Hon'ble Dr. KOTHARI, J.—Heard learned counsels. 2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 19/5/1998, whereby, the learned Workmen Compensation Commissioner, Hanumangarh rejected the claim petition No. 14/96 holding that deceased Ashok Shah s/o applicant, Mahendra Shah was not covered by the definition of `workman' being employed as a casual labourer in the agricultural field of employer Baldev Singh for particular day and, therefore, he was not entitled to any compensation under the provisions of Workmen Compensation Act, 1923. 3. Being aggrieved of the said order, the claimant has approached this Court by way of present appeal. 4. Learned counsel Mr. 3. Being aggrieved of the said order, the claimant has approached this Court by way of present appeal. 4. Learned counsel Mr. R.D.S Kharlia, appearing for the claimant urged that deceased Ashok Shah was doing the work of masonary for construction of well/tube well in the agricultural field of respondent Baldev Singh would fall within the definition of `workman' by virtue of clause (xxx) of Schedule II of the Act of 1923, which specifies that workman, "employed, otherwise than in a clerical capacity, in the construction, working, repair or maintenance of a tube-well; or" would be included within the definition of `workman' as defined under Section 2(1)(n), which reads as under:- "(n) "workman" means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business) who is- (i) a railway servant as defined in clause (34) of Section 2 of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or (i-a) (a) a master, seaman or other member of the crew of a ship, (b) a captain or other member of the crew of an aircraft, (c) a person recruited as driver, helper, mechanic, cleaner or in any other capacity in connection with a motor vehicle, (d) a person recruited for work abroad by a company, and who is employed outside India in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II and the ship, aircraft or motor vehicle, or company, as the case may be, is registered in India, or (ii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them." 5. He further urged that under sub-section (3) of Section 2(1)(n), the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette has specified under aforesaid clause (xxx) such persons to be falling within the definition of workman as defined under Section 2(1)(n) but this aspect has not been considered by the learned Workmen Compensation Commissioner in the impugned order. 6. On the other hand, Mr. R.S.Saluja, learned counsel for the respondent relying upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Ltd. vs. Ramu Pasi & anr. - 2006 SCC (L & S) 244 = RLW 2006(2) SC 1252 submitted that the definition of `workman' has been amended by Act no. 46 of 2000 on 8/12/2000 only by which bracketed portion of definition reproduced above was deleted, whereas, accident in the present case took place on 27/8/1994 and, therefore, prior to amendment, since casual worker was excluded from the definition of `workman', as held by the Supreme Court in aforesaid case, the claim petition has rightly been rejected by the learned Workmen Compensation Commissioner. He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the present appeal. 7. Having heard the learned counsels and upon perusal of the relevant statute and case laws cited at the bar, this Court is of the opinion that the matter deserves to be remanded back to the learned Commissioner. The reasons are as follows. (i) The definition of `workman' as quoted above prior to amendment would undoubtedly be applicable to the facts of the present case. In the definition of `workman' two exceptions were carved out in the substantive part of the definition of `workman' and two categories of persons who will not be included in the ambit and scope of `workman' are (i) a person whose employment is of a casual nature; and (ii) (a person) who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business. If a person falls in any of these two exceptions, he will not be a `workman' entitled to claim compensation under this Act, but if he does not fall in either of the two exceptions, then he would be a `workman' subject to further clauses given in the said definition and additionally with reference to various clauses given in Schedule II of the Act, which clauses are 53 in number (roman numbers) in the said Schedule II. Clause (xxx) as aforesaid covers the present case of the claimant's son – deceased Ashok Shah, as he was employed otherwise than in a clerical capacity, in the construction, working, repair or maintenance of a tube-well, even though employed for a particular work of construction of well or even as a daily rated worker employed for the said construction of tube-well/well and he cannot be said to be in casual employment so as to fall in the first exception of the definition quoted above. This is what was precisely held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gorelal vs. Dropadibai – AIR 1963 Madhya Pradesh 24 in which relying upon the English decision in the case of Hughes vs. Walker – 1926 (19) BW CC 79, it was observed as under and to quote:- "In that case reference was made to Hughes vs. Walker, (1926) 19 BW CC 79, where it was observed at page 85: "In the present case it appears to me that there was evidence before the County Court Judge which would justify him in holding that a man employed to build a wall at a rate of wages, whether determined by the hour, by the week or by the day I care not, but employed to build a wall, might well be found to be engaged in an employment that was not of a casual nature. Having regard to the opinion thus expressed with which I respectfully agree there is no doubt that in the present case the employment of the deceased was not of a casual nature." 8. Thus, in the present case, the deceased son of the claimant cannot be said to be in employment of a casual nature and, therefore, would not fall in the first exception pointed out above nor for the same reason the Supreme Court decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent employer would apply in the present case of the claimant. As far as second exception in the definition of `workman' is concerned, that would also not take out the deceased Ashok Shah from the ambit and scope of `workman' because the exclusion or exception will apply only if a person was employed otherwise than for the purpose of employer's trade or business. As far as second exception in the definition of `workman' is concerned, that would also not take out the deceased Ashok Shah from the ambit and scope of `workman' because the exclusion or exception will apply only if a person was employed otherwise than for the purpose of employer's trade or business. From the evidence on record or rather own admission of employer Baldev Singh in the FIR lodged by him at the time of accident, Ex-1, it is clear that the deceased Ashok Shah was employed for the purpose, which was fully within the scope of employer's trade or business, namely agriculture and, therefore, even if employed on daily wages basis for a single day, the worker would fall within the definition of `workman' under Section 2(1)(n) read with clause (xxx) of the Schedule II. 9. Therefore, it is held that the claimant was entitled to maintain the claim petition before the learned Workmen Compensation Commissioner and the learned Commissioner was not justified in rejecting the claim petition on aforesaid grounds. However, since, the amount of compensation has not been determined by the learned Commissioner at all on the ground that claimant was not entitled to maintain the claim petition, the matter has to be sent back to learned Workmen Compensation Commissioner for determining the amount of compensation and award the same with interest and penalty, as the case may be, in terms of Section 4 (a) of the Act of 1923. Since the accident was of 27/8/1994 and about 16 years have passed by now, the learned Workmen Compensation Commissioner is directed to determine the compensation within a period of three months from today and upon such determination, the amount of compensation may be paid to the claimant within next three months with interest @ 12% p.a., from one month after the date of accident i.e. 27/8/1994, namely from 27/9/21994 till the date of payment, after taking into account the amount, if any, already deposited by the employer Baldev Singh and disbursed to the claimant under the impugned order. The imposition of penalty is, however, left to the discretion of the learned Workmen Compensation Commissioner to be decided in accordance with law. 9. Consequently, this appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 19/5/1998 passed by the learned Workmen Compensation Commissioner is quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back, as indicated above. No costs.