JUDGMENT D.Y. Chandrachud, J. The present application is directed against an order dated March 23, 2011, passed by the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal rejecting an application under section 61 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 for a reference of the following questions of law for the decision of this court : "(1) Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the order of assessment did not merge in first appeal order since the appeal before first appellate authority was against imposition of penalty and interest particularly in view of the fact that the appellant had reserved the right to add, alter, amend and delete any of the grounds of appeal ? (2) Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding there was no merger of assessment order with the appeal order and the revision order was barred by limitation ?" The respondent is a registered dealer manufacturing engines and their spare parts, bearings of oil engines, auto parts, tractor spares and other products. As a dealer the respondent was assessed for the assessment year 1995-96 by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Pune. The order of the assessment was passed on March 31, 1999 and was communicated to the dealer on April 21, 1999. The assessment resulted in an order of refund in, favour of the dealer under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, which amount was adjusted against Central sales tax dues. The assessing officer imposed a penalty apparently of Rs. 1,000 and interest under section 36(3)(a) in the amount of Rs. 12,967. The order of the assessing officer was challenged by the dealer only on the ground relating to the levy of interest and penalty. The Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax by his order dated June 30, 2000, allowed the appeal and set aside the imposition of interest and penalty. The order was communicated to the dealer on July 31, 2000. The Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax by a notice dated August 27, 2001, proposed to revise the order of assessment dated March 31, 1999, passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Appeals) on June 30, 2000. The order was communicated to the dealer on July 31, 2000. The Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax by a notice dated August 27, 2001, proposed to revise the order of assessment dated March 31, 1999, passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Appeals) on June 30, 2000. The revisional authority proposed to withdraw a set-off granted under rule 41D of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1959 and proposed the imposition of sales tax at the rate of 13 per cent instead of four per cent by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax on the sale of spare parts. The notice of revision was forwarded in form 40 on December 21, 2001 to the dealer. The revisional authority proposed to revise the assessment on four issues. The revisional order was passed on June 27, 2005 revising the assessment on the foundation that the original order had merged in the first appellate order dated June 30, 2000. The assessee filed an appeal before the Sales Tax Tribunal against the order of the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax which is allowed by a judgment dated July 28, 2010. The Tribunal held that the Revenue had sought to correct in revision the assessment made by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax on March 31, 1999 for which the period of limitation would commence from April 21, 1999 on which date the order was served on the dealer. Hence, the power was exercised within three years from the date of communication as provided in section 57(1)(a) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. However, the revisional order which was passed on January 27, 2005 was passed beyond the period of five years enunciated in section 57(1)(a). The appeal filed by the dealer was accordingly allowed; the order passed by the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax revising the assessment was set aside and the assessment order dated March 31, 1999 passed by the assessing officer was restored. The Revenue thereupon filed an application under section 61 for a reference to this court of the questions of law as noted earlier. The reference application Was dismissed by the impugned order dated March 23, 2011. The Revenue thereupon filed an application under section 61 for a reference to this court of the questions of law as noted earlier. The reference application Was dismissed by the impugned order dated March 23, 2011. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue submits that though the dealer had filed an appeal against the order of assessment dated March 31, 1999 only on the question of interest and penalty, the dealer had nonetheless reserved his right to add, alter or amend the grounds of appeal. According to the Revenue, the order of assessment which was passed on March 31, 1999 must be regarded as having merged with the order of the appellate authority dated June 30, 2000. Hence, the revisional order which was passed on June 27, 2005 was within a period of five years of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and was within limitation. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the dealer that the doctrine of merger can have no application to the present case. The dealer, it was urged, had filed an appeal against the order of assessment only confined to the issue of interest and penalty. That was the only aspect which was therefore considered in the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in first appeal on June 30, 2000. There was therefore no merger of the other aspects of the order of assessment with the order passed by the first appellate authority. Hence, for the purposes of section 57(1)(a) the limitation for revising the order of assessment would commence from the date of the original order of assessment, March 31, 1999. Consequently, the revisional order was passed beyond a period of five years contrary to the mandatory requirement of section 57(1)(a). Section 57(1)(a) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 provides as follows : 57. Revision. Consequently, the revisional order was passed beyond a period of five years contrary to the mandatory requirement of section 57(1)(a). Section 57(1)(a) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 provides as follows : 57. Revision. - (1) Subject to the provisions of section 56 and to any rules which may be made in this behalf, - (a) the Commissioner may, of his own motion, call for and examine the record of any order passed (including an order passed in appeal) under this Act or the Rules made thereunder by any officer or person subordinate to him and pass such order thereon as he thinks just and proper : "Provided that no notice in the prescribed form shall be served by the Commissioner under this clause after the expiry of three years from the date of the communication of the order sought to be revised and no order in revision, shall be made by him hereunder after the expiry of five years from such date." The proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 57 stipulates two periods of limitation. The first is for the service by the Commissioner as a revisional authority of a notice on the dealer for which a period of three years is prescribed from the date of the communication of the order sought to be revised. The second is a period which is prescribed for passing an order in revision, for which an outer limit of five years has been prescribed from the date of the communication of the order sought to be revised. In the present case, the order of assessment was passed on March 31, 1999. The order directed a refund to the assessee which was adjusted against the Central sales tax dues. The dealer was aggrieved by the order of assessment only to the extent that it imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,000 and interest in the amount of Rs. 12,967. The first appellate authority allowed the appeal preferred by the dealer on June 30, 2000. Ex facie, the notice dated August 27, 2001 issued by the revisional authority would indicate that the revisional jurisdiction was sought to be exercised in respect of the order of assessment itself. That is not in dispute before this court. 12,967. The first appellate authority allowed the appeal preferred by the dealer on June 30, 2000. Ex facie, the notice dated August 27, 2001 issued by the revisional authority would indicate that the revisional jurisdiction was sought to be exercised in respect of the order of assessment itself. That is not in dispute before this court. The issue before the court is as to whether the order of assessment dated March 31, 1999 had merged with the order of the first appellate authority dated June 30, 2000. Evidently as the record before the court would indicate the order of assessment was challenged only by the dealer and that too on the two grounds alone, viz., on the penalty and interest that were levied by the assessing officer. The rest of the order was not in challenge before the first appellate authority. Hence, in a situation such as the present, there would be no occasion to apply the doctrine of merger where the order of the assessing officer was subjected to only a limited challenge and that too at the behest of the registered dealer. The doctrine of merger postulates that an order which is passed by a lower authority merges in an order passed by a higher forum before which the correctness of the order of the lower authority is questioned in appeal or revision. It is trite law that the doctrine applies irrespective of whether the order of the lower forum or authority is affirmed or modified by the higher authority. The doctrine of merger has been the subject-matter of a long line of authority of the Supreme Court. In the context of revenue legislation it would be necessary to advert to the decision in State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. [1967] 19 STC 144 (SC). In that case, the respondent was assessed to sales tax on a certain turnover. An appeal was partly allowed by the Commercial Tax Officer for the exclusion of certain items from the turnover. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer made a revised assessment on November 28, 1952. The respondent thereupon preferred a revision to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes objecting to the inclusion in its turnover of a certain sum calculated by way of tax. No other objection was raised to the order of assessment of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. The Commissioner dismissed the revision petition. The respondent thereupon preferred a revision to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes objecting to the inclusion in its turnover of a certain sum calculated by way of tax. No other objection was raised to the order of assessment of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. The Commissioner dismissed the revision petition. The Board of Revenue issued a notice to the respondent proposing to revise the assessment of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer by including in the net turnover a sum representing the value of cotton purchased from outside the State of Madras on the ground that it was wrongly excluded in computing the turnover. This was objected to by the respondent on the ground that the limitation of four years prescribed by section 12(4)(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 should be computed from November 28, 1952 which was the date of the order passed by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and therefore the proceeding of the Board was barred by time. This submission was rejected by the Board of Revenue, but on appeal the High Court held that the action of the Board of Revenue was barred by limitation under section 12(b). Before the Supreme Court the Revenue contended that the bar of limitation was not attracted since what was sought to be revised was the order dated August 21, 1954 of the Deputy Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that it cannot be said that there was a merger of the order of assessment made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer on November 28, 1952 with the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes dated August 21, 1954 because the question of exemption on the value of yarn purchased from outside the State of Madras was not the subject-matter of the revision before the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. The only point that was urged before the Deputy Commissioner was that the sum calculated by the respondent by way of tax should not be included in the taxable turnover. This was the only point raised before the Deputy Commissioner and was rejected by him in the revisional proceeding. On the contrary, the question before the Board of Revenue was whether the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer was right in excluding from the net taxable turnover, the sum representing the value of cotton purchased from outside the State. This was the only point raised before the Deputy Commissioner and was rejected by him in the revisional proceeding. On the contrary, the question before the Board of Revenue was whether the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer was right in excluding from the net taxable turnover, the sum representing the value of cotton purchased from outside the State. On these facts, which are similar to those of the present case, it was held that the doctrine of merger would not apply. The judgment of the Supreme Court is an authority for the following proposition : "... But the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application and it cannot be said that wherever there are two orders, one by the inferior Tribunal and the other by a superior Tribunal, passed in an appeal or revision, there is a fusion or merger of two orders irrespective of the subject-matter of the appellate or revisional order and the scope of the appeal or revision contemplated by the particular statute. In our opinion, the application of the doctrine depends on the nature of the appellate or revisional order in each case and the scope of the statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. ..." The same principle has been applied in the context of Revenue legislation by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi v. Pearl Drinks Ltd. [2010] 32 VST 1 (SC). In that case, the assessee had claimed eight deductions in arriving at the assessable value of the aerated water manufactured and sold by it. The Commissioner disallowed a deduction only of two items. The Tribunal in appeal held that the disallowance of the deductions was in order. A further appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed thereby settling in favour of the Revenue the controversy as regards the admissibility of the deductions under the two heads. As regards the admissibility of the deductions under the remaining six heads which the adjudicating authority allowed to the assessee, the Central Board of Excise and Customs reviewed the order of the Commissioner under section 35E(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and came to the conclusion that the grant of deductions under the other six heads was unjustified. The Board accordingly directed the Commissioner to approach the Tribunal for a correct determination. The Board accordingly directed the Commissioner to approach the Tribunal for a correct determination. In complying with the order passed by the Central Board of Excise and Customs the Commissioner preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Tribunal holding that the order under challenge had merged in the earlier order passed by the Tribunal in the assessee's appeal whereby disallowance of two of the eight deductions had been upheld. The Supreme Court adverted to the earlier decisions including in Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. [1967] 19 STC 144 (SC) and in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [2000] 119 STC 505 (SC); [2000] 245 ITR 360 (SC); [2000] 6 SCC 359. The Supreme Court observed that the doctrine of merger is not of a universal or unlimited application and would depend upon the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or the subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid. On the facts before it, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of merger had no application since in the earlier decision the Tribunal was concerned only with the question as to whether the adjudicating authority was justified in disallowing deductions under the two heads and had no occasion to examine the admissibility of the deductions under the remaining six heads : "Applying the above test to the case at hand the doctrine would have no application for the plain and simple reason that the subject-matter of the appeal filed by the assessee against the adjudicating authority's order in original was limited to disallowance of two out of eight deductions claimed by the assessee. The Tribunal was in that appeal concerned only with the question whether the adjudicating authority was justified in disallowing deductions under the said two heads. It had no occasion to examine the admissibility of the deductions under the remaining six heads obviously because the assessee's appeal did not question the grant of such deductions. Admissibility of the said deductions could have been raised only by the Revenue which had lost its case qua those deductions before the adjudicating authority. Dismissal of the appeal filed by the assessee could consequently bring finality only to the question of admissibility of deductions under the two heads regarding which the appeal was filed. Admissibility of the said deductions could have been raised only by the Revenue which had lost its case qua those deductions before the adjudicating authority. Dismissal of the appeal filed by the assessee could consequently bring finality only to the question of admissibility of deductions under the two heads regarding which the appeal was filed. The said order could not be understood to mean that the Tribunal had expressed any opinion regarding the admissibility of deductions under the remaining six heads which were not the subject-matter of scrutiny before the Tribunal. ..." These judgments, in our view, provide a clear answer to the submissions which have been urged on behalf of the Revenue. The judgment delivered by the first appellate authority on June 30, 2000 was on a limited challenge by the dealer only on the award of interest and penalty by the assessing officer in the order of assessment dated March 31, 1999. The rest of the order of assessment was not in challenge before the first appellate authority and would therefore to that extent not merge with the order of the first appellate authority. The limitation for revising the order of assessment dated March 31, 1999 would therefore commence from April 21, 1999 which was the date on which the order was served on the dealer. While the notice was issued by the revisional authority within the prescribed period of three years, the order of the revisional authority which was passed on June 27, 2005 was clearly beyond the period of five years prescribed by the proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 57. In these circumstances we are of the view that the impugned order of the Tribunal does not suffer from any error whatsoever. No case for interference is made out. The sales tax application is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.