subject-matter of challenge before a statutory Tribunal. That is the legislative intendment behind the aforesaid two provisions. A distinction has been deliberately made between transfer of a pending case an appeal against the decree or order passed by any Court and that passed by the High Court. 11. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the writ appeals are to be entertained by this Court and accordingly, we treat the writ appeals to be maintainable.” 27. Thus, it is to be noted that the Special Appeals in our Court are filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court which have been framed in exercise of powers conferred upon it under Article 225 of the Constitution. They are akin to Letters Patent Appeal flowing from the Charter of the High Court. Therefore, Special Appeals arising from the judgment of the learned Single Judge is, as Sri Gupta puts it, ‘an integrated procedure of self correction’ in exercise of power of issuing writs under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 28. Considering the arguments aforesaid, we can say with certain amount of clarity that the constitutional powers which are exercised in such appeal are that of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and that cannot be exercised by any other forum much less the Tribunal. 29. 28. Considering the arguments aforesaid, we can say with certain amount of clarity that the constitutional powers which are exercised in such appeal are that of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and that cannot be exercised by any other forum much less the Tribunal. 29. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid discussions and after a close scrutiny of various provisions of the Constitution and the Act as well as the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (Supra), and a Full Bench of this Court in the case of M/S Jupiter Chit Fund (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh Dayal & others, (Supra), we are of the view that the judgment in Ram Baran’s case requires reconsideration and, therefore, for an authoritative pronouncement on the subject, the papers may be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Bench of higher strength as deemed fit for considering the following issue: “Whether an Special Appeal filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court against a judgment of the learned Single Judge pending adjudication immediately prior to the constitution of the Armed Forces Tribunal under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 can be transferred to the Tribunal as held by the Division Bench in Ram Baran’s Case (Supra) in the light of the express purpose and the language employed in Sections 34 and 35 of the said Act and also the judgment rendered in L. Chandra Kumar’s Case, (Supra) by the Apex Court”? 30. Let the papers of this appeal be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. _____________